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This dissertation examines the transformation of French mentalities regarding 
France’s role in Africa, beginning with World War II and continuing through the end of 
Charles de Gaulle’s presidency in 1969.  Despite the political independence of France’s 
African colonies in 1960, many of them quickly transitioned from colonies into client-
states.  Since then, France’s relationships with its former colonies have enabled a variety 
of underhanded dealings on the continent.  In tracing the roots of this transformation, I 
focus on French politicians and colonial administrators, and their gradual ideological shift 
away from traditional conceptions of the French colonial mission.   
I argue that the events of World War II, which split the empire and placed France 
in a greatly disadvantageous international position (first with respect to Nazi Germany 
and later vis-à-vis the Allies), led to a formidable shift in how France viewed its colonies 
and other Francophone territories in sub-Saharan Africa.  French insecurity, precipitated 
by its fall as a major world power, required new ways to maintain influence 
 
 
internationally and in its empire.  This mentality, while shaped by the postwar 
environment, was not the product of any one political ideology; it was shared by colonial 
administrators in both the Vichy and Free French regimes, and by politicians on both the 
left and right of the political spectrum after the war.  At the same time, French officials 
grew increasingly wary of British and American efforts to broaden their respective 
standings in Africa.  This renewed concern about the “Anglo-Saxon” threat, along with 
the increasing need to preserve influence in Africa in a postcolonial age, were powerful 
undercurrents in the formation of French policy on the continent leading up to and after 
decolonization.  The result was increasingly cynical support of despotic regimes friendly 
to French interests, in an effort to maintain political influence in Africa after 
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In this dissertation, I examine the political and intellectual roots of France’s 
postcolonial relationship with sub-Saharan Africa, beginning with World War II and 
continuing through the end of Charles de Gaulle’s presidency in 1969.  France’s interests 
on the continent can be traced to the colonial period, when it maintained a vast empire in 
West, North, and Central Africa.1  But since the independence of France’s sub-Saharan 
African colonies in 1960, French relations with African nations have encompassed a 
number of underhanded dealings.  These included support for dictators such as the former 
Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko and the Central African Republic’s Jean Bédel Bokassa; 
meddling in civil wars, such as the aborted attempt at independence by the breakaway 
area of Biafra in Nigeria in the 1960s; and numerous episodes of corruption, including 
the bribery of African officials by state-owned oil company Elf Aquitaine, and the recent 
“Angolagate” arms trading affair.2  Most tragically, French involvement in Africa 
                                                 
1 France’s North African holdings included Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, all of which held 
significant settler populations.  In West Africa, known as Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), 
French influence extended from the westernmost tip of the continent, starting with the four settler 
communes in Senegal and extending inward to include the present-day countries of Mauritania, 
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Benin.  In central Africa, or Afrique 
Ėquatoriale Française (AEF), led by the late 19th century efforts of explorer Pierre Savorgnan de 
Brazza, France made inroads into the heart of the continent, extending from the modern day 
Republic of the Congo through Gabon, Chad, and the Central African Republic.  At its height, the 
French Empire held roughly one-third of all Africa.  For a survey of the French presence in 
Africa, see Patrick Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 1880-1985 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
2 For a general overview of Africa’s struggles after decolonization, see Martin Meredith, The Fate 
of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair: A History of Fifty Years of 
Independence (New York: Public Affairs, 2005); Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past 
of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  France’s general postcolonial 
involvement in Africa is discussed in Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism: 
Security Policy in sub-Saharan Africa (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008).  French collaboration with 
the Mobutu regime is discussed in Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the 
Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo (New York: Harper Collins, 2001).  The Bokassa regime is 
the subject of Brian Titley, Dark Age: The Political Odyssey of Emperor Bokassa (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997).  For more on the Elf corruption scandals, see Henri 
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culminated in its support for the genocidal Hutu regime in Rwanda in 1994.  In the past 
few years, awareness of the French role in Africa has led to the coining of the term 
“Françafrique”, which, as argued by François-Xavier Verschave, former head of the 
French anticorruption group Survie, has represented “the longest scandal in the history of 
the Republic.”3 
Of course, there is nothing inherently new about the employment of callous, 
cynical policies in the developing world by former colonial powers, but French dealings 
in Africa in the past fifty years are somewhat surprising, given the professed ideology of 
France’s traditional colonial project on the continent.  During the Third Republic, French 
leaders had at least outwardly advocated for a “civilizing mission” in Africa, whereby 
France would help the continent develop toward greater political and economic progress.  
To be sure, these ideas were often misguided, and generally propagated by colonial 
leaders who were ignorant of the societies they sought to transform.  But by the 1960s, 
they had been almost completely cast aside, in favor of a policy of power politics.  I 
argue that this transformation of mentalities was largely influenced by international 
events, starting with France’s fall as a world power during World War II, which seriously 
                                                                                                                                                 
Astier, “Elf Was ‘Secret Arm of French Policy,”BBC News Online, March 19, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2862257.stm; John Tagliabue, “French Court Convicts and 
Jails Ex-Leaders of Oil Company, “NY Times, Nov. 13, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/13/world/french-court-convicts-and-jails-ex-leaders-of-oil-
company.html; “Elf Funds ‘Went to French Parties,” BBC News Online, April 7, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2926335.stm; John Lichfield, “French Presidents Condoned 
Bribery, Says Ex-Boss Of Elf, ”The Independent, May 19, 2001, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/french-presidents-condoned-bribery-says-
exboss-of-elf-685280.html.  More information on Angolagate, which involved illegal arms 
shipments to Angola during the Mitterrand regime, can be found in “Angolagate Trial Opens in 
France, ”Agence France Presse, Oct. 5, 2008, 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gBZpmQCVyFl3IMQ5s5l-ZPRKobzw; Lizzy Davies, 
“French Elite on Trial in $791 Million Angola Arms Case,” The Guardian, Oct. 7, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/07/france. 




undermined French security and international standing.  This weakened position forced 
immediate changes in the colonial relationship after the war, as France’s African subjects 
demanded and won expanded political rights.  Paradoxically, it also forced violent 
attempts to hold on to French colonies in Vietnam and Algeria.  Because of their eventual 
loss, and the need to preserve what remained of French international power, French 
leaders gradually developed a vision of the future which required continued and 
expanded French influence in Africa.  This vision cannot be primarily explained by base 
economic interests, although these were present in various degrees.  Rather, I maintain 
that French involvement in Africa after the war was most profoundly influenced by a 
certain idea of France – that is, a notion of eternal and enduring French power in the 
world.  De Gaulle famously labeled this notion grandeur, but it was articulated in similar 
ways by many others.  It was this idea, and not any particular material interest, which 
provided the overwhelming impetus for France’s continued involvement on the continent 
for five decades after decolonization. 
In recent years, a few historians have discussed how specific post-1940 French 
regimes viewed France’s relationship with Africa.  However, to this point, there has been 
little discussion of the ideological continuities regarding Africa among the colonial and 
foreign policy establishments after the invasion of France by the Nazis.  Based on 
evidence from both archival sources and public statements, I argue that when it came to 
sub-Saharan Africa, there existed a particular vision that transcended political ideology 
and regimes, through three decades of incredible political turmoil.  Some of this evidence 
has been commented upon before, but a fresh approach is merited, given the consistency 
of mentalities it reveals.  Beliefs evident in the speeches, internal memos, and personal 
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papers of French leaders from this period are not just representative of their respective 
regime’s policies.  They also help us understand the development of an ideology within 
the colonial and foreign policy establishment concerning France’s role in Africa. 
To be sure, this was not an ideology that pervaded throughout French society; 
others outside the government had very different views about what was best for le tiers 
monde.  But there was general agreement among French political elites about France’s 
future in Africa.  Put simply, leaders in the colonial and foreign offices in every French 
regime starting with Vichy, and continuing through De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic 
presidency, shared a core set of ideas that informed how France perceived its relationship 
with sub-Saharan Africa.  Through the development of this ideology, the transition of 
France from colonial empire to client-state sponsor became integrated into the accepted 
view of France’s rightful place in Africa.  During the immediate postwar era, these ideas 
saw practical application through a concerted effort to strengthen ties with African 
political leaders, and after 1960, with newly-independent states.  Eventually, even 
African leaders, including Senegal’s Léopold Sédar Senghor and Côte d’Ivoire’s Félix 
Houphouet-Boigny, would adopt and defend these ideas, leading to even greater support 
for them in the métropole and in Africa. 
The ideas that underwrote this worldview were various, but in this dissertation I 
focus on three themes that were particularly vital to the development of France’s 
postcolonial policy on the continent.  The first was the notion of territorial integrity in 
the empire.  Colonial administrators on both the Vichy and Free French sides, as well as 
during the Fourth Republic, constantly emphasized France’s right to govern the colonies 
as they saw fit, without interference from outside powers.  While this notion predated the 
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war, it was provided with a renewed imperative by the events of 1940 and afterwards.  
During the war, France found itself threatened by nations on all sides; by Germany and 
Italy, which sought to diminish France’s standing on the European continent; by England, 
which opposed the Vichy regime and had longstanding ambitions in Africa; and by the 
United States, which under President Roosevelt had clearly articulated its opposition to 
the old colonial empires.  In this atmosphere, the notion of “territorial integrity” grew in 
popularity, as it helped link the notion that France had certain rights in its colonies to 
internationally-accepted principles of sovereignty.  While the concept would not survive 
decolonization, the postcolonial notion of sub-Saharan Africa as “France’s backyard” 
drew from colonial views about territorial rights on the continent, and helps to partially 
explain France’s later participation in power struggles in Africa, especially under 
François Mitterrand.  The notion of territorial integrity also inspired the postcolonial 
concept of Francophonie, whereby France portrayed itself as the cultural center of 
French-speaking nations, including those in Africa.  The latter idea was employed to 
great effect in influencing political and economic developments on the continent after 
decolonization. 
The second crucial idea was the importance of Africa to French international 
power.  To be certain, when comparing Vichy and Free France, one can see that this 
notion assumed divergent forms.  For Vichy, France’s possessions in Africa were seen as 
a bargaining chip that could signify her continuing relevance in world affairs, or her “best 
card.”  Vichy operated under a paradigm of a postwar world divided between the 
hegemony of Nazi Germany in Europe and the rising United States to the west.  In this 
world, France could act as a mediator between old and new, thus justifying its continued 
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relevance on the world stage.  Free France’s ambitions were somewhat less cynical, but 
the dynamic was the same.  De Gaulle and his followers correctly predicted a split 
between the United States and the Soviet Union after the war; once again, French 
influence in Africa could help prove that France had a role to play in the postwar order, 
both in the United Nations and in Cold War controversies.  These notions survived de 
Gaulle’s political exile 1946, and would endure throughout the Fourth Republic.  With de 
Gaulle’s return to power in 1958 and decolonization two years later, French influence in 
Africa would assume a different form.  But Africa remained vital to French standing after 
independence – indeed, the continent was one of the cornerstones of French foreign 
policy during the De Gaulle era. 
Finally, any study of France’s postwar policies in Africa must address the French 
colonial and foreign policy establishment’s deep-rooted suspicions of both Britain and 
the United States, disdainfully referred to as the “Anglo-Saxon” powers.  Of course, these 
sentiments were not merely a product of the postwar atmosphere.  Despite the formation 
of the entente cordiale in the early part of the twentieth century, the cross-channel rivalry 
was deeply rooted in centuries of conflict between the two powers, as manifested in the 
French notion of “perfidious Albion” and the existential threat it posed to the French 
nation-state.4  With both powers competing for territory in Africa, the rivalry was quite 
naturally transferred there, as evidenced by the infamous Fashoda Crisis of 1898, when 
                                                 
4 See Antoine Capet, ed., Britain, France, and the Entente Cordiale since 1904 (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2006); Phillippe Chassaigne and Michael Dockrill, eds., Anglo-French 
Relations Since 1898: From Fashoda to Jospin (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Simon Berthon, 
Allies at War: The Bitter Rivalry among Churchill, Roosevelt, and De Gaulle (New York: Carroll 




British and French forces almost came to hostilities in modern-day Sudan.5  As French 
academic Gerard Prunier has colorfully and sardonically noted:  
Everybody in France knows that ‘les Anglais’ are among the worst enemies the 
French ever had: they burnt Jeanne d’Arc alive, they stole Canada and India from 
us in 1763, they exiled Napoleon to a ridiculous little rock in the South Atlantic, 
and they sank our battlefleet at Mers-el-Kebir in 1940…Nowadays they are 
greatly weakened and do not represent the threat they once did, but they have 
spawned an evil brood scattered over the four continents, the ‘Anglo-Saxons’.6 
 
Considerable attention has been already been paid to the Anglo-French rivalry in 
the postwar period regarding Cold War issues and the development of the European 
community, but there was also a significant African dynamic that lead to suspicions of 
the “Anglo-Saxons.”  Given Britain’s support for Free France’s presence in AEF, as well 
as continued Free French assaults on AOF, Vichy had reason to suspect Britain’s designs 
on France’s colonies in Africa.  Similarly, on the Free French side, De Gaulle and his 
lieutenants grew to suspect Britain’s intentions for France’s colonial future.  These 
sentiments were exacerbated by numerous anticolonial statements by American officials 
during and after the war, which made clear that the United States would not accept the 
status quo on the continent.  With the ascendance of American power after the war, the 
French resentment for “Anglo-Saxon” interference in Africa was easily projected onto 
the United States.7  There is little coincidence that François Mitterrand – who started his 
                                                 
5 The incident stemmed from France’s desire to carve out a line of control across the continent 
stretching from AOF through East Africa.  Given Britain’s possessions in Sudan and Kenya, this 
posed a direct threat to their empire.  While the incident would be resolved diplomatically, it 
brought both nations to the brink of war in autumn 1898.  See Darrell Bates, The Fashoda 
Incident of 1898: Encounter on the Nile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
6 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University 
Press 1995), 104-6. 
7 As Prunier elaborates, the “Anglo-Saxon” concept has been quite malleable in the postwar 
context: 
The notion of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ is hazy yet it also has a deadly clarity.  Anybody who 
speaks English can be ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and indeed northern Europeans such as the 
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political career in the Vichy regime before making a quick transition to the resistance – 
would later justify France’s actions in Rwanda by citing the need to prevent “Anglo-
Saxon” encroachment in east Africa.8 
 The development of this postcolonial mentality may be surprising to the casual 
observer, as the history of French involvement in Africa would seem to run counter to a 
variety of distinctly “French” principles.  Beginning with the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen in 1789, French leaders have traditionally viewed their nation as the 
origin of universal human values.9  The universal values of the Revolution would also 
inform the civilizing mission of France’s colonial project in the early twentieth century.10  
Yet France’s policies in Africa, which included military pacification, the use of slave 
labor, and political inequality for Africans, often served as a direct repudiation of these 
values.  During the time of the empire, French colonial administrators often seemed 
uncertain as to whether they wished to incorporate their indigènes into a French body 
politic that underwent a progressive evolution toward more rights, or exclude them 
entirely and focus instead on more exploitative measures.11  As Frederick Cooper has 
                                                                                                                                                 
Scandinavians and the Dutch are honorary ‘Anglo-Saxons’ because they tend to speak 
English so well.  Of course ‘Anglo-Saxons’ are usually white, but not always.  President 
Yoweri Museveni [of Uganda, a backer of the RPF], as we shall see, was definitely an 
incarnation of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ menace in its truest form: because an ‘Anglo-Saxon is 
an English speaker who threatens the French… 
Ibid., 106. 
8 See “Génocide rwandais: ce que savait l’Elysée,” Le Monde, July 7, 2007. 
9 See François Furet, Revolutionary France 1770-1880 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992). 
10 French lawyer René Cassin, a supporter of de Gaulle’s, was instrumental in drafting the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations.  See Mary Ann Glendon, A World 
Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: 
Random House, 2001). 
11 The term indigènes was commonly employed by French colonial administrators in discussing 
their colonial subjects.  In English, it loosely translates to “natives.”  While it did not always have 
one clear meaning, the term was often used pejoratively.  No such meaning is intended here; I use 
the term throughout this dissertation to capture the intended meaning of colonial administrators 
and for purposes of linguistic consistency. 
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noted, “tensions often erupted between those who wanted to save souls or civilize natives 
and those who saw the colonized as objects to be used or discarded at will.”12  This 
tension mirrored, albeit not precisely, the debate between association and assimilation, as 
first described by Raymond Betts in 1961 and recently elaborated upon by Alice 
Conklin.13  Policies of assimilation generally focused upon providing western education 
for Africans in order to transform them into French citizens, while policies of association 
rejected such goals of transformation in favor of a more British-style form of indirect 
control over colonial territories.  
Decolonization would put an end to ideas of assimilating Africans into the French 
body politic.  No longer would the French political establishment need to make Africans 
French; instead they could focus on cultivating French influence on the continent through 
more traditional means.  In contrast to the fifteen year period after the war, which had 
forced France to adopt more progressive policies, the de Gaulle regime would see the 
return to a darker era, whereby French African policy degenerated and mutated into its 
postcolonial form.  Without the scrutiny of the United Nations and the international 
community, France was no longer required to reconcile the principles of its civilizing 
mission with the realities of failed political development.  French power became an end 
to itself, as epitomized most tragically by France’s involvement in the Rwandan genocide 
in 1994. 
                                                 
12 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 
24. 
13 Raymond Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1961); Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican 




As already noted, the deterioration and loss of the empire in sub-Saharan Africa 
has been the subject of considerable scholarship in recent years.  Tony Chafer’s work, 
The End of Empire in French West Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization has been 
most valuable in this regard.14  Chafer’s focus on the interaction between French colonial 
administrators and African elites has helped overturn previous notions of independence 
as a “gift” granted to Africans by the De Gaulle regime.  As he notes, African 
independence was zealously fought for by vibrant political movements in West Africa 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and was only allowed as a last resort when France could 
not maintain control by other means.  But the misconception of independence as a “gift” 
from France to Africa would nevertheless justify France’s involvement on the continent 
for four decades after decolonization. 
Chafer’s broad view of the decolonization process in Africa from World War II to 
the de Gaulle presidency has been supplemented by the work of numerous historians, 
most of whom have focused on distinct political regimes or periods of time.  Regarding 
the Vichy regime, Ruth Ginio and Eric Jennings have been invaluable in detailing the 
interaction between Vichy colonial administrators and their subjects during World War 
II.15  As both have argued, the contrast between Vichy’s notions of racial superiority and 
African hopes for greater autonomy would lead to irreconcilable tensions after the war’s 
conclusion.  Not as much has been written about the encounter between Free French 
colonial elites and Africans, but Catherine Akpo-Vaché and Edward Bimberg have both 
                                                 
14 Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization? 
(New York: Berg, 2002). 
15 Ruth Ginio, French Colonialism Unmasked: The Vichy Years in French West Africa (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2006); Eric Jennings, Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain’s National 
Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001). 
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examined the importance of sub-Saharan Africa to the broader war effort.16  From the 
standpoint of ideology, De Gaulle’s views on Africa during the war have been addressed 
by Chafer and Dorothy Shipley White, although the latter’s work has been dated by its 
romanticism of De Gaulle’s contribution to African independence.17  Regarding the 
immediate postwar era, Frederick Cooper’s work has provided even further depth to the 
development of African political consciousness, illustrating the evolution of the labor 
movement in West Africa in the immediate postwar era.18  And John Kent’s examination 
of Anglo-French cooperation in Africa remains vital in understanding how postwar 
international realities shaped colonial policy.19 
Despite all of this significant work, less attention has been paid to how the 
evolving international situation transformed broader mentalities about Africa, starting in 
1940 and culminating in the de Gaulle regime.  The defeat of 1940, the fall of Dien Bien 
Phu in Vietnam, and the outbreak of revolution in Algeria all shaped France’s position in 
the international community, and limited its latitude in acting freely throughout the 
world.  This diminished international status would have great influence on the 
relationship between France and Africa.  There is no question, as Chafer demonstrates, 
that the role of Africans was instrumental to the drive toward independence in the 1950s.  
                                                 
16 Catherine Akpo-Vaché, L’AOF et la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (Paris: Karthala, 2000); 
Edward L. Bimberg, Tricolor over the Sahara: The Desert Battles of the Free French, 1940-1942 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002). 
17 White’s book is representative of the Gaullist myth criticized by Chafer.  In discussing the 
decolonization process, she argues that de Gaulle “reached Africa, gradually came to understand 
the situation, and began to think his way out of the old beliefs about the rightness and necessity of 
the domination of one people by another.  His actions and those of a few others would lead to the 
political independence of fifteen states.”  Dorothy Shipley White, Black Africa and de Gaulle: 
From the French Empire to Independence (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1979), 8. 
18 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and 
British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
19 John Kent, The Internationalization of Colonialism: Britain, France, and Black Africa, 1939-
1956 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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But the transformation of France’s relationship with Africa, from colonial power to post-
colonial supporter of client state regimes, was also influenced a great deal by 
international events, including World War II, the developing Cold War, and rivalries with 
both the United States and Great Britain on the continent.  This dissertation attempts to 
address how these external factors interacted with France’s designs for Africa in light of 
the postwar situation and diminishing French power. 
World War II was the primary impetus for this rapid transformation.  The 
invasion of France and subsequent fall of Paris to the Nazis in June 1940 brought about a 
radical shift in France’s status as a world power.  As Stanley Hoffman has noted, in the 
aftermath of the Nazi invasion, “[e]verything... was affected and thrown into question: 
the army and the political regime, the policies leading up to the war, also the very identity 
of the nation, what Montesquieu would have called the ‘general spirit’ of the French 
political community.”20  Almost overnight, French leaders were forced to confront 
France’s dramatically transformed international standing, and determine new strategies to 
maintain French power and influence.  Essentially, June 1940 represents a radical caesura 
in contemporary French history, the point at which France could no longer be considered 
one of the preeminent world powers.   
This traumatic experience led to re-evaluation – both within the Vichy 
administration and in resistance circles – about the role France would play in a future 
Europe.  It quickly became clear to leaders on both sides of the guerre franco-française 
that France’s colonies would be of fundamental importance in regaining France’s lost 
stature once the war was over.  Only through empire could France continue to justify 
                                                 
20 Stanley Hoffman, “The Trauma of 1940: A Disaster and Its Traces,” in Joel Blatt, ed., The 
French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998), 355. 
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anything approaching its former international position, and remain relevant in world 
affairs.  Therefore, both the war experience and its aftermath involved an active struggle 
– both military and diplomatic – to defend the empire from all external threats, and to 
prevent significant unrest from colonial populations.  Of course, this imperative was 
further augmented by the presence of settler populations, most notably in Algeria, and to 
a lesser extent in French Vietnam.  In Algeria in particular, there could be no discussion 
of a French exodus, given that the colony was considered an integral part of the 
métropole. 
But the settler imperative did not generally apply to France’s holdings in sub-
Saharan Africa.  Here, with the exception of attempts to assimilate colonized peoples in 
Senegal, the French state had pursued more traditional colonial ambitions.  These were 
limited to extracting resources, both for the government and for French companies, and to 
obtaining and maintaining as much colonial territory as possible, for the purposes of 
international prestige.  Consequently, the need to preserve French control in these areas 
was not driven by the same internal pressures as the desire to remain in Algeria or French 
Vietnam.  With the exception of colonial administrators and a limited business 
community, there was no noteworthy colonial lobby for French interests in Africa, as 
there was in Algeria.  Therefore, the significant – albeit not exclusive – portion of 
political pressure to remain came from within the government.  The necessity of 
maintaining France’s possessions in Africa became an important part of the stated war 
aims of both sides of the French divide during the war.   
In an essay discussing the impact of the fall of France in 1940 the Nazis, Stanley 
Hoffman has distinguished between two categories of fallout from the Vichy disaster – 
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“action effects” and “question effects”.21  The former were comprised of “policies that 
were carried out in order to repair damage, get the country back on its feet and undo in a 
way the defeat.”22  The latter implicated “profound uncertainties, the cracks that the 
trauma of May-June ’40 brought forth in the French conscience or the nation’s political 
culture.”23  France’s policies in sub-Saharan Africa may be viewed through the prism of 
both of these categories.  As Hoffman notes, “restoration of the Empire” was one means 
for France “to become a great power once again.”24  To this end, the defeat of 1940 led to 
immediate “action effects” in France’s sub-Saharan colonies – on the part of both the 
Vichy and Free French authorities – to preserve the territorial integrity of the empire.  
From Vichy’s standpoint, this included zealous efforts to prevent British infringement on 
French African territory, and attempts to discredit the presence of Free French forces in 
Afrique Équatoriale Française.  It also meant rolling back Third Republic notions that 
Africans could somehow be assimilated and integrated into the French body politic.  On 
the Free French side, De Gaulle and his colonial specialists made the territorial integrity 
of the empire of prime importance in their negotiations with Roosevelt, Stalin and 
Churchill.  They also formulated ways to transform France’s colonial policy so as to 
mitigate rising tensions in the colonies and ensure that Africans would happily maintain 
their place in a postwar empire.  The culmination of this was the Brazzaville Conference 
of 1944, which established the foundations of a more liberal policy in Africa once the war 
concluded. 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 364. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid., 367. 
24 Ibid., 365. 
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These “action effects” would continue after the war, as the importance of French 
influence on the continent became increasingly apparent with the rise of the United States 
and the discrediting of colonialism in international politics.  To this end, postwar France 
adopted a number of policies to consolidate its control in African colonies, including 
domestic reforms that expanded individual rights and granted more control over policy to 
local governments.  French leaders also fiercely defended their African possessions 
against perceived encroachment from the international community, including the United 
States and the United Nations, where anticolonial sentiments were ascendant throughout 
the 1940s and 1950s.  As we now know, none of these actions could forestall the 
inevitable tide against empires.  But they did succeed in delaying the end of the official 
French presence in Africa for roughly two decades after the fall of Paris to the Nazis.   
In a way, all of the aforementioned steps were reactions to the war and the 
immediate postwar situation.  More profound was the transformation of French 
mentalities about France’s long-term role in Africa.  In this sense, Hoffman’s notion of 
“question effects” is particularly helpful.  For there were profound anxieties about 
France’s existential situation, even after the end of the Vichy regime and the triumphant 
return of De Gaulle to Paris in August 1944.  The trauma of 1940 had inflicted a mortal 
wound to the French psyche; things could no longer be as they once were.  The resulting 
sense of insecurity may partially explain France’s actions in Vietnam and Algeria in the 
1950s, when lives were needlessly wasted in quixotic attempts to maintain the empire 
intact.  It also helps partially explain the formation within the public consciousness of a 
number of historical myths in the years following the war.  Henry Rousso has famously 
described a “Vichy Syndrome” whereby painful truths about support for Vichy, as well as 
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the political realities of the immediate postwar period, were conveniently forgotten or 
manipulated by leaders in the Fourth and Fifth Republics.25  And, as Tony Chafer and 
Todd Shepard have demonstrated, carefully constructed postwar narratives were also 
instrumental in avoiding painful memories from the colonial past.26  The loss of the 
empire, like the loss to Germany in 1940, raised serious questions about the nature of the 
French values and France’s place in the international community – many of which remain 
unanswered to this day.27 
More can also be said about the evolution of mentalities within the French state 
itself.  Studies of France’s postcolonial policies in Africa have typically viewed them as 
extensions of De Gaulle’s notion of grandeur, whereby the general, and later president of 
the Fifth Republic, attempted to orient French foreign policy toward a notion of an 
“eternal France” with an indispensable position in world affairs.28  There is much truth in 
this notion; France’s uncertain postwar identity was a main impetus for de Gaulle’s 
policies, which desperately attempted to reaffirm what had already been irrevocably lost.  
                                                 
25 Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1991). 
26 Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 3.  Shepard focuses on the French 
exodus from Algeria, and posits that key questions about France’s colonial past, as well as its 
future as a body politic, were avoided through the “invention of decolonization” – or a process 
whereby “French bureaucrats politicians, and journalists rewrote the history of imperialism and 
anti-imperialism so that decolonization was the predetermined endpoint.”  Todd Shepard, The 
Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 4. 
27 The preservation of a distinctly “French” culture in the face of an increasingly multi-ethnic 
society has been explored by Herman Lebovics, Bringing the Empire Back Home: France in the 
Global Age (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
28 See Frédéric Turpin, De Gaulle, Pompidou, et l’Afrique (1958-1974): décoloniser et coopérer 
(Paris: Indes Savantes, 2010) ; Guia Migani, La France et l’Afrique sub-saharienne, 1957-1963: 
Histoire d’une décolonisation entre idéaux eurafricains et politique de puissance (Brussels: 
Peter Lang, 2008); Dorothy Shipley White, Black Africa and De Gaulle: from the French Empire 
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French Power in Africa (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Robert Bourgi, Le Général de 
Gaulle et l’Afrique noire: 1940-1969 (Paris: Librairie générale de droit de jurisprudence, 1980). 
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When it became clear that France could no longer be a colonial power, de Gaulle and his 
successors attempted to preserve French influence on the continent by other means. It 
was Jacques Foccart, one of de Gaulle’s key functionaries, who established the 
Secrétariat Général pour les Affaires Africaines et Malgaches, which was placed under 
the direct control of the President’s office and charged with the management of France’s 
postcolonial relationships with African rulers.29  Its descendant, the “Africa Cell” within 
the Mitterrand presidency, was most responsible for France’s continued support for the 
Hutu regime, as well as other dictatorships throughout Africa.   
But it must be remembered that De Gaulle’s notion of grandeur was inspired by 
the same challenges faced by the Vichy regime, as well as the postwar Fourth Republic.  
A closer look at postwar French policy in Africa reveals a greater deal of continuity than 
has been traditionally recognized.  During this period, there were essential qualities 
within the French state that spanned disparate political ideologies and systems.  Of 
course, to students of French history, this is not a novel concept.  Alexis de Tocqueville 
wrote extensively of the enduring nature of the French state, noting the continuity of 
bureaucratic structure and administration between the ancien regime and revolutionary 
France.30  Those who led the Revolution, Tocqueville argued, “retained from the old 
regime most of the feelings, habits, and even ideas which helped them make the 
Revolution that destroyed it.  Unintentionally, they used the debris of the old regime to 
                                                 
29 As of the date of this writing, the archives for the Secrétariat Général pour les Affaires 
Africaines et Malgaches are still in the process of being opened to the public.  A full index is 
expected to be completed by 2011.  A description of the files may be found in Pascal Geneste, 
“Archives: Les papiers Foccart aux archives Nationales”, Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire 
2/2003 (n. 78), p. 157-162.  Foccart has discussed his role in postcolonial Africa in Jacques 
Foccart, Foccart Parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, 2 vols. (Paris: Fayard-Jeune Afrique, 
1995). 
30 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, trans. Alan S. Kahan (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
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construct the framework of their new society.”31 Contra the popularly-constructed myth 
of his time, Tocqueville argued that the Revolution’s purpose was not to destroy the state 
itself; indeed, despite the replacement of political elites, the state itself endured and 
flourished from the roots of administrative forms developed by the ancien regime.32 
Of course, neither the National Revolution, nor De Gaulle and the resistance’s 
revolt of 1940, had the same impact as the revolution of 1789.  Yet like that earlier 
revolution, those within Vichy and Free France presented themselves as a fundamental 
break from the preceding order.  For Vichy, this meant contrasting the Third Republic’s 
ineffectual democracy and its values of liberté, égalité, and fraternité with a more 
decisive regime espousing the more traditional values of travail, famille, and patrie.  For 
De Gaulle and his followers, it meant branding Vichy and its followers as enemies of 
democracy who illegally usurped the legitimate French state in the wake of the invasion 
by Nazi Germany.  But much like the popular history of the Revolution of 1789, postwar 
efforts to distinguish opposing regimes and ideologies also obscured what they had in 
common.  As Julian Jackson has noted, the political and intellectual divide between 
supporters of Vichy and Free France is not always so easily identified.  Indeed, he argues, 
“it is misleading to draw neat boundaries between ‘two Frances’ – between supporters 
and opponents of liberal democracy.  Vichy also drew upon political and cultural values 
shared between liberals and non-liberals, Republicans and anti-Republicans.”33The same 
could be said about colonial ideology during the war and afterward, which encompassed 
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a variety of opinions, but nevertheless embraced common notions of French entitlement 
in its African territories, and Africa’s necessary role in France’s future. 
I begin my study with the Vichy regime and the immediate threat posed to the 
French empire, both by the invasion of 1940 and the joint menace of De Gaulle’s Free 
France and his British allies.  From the beginning of the Vichy regime, it was beset on all 
sides by threats to both its political existence and its territory in Africa.  These threats led 
to an increased emphasis on preservation of the empire, as it could serve as a foundation 
for French renewal in anticipation of a future Europe dominated by Nazi Germany.  I 
focus particularly on the civilian and military authorities directly charged with overseeing 
colonial policy, most notably Pierre Boisson (High Commissioner for French Africa), 
General Maxime Weygand (Delegate-General to Africa), Admiral François Darlan 
(Prime Minister of France from 1941-1942), and General Charles Platon (Minister of 
Colonies).  Because of Vichy’s position in Europe and its rivalry with Britain in Africa, 
concerns about preservation of the empire were underscored by a deep resentment of the 
“Anglo-Saxons”, most notably by Boisson, who had the greatest influence on Vichy’s 
Africa policy.  Events early in the war only exacerbated these tendencies, especially after 
the British attack on Mers-el-Kebir and the Gaullist-led raid on Dakar, Senegal in 1940.  
This hostility would later influence Vichy’s ties with Britain’s ally across the Atlantic, as 
Vichy administrators looked warily to America’s idealism as a distinct threat to its 
colonial future.   
However, suspicion of Anglo-Saxon interference was not limited to the Vichy 
authorities.  In chapter two, I examine the Free French movement, which was based for 
the first half of the war in France’s colonial possessions in Afrique Équatoriale Française.  
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Like their counterparts in Vichy, Free French colonial administrators saw the empire as 
one means to rejuvenate France after the war.  And like Vichy, they sought to reunite all 
of France’s African possessions under one flag before the war’s conclusion.  De Gaulle’s 
followers also faced the probability that the postwar order would be determined by actors 
beyond France’s influence.  But Free France faced additional challenges.  Unlike Vichy, 
the operative assumption was never one of a Nazi victory.  Instead, Free French leaders 
prepared for a postwar settlement dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, 
both of whom were avowedly anticolonial.  Free French leaders were forced to 
accommodate their colonial desires to this decidedly hostile atmosphere.  It should 
therefore come as no surprise that like Vichy, Free French colonial administrators 
evinced suspicion about Anglo-American conspiracies to undermine French power in 
Africa.  The importance of the latter became more pronounced as the war concluded, 
given De Gaulle’s constant articulation of the need to restore French independence and 
grandeur once the Nazis were defeated.  In response to these threats, French colonial 
administrators, most notably Félix Éboué, began reconceptualizing France’s relationship 
with Africa, so as to better bind the colonies to French control once the war ended. 
These efforts intensified with the conclusion of the war and the creation of the 
United Nations.  Chapter three addresses the Provisional Government’s efforts to 
maintain its standing in Africa in the face of increasingly anticolonial sentiment.  The 
immediate postwar era suggested that the notion of empire – a fundamental component of 
France’s international influence – would eventually be relegated to the dustbin of history.  
Confronted with hostility from the two emerging superpowers, the French imperial 
project could not hope to survive in its traditional form.  Heightened international 
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scrutiny dictated the pace of reform in the colonies, as France had to renew its imperial 
project so as to appear less colonial and more democratic.  Consequently, the Provisional 
Government focused on transforming the empire into a French Union, which would allow 
for central representation in Paris and the devolution of some powers of government to 
local assemblies.  But political transformation in Africa also had to walk a delicate line 
between satisfying the scrutiny of the international community and placating powerful 
European interests in the colonies.   
As chapter four demonstrates, these initial efforts to consolidate French control in 
sub-Saharan Africa were largely successful.  Despite unrest throughout its empire, the 
Fourth Republic managed to preserve most of its territorial integrity in Africa for several 
years after the conclusion of the war.  But the threat posed by anticolonial sentiment 
remained.  The United Nations would continue to be a growing concern for France’s 
presence in Africa, as it became a forum for a growing anticolonial front against the 
continued influence of European nations in the developing world.  For French colonial 
administrators, the greatest fear was an emphasis on “internationalization”, or the 
increased scrutiny on French colonies by the international community so as to subvert 
French power and influence.  Not surprisingly, it was during this period that French 
colonial administrators increased their collaborative efforts with their counterparts in 
Britain and Belgium, hoping to form a common cause against interference from both the 
United Nations and the United States.  French officials also took advantage of the 
growing Cold War divide, portraying themselves to American officials as the logical 




As Tony Chafer has demonstrated, French colonial authorities in the 1940s and 
1950s never seriously planned for the independence of African colonies, and certainly not 
for a decolonization process that would take place as early as 1960.34  But events 
elsewhere in the empire would threaten the hard-won stability in France’s sub-Saharan 
African colonies.  The disaster at Dien Bien Phu, and rising unrest in Algeria, provided a 
renewed imperative for France to preserve its influence in the remainder of its colonial 
possessions, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa.   In chapter five, I discuss how French 
leaders reacted to events in Vietnam and Algeria, and how they reified notions that sub-
Saharan Africa was of inherent importance to France’s future.  During the late Fourth 
Republic, French foreign policy underwent a “turn to Africa” whereby its former sub-
Saharan colonies assumed the foremost importance to French international power.  I 
focus primarily on the views of François Mitterrand and Pierre Mendès France, both of 
whom argued that France needed to find more liberal and creative ways to ensure that 
France’s place in Africa remained secure.  Consequently, the Fourth Republic would 
continue to relinquish power to African elites in order to placate demands for more 
autonomy.  This chapter also examines the response to these efforts by two African 
leaders – Léopold Sédar Senghor and Félix Houphouet-Boigny – and explores their 
contributions to France’s presence on the continent. 
Of course, the fall of the Fourth Republic in 1958 and the granting of 
independence to France’s colonies in Africa in 1960 would irrevocably change France’s 
relationship with the continent.  These early years of independence were vital in 
constructing the neocolonial affiliations that grew out of the end of France’s empire.  In 
chapter six, I examine the De Gaulle regime’s response to the process of decolonization.  
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While De Gaulle initially made efforts to maintain the colonies within the French orbit, 
he quickly renounced this position, publically professing that France’s true future lay in 
Europe, not in Africa.  But this public renunciation of French control in Africa was 
accompanied by Foccart’s efforts to build relationships with Africa’s new leaders.  While 
some of these relationships were relatively benign, efforts to ingratiate France into these 
leaders’ good graces would set the stage for client-state relationships under the 
Pompidou, Giscard, and Mitterrand administrations.  Essentially, the early Gaullist 
regime found a way to reinvent French power in Africa without the drawbacks of a 
physical presence – a form of colonialism by other means. 
In commenting on the end of empires, Frederick Cooper notes that “[b]y the 
1970s, colonialism had been banished from the realm of legitimate forms of political 
organization.  What remained ‘colonial’ in world politics passed itself off as something 
else.”35  This new form of relationship would have great impact on France’s former 
colonies.  In a brief concluding chapter, I reflect on the legacy of France’s postwar 
experience in sub-Saharan Africa.  Fifty years after decolonization, French leaders still 
find it difficult to disengage from a continent on which France once exercised 
considerable power.  That process continues to unfold painfully, still greatly affected by 
mentalities born from the disaster of 1940 and the subsequent decline of French 
international power. 
  
                                                 




Facing the Anglo-Saxon Threat:  
The Vichy Regime and the Future of Africa, 1940-1943 
 
My belief is that the situation we are in is a block.  Every accession we 
make to German requests will undermine it irrevocably... The tragedy of 
this debate is that the sole beneficiaries of any concessions made will be 
the eventual aggressors in sub-Saharan Africa – the Anglo-Saxons. 
 
-Telegram from Pierre Boisson, Haut-commissaire de l’Afrique  
Noire, to Maréchal Philippe Pétain, July 13, 194236 
 
 The fall of France to the Wehrmacht on June 13, 1940 and her subsequent 
surrender to Germany marked the end of France’s standing as one of the preeminent 
world powers.37  Only a few weeks earlier, France and Great Britain, the two largest 
imperial powers in the world, stood united against Hitler’s encroachment in Poland and 
the attempted Nazi domination of Europe.  Now, with the defenses of the Maginot line 
overrun, France was subjected to the humiliation of German soldiers marching into Paris 
and the scene of thousands of citizens exiled from their homes in the face of the Nazi 
onslaught.   The dramatic consequences could scarcely be understated – a parliamentary 
democracy was replaced by an authoritarian regime wishing to exact revenge for the 
humiliations of the Dreyfus Affair and the riots of 1934; a society marked by relative 
tolerance throughout the 19th century would collaborate with the Nazis by sending a 
significant part of its Jewish population to concentration camps; and harsh policies 
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established by Pétain’s National Revolution would lead to growing support for a 
clandestine resistance movement and eventual civil war.  Put simply, in 1939, France 
stood equal with Britain among the world powers.  A year later, it was relegated to 
planning its future in the shadow of a Nazi-dominated Europe.   
An interior Vichy report from November 1940 summarized the situation that 
France now found itself in: 
France presently no longer has the moral and spiritual situation of its former 
position; the center of gravity of Europe, which once was French, has now passed 
to Germany; it has moved from the west to the center of our continent. The 
demographic complexion of the former world has been transformed.  Once, under 
its kings and even up to the first Empire, France was dominant in the number of 
its inhabitants and births.  It is now in the demographic situation of Germany after 
the Thirty Years’ War.  In 1939 it had nearly a million fewer births than the 
Reich.  It only occupies, in its population, the fourth place in Europe.38 
 
Historian Marc Bloch provided an even bleaker short-term analysis: “the fate of France 
no longer depends on the French…the future of our country and of our civilization has 
become the stake in a struggle of which we, for the most part, are only the rather 
humiliated spectators.”39  He nevertheless remained optimistic that in the long-term 
France would be able to reconstruct itself – even if Germany defeated England.40  But 
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40 Ibid., 174-6. 
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there could be no question that something had changed irrevocably.  As the French poet 
Paul Valéry noted, “there is no more France in yesterday’s meaning of the term.”41 
Like Bloch, even the most optimistic leaders in Vichy could not hope for a return 
to France’s prewar status in the short term.  France could not compete militarily with a 
Nazi war machine that had swept across mainland Europe at a startling rate.  Nor could 
she hope to be the preeminent economic power on the continent, saddled with war 
reparations by the Nazi regime and forced to make labor and industrial sacrifices to the 
German war effort.42   Instead, France’s hope lay in a policy of territorial integrity in the 
empire, which would allow for a gradual return to prominence after the war.  Alluding to 
this future, Prime Minister Pierre Laval noted in a June 1942 speech that “from this war 
will inevitably arise a new Europe…I would hope then that we will come to love Europe 
in which France will have a place which will be sufficiently dignified for her.”43  From 
the beginning, Vichy officials expressed strong beliefs that the British would be defeated 
by Germany; Laval stated as much to American ambassador Matthews in November 
1940.44  In the postwar order, with the Nazis victorious, a renewed France under Vichy 
could help serve as a mediating force between Germany, Britain, and the United States.  
Pétain outlined this strategy in an interview with the New York Times in January 1941: 
France has lost neither her personality nor her soul.  She has not gone back on her 
history.  Situated as she is at the western end of Europe, she aspires to serve as a 
                                                 
41 Paul Valéry, Cahiers Vol. 23 (Paris, 1960), 429.  This reference is contained in Robert Paxton, 
Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1972), 24. 
42 The most prominent of these contributions was the service du travail obligatoire, a conscripted 
labor program established by Pierre Laval whereby French citizens were brought to Germany to 
supplement the depleted labor force. 
43 Pierre Laval, Les Discours de Pierre Laval 1942-1944 (Paris: Fondation Josée et René de 
Chambrun, 1999), 25. 
44 The chargé in France to the Secretary of State, Nov 14, 1940.  Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1940 Vol. II (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 403-406.   
27 
 
bridge between American currents of civilization and developments in European 
thought – to become the link between the two continents. 
After this war there will come – unavoidably – a reorganization of the continent 
of Europe.  In this reorganization France intends to be an associate and to 
collaborate loyally therein with the hope of establishing a lasting and solid peace 
both in Europe and the world.45 
 
This policy of preparing France for a new order in Europe contained shades of both 
realism and ambition.  From a practical standpoint, Vichy clearly understood and 
accepted the loss of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany as a natural spoil of war.  But unity 
of the métropole and the empire could not be compromised.  As Pétain explained in an 
address to the French empire in September 1940, France could tolerate three-fifths of the 
mainland being occupied by Germany; she could recover from the war; she could endure 
the winter and the hardships to come.  However, France’s “unity – a unity forged by a 
thousand years of effort and sacrifice – must remain intact.”46  Another Pétain speech in 
October emphasized that Vichy “will defend, first of all, national unity – that is, the very 
close union of the métropole and overseas France.”47  As the terms of the armistice took 
shape, it became clear that of particular importance to this sense of national unity were 
France’s holdings in Africa, which could help justify France’s future status as a 
significant world power. 
 Given the availability of excellent scholarship on the Vichy regime, it is 
somewhat surprising that Vichy’s project in sub-Saharan Africa went virtually ignored 
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until very recently.48  Catherine Akpo-Vaché’s work on West Africa during World War II 
remains a useful survey of the events of the period and the strategic importance of West 
Africa to the larger war effort.49  In addition, numerous historians have examined how 
Vichy’s racial ideology affected how it treated its African subjects.50  More recently, 
Ruth Ginio’s work on the Vichy regime in West Africa has enabled a fuller 
understanding of Vichy’s goals for the future of its African colonies and how it 
implemented these policies in the face of actual wartime conditions.51  Ginio has 
provided valuable insight on how the encounter between Vichy authorities and Africans 
affected the eventual development of West Africa after the war.  As she notes, the Vichy 
experience in West Africa “shattered many myths for Africans, as well as for colonial 
subjects in other parts of the Empire.  This period paved the way for the challenging of 
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colonial rule and the subsequent dissolution of the European empires in Africa and 
Asia.”52 
 Because her work focuses mostly on Vichy policy in Africa, Ginio pays less 
attention to how the need to maintain France’s standing abroad affected colonial policy.  
To be clear, she does not ignore this point; Ginio notes that “the empire enabled France to 
prove to the world that it was still an independent state with resources, territory, and 
enormous manpower in its service.”53  However, the influence of the international 
situation on Vichy’s Africa policymaking merits further investigation and discussion, as 
by all accounts, preservation of the empire was one of the fundamental goals of the Vichy 
regime.  Maintaining the empire was not simply about consolidating France’s strength in 
the face of Nazi domination, although this was certainly a motivating factor.  What must 
also be emphasized is the importance of the empire, including Africa, to France’s future.  
Put simply, it was inconceivable to anyone within Vichy’s ranks that France would face a 
future without its colonies. 
These views were expressed frequently to foreign officials throughout the course 
of the war.  According to a conversation between Laval and American representative 
Robert Murphy in December 1940, France was “motivated by no desire to play 
Germany’s game, but merely to protect French interests and to retain intact France’s 
colonial empire.”54  Fortunately for Vichy, the armistice allowed her to do exactly that.  
By 1940, the empire had expanded to include territories in North America, Asia, the 
Middle East, and one third of Africa.  The most significant of these were France’s 
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possessions in Indochine (modern-day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos), North Africa 
(including Algeria, Tunisia, and parts of Morocco), Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF, 
or French West Africa) and Afrique Équatoriale Française (AEF, or French Equatorial 
Africa).55  Of these, Algeria had the greatest importance to Vichy, given the almost one 
million European settlers residing in the country’s northern territories, and the fact that 
those territories were considered departments of France.  In contrast, while Indochine 
also had a settler community (albeit much smaller than the one in Algeria), its distance 
from Vichy and the invasion by the Japanese in September 1940 made its future in the 
French Empire considerably more doubtful.   
Given the unstable situation in North Africa, and the loss of control over 
Indochine to the Japanese, French sub-Saharan Africa’s importance to the empire was 
heightened after the events of June 1940.  In discussing Vichy’s Africa policy, a 1942 
Free French memo observed that a major priority for the regime was “to retain and keep 
the Empire out of the war, the only chance for the new regime to establish itself.  When 
Marshall Pétain said that ‘Africa was his best card,’ he sought to make known that it 
would be used to limit the increasing claims of the conqueror, threatening [Germany] 
with the restoration of freedom of action in the Empire.”56  In actuality, Pétain’s “best 
card” was composed of two parts.  While both AOF and AEF grew largely from the 
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“scramble for Africa” by European powers during the second half of the twentieth 
century, they were administered by different governors-general and had grown from 
separate exploration and colonization initiatives.  AOF encompassed the colonies of 
Senegal (itself split into the four settler communes of Dakar, Rufisque, St. Louis, and 
Gorée), Niger, Mauritanie, Côte d’Ivoire, Haute Volta, Dahomey, Guinée, and Soudan 
Française.57  France had engaged in trading along the northwest coast of Africa going 
back to the seventeenth century, but during the mid-nineteenth century, the governor of 
Senegal Louis Faidherbe conducted a series of expeditions into the interior of West 
Africa, leading to a great expansion of French territory.  By 1895, most of the 
aforementioned territories had been conquered and a French federation in West Africa 
had been established, with the governor-general’s office established in 1904.  AEF had 
been acquired after the explorations of Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, who penetrated 
central Africa via the Congo river from the Atlantic Ocean.  In 1880, he founded 
Brazzaville (in modern-day Republic of the Congo), the eventual capital of AEF, on the 
Congo River.  By 1910, France had consolidated the territories of Moyen Congo, Gabon, 
Oubangui-Shari and Chad into AEF.58  After World War I, a League of Nations mandate 
also gave France control over Togo and Cameroon, previously German colonies. 
 During the war, policy in Africa was driven by a select few individuals in the 
government offices in Vichy and in the colonies abroad.  Pétain was both head of state 
and symbol of national unity for the duration of the war.  He also provided the 
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ideological rhetoric that encouraged Frenchmen to do their part to keep the empire 
intact.59  Pierre Laval served as the Vichy equivalent of Prime Minister on two occasions 
(Vice President of the Council of Ministers in 1940 and President of the Council from 
1942-1944, after the Germans insisted upon his return), but showed little interest in the 
empire, instead focusing his efforts on coordinating collaboration efforts with the Nazis, 
overseeing the cabinet, and justifying the National Revolution through antisemitic and 
anti-communist propaganda.60  Without significant interference from Laval, colonial 
policy was left to the civilian and military authorities directly charged with overseeing 
the empire.  The most prominent of these were General Maxime Weygand (Delegate-
General to Africa), Admiral François Darlan (Prime Minister of France from 1941-1942, 
and later High Commissioner of French Africa after his defection to the Allied cause), 
General Charles Platon (Minister of Colonies and a member of the cabinet), and Pierre 
Boisson (High Commissioner for French sub-Saharan Africa).  Following Pétain’s lead, 
these men, and particularly Boisson, developed France’s policy in Africa in the early 
stages of the war, and emphasized the importance of these territories to France, given a 
postwar Europe presumably ruled from Berlin. 
 
The Immediate Threat to the French Empire after the Armistice 
 In understanding both Vichy’s policies and its future plans for Africa, one must 
keep in mind the sense of encirclement that pervaded France’s African territories during 
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the war.  As this chapter will demonstrate, Vichy Africa was subjected to a constant 
military siege from the Allies that resulted in a steady drumbeat of territorial loss.  A 
Vichy political report from 1942 noted this state of fear of the British, observing that 
since the armistice, “our possessions in Black Africa have been living under the threat of 
an Anglo-Saxon attack.”61  In protecting its sub-Saharan African territories from 
encroachment, the Vichy regime faced a number of other challenges on several fronts.  
Immediately pressing was the German and Italian desire to extract territorial and military 
concessions.  Germany eyed its former colonies Cameroon and Togo, taken after the 
defeat in World War I.  Italy had designs on Tunisia, parts of Morocco, and French 
Somaliland (Djibouti).  As mentioned, Japan would eventually control large parts of 
French Indochina.  However, as the war evolved, both the authorities at Vichy and 
colonial administrators evinced primary concern about threats to its African possessions 
from Britain, and to a lesser extent, the United States.   
 From the beginning, Vichy was concerned about Germany’s attitude toward its 
colonial Empire in Africa.  The Armistice Commission, which addressed issues arising 
out of the June 1940 agreements between France, Germany and Italy, was located at 
Wiesbaden, a southwestern German city.  French General Charles Huntzinger’s mission 
to Wiesbaden endeavored to take most advantage of Franco-German collaboration in 
Africa, especially in the economic sphere.62  To this end, Huntzinger noted hopefully that 
the German representative Hemmen “understands the situation in our colonies and that 
Germany would do nothing to compromise our sovereignty or give the British new 
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advantages.”63  A 1942 Free France memo confirmed this policy, noting that Vichy 
sought to show Germany that only France was capable of maintaining order in the 
Empire and that Germany therefore had to help France consolidate its authority there.64 
Nevertheless, the Nazis displayed contempt for France’s colonial project.  In 
September 1940, a report of the French delegation to the Armistice Commission 
summarized the state of propaganda in Germany on colonies in Africa.  One brochure in 
particular, “Kampf un Afrika” evinced clear disdain for the colonial empires of Britain 
and France, noting that Germany would have only two purposes for such territories: the 
exploitation of raw materials and to serve as a training ground for young Germans, in 
order to teach them initiative and an attitude of superiority over inferior races.65  The 
report further noted the brochure’s criticism of France’s use of African soldiers, saying 
that “France, which has already placed in danger the prestige of the white race by its 
inconsiderate policy of mixing the races, has not only betrayed its race, but lost the 
dignity of a European colonial power.”66  A subsequent telegram in October affirmed that 
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Hitler’s attention was focused on conquest in Europe, but reminded Vichy of the 
contempt he had expressed for French civilization in Mein Kampf.67   
However, the bottom line was that the Third Reich “is not seeking to construct an 
empire in the British or French sense.  It only wants to assure itself of colonial 
possessions so that it does not have to rely any longer on foreign nations for raw 
materials that it lacks.”68  An article published in several German newspapers in early 
1941 confirmed this, indicating that Germany’s task after the war forced it “to implement 
large scale colonization with minimal participation from German nationals.  This is why 
our overseas possessions will never become territories for emigration…Germany’s 
homeland must remain the Reich.”69  The obvious conclusion drawn by the Wiesbaden 
delegation was that Germany would not be interested in territorial acquisition in Africa, 
and that France could conceivably maintain its possessions there.70 
 The same could not be said for Mussolini’s Italy, which saw the Mediterranean as 
its sphere of influence in a postwar atmosphere.  From 1911 to 1934, it gradually 
conquered modern-day Libya, thus establishing itself as a significant player in the region, 
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along with France.  In 1936 Italy invaded Ethiopia and annexed most of it into Italian 
East Africa, which included modern-day Eritrea and Somalia.  The armistice between 
Italy and France later provided for some concessions to the Italians in Africa, most 
notably free use of Djibouti by the Italian navy.  While France was allowed to retain the 
use of military power in Africa to defend the Empire, several ports had to be 
demilitarized, including Toulon, Bizerte, Ajaccio, and the ill-fated Mers-el-Kébir 
(discussed below).  All French ships not directly guarding the sovereignty of the Empire 
were required to return to metropolitan ports, and Italy was given wide latitude in matters 
affecting French North Africa, Syria, and Djibouti.71  While these were necessary 
concessions on Vichy’s part, they would hang over the prospect of stability of French 
rule in North and West Africa throughout the war.  As General Weygand noted after a 
visit to North Africa in November 1940, military concessions made to both Germany and 
Italy undermined confidence in French rule and threatened the dissolution of the 
Empire.72 
 But the Axis was only one half of the planned postwar equation in 1940.  Britain 
had its own colonies in West Africa, including Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and 
Gambia.73  Further, Anglo-French rivalry in Africa had persisted for decades, and had 
manifested most notably in the 1898 Fashoda Incident, a land dispute in modern-day 
Sudan.  Given its history of rivalry in Africa with the British, it is not surprising that 
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Vichy saw the British Empire as the greatest threat to its future role on the continent.    In 
a meeting with American representative Robert Murphy in Paris in July 1940, Pierre 
Laval launched into a tirade against the British, expressing his view that “France had 
suffered too often as a result of British dishonesty and hypocrisy.”74  Pétain expressed 
similar sentiments to Murphy a week later.75  Indeed, as Philippe Burrin has shown, 
Pétain himself was expressing rabid Anglophobia three years before the onset of the war, 
in a conversation with the Italian ambassador in Paris in February 1936: 
England has always been France’s most implacable enemy…I tell you that France 
has two hereditary enemies, the English and the Germans, but the former are older 
and more perfidious.  That is why I should incline towards an alliance with the 
latter, which would guarantee absolute peace in Europe, especially if Italy joined 
in that alliance.  Then it would be possible to solve all the problems that so far 
have remained insoluble, because a better distribution of the British colonies 
would make it possible to provide wealth and work for all.76 
 
Pétain and Laval’s sentiments about the British by no means predominated in France in 
the early months of the war, but it is telling that both the French and British governments 
had assembled vigorous propaganda campaigns in 1939, including a joint Bastille Day 
parade in Paris, to convince the French population of the loyalty of their British ally.77  
Both governments were combating the memory of 1914, when a poorly-prepared Entente 
Cordiale allowed Germany to invade much of northern France, leading to the trauma of 
trench warfare that would claim over a million French lives.  Of paramount importance 
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for both Britain and France in 1939 had been undermining the conception that the British 
would only look after their own interests and would once again allow the French army to 
absorb the brunt of the casualties on the European mainland.  It was precisely this 
concern that Vichy would exploit immediately after the surrender to Germany, with 
Pétain telling the French a week after the armistice that “Churchill is the judge of his 
country’s interests; he is not the judge of our interests and even less of French honor.”78 
Vichy’s status as a tentative ally of Germany, and combined British/Free France 
attacks on colonial bases and cities in Africa, only increased the feeling of enmity vis-à-
vis London.  The annual political report from the Haut-Commissariat de l’Afrique 
Française indicated that the break from Great Britain had the greatest impact on AOF of 
all the events of the preceding year.79  Among Britain’s actions against France in 1940 
were the loss of AEF and Cameroon and an attack on Dakar, discussed in greater detail 
below.  British attacks were supported by constant propaganda directed at West Africa 
that sought to rally colonial populations to fight with Britain against the Axis, thus 
undermining France’s authority.  As the political report noted, such propaganda could 
lead to “the dissolution of the French West African bloc.”80  The result was a gradually 
rising antipathy for Britain throughout Vichy, and particularly among those responsible 
for administering the Empire in Africa.  This resentment towards the British, and the 
belief that the colonies in Africa would be vital to France’s postwar rehabilitation as a 
world power, were the two central themes of Vichy colonial ideology in Africa.   
                                                 
78 “Réponse à Churchill,” June 23, 1940, Messages d’Outre-tombe du Maréchal Pétain, 17-18.  
“Churchill est juge des intérêts de son pays: il ne l’est pas des intérêts de notre.  Il l’est encore 
moins de l’honneur français.”   
79 Rapport Politique du Haut Commissariat de l’Afrique Française (Année 1940), p. 62, ANOM, 




Also nascent was a growing uncertainty and suspicion about the rise of the United 
States and its eventual postwar intentions on the continent.  An internal Vichy memo 
(most probably from late 1940) examined the probability that Britain would succumb to 
an invasion in some form by Germany.  In this case, the world would be divided in two 
spheres – Europe dominated by Germany, and the Western hemisphere controlled by the 
United States.  The memo projected that in the case of British defeat, America would use 
it diplomatic and military power to establish a zone of influence in the Atlantic.  Such 
efforts would probably be successful because the United States had the financial ability to 
engage in an arms race with Germany, and the necessary influence in South America to 
apply economic pressure to Europe, which would take years to rebuild after the war.81  
Given this probable postwar outcome, France had to carve out a role between the two 
powers.  The memo notes that “without doubt, in a world where the two major centers of 
power would be Washington and Berlin, France would be closer to Berlin than 
Washington. But it will always be necessary, if our country wants to survive as an 
independent nation, to retain the support of the United States.”82  Laval himself suggested 
to Robert Murphy in November 1940 that France would have a postwar role in fostering 
collaboration between Nazi-dominated Europe and the United States.83 
At the outset of the war, the Americans were seen as useful partners, both in 
facilitating commerce to Africa and as a potential surviving power of the war, along with 
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Germany.  America also provided food and clothing aid to France in the aftermath of the 
Nazi invasion, for which Pétain expressed his gratitude in a public address in August.84  
In October, Pierre Boisson invited the American consul in Dakar to consider opening an 
America airline terminus in Dakar.85  But the British attacks in Africa, and concerns that 
America was providing tacit political support to Churchill, began to change the equation.  
Roosevelt and Churchill’s promulgation of the Atlantic Charter in 1941, which 
established the ideals that would guide the postwar order, along with America’s rise as a 
military power, presented new concerns.  These developments brought an awareness of 
America’s idealism, and its desire to have an increased commercial and military presence 
on the continent.  By the end of the war, the United States was seen as a potential rival in 
Africa, both by Vichy and Free France forces. 
 It was in this atmosphere of a constant threat to Vichy’s African territories that its 
policy for the continent was forged.  Regardless of which country had territorial, 
economic, or ideological ambitions in Africa, Vichy’s goals were to preserve its long-
term interests and influence by keeping all foreign presence out.  As Laval explained to 
U.S. ambassador Leahy in April 1942, the desire to maintain the Empire intact 
superseded any political ideology: 
He felt that the present war was a ‘Civil War’ in the sense that it was a conflict 
between democratic and totalitarian ideals and that in such a conflict he was only 
concerned with the ultimate salvation of all of France.  He was prepared to defend 
France and her Empire against all comers and he stated specifically that if British 
or the Americans were to attempt a landing either on the soil of metropolitan 
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France or on French North African territory he would resist them to the best of his 
ability.86 
 
However, it was one thing for Laval to express this policy to the Americans from Vichy, 
far removed from realities in the Empire.  It would be left to the colonial administration 
to make crucial decisions and formulate policy in the territories that prevented all foreign 
encroachment in Africa. 
 
Pierre Boisson, High Commissioner of French sub-Saharan Africa 
 Given the perception by Vichy that the postwar order threatened its empire in 
Africa, it sought to preserve territorial integrity in the colonies to the best possible extent.  
The most important figure in the development and enactment of Vichy policy in Africa 
was unquestionably Pierre Boisson, the de jure Haut-Commissaire (High Commissioner) 
of sub-Saharan Africa (although only the de facto head of AOF, not AEF, after August 
1940) for the duration of the Vichy regime.  Recent work by William Hitchcock and 
Pierre Ramognino has helped demonstrate the centrality of Boisson to Vichy policy in 
AOF.87  Hitchcock’s research focuses on Boisson’s controversial policies as high 
commissioner, and how they placed him in a problematic position as a Vichy loyalist 
during the post war épuration, when the most prominent figures from the Vichy regime 
were placed on trial.  Until his defection to the Allies in late 1942, Boisson was 
considered a loyal servant of Vichy, receiving favorable reviews from General Weygand 
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on more than one occasion in reports to Pétain.88  Boisson also remained popular with the 
European population for most of his tenure, mostly due to his leadership during the Dakar 
crisis.89 
This section focuses more closely on the ideology that underlay Boisson’s 
policies.  Julian Jackson has discussed the complexity of political ideology in France 
prior to and during the Vichy regime, whereby ardent defenders of Vichy could be both 
anti-German and pro-Pétain, while supporters of Free France could be antisemitic yet still 
opposed to the National Revolution and Nazi occupation.90  Boisson is an excellent 
example of this seemingly conflicting ideology – a colonial administrator who despised 
German racist attitudes toward Africa, he nevertheless had limited faith in the capabilities 
of the indigènes who were his subjects.91  He was no more enamored with German 
occupation of France, but hated equally (and perhaps even more) the British, and 
despised de Gaulle and his followers.  Yet he betrayed Vichy only two years after his 
promotion by Pétain, at a crucial period in the war and in a way that drastically 
undermined Vichy’s plans for Africa.  These contradictions can easily be resolved by 
examining the central principle of Boisson’s policies during the Vichy regime: the need 
to maintain French territorial integrity in Africa so as to place it in a better position after 
the war.  In this sense, he provided a significant foundation for Vichy’s Africa policy. 
 Pierre Boisson, like many who rose through the ranks of the French colonial 
administration, came from a middle class upbringing.  The son of two schoolteachers, he 
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was born in 1894, placing him squarely in the generation of Frenchman that volunteered 
en masse to fight in World War I.  After graduating in 1913 from the Ecole Normale de 
St-Brieux, Boisson volunteered for the military and received his commission in 1914, 
serving in the 48th infantry division.  In February 1915, he volunteered to go to the front, 
and received the first of four wounds a few days later.  After a recovery of two months, 
Boisson insisted on a return to the front.  He was promoted to sous-lieutenant and 
acquitted himself well in the French offensive on Artois in May 1915.  He saw additional 
action in Argonne in 1916, and in June of that year at Verdun, Boisson was wounded 
both in his hand and his chest during an attack.  Despite being severely weakened from a 
loss of blood, he bravely led a counterattack against the Germans, this time unfortunately 
suffering another wound in his leg from a grenade.  The leg was eventually amputated.92 
 Taken captive by the Germans, he found his way to a Swiss military hospital, 
where he convalesced from December 1916 through July 1917.  Despite his wounds, his 
stay in hospital proved to be the turning point in Boisson’s life.  It was during this time 
that he met several officers from the French colonial forces, many of whom told him 
about France’s prestigious Ecole Coloniale, a training ground for future colonial 
administrators.  With little future in the military, Boisson was intrigued by the same ideas 
of advancement and adventure that had lured many other promising men into the colonial 
service.  He wrote to the école’s director, inquiring about admission.  He was finally 
admitted in February 1918 and concluded the program in June.93  This colonial education 
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distinguished him from Weygand, Platon, Darlan, and Laval, and perhaps explains his 
later interest in “civilizing” the indigènes under his charge. 
 After working his way through the colonial ranks, Boisson served in several 
prominent positions in French Africa during the 1930s, including Secretary-General of 
AOF, High Commissioner of Cameroon, and Governor-General of AOF, where he served 
for almost a year starting in August 1938.  The following August, he was transferred to 
the same position in AEF, where he participated with his British counterparts in a 
conference in May 1940 designed to improve collaboration between the two imperial 
powers in West Africa.94  His duties as Governor-General of AEF would officially 
overlap with his appointment as High Commissioner of all of French sub-Saharan Africa 
on June 25, 1940, just days after the fall of Paris (Louis Husson would serve as acting 
Governor-General of AEF until its defection to Free France that August).  Boisson’s 
appointment by Vichy placed him in control of AOF, AEF, Cameroon and Togo. 
Alice Conklin has provided a valuable study on the French mission civilisatrice, 
or civilizing mission, in West Africa in the early 20th century – an ideology both idealistic 
and racist in nature by which French colonial administrators were to “improve their 
subjects’ standard of living through the rational development, or what the French call the 
mise en valeur, of the colonies’ natural and human resources.”95  This civilizing mission 
manifested in a number of ways, and had been pursued through policies of assimilation 
(put simply, impressing upon Africans western means of education and labor, and 
transforming them into French citizens) and association (rejecting such transformation in 
favor of a more British-style form of indirect control over colonial territories).  Boisson 
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was a believer in the French civilizing mission in Africa, but only to a certain point.  He 
viewed the African as primarily a farmer, and not suited to industrialization anytime in 
the near future.  In a talk given to the Academy of Colonial Sciences in February 1938, 
he set forth his views on the place of indigène workers in African society: 
A farmer in every fiber of his being, he wants increasingly to cultivate the soil for 
himself and exploit its possibilities for his own benefit.  We can be assured that if 
the choice were offered to him to satisfy his essential needs by working on a 
plantation or on his own lands, he would not hesitate, and there would be no 
doubt where his preferences would lie…96 
 
This view of his subjects would inform Boisson’s dealings with them, as well as his plans 
for France’s future in Africa, throughout the duration of his tenure as high 
commissioner.97 
Boisson was Governor-General of AEF when Paris fell to the Nazis in June.  It 
must be remembered that between June 22, when Pétain signed the armistice with 
Germany, and July 10, when it was ratified by the hastily-convened rump National 
Assembly, a state of great uncertainty existed throughout the French empire.98  During 
these early days, Boisson demonstrated some interest in continuing the fight in Africa.  
On June 27, he telegraphed Léon Cayla, then governor-general of AOF, asking for his 
position on whether he would support a continued battle against Germany.  Boisson noted 
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that North Africa, AOF, Cameroon, AEF and Madagascar could represent an important 
asset for the Allies.99  The same day, he telegraphed Richard Brunot, the high 
commissioner of Cameroon, suggesting that an “African bloc” could be assembled to 
continue the fight.100  Interestingly, these communications actually postdated Boisson’s 
appointment as high commissioner of AOF, which Pétain and Laval made official on 
June 25.  Boisson would not announce the official rallying of AOF to Vichy until July 
6.101 
It is not entirely clear what changed his mind, but his learning of his appointment 
as high commissioner, along with the British attack on Mers-el-Kébir on July 3, most 
likely reoriented his views on the war.  Mers el-Kébir, a port town in Algeria, housed the 
bulk of the French Mediterranean fleet.  Concerned about the possibility that it might fall 
into Nazi hands, Churchill ordered a bombing of the French naval forces.  From a 
military standpoint, the operation was largely successful, resulting in destruction or 
significant damage to three battleships and four destroyer-class ships.  It also sent a 
message both to Britain’s prospective allies and Germany that Britain did not intend to 
give up the fight against the Nazis.  However, it effectively ended any significant 
sympathy for Britain for many in France leaning toward Vichy, as the deaths of over 
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1,200 French sailors were seen as a terrible betrayal on the part of the former ally.102  
Noting that “nothing foreshadowed this aggression, and nothing justifies it,” Pétain used 
the attack to rally the Empire behind the Vichy regime.103  
Mers-el-Kébir was not the only place where the French found themselves under 
British siege.  At the same time as the attack on the fleet, Britain was sending agents from 
its Gold Coast colony (present-day Ghana) over its western border to Ivory Coast, 
attempting to incite the local population to rebel against French colonial 
administration.104  According to Boisson, the British were also using it as an armory for 
their efforts in West Africa, and saw it as a fertile area for recruitment of troops to be sent 
to the Ethiopian campaign.105  By July 9, the governor of Ivory Coast had declared a state 
of siege in the colony.106  Gold Coast, Boisson noted in a later report, represented “a 
certain menace for neighboring French colonies,” and British authorities were preparing 
the locals for an inevitable conflict with the French Empire.107  They were joined by de 
Gaulle’s sympathizers, formed by troops from Cameroon and AEF, who sought to detach 
AOF from Vichy West Africa.  At the same time, the British seriously damaged the 
Richelieu, part of a new class of French battleships, in harbor at Dakar.   
On July 24, having arrived in Dakar to assume his duties, Boisson cabled Vichy to 
warn of the two threats to French sub-Saharan Africa – British propaganda and local 
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dissidence, both of which threatened French solidarity and cohesion.  Despite his wish a 
month earlier to continue supporting the British effort, his views had by now changed 
radically.  He observed that “it is equally certain that all aggression on the part of 
England places French sovereignty in peril in some portion of the colonial empire.”108  
Mers-el-Kébir had shown that no part of the empire was safe.  At the end of July, 
governor Richard Brunot of Cameroon telegraphed Boisson indicating his intent to 
continue the war in West Africa in cooperation with British Nigeria.109  Although Brunot 
was convinced not to break from Vichy Africa, Cameroon would eventually declare its 
allegiance to Free France in late August, having been convinced to do so by Gaullist 
captain Jacques-Philippe Leclerc.  By the end of July, the borders between all French and 
British colonies had been officially sealed by Vichy.110 
 
The Loss of AEF and the Attack on Dakar 
 Vichy’s already tenuous grip on its territories in Africa was further weakened on 
August 26, when Félix Éboué and Colonel Marchand, military commander of Chad, 
declared that AEF would rally to de Gaulle’s Free France cause.  Éboué, a descendant of 
African slaves, will be discussed further in chapter two, but the importance of the 
defection of AEF must be emphasized here.  Through Éboué’s defection, almost half of 
France’s sub-Saharan African empire was lost to the Allies.  Vichy would never regain an 
intact empire in Africa.  It would not be until 1944 that all of France’s African territories 
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were officially reintegrated into the French empire, and only then under the Free France 
flag.  On August 27, Éboué wired Boisson, indicating that in accord with both military 
and popular sentiment, he and Marchand were declaring AEF’s allegiance to Free France. 
In his sternly-worded response, Boisson made clear his view that through his actions, 
Éboué had greatly undermined France’s international position and prestige: 
By your decision you have betrayed the duties of your post.  By taking the 
initiative to hand over to England the territory that was entrusted to you, you 
have, by a deliberate act, broken the cohesion of the Empire and also undermined 
France’s grand position.  You have betrayed those you have had the task of 
guiding. Your arguments are specious because you know all the measures agreed 
to in principle and still in development that will allow colonies to endure in a time 
when our Motherland suffers through such cruel tests. You have assumed the 
responsibility for making a gesture that could add to these French hardships; you 
have forgotten your duty to the French.111 [emphasis added] 
 
Brazzaville would fall to de Gaulle’s forces on August 28, with governor-general 
Husson arrested by Free France.  By the end of the month, Gabon was the only territory 
remaining in AEF still loyal to Vichy.  To make matters worse, Éboué had begun to make 
personal appeals to leaders in AOF to rally to Free France, most notably the governor of 
Niger.112  AEF’s defection also presented a potential postwar threat to Vichy, as detailed 
in a September 1941 study by the Secrétariat d’Etat de la Marine.  The study noted the 
increased cooperation during the war between Belgian Congo (which under Pierre 
Ryckmans was now assisting the Allied effort in Africa), AEF, and Cameroon, and 
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warned that such cooperation during the war could lead to a naturally unified postwar 
“bloc” that would greatly benefit the British presence in Africa.113  The fear was palpable 
throughout AOF in 1940 that the British would undermine France’s empire in Africa 
during the war, and press their advantage to expand British influence on the continent in 
the postwar order. 
 Vichy attempted to use the loss of AEF as a means to better its position vis-à-vis 
Germany.  Just days after Éboué’s defection, Huntzinger warned the Armistice 
Commission in Wiesbaden that without better coordination between the métropole and 
the empire, and an improvement in economic conditions, the situation ran the risk of 
rallying the French colonies to the British flag.114  Without quick measures, such as 
providing for better maritime commercial traffic between Africa and the occupied zone, 
as well as allowing Vichy military flexibility in the colonies, the uprising in AEF would 
spread, causing a dissolution of the French Empire.  As Huntzinger noted, “this situation 
presents an immediate danger not only for French interests, but also for those of Germany 
and Italy.”115  The loss of the colonies would have an effect on relations between France 
and Germany after the war; Huntzinger emphasized that “a France diminished in its 
colonial power would only see its ability to cooperate in the European continental bloc 
quite reduced.”116  If Germany wanted to keep France as a strong and faithful ally, and 
preserve the stability of Pétain’s government, it needed to work with the Italian 
government to strengthen France’s military position in Africa. 
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 Having already witnessed the attack on Mers-el-Kébir, and increasingly aware of 
British intrigues in West Africa, Boisson was further alienated from the British and de 
Gaulle by the events of September.  Throughout the month, Boisson had indicated to 
Vichy his concern about Britain’s increased propaganda efforts in AOF.  In the beginning 
of the month, representatives of de Gaulle had been sent to Gambia, a thin horizontal 
strip of land cutting across Senegal from the Atlantic that had been a British colony since 
the late nineteenth century.  According to Boisson, their mission was to use Gambia as a 
base to gauge the possibility of dissent against Vichy in West Africa.117  On September 
14, Boisson notified Platon about a conversation he had with members of the French 
African Chamber of Commerce, who had raised a number of economic issues with 
Boisson, including the impediment of the flow of goods and products throughout the 
colonies by both British blockades and conditions of the armistice with Germany.118  On 
September 21, he warned Platon that British propaganda threatened to throw all of Africa 
into dissidence unless sharp measures were taken.119  Boisson warned that the disparity 
between the economic situations of British West Africa and AOF was being used as a 
propaganda point by the Allies.  British propaganda was also directed against Boisson 
himself.  Prior to and during the assault on Dakar, they had painted Boisson and the 
Vichy-loyal regime as supporting Nazi aims in Africa, and portrayed Boisson himself as 
a mere puppet of the Germans, despite his assertions that there were no Germans in 
Africa.   
The joint British/Free French attack on Dakar took place from September 23-25 
and was a bold attempt by the British and de Gaulle to seize the remainder of sub-
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Saharan Africa from Vichy.120  It would turn out to be both a miscalculation and a 
setback for the Free France cause.  While they sent a significant force, including 
numerous heavy warships and over 8,000 troops, it seems the joint British-Gaullist 
military leadership underestimated the resolve of the pro-Vichy forces to hold the port 
city.  On the first night, British aircraft dropped propaganda leaflets on the city as 
representatives of de Gaulle attempted to land and present terms, but were turned back.  
That same night, Boisson addressed West Africa by radio and took pains to emphasize 
the independence of AOF from German control: 
This morning, a horrible attack was perpetrated on peaceful and hard-working 
Dakar.  In an attempt to convince us to join his movement, de Gaulle supported 
the lies and the cannons of the English fleet.  It began with them saying that 
Dakar was or would be in the hands of the Germans, that Dakar was starving. I 
oppose these miserable deceptions with the most formal denial. You know that no 
German is in Dakar and there has never been any question of German occupation 
of Dakar.121 
 
Over the next two days, the Free French/British force conducted bombing raids and 
shelling of coastal positions, but never seriously weakened them or penetrated Dakar’s 
inner defenses.  To make matters worse, British bombs fell somewhat clumsily on 
civilian areas, causing casualties that Vichy was quick to exploit.  Seeing the death toll 
rise, and understanding that Dakar would not fall easily, de Gaulle ended the attack on 
September 25.  The Vichy presence in Africa, besieged since the early days of July, had 
won a reprieve.   
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In Boisson’s estimation, the attack on Dakar radically turned around Vichy’s 
prospects in Africa.  Prior to the attack, the morale of the European population had been 
low, with much uncertainty about the future of the war and economic prospects in the 
colony.122  After the defection of AEF, the situation had been exacerbated by British 
radio propaganda suggesting that Germany had long-term interests in French Africa, and 
calling on the French to rise against the Vichy sympathetic regime for patriotic reasons.  
Boisson also noted the great fears of the indigènes about being subjected to “domination” 
by Germany.123  However, according to Boisson, the situation had been clarified by the 
British attack.  Most notably, he observed that “the rigorous and precise conduct of 
bombings through the use of large mortar shells provoked an intense nervous shock, 
especially among the female population, the children, as well as among the Syrian 
population and the indigènes.”124  Vichy took advantage of this sentiment and distributed 
brochures that exaggerated civilian casualties resulting from the British “aggression.”125    
According to Vichy, the attack had largely discredited the Gaullist movement among the 
population of Senegal, and they had proven through their fierce resistance to the British 
that they would remain loyal to Vichy.  Consequently, the end of the year political report 
noted that the repelling of the joint British-Gaullist force “marked the end of uncertainty 
and puts a stop to the massive rallying to the Gaullist cause.”126 
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 The combined attack on Dakar also provided fertile ground for a counterattack of 
anti-British propaganda from Vichy.  On September 24, Minister of Colonies Charles 
Platon, who was viscerally anti-British and passed much of his time as colonial minister 
plotting ways to re-conquer AEF from de Gaulle, addressed AOF in a speech wherein he 
labeled the attacks as “treason” and “odious aggression.”  He further emphasized that the 
only purpose they served was to threaten the ruin of the French empire.127 One piece of 
Vichy propaganda stressed that the armistice had not infringed upon French sovereignty; 
instead, it was the Gaullists who had “broken the unity of the Empire.”128  Almost 
immediately after the attack, the film Dakar, après l’attaque des 23, 24, et 25 Septembre 
1940, was produced and distributed to cinemas throughout both the occupied and 
unoccupied zones, AOF, and North Africa.  Dakar, 15 minutes in length, largely glorified 
the efforts of the colonial administration and France’s courageous African subjects who 
defended the port against assault.  It also showed images of the damage caused to civilian 
areas by British and Gaullist forces.129  Essentially, the British assault was used by Vichy 
as an effective means to highlight de Gaulle’s treachery – not only had he attacked 
France, but he had done so in collusion with the perfidious British.  The two now 
presented the greatest threat to the sovereignty and integrity of the Empire. 
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 A letter written from an unknown author (“X”) in Avignon to his brother “Henri” 
on October 9, 1940, is illustrative of the message emanating from Vichy immediately 
after the Dakar attack.  “Henri” was stationed at Fort Lamy, Chad, which had defected to 
Free France over a month earlier.  In the letter, “X” attempts to convince Henri of the 
folly of supporting Britain.  After blaming the war on the Jewish population of Europe 
and emphasizing the atrocities of the British bombing campaign, the author emphasized 
that France must maintain the Empire because it had a role to play in the postwar order.  
De Gaulle and the British were threatening that future: 
In France we cannot accept working with the English, who seek only to dissolve 
our Colonial Empire.  The case of Dakar…has clearly proved that you are 
obeying a street performer in the person of de Gaulle. Certainly we understand 
that [you are] far from the métropole and ill-informed…But our specific role is to 
bring you up to speed and to take stock of the situation. So I beg you to stop your 
propaganda efforts in favor of the Anglo-Gaullist movement, a movement which 
is clearly anti-French.130 
 
The letter added that France only had one choice that could save the Empire – to maintain 
unity under the leadership of Pétain. 
 However, as French citizens began to accept the new paradigm in which Britain 
was again a bitter enemy, there were still concerns about morale in the empire.  Despite 
Boisson’s earlier assurances about AOF opinion rallying to Vichy, on October 20 Platon 
warned the colonies about British propaganda that focused on the uncertain future of the 
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French Empire.131  Boisson also noted the harmful effect of propaganda on colonies 
proximate to British Empire territories, especially Niger, Dahomey, and Ivory Coast.  By 
November, Gabon had rallied to Free France, thus placing all of AEF under Allied 
control.  Even worse, there was increased concern about America’s position regarding the 
attacks.  On October 7, the Foreign Minister wrote to the Secretary of War, noting that 
France’s ambassador to the United States Gaston Henry Haye had indicated that the U.S. 
largely approved Britain’s actions in Senegal.132  The U.S. firmly believed that there were 
German agents in Dakar, a charge that Henry Haye vigorously denied.133   
The British/Free France campaign was also instigating internal problems.  The 
demobilization and return to Africa of the tirailleurs (African soldiers) who had served in 
Europe provided opportunity for unrest.134  Britain had already begun a propaganda 
campaign aimed at convincing the tirailleurs to defect to Free France – a campaign that 
continued through 1941.135  Another concern was the uprisings among the hamalliste 
movement, followers of the deceased Sufi Muslim leader Hamahullah bin Muhammad 
bin Umar.136  These uprisings had plagued the French in West Africa throughout the 
1920s and early 1930s.  Now, Boisson claimed, the hamallistes were “convinced of our 
impotence, not only to maintain order but also to continue to assure the effective 
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occupation of the territory.  They believe the moment has come to impose their beliefs on 
the Sahel by force.”  They conducted attacks throughout French Soudan (present-day 
Mali) in August 1940, killing dozens.  The spread of Islam was also a concern in Senegal, 
Ivory Coast, Niger, and Mauritania.137  In response to these concerns and others, Boisson 
proposed a more centralized economic policy, the restoration of maritime shipping and 
commerce, and a stepped-up propaganda campaign to improve morale.138 
 Boisson also felt pressed to take more repressive measures in the face of potential 
encirclement by the British.  Almost immediately after Mers-el-Kébir, a campaign of 
surveillance was initiated throughout AOF and AEF, and was even more vigorously 
pursued after the defection of AEF and the attack on Dakar.  AOF also suspended the 
elected Municipal Council and replaced it with a “special municipal delegation”, hand-
picked by the office of the high commissioner.  Shortly after the attack on Dakar, Boisson 
had many prominent citizens arrested for suspected Gaullist leanings, including the 
mayor of Dakar, the president of the chamber of commerce, and the president of the local 
chapter of the League of Human Rights.139  He continued this harsh repression of 
dissidents throughout his tenure as high commissioner.140  In December he recommended 
either interning or expelling any British citizens that could be found on French African 
soil; these recommendations were disapproved by both Weygand and Platon because they 
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would needlessly deliver propaganda points to the British.141  But by that point, Pétain 
had already decided that Boisson needed more help in Africa. 
 
Weygand’s Appointment and the Murphy-Weygand Accords 
 General Maxime Weygand, who had served as the Supreme Commander of 
French forces after the replacement of General Gamelin in May 1940, and as Minister of 
Defense in the first three months of the Vichy regime, was appointed as Pétain’s 
delegate-general to Africa in October 1940, primarily to quell the aforementioned fear of 
dissidence in French Africa.  An internal Vichy memo had indicated that such dissidence 
in the empire threatened the loss of territories, noting that ““it is clear, moreover, that a 
France without an empire…would in the immediate future fall into the worst material 
hardships and would in its own eyes, as in those of the world powers, be no more than a 
simple province of continental Europe.”142  Weygand was a strong believer in the 
inviolability of the Empire and a fierce disciple of Pétain and the National Revolution.143  
He also strongly distrusted the British, in part because of disagreements over military 
policy in the days leading to the fall of France to the Nazis.144  In December 1940, shortly 
after his appointment as delegate-general, Weygand granted an interview to Jay Allen of 
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the New York Times, who would also later be the first American to interview Pétain.  
During the short interview, Weygand provided insight into his views on the importance 
of Africa to France: 
I am here to serve my country.  That country is Marshall Pétain incarnated.  There 
is not any second France.  There is only one.  I have been delegated to command 
all French Africa.  My mission is to maintain the unity of French Africa in itself 
and the unity of French Africa with the metropolis of France.  Africa is one with 
France and General Weygand is one with Marshall Pétain.145 
 
His interview with Allen was similar to views he expressed just before his removal from 
the position of delegate-general in 1941, when he noted that, through the Armistice’s 
provisions allowing France to retain control of the empire, “France again became master 
of an important factor in the outcome of the war, and the strategic position in its control 
became a trump essential in the general diplomatic situation.”146 
Upon his appointment, he was given detailed instructions from Pétain regarding 
his mission.  Noting that large parts of the empire were in disagreement with the 
métropole, Pétain indicated that Weygand’s three most important objectives were to 
ensure the security of the three territories most threatened by military action – Tunisia, 
Morocco, and Senegal; “maintain without fissure the bloc of our African possessions that 
remain loyal”; and attempt to rally to Vichy pockets of dissidence in the territories.147  To 
this end, Weygand was given extensive responsibilities in Africa – commander in chief of 
all military forces in Africa, coordinator of all matters that affected military security 
(including some economic issues), coordinator of the efforts of the governors-general, in 
                                                 
145 Jay Allen, “Weygand Denies Rift with Pétain, Holds There is ‘Only One’ France,” New York 
Times, Dec. 12, 1941. 
146 Memorandum by General Weygand, relayed by Robert Murphy to Cordell Hull, Nov. 18, 
1941.  Foreign Relations of the United States 1941, Vol. II (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1959), 461-3. 
147 Instruction de Mission pour Monsieur le Général Weygand, Oct. 5, 1940, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 
638 Dossier 4. 
60 
 
charge of strategy to retake lost colonial possessions, and head of all propaganda efforts 
in French Africa.148  He was also granted extraordinary emergency powers.149 
As one of his first responsibilities, Weygand was sent on the first of three visits to 
French Africa in November 1940, during which he conducted inspections of Algeria, 
Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, French Soudan, Ivory Coast, Togo, Dahomey, and Niger.  
The primary goal of his mission was to better coordinate relations and commerce 
between North Africa and AOF.150  In his report to Pétain, he emphasized the outpouring 
of support and loyalty for Vichy that he had personally witnessed.  He also noted that in 
most of West Africa, Germany remained the enemy, but England had fallen in disfavor 
due to the attacks on Mers-el-Kébir and Dakar.151  Nevertheless, there were still many 
who openly advocated for British victory.  Weygand encouraged Pétain to increase anti-
British propaganda efforts throughout the territories, and appoint only loyal Vichyites to 
key positions.  He also asked Pétain to take measures to improve economic conditions in 
the territories, especially by allowing for better flow of goods and transit.  Above all, 
Pétain had to do his best to avoid providing concessions to Germany and Italy in French 
Africa, as it could upset the delicate balance of sympathy among the population.  The 
central principle remained the unity and integrity of French territories in Africa.  
Weygand concluded his report by noting that “the situation in sub-Saharan Africa is far 
from definitively settled…consolidating this union through all the means in their power is 
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the sole objective of all representatives of the French state in all of the African 
territories.”152    
An internal Vichy memo from November 23, 1940 corroborates some of the 
threats to the French African Empire discussed by Weygand.  The loss of AEF and the 
propaganda threat it posed to Vichy’s territories in North Africa, the desire for Italy to 
increase its influence in the Mediterranean, a “profound malaise” throughout AOF, 
ongoing British blockades of parts of West Africa, and the threat of direct German or 
Italian intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, were all contributing to an atmosphere which 
dictated that Vichy had to take “measures to maintain our sovereignty in French 
Africa.”153  But the memo argued that attempts to restore control could not be too heavy-
handed, as it could lead to an atmosphere of civil war, “whose sole beneficiaries would 
clearly be either Great Britain or Germany.”154  The memo further suggested a policy of 
absolute neutrality regarding the war.  What was needed was better administrative and 
economic coordination between Vichy and the colonies, and stronger diplomatic efforts.  
 Dealing with these problems without upsetting the delicate balance in Africa was 
a difficult proposition.  Given France’s precarious position between Germany and Great 
Britain, one solution proposed by the memorandum was better relations with the United 
States.  America held the key to French Africa because of its relationship with Great 
Britain and its ability to provide fuels to the colonies.  If the United States decided to 
follow Britain’s lead and cut off credit or goods to Africa, “all of our African territories 
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will fall like a ripe fruit into the hands of Great Britain or the dissidents.”155  Therefore, 
negotiations with Washington were necessary in order to give the State Department “the 
sense that it is in the interest of the United States that France maintain its sovereignty 
over its territories.”156  During his time as delegate-general, Weygand vigorously pursued 
this policy, recognizing the importance of the United States to maintaining France’s 
presence in Africa. 
The United States was also eager to conduct negotiations with Vichy, if only to 
get a better sense of its war intentions.  In January 1941, the State Department sent 
Robert Murphy to visit both North and West Africa.  During the trip, which included 
stops in Algiers, Dakar, and Tunis, Murphy met with Weygand to discuss the war and 
France’s need for assistance from the United States to obtain a better flow of goods for 
the colonies.  As a whole, the meeting is exemplary of Vichy’s flexibility, whereby it 
played both sides so as to secure better conditions in the empire.  In order to put Murphy 
at ease, Weygand insisted that he wanted the British to win the war, a sentiment with 
which many in his group agreed.157  Whether he meant it or not, Weygand qualified his 
statement by noting that “my primary job, however, is to keep France intact – for France.  
It is a situation in which the greatest discretion must be exercised.”158  Both Weygand and 
Boisson, who also attended the meeting, were particularly concerned about British 
designs in French Africa.  For his part, Murphy assured Weygand that President 
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Roosevelt understood France’s desire to maintain the integrity of the empire and protect 
it from all forms of aggression.  America was willing to help Vichy in these aims, but 
only to the extent that it did not detract from Britain’s war effort.159   
Weygand countered by saying that the United States could best remedy the 
situation in Africa by helping clear the way for a better flow of goods and products to the 
colonies, currently hindered by British blockades.160  He suggested that such American 
help could strengthen French Africa so that it might be used militarily against Germany, 
or at the very least, as a bargaining chip with Hitler in Europe.161  According to 
Weygand, the French considered the empire in Africa as “France’s last trump card which 
must be cautiously and skillfully played.”162  Murphy assured him that the United States 
would help, but he was particularly concerned about the presence of Germans in French 
Africa, to which Weygand insisted there were none.  However, pressing a separate point, 
Weygand noted the danger of British propaganda directed at the colonies, “that aims to 
weaken our influence and rattle our foundation in sub-Saharan Africa, which could give 
the Germans an excuse to intervene.”163  The meeting concluded with Weygand having a 
sense that Murphy and the Americans genuinely wanted to provide help to France.   
These initial talks led to the Murphy-Weygand accords of February 26, 1941, 
whereby the United States agreed to provide economic aid to North and West Africa in 
spite of the British blockade, in exchange for assurances that the French fleet would not 
be turned over to Germany and that none of the aid would leave its place of import or be 
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transferred to the Axis.164  Concerns about a possible German presence in French North 
Africa delayed implementation of the economic aid program, but in April Secretary of 
State Hull approved the first shipment of purchases.165  Although the program would be 
largely suspended in late 1941 after Pétain’s recall of Weygand from his role as delegate-
general to Africa, in the short term it enabled a greater optimism for Vichy in AOF, 
despite the setbacks of the previous year. 
For his part, Boisson remained positive about France’s position in Africa at the 
beginning of 1941.  While there were still concerns about Muslim uprisings and potential 
population shifts throughout the territories, it seemed that Britain’s assault had been 
significantly repelled, and the potential unrest caused by the return of the demobilized 
tirailleurs had begun to be allayed by their reintegration into society.166  As Vichy 
consolidated its control over West Africa, Boisson had two priorities.  First, it was 
important not to abandon the colonial project in Africa.  Boisson’s report notes that 
“there is no advantage…in abandoning our traditionally humane policy, for policies that 
would not be our way.”167 More importantly, France had to recognize the vitality of its 
African territories to the future of the Empire: 
The year 1941, one can already predict, will mark the end of internal divisions 
and hesitations. The Anglo-Saxon policy will finally throw off its mask and the 
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French of Black Africa will come together to make, along with the loyal natives, a 
new France in which the Empire is the principal asset.168 [emphasis added] 
 
Boisson had reason for optimism.  The events of the second half of 1940 had ensured that 
preservation of the sovereignty of France’s African territories was one of Vichy’s most 
important policies. 
  
Propaganda to Maintain the Sovereignty of the Empire 
Having fought off the British at Dakar and consolidated its position in North 
Africa and AOF through the Murphy-Weygand accords, Vichy initiated a series of 
propaganda efforts to support its imperial project and combat Britain’s supposedly 
malevolent designs on French territory.  This propaganda, according to a December 1942 
Free France report, had two goals – to maintain the cohesion of the Empire, and to defend 
it against all aggression.169  Pétain continued to provide the rhetorical foundation for this 
message.  On April 9, 1941, he gave a speech to the empire in which he noted that “the 
pride of France is not only the integrity of her territory, but also the cohesion of her 
Empire….One cannot serve France by being against French unity, against the unity of the 
fatherland and the Empire.”170  He also oversaw other efforts to enhance France’s 
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colonial stance and self-awareness.  These efforts included significant propaganda 
campaigns throughout the métropole and empire, spanning a diverse range of media. 
 The most prominent of these was the semaine impériale of July 1941.  
Recognizing the importance of the colonies to both French unity and France’s postwar 
prestige, in spring of 1941 Vichy began planning a weeklong celebration that would 
commemorate the empire and emphasize its integral place in France’s future.  The 
committee charged with its planning contained prominent officials from several 
ministries, including the colonial administration, the navy, information, and the interior.  
General Weygand sent a personal representative to observe.  The notes of the meeting 
emphasized that “France must demonstrate that it is able, better than anyone else to 
defend, administer, and develop its overseas territories.”171  Consequently, a 
commemorative week was necessary in order to revitalize imperial consciousness in the 
métropole, strengthen the attachment of colonial populations to France, remind foreign 
nations about French imperial power, facilitate the return of territories lost to Free 
France, and prepare the French people for the future Empire.172  A significant propaganda 
campaign was planned, to include radio, newspapers, brochures and posters, cinema, and 
expositions, and a budget of 10 million francs was set aside.  The central message was 
that France had to maintain its colonial empire for a variety of reasons, but most 
importantly for influence, international prestige, economic importance, and resources.173 
The campaign took place from July 15-21, 1941, and was launched by an address 
from Pétain on July 15, in which he saluted the loyalty of the entire Empire, and 
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especially the indigènes “who, during this misfortune of our fatherland, have retained 
their love and trust for this to the great nation that has always loved and protected 
them.”174  Platon provided a similar message, indicating that the Gaullists underestimated 
the loyalty of the native populations of French colonies.175  On July 19, Le Temps echoed 
this theme of colonial loyalty in an editorial, and noted that despite its diversity, the 
empire was absolutely unified: “with each part of greater France keeping its originality, a 
common union that will increase the moral power of the French bloc will be established 
under the influence of feeling, reflection, and experience.”176   The week was also an 
opportunity for colonial governors to reaffirm both their loyalty to the empire, and that of 
their subjects, which the governor of Djibouti did when he sent a personal message to 
Platon.177  Réunion, French Guyane, and AOF provided similar messages later in the 
week.178   
Demonstrations were staged throughout the empire and the unoccupied zone.  The 
first ceremony took place in Lyon, where a large parade including Vietnamese workers, 
French youth, and the Legion Française de Combattants was held.179  The latter was a 
veterans’ group devoted to implementing the principles of the National Revolution.180 
Clermont-Ferrand and Chatel-Guyon both hosted a series of demonstrations and 
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conferences that lasted through July 20.  At Vichy, a two-day colonial exhibition was set 
up in the train station.181    On July 17, Pétain attended a conference on the explorer 
Ferdinand Savorgnon de Brazza and discussed the ongoing dissident movement in 
Gabon.182  On July 20, Platon presided over a parade in St. Raphael (Dordogne) 
orchestrated to show the unity of the Empire that included Vietnamese, Senegalese, and 
Malagasy subjects.183   At the conclusion of the week, Boisson emphasized this message 
of unity in a radio message on the contributions of Africa to the empire: 
From Dakar inviolate I send France an expression of the commitment and 
dedication of Black Africa.  In fighting fiercely for our French loyalty, we have 
known and still know that, if it was necessary, we would never allow a separation 
from France.  The fate of France and that of Africa is closely intertwined, and that 
solidarity is forever etched in every African heart. French West Africa is 
completely dedicated to its work to come to France’s assistance when needed.184 
 
Another goal of Vichy’s propaganda in the empire was to foster a culture of 
obedience its subjects.  Upon taking his post as governor of Senegal in January 1941, 
Georges Pierre Rey emphasized that “work, discipline, and union” were the most 
important values in Senegal, because the new order installed by Vichy was working 
together for the recovery of France.185  That February, Boisson gave a speech before the 
Council of Notables of St. Louis (Senegal), which represented the African population.  
Acknowledging that it was not possible for him to speak to all of the indigènes, Boisson 
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asked the notables to take his message back to the population.  After emphasizing his 
faith in the “fidelity and loyalty” of the Senegalese people, he noted that the duty of the 
indigènes was to work hard and tend to their own place.  Marshall Pétain’s message, he 
insisted, was a simple one: 
What does the Marshall still tell us? 
That we must obey. 
That we must take up again the habit of obedience. 
… 
What I am telling you is a simple thing: 
Obey.  Work. 
These are the only remedies to heal Senegal, and France.186 
 
Boisson emphasized not only obedience to French authorities, but also a renewed 
devotion to tribal hierarchies, with chiefs answering to Boisson himself.  This was 
reminiscent of the policy of association, followed in the late Third Republic, and to which 
Vichy had returned. 
 Anti-British themes also remained a staple of Vichy propaganda, both in the 
métropole and the colonies.  One pamphlet, sarcastically titled “Nos Amis les Anglais” 
(“our friends the English”) was distributed by the Légion Françaises des Combattants de 
l’Afrique Noire, an offshoot of the larger quasi-fascist Légion Françaises des 
Combattants organization.  The branch of the Africa Legion had elevated Boisson as its 
honorary leader.187  The pamphlet, disseminated in August 1942, introduced the reader to 
the long history of enmity between England and France, going back to Louis VI’s 
resistance against Henry I of Britain in 1119.  It also reminded readers that France had 
borne the brunt of misery during World War I.  To these more understandable concerns, 
                                                 
186 Speech Pronounced before Council of Notables of St. Louis, Feb. 12, 1941, ANOM, 1 
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the pamphlet claimed that France’s decision to go to war in 1939 had been misguided, as 
it served the purpose of the British and the “Jewish Empire.”  However, after a series of 
British betrayals, France was no longer under any illusions.  The pamphlet noted that “the 
mask has come off.  The horrible conjunction of the Jew, England, and the unfortunate 
American, under which the government responded “at your service” to the orders of the 
Sanhedrin, declared war in Europe.  France is in Europe, and it took a disaster to remind 
her of this.”188  It added that “no word, no statistic, can convey the amount of harm that 
these powers have caused the French community.”189  Given the alleged designs of 
European Jews to take over Europe, and the pain inflicted upon France by the war, the 
pamphlet concluded by saying that “whoever is for the Jew is for the British, and 
whoever is for the British is against the French.”190   
The Legion would continue to support Vichy’s propaganda efforts in Africa, 
which included a conference in August 1942 that examined ways to more effectively aim 
propaganda at both Europeans and colonial subjects in the territories.191  The Legion’s 
propaganda spanned brochures, film, radio, and newspapers and was targeted at a wide 
variety of audiences, including European settlers, evolués, former tirailleurs, and 
schoolchildren from all levels of education.192  The Legion also made use of the daily 
newspaper Paris-Dakar, which provided it a weekly page to publish anti-Gaullist and 
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anti-British propaganda.193  Beginning in August 1942, the Legion started its own 
publication Le Légionnaire, in Dakar.  Branches in Senegal and Mauritania had their own 
publications as well.194 
Vichy also made efforts to target printed material to its subjects by translating it 
into local dialects.  One such pamphlet was distributed throughout Dahomey in 1942.  
Titled “Pourquoi?” it was a direct response to British propaganda efforts in West Africa 
to undermine support for Vichy: 
Why do the English authorities say terrible things about the French? Why do they 
set the Nigerians against the Dahomeans, who are their brothers? These are the 
questions we must ask the English. Don’t the English say that the French were 
their old friends and allies? They never gave them any help during the battle, and 
after the battle they stole the boats of their former friends and allies; they fired 
cannons and bombed their cities; they have gone to war with the French.  There is 
no person in the world not familiar with their atrocities…Why do the English seek 
to attack us as enemies?  Are there not other enemies to fight in the world?195 
 
Another pamphlet, “The Free Consciousness of France” favorably compared the state of 
happiness and satisfaction in France’s colonies to those of Britain.  Yet another, “The 
Agreement with France” emphasized that the indigènes in the empire remained faithful to 
France because “they know the truth” that living under French rule was more peaceful 
and beneficial than British rule.  Consequently, French subjects “direct all their efforts so 
that the French government can regain the power it has lost, and above all, they do not 
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want to follow the British path.”196  In reality, these brochures were mere rhetoric.  Vichy 
had already made significant efforts to roll back rights granted by the Third Republic to 
Africans, and was contemplating a new constitution that would disenfranchise its subjects 
even further. 
 
Vichy’s Conflicting Plans for the Future of the Indigènes 
 While Vichy focused on augmenting imperial consciousness in the métropole, 
Boisson was concerned about the morale of his subjects and their treatment by the French 
administration.  Despite the ongoing war, Boisson continued to believe in France’s duties 
to its African subjects and the civilizing mission.  In May 1941, he vigorously opposed a 
plan by Platon to severely reduce the number of originaires (Africans from the four 
communes of Senegal, discussed below) fighting in the French army; Platon’s 
justification was the “mediocre military valor of the originaires.”197  Noting that it was 
very difficult to roll back rights acquired by certain groups over the years, and that 
stripping the originaires of military service would serve a useful propaganda point for the 
British, Boisson recommended maintaining the status quo.198  On June 26, he sent a 
memo to the colonial governors in Africa and warned them against ill treatment of the 
indigènes: 
Various sources have informed me of the tendency of governmental officials, 
other agents of the colonial administration, and private organizations to be less 
hospitable to the indigènes, and in all cases to show them a less than benevolent 
concern or even remote coldness. This trend, to the extent it exists, is an offense 
against the heart and the spirit that we should not commit and that I will not 
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tolerate in any of its manifestations. We have just obtained, in a time of 
indescribable national distress, very reassuring proof of the deep, and I would say, 
even the sincere affection of our indigène nationals. We should not today, through 
an absolutely inconsistent attitude contrary to French tradition, reward this fidelity 
and loyalty with unacceptable and unjustified detachment.199 
 
Instead, Boisson recommended even more interaction between the French and their 
subjects, including further education.  In closing, he reminded the governors that “every 
indigène is the beneficiary of a French colonial system that is the most humane and the 
most generous in the world” and that “the destiny of Africa and metropolitan France is 
tightly knit.”200 
During his tenure as high commissioner of sub-Saharan Africa, Boisson also 
drafted several reports and policy papers concerning the future of the continent.  
However, unlike some of the earlier Third Republic colonial administrators discussed by 
Alice Conklin, Boisson was not interested per se in the evolution of the local 
population.201  In August 1941, he drafted “Trois Directives de Colonisation Africaine”, 
which set forth a general outline for France’s future colonial policy.202  In it, he called for 
better collaboration with and supervision of the indigènes, noting that “[t]o colonize is 
essentially to cause indigenous societies to advance in ways that we have chosen for them 
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and in which they must, under our supervision, find the improvement of their living 
conditions, both physical and moral.”203  Of particular importance for Boisson was the 
need to improve discipline in all areas of the everyday life of the indigène – discipline in 
housing, diet, clothing, and agricultural life – in order to break “old habits.”  Nothing less 
than a complete control over indigenous society was required; Boisson noted that “we 
must show, prove, advise, decree, control, and constantly return to the task irrespective of 
the area in which the colonizer is exerting himself.”204  In order to properly guide the 
indigènes to accept these new ways of life, France had to “anchor” in them a sense of 
professional conscience, a work ethic that paid attention to detail, and a greater devotion 
to honest dealing.205 
Boisson’s plans to improve Africa were also reactive to the ongoing struggle with 
Britain.  In January 1942, he drafted a program for administrative and economic reforms 
in AOF, in part geared to combat British propaganda efforts to portray the failure of mise 
en valeur in Africa under Vichy.206  Among the needs identified by Boisson in Africa 
were more specialists and technicians, an overhaul of schools for colonial administrators 
in France, and improved training of a bureaucracy within the colonial population so as to 
foster better collaboration.  These reforms were necessary because, in Boisson’s 
estimation, many aspects of the French colonial mission were failing – commerce was 
inefficient, health and hygiene issues abounded, and despite French efforts, much of the 
                                                 
203 Trois Directions de Colonisation Française, ANOM, 17G395.  “Coloniser c’est 
essentiellement faire avancer les sociétés indigènes dans les voies que nous avons choisies pour 
elles et dans lesquelles elles doivent, sous notre tutelle, trouver l’amélioration de leurs conditions 
de vie matérielle et morale.”   
204 Ibid.  “Il faut montrer et démontrer, conseiller, ordonner, contrôler et sans cesse revenir à la 
charge quel que soit le domaine d’activité où le Colonisateur se dépense.”   
205 Ibid. 
206 Directives pour un programme d’équipement administrative et économique de l’Afrique 
Occidentale Française, p. 4, ANOM, 1AFFPOL982, Dossier 6.   
75 
 
colonial population still had a provincial mentality.  Yet Boisson did not necessarily want 
to follow a policy of assimilation. He contrasted a policy of “European colonization” with 
“indigenous colonization” – the latter was preferable because it was more realistic and 
took into account the aptitudes of the indigènes.  Returning to a theme from his 1938 
speech before the Academy of Colonial Sciences, he observed that, “the African is a 
farmer, and for political stability and the tranquility of our occupation, he must remain a 
farmer, and it would be an error to create a proletariat through industrialization.”207  
Essentially, the solution for Africa was to train better colonial administrators to better 
understand their subjects, so as to enable more efficient French exploitation of natural 
resources on the continent and preserve French influence. 
However, Boisson’s views differed from his colleagues in the Vichy regime. He 
represented a middle ground between the early 20th century assimilationist policies of the 
Third Republic and Vichy’s plans for the colonies.  Using case studies of Madagascar, 
Guadeloupe, and Indochina, Eric Jennings has shown how the debate between association 
and assimilation essentially ended when Vichy came to power.  Vichy used the virtues of 
the “National Revolution” in a cynical fashion, as a means to inspire in local populations 
notions of cultural or biological distinction.  As Jennings argues, this new awareness led 
to the rejection of assimilation and the democratic values of the Third Republic, thus 
removing the burden of Vichy having to offer colonial population the rights of French 
citizenship.208  Vichy’s true attitude toward its subjects is also revealed by actions taken 
to repeal the rights earned by French citizens in the four communes of Senegal, as well as 
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debates on the constitution of 1944.  While the Third Republic had taken several 
(admittedly flawed) measures to integrate Africans into the republic, the Vichy regime 
never saw them as anything more than subjects.  This attitude also indirectly sheds light 
on why Africa was so vital to Vichy.  The regime’s policy was certainly not focused upon 
maintaining the participation of the indigènes in the body politic of the Empire.  Instead, 
in the end, French sub-Saharan was nothing more than a bargaining chip for the revival of 
French prestige in the postwar order – or in Pétain’s words, his best playing card.   
 Although Pétain had been voted full powers by representatives of the Third 
Republic, he did not wish to exercise power through the parliamentary system.  
Throughout the Vichy regime, governmental committees worked on a new constitution in 
line with the principles of the National Revolution and capable of providing the 
government the powers it needed to reshape French society.  This would eventually result 
in the Project of the Constitution of 1944, which was signed by Pétain but never put into 
effect.  Even before this effort was underway, Pétain and his followers had taken 
significant steps to curtail or completely remove political rights for the indigènes.  Vichy 
also underwent administrative reorganization during this period, with a Permanent 
Secretary General position (answering directly to the Prime Minister) created in 
November 1941 to coordinate economic issues in Africa.209  The position served as proof 
that Vichy understood the effect of ongoing economic hardship in the political sphere. 
Under the Third Republic, French subjects in the four communes of Senegal 
(Dakar, Rufisque, Gorée, and St. Louis, all on the western end of the colony) had been 
given the opportunity to attain French citizenship.  By 1914, these citizens, known as the 
                                                 




originaires, had earned a representative in the National Assembly, Blaise Diagne.  The 
granting of political representation was partially meant to help recruitment of African 
soldiers for World War I.  Such military service also provided the opportunity for French 
citizenship.  The originaires were also able to vote for their representative in the national 
assembly and were immune from conscription into forced labor programs.  They were 
given access to the colonial bureaucracy and were allowed to form municipal councils 
(one for each of the four communes) through which they could exercise limited authority 
over local matters and provide advice to the governor-general of Senegal.  In essence, 
Senegal was the most direct beneficiary of the mission civilisatrice’s aim to assimilate 
select subjects into the French body politic. 
From the outset, Vichy sought to roll back the Third Republic’s policies of 
assimilation and some of the rights granted to the originaires.  In September 1940, Vichy 
dissolved the municipal council of Senegal, in large part due to the fear of dissidence 
after the Dakar attack.210  The following year, Pétain suspended the circonscription de 
Dakar, a 1924 statute that allowed for elections of administrators to address limited local 
matters.  Now, these administrators would be subject to the approval of the governor-
general, and he would have greater oversight of local policy.  Boisson protested against 
this reorganization in early 1942, largely for reasons of efficiency.211  Also in 1941, the 
governor was given the power to appoint representatives to municipal councils.212  That 
same year, other municipal bodies in AOF were substantially overhauled, now providing 
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the governor-general with the ability to suspend the powers of mayors and the 
councils.213   
As mentioned, Vichy was also considering the outlines of a new constitution.  To 
this end, in 1941, the Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Colonies prepared a 
report for Platon discussing the need for constitutional reforms in the Empire.214  The 
memo noted that despite France’s long involvement in the imperial project, there had 
never been an Imperial Charter.215  Instead, the dominance of the National Assembly 
during the Third Republic had led to a system of laws that contradicted local policy 
followed in the colonies.216  The result was a state of confusion with local conditions 
having to default and adapt to national law.  Further, the report noted that the power of 
the National Assembly to make laws affecting the colonies, along with the Third 
Republic’s policy of assimilation in Senegal, were mutually reinforcing, as the ability of 
the originaires to elect a member to the National Assembly gave the lawmaking body 
greater legitimacy over colonial policy.    
 These assimilationist policies of the Third Republic were directly counter to 
Vichy’s plans for the Empire.  Assimilation had been a failure because it was not well-
adopted to the local populations it sought to integrate into France.  In justifying this 
belief, the memo indicated that “it is true that the Declaration of the Rights of Man states 
that men are born and remain free and equal in rights, but this equality does not 
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necessarily mean assimilation.”217  Instead, the memo recommended a hard policy of 
association, whereby Africans would have a measure of self-government but would not 
be accorded full rights as French citizens.    Despite Third Republic efforts to assimilate 
its subjects, the indigènes were not like the French: 
…in this sense, equality is pure nonsense.  Are the indigènes more or less 
[human] than us?  Put this way, the question has no answer.  What is certain is 
that the indigènes are “others”.  This idea of fundamental difference between the 
colonies and the métropole, and also between the colonies themselves, is 
important.  One can say that this idea is now universally understood.  Every 
foreign colonial organization that we have seen, as well as previous systems in 
France, have assumed this even when they do not proclaim it.218 
 
Rather than equality before the law, the memo argued, there should be systems of 
separate laws governing the métropole and the Empire – essentially, separate but equal.  
 The memo also reveals the reality behind Vichy’s rhetoric of unity.  It further 
argued that the idea of assimilation and unity of a French body politic actually derived 
from the constitution of the Year III of the Revolution, which had contained the language 
“the Republic is one and indivisible.”  From this notion was born the illusion of the unity 
of the people of the métropole and the Empire.  In contrast, the memo argued that there 
was no such territorial unity in France, and it was foolish to suggest otherwise.  The 
legitimate power of the sovereign should not flow from the concept of the indivisible 
republic, but rather from the person of the strong executive.   Instead of providing 
representation for indigènes in the National Assembly, their interests would be 
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represented at the local level.  The governors-general would have central power in the 
colonies and answer to the national government in Paris.  In turn, the governors-general 
personified the “autonomie locale” of each colony, and would be the representative of 
local legislative, administrative, and financial power.  At the national level, the chief of 
state would be the head of all colonial policy, with a Minister of the Empire in charge of 
administering it.  All union-wide matters would be dealt with in the President’s circle, out 
of the hands of the indigènes.219   
Of course, this policy meant moving away from granting the indigènes French 
citizenship, as had been the policy of the Third Republic with the évolués and the 
tirailleurs.  The memo justified this radical shift by aligning the concept of citizenship 
with an essential state of being that the indigènes simply could not fulfill, no matter what 
service they might perform for the métropole: 
The right to French citizenship must not be seen as a way for well-deserving 
slaves to freedom, both because there are no slaves to free and because it is not a 
liberation. A fortiori, we must not consider military cooperation provided by the 
colonies to the métropole as providing a right to assimilation because assimilation 
is not a reward but the recognition of a finding of fact – a finding of a fact that, in 
these circumstances, does not exist and that we cannot create by judicial 
decision.220 
 
The end result would be a highly regressive policy that rejected the fundamental tenets of 
the Third Republic’s colonial policy.  It sought only to maintain the colonies within the 
French orbit, but not to incorporate them.  This policy of “local autonomy” would divorce 
the indigènes from any input to the policies of the national state and the chief executive, 
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to which they were subordinated.  Consequently, it represents a prime example of 
Vichy’s mentality regarding the colonies in planning for the postwar atmosphere.  In a 
way, it also foreshadowed the eventual policy briefly followed by the Fifth Republic 
during decolonization, whereby France sought to maintain its influence in Africa by 
keeping its former colonies federated within a French Union, but without territorially 
integrating them into the métropole. 
These debates culminated in the drafting of a new French constitution in 1944.  
Several drafts of the Project of the Constitution of 1944 are extant today.  Many of these 
drafts underwent scrutiny from both Pétain’s office and the German embassy in Paris.  
The final draft of the constitution from July 25, 1944 said very little about the Empire.  
But it did incorporate many of the ideas set forth in the memo circulated by the Minister 
of Colonies three years earlier.  Title IV of the text dealt with the government of the 
colonies.  All territories upon which the French state exercised its sovereignty were 
considered part of the Empire.  Control over these territories by a strong executive 
(elected for a period of ten years) would be exercised by “high functionaries” (essentially 
the governors and governors-general) who would attend to the internal and external 
security of their respective territories.221   
Article 47, section 3 noted that the empire would be controlled by “legislations 
particulières” – presumably local councils with limited control over matters not affecting 
the Empire as a whole.  Although it did hint at some form of representation in the 
national legislature for those who had traditionally had such rights, no particular 
provision in the constitution guaranteed such representation or provided any other 
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specific details.  In contrast, most matters affecting the colonies would be dealt with by 
the governors, answering directly to the executive.  If these issues involved social matters 
or local security, the functionary was permitted to rely upon a “consultative council.”  In 
addition, the executive had his own Imperial Council, which would provide advice as to 
matters affecting the entire Empire.222   In effect, Vichy’s overall goal was to remove any 
significant decision-making power from it colonial subjects, and place it firmly in the 
hands of the executive.  This was very much in line with the principles of the National 
Revolution, which sought to purify the French body politic from foreign influence. 
 
Vichy’s Growing Suspicion of the United States 
As it planned the postwar future of its African empire, Vichy was losing ground 
with the United States, which had becomes increasingly favorable to Free France and was 
running out of patience with Pétain.  In late 1941, the United States sent an observer to 
AEF to determine the strength of de Gaulle’s partisans.  The following April, the United 
States essentially gave diplomatic recognition to Free France by opening a post in 
Brazzaville, a move which drew a vehement protest from France’s ambassador to the 
United States, Gaston Henry-Haye.223  By August 1942, Vichy was actively worried that 
the Brazzaville post was being used as a propaganda center in West Africa.224  The 
United States had also expressed to Vichy its approval of the British attack on 
Madagascar (discussed below), explaining that the island was a threat due to its military 
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usefulness to Japan.  Through the American ambassador in Vichy, Roosevelt assured 
Pétain and Laval that the Allies planned to return Madagascar to France after the war.225 
There was also a growing awareness that in the postwar atmosphere, the United 
States would have an increased interest in Africa.  This interest included military and 
economic concerns, but was also spurred by American ideals, as embodied by the 
Atlantic Charter of August 1941.  Through its eight points, the Charter established the 
conditions for a postwar order.  On its face, the text contained provisions that were 
reassuring to the French government.  Most notably, points one and two indicated that the 
United States and Britain “seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other” and that the 
Allies did not wish “to see territorial challenges.”226  Other provisions calling for lowered 
trade barriers and better economic cooperation were relatively harmless.  Yet the 
Charter’s third point promised “the right of all people to choose the form of government 
under which they will live” – a direct threat to the prospect of empire after the war.227   
The Charter immediately led to debate about the postwar future.  In 1942, the 
Phelps Stokes Fund, an American nonprofit group established in 1911 after a bequest 
from the estate of philanthropist Caroline Phelps Stokes, held a conference in New York 
which applied the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the postwar situation in Africa.  
Comprised of four groups – missionaries, educators and anthropologists, foundations 
focusing on international problems, and other persons with a specific expertise in Africa 
– the Fund’s Committee on Africa, the War, and Peace Aims convened the proceedings 
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with the firm belief that the United States “can approach its [Africa’s] problems with 
more detachment, if with less first-hand knowledge and experience, than can European 
powers directly concerned with its government.”228 
The final report of the conference, while presenting some favorable comments 
about the French policy of assimilation in Africa, also noted some of the problems that 
had arisen from European colonialism over the years, most notably rampant violence and 
cultural clashes between European colonial authorities and populations.  Consequently, 
its general recommendations included more United States involvement in the continent 
(given its large “missionary, financial, educational and scientific” interests), and 
international oversight of development plans by European powers and the treatment of 
subject populations.  The latter would best be achieved by an extension of the mandate 
system first established after World War I by the League of Nations to address the 
development of former German and Turkish territories, including Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Cameroon, Togo, and Namibia.  Even if European colonial powers did not include their 
territories in the mandate system, they “should be willing…to submit to international 
inspection and report.”229  Finally, better accountability in Africa could best be promoted 
by an international collective security arrangement that would implement the provisions 
of the Atlantic Charter and best represent the interest of African populations.230 
Vichy’s representative in Washington, Gaston Henry Haye, took great interest in 
the proceedings of the Phelps Stokes Fund conference, and provided a report to Pétain 
and Laval in November 1942.  While Henry Haye noted the relative moderation of the 
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report, especially the United States’ professed desire not to have direct political control 
over African territories, he nevertheless warned that the committee’s recommendation on 
the extension of the mandate system throughout sub-Saharan Africa “risks modifying the 
existing order.”231   He pointed to the committee’s emphasis on increased property rights 
for Africans, the end of slave labor, and the end of military conscription of Africans into 
European armies.  Taken in conjunction with other recommendations coming out of the 
United States regarding the future of Africa, there could be no doubt of the United States’ 
desire to become more influential on the continent: 
One thing is certain in any case... America – which, if victorious, will emerge 
from this fight with an increased industrial potential, but perhaps without access 
to its sources of supply of raw materials in the Far East – will take an increased 
interest in Africa and claim the right to participate in its operations on a footing of 
complete economic equality, if not also political, with the colonizing nations of 
Europe.232 
 
This increased concern about the prospect of American meddling in Africa was 
accompanied by a significantly more tense war atmosphere.  Throughout 1942, friction 
between Vichy and the United States gradually increased over the issue of France 
providing shipping and material aid to Nazi Germany.  Just days after Henry Haye’s 
telegram to Laval and Pétain, Vichy broke off diplomatic relations with the United States 
due to its decision to invade North Africa in Operation Torch (discussed below).233  
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Nevertheless, Vichy continued to monitor America’s disposition toward the 
French empire in Africa.  A report drafted in October 1943 examined American colonial 
policy and its possible ramifications in the postwar world.  While noting that America’s 
overseas interests had traditionally been of the commercial nature, the report warned that 
President Roosevelt had repeatedly expressed that the United States must take its place 
among the world powers and have a more interventionist foreign policy.234  “There exists 
in America,” the report noted, “a vigorous missionary spirit and a sense of profound 
moral obligation…which form today the dynamic force of a great power.”235  This break 
with isolationism could also be seen in America’s desire to add military bases in Africa, 
most notably in Dakar and Cap Vert, Senegal.236  The report also reflected on the 
possibility of America constructing military bases throughout the world, including in 
Gibraltar, Alexandria, and Malta.  These policies would represent a clear threat to the 
empire: 
It goes without saying that the achievement of such a plan would not go forward 
without leading to a serious diminution of sovereignty for powers that fall within 
the areas where these points would be established, and both France and England 
would be justified in fearing the consequences of such a policy.  We would also 
find our American possessions, colonies in the Pacific, the west coast of Africa, 
and Morocco endangered.237 
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While the report did note that America had repeatedly professed to keep the French 
empire intact after the war, it warned that France had to prepare itself for “a highly 
flexible colonial policy that allows the inevitable concessions in the economic order to 
safeguard the integrity of the Empire.”238  The report went on to predict that in such an 
atmosphere, Great Britain might even be a potential ally, given the common interest of 
preserving its Empire – a prediction that would foreshadow France’s policy during the 
early years of the United Nations. 
Perhaps of most interest in the report is its conclusion, which refers to the 
possibility of “la victoire anglo-saxonne.”  In the context of the report, the term is used in 
discussing the potential joint victory of Britain and the United States.  “Anglo-Saxon” 
had an historically pejorative meaning, and as such encompassed the entire history of 
France’s relationship with “perfidious Albion.”  At the beginning of the war, Vichy had 
pursued a policy designed to limit British influence in Africa, while seeking to bolster 
relations with the United States.  Through the events of the war and its clearly articulated 
postwar policy that called for more autonomy in Africa, America now posed a clear 
threat to the French Empire in Africa.  In this sense, it had earned its place with Britain in 
Vichy’s contempt as part of the “Anglo-Saxon” threat. 
 
The Fall of Vichy Africa 
In 1942, the last dominoes of Vichy’s African Empire fell to the Allies.  At the 
start of the year, Free France held all of AEF, while the United States and Britain had 
already begun planning Operation Gymnast (later known as Operation Torch), which 
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would liberate North Africa from Vichy/Axis control.  In the spring, Britain and Free 
France focused on an invasion of the island of Madagascar, once considered (albeit not 
very seriously) as a location to which the Jews of Europe could be expelled.239  Given the 
events of the war, a British attack on Madagascar was inevitable.  Boisson himself had 
predicted one in April 1942, claiming that there had been some indication from U.S. 
representatives that the British were planning it.240  The battle for Madagascar took place 
in two phases.  The first was a landing at the northern port of Diego Suarez in May 1942.  
Heavy fighting quickly led to a cease-fire between French and British forces, but it would 
not last long.241   
On September 10, the British launched a multi-pronged second attack on the 
island, this time focusing on Majunga and Morondava and moving on to other ports in the 
days following.  On September 16, governor-general Armand Léon Annet petitioned the 
British forces for a cease-fire; he had noted the previous day that he would try his best to 
maintain French sovereignty to the utmost.242  But on the same day he was soliciting 
offers from the British, Annet received a telegram from Minister of Colonies Jules 
Brévié, who had replaced Platon in April.  In his message, Brévié noted that he had full 
confidence in Annet to resist the British with honor to the very end.243  The British 
presented their terms of surrender the following day, which Annet rejected as too 
harsh.244  Fighting continued until early November, when Annet finally surrendered the 
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island.  Both American and British representatives made sure to tell French authorities 
that Madagascar would be returned to France after the war.245 
The gradual encirclement of Vichy by British and Free French forces in Africa 
triggered German concern that the regime was unable to maintain a stable hold on the 
continent.  As a condition of rearming the colonies against an attack by Allied forces, 
Germany insisted that Pétain accept German and Italian intelligence officials in AOF to 
observe whatever measures Vichy took.  The issue of German influence in Africa had 
been a controversial one for over a year.  In a March 1941 report from Weygand to Pétain 
that discussed the overall situation in Africa, Weygand had emphasized the importance of 
keeping the Nazis out of French Africa: 
It is my duty, in closing this optimistic account, to remind you that the sentiments 
of West Africa are, like the rest of French Africa, clearly inclined towards 
England, which it hopes will be victorious.  It is important, I apologize to repeat, 
to fiercely prevent any German presence that would make it difficult, to say the 
least, for the task of the High Commissioner to the Federation, and would risk 
taking away in a very short period of time the benefits of our efforts in recent 
months.246 
 
At his trial in 1945, Boisson repeatedly emphasized his own efforts to keep Germany out 
of sub-Saharan Africa during the war.  While it is possible that in his attempt to exculpate 
himself he exaggerated his resistance to Germany and downplayed his hatred for the 
British, there is no question that Boisson saw the German presence in Africa as a threat to 
French sovereignty.  In documents he prepared for his defense, he noted his desire to 
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prevent German control of French Africa and the humiliation that would have followed 
from it.  Probably more accurate was the reason Boisson gave in 1945 for keeping the 
Germans out, entirely consistent with his motives during the war.  Noting the “desire to 
maintain French prestige in the eyes of the indigènes,” Boisson indicated that in 1940, 
while France’s colonial subjects knew she had been beaten by Germany, their everyday 
life had not changed.  It was possible to cause the memory of the defeat to fade away, but 
“the German presence would serve as a reminder.  And of course, the German presence 
would be accompanied by German propaganda... I wanted France to find her indigènes as 
she had always known them.”247 
In what would become known as the Martin-Moellhausen Affair, Pétain ordered 
Boisson to accept a German military observer (code named René Martin; in actuality 
Eitel Moellhausen) in Dakar, at the behest of the Reich.248  In a vigorously argued memo 
to Vichy in July 1942, Boisson adamantly protested the policy of allowing German 
military observers entry into AOF, viewing it as undermining promises made to the 
population to keep the empire neutral in the struggle between Britain and Germany.  
Allowing German or Italian agents into Dakar would create ambiguity within AOF as to 
Vichy’s intentions, an ambiguity that would be easily exploited by the British.  Once this 
ambiguity was created, he noted, “[a]s the Empire moves forward, France will no longer 
have the same West Africa.  It will have only a West Africa uncertain in the face of 
possible aggression, a West Africa with a new susceptibility to the effects of Anglo-
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Gaullist propaganda, which has certainly never relented but which I can say had become 
impotent.”249  Boisson’s recommendation was to keep the Germans out, in line with his 
overall policy of maintaining the sovereignty of the French empire.  But in arguing this 
point, his words to Pétain reveal his preferences in the war.  While he opposed German 
involvement in Africa, it was largely to keep the real enemy - the British - out of AOF: 
My belief is that the situation we are in is a block.  Every accession we make to 
German requests will undermine it irrevocably, and further, at the same time as 
the Germans, the Italians are still waiting.  The tragedy of this debate is that the 
sole beneficiaries of any concessions made will be the eventual aggressor in Sub-
Saharan Africa – the Anglo-Saxons.250   
 
However, Pétain overrode Boisson’s concerns.  On August 7, he ordered Boisson to 
accept the German agent, noting that “in the wake of the attacks that our former ally has 
directed against us, the political conditions which justified these commitments are totally 
outdated.  The only thing that remains is the task of arming the colony against threats that 
continue to assert themselves.”251  But as late as August 25, Boisson was still protesting 
Axis supervision of rearmament in West Africa, noting that he would not remain in 
Dakar if the Germans or Italians were allowed in.252 
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 Pétain’s decision to allow German observers into West Africa was critical to 
Boisson’s eventual decision to rally to the Allies and Admiral Darlan.253  By the fall of 
1942, it was clear the tide of the war was turning against pro-Pétainist forces in what was 
left of Vichy Africa.  A successful attack on Algiers in early November by a small 
resistance force presented Admiral Darlan (who had been stripped of much of his power 
in the cabinet after Laval’s return as Prime Minister) with a fait accompli that was made 
official by a full scale British invasion of the city the following day.  Faced with the 
possibility of irrelevance in North Africa, Darlan decided to cut a deal with Dwight 
Eisenhower and shift his allegiance to the Allies.  Darlan’s decision would prove to be 
one of the most significant of the war, because not only did it end Vichy’s control of 
North Africa, but also led Hitler to invade the unoccupied zone of France.  Vichy had 
now lost control over all of France and most of the Empire. 
As Boisson struggled with the decision whether to maintain loyalty to Vichy or 
join forces with Darlan and the Americans, he was guided by his own rubric of 
maintaining the sovereignty of the empire and preserving French influence to the greatest 
extent possible in a postwar environment.  His eventual decision to follow Darlan would 
be facilitated by several statements made by President Roosevelt, who emphasized the 
importance of keeping the French empire intact after the war.  Roosevelt’s 
communications with Vichy included a letter sent to Pétain on November 8 as the Allies 
prepared to send forces to North Africa.  In it, he emphasized the threat to the French 
Empire posed by the Axis: 
Germany has neglected no opportunity to demoralize and degrade your great 
Nation.  Today, with greedy eyes on the Empire which France so laboriously 
                                                 




constructed, Germany and Italy are proposing to invade and occupy French North 
Africa in order that they may execute their schemes of domination and conquest 
over the whole of that continent. 
I know you will realize that such a conquest of Africa would not stop there…It is 
evident, of course, that an invasion and occupation of French North and West 
Africa would constitute for the United States and all of the American Republics 
the gravest kind of menace to their security – just as it would sound the death 
knell of the French Empire…I need not again affirm to you that the United States 
of America seeks no territories and remembers always the historic friendship and 
mutual aid which we have so greatly given to each other.254 
 
In addition to Roosevelt’s statements, American representatives sought to assure the 
leaders of French Africa about the United States’ postwar intentions on the continent.  On 
November 2, 1942, Robert Murphy wrote to Boisson.  Referring to numerous 
declarations by both Britain and the United States, Murphy assured Boisson that “the 
restoration of France to full independence, in all the grandeur and expanse that it 
possessed before the war, both in Europe and overseas, is one of the war aims of the 
United Nations…U.S. authorities will not intervene in any way in matters solely the 
responsibility of the national administration, or which relate to the exercise of French 
sovereignty.”255  The letter went on to assure that the U.S. would only place military 
forces in French territory to the extent it was necessary. 
 Pétain sensed Boisson’s indecision.  On both November 16 and 17, Vichy sent 
telegrams to Boisson, asking for updates on the situation in West Africa, with no 
response.  On November 21, Pétain wrote him directly, ordering him not to negotiate and 
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to resist all American or “Anglo-Saxon” aggression in Africa.256  Boisson responded on 
November 23, noting the deteriorating military situation and the rising dissidence against 
Vichy in AOF: 
In this situation, my mission to maintain French sovereignty can only be fulfilled 
by seeking a full agreement, under the auspices of Admiral Darlan, with U.S. 
authorities.  It is because I and the military leaders have seen the inevitable 
outcome of military events and political developments in North Africa, that we 
have asked ourselves under what conditions would the day come when a choice 
was imposed upon us as a result of internal circumstances.  That day has come.  
Therefore, with the unanimous agreement of all military officials I have decided 
to place myself under the command of Admiral Darlan (under certain accepted 
reservations), which will ensure preservation of absolute French sovereignty in 
the territories of Federation, which remain free of foreign occupation and Gaullist 
interference.  It was a painful decision for us.  We have absolute confidence that 
we are serving the destiny of the Patrie that you embody.257 [emphasis added] 
 
Pétain could hardly contain his anger at Boisson, replying to him the same day that he 
had “seriously failed France,” and demanding that he cease taking orders from Darlan 
and avoid cooperating with “Anglo-American” military officials.258  For his part, Boisson 
could only try to reassure Pétain that AOF remained faithful to Pétain, and that the terms 
of the agreement excluded foreign or Gaullist intervention in West Africa.259  He made 
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similar assurances to the population of AOF in a speech on November 23, justifying his 
decision to follow Darlan: 
Since I assumed command of French West Africa, my constant concern was the 
maintenance of French sovereignty in the territories entrusted to me.  It is the 
same concern that prompts my decision, with the agreement of the military 
authorities, to place West Africa under the command of Admiral Darlan.  We 
would not have come to this decision unless we were certain that we are 
maintaining faithfulness to the oath we took to the Marshall… West Africa…will 
remain totally and absolutely free of foreign occupation whatsoever…Now that 
the decision is made, accept it solemnly.  Think of France.260 [emphasis added] 
 
Like Robert Murphy, Eisenhower recognized the importance of assuaging any 
qualms Boisson may have had about his betrayal of Pétain.  The Eisenhower-
Murphy/Darlan-Boisson accords of December 7 made a number of promises to French 
authorities in Africa, including the maintenance of French sovereignty, free passage of 
commercial ships, and guarantees that the French would give and carry out military 
orders to French troops, and that French troops would not be used in battles against other 
French (Vichy) forces.  In return, American and British forces were free to use AOF and 
North African ports, and could transport troops across AOF’s land, water, or airspace.261  
Perhaps most importantly, the parties made a commitment “to restore integrally the 
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French Empire.”262  In thanking him for his cooperation, Eisenhower personally assured 
Boisson that the Allies would not seek to undermine his authority in Africa, and that 
America was interested mainly in a unified France fighting against the Axis.263  Days 
later, the Vichy France enclave in Djibouti fell to British forces.  By the end of 1942, 
Vichy was irrelevant in Africa. 
Boisson meant every word of both his telegram to Pétain and his speech to AOF.  
For as long as he maintained control in AOF, he proclaimed loyalty to Pétain and 
continued to criticize and suppress Gaullist followers.  This situation was facilitated in 
the month after the accords by Darlan himself, who maintained many of the harsh Vichy 
policies in North and West Africa, including the enforcement of antisemitic laws.  After 
an attack by de Gaulle’s followers on the island of Réunion, a French colony east of 
Madagascar in the Indian Ocean in late November 1942, Boisson telegraphed all colonies 
under his control, calling for an increased crackdown on Gaullist sympathizers and the 
need for further surveillance.264  He noted that “by attacking Réunion, the Gaullist leaders 
have reaffirmed the true character of their movement… Do not tolerate any propaganda 
or gesture that risks being seen by outsiders as serving a cause that is not ours, I repeat, 
that is not ours.”265  In March, Boisson gave a speech in Bouake, Ivory Coast where he 
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emphasized that AOF, now collaborating with the allies, had to maintain loyalty to 
Pétain.266     
 Boisson’s tenure as head of a liberated West Africa would not last long.  On 
Christmas Eve 1942, Darlan was assassinated by a Gaullist sympathizer in Algiers.267  
Although Roosevelt and Churchill favored Henri Giraud (a member of Free France 
installed as Darlan’s second in command after the Eisenhower accords) to take over 
French Africa, it would be only a matter of months before de Gaulle would become the 
officially recognized head of Free France.  There was no possibility that Boisson would 
maintain power in AOF after de Gaulle’s consolidation of the resistance movement.  Free 
French authorities loathed Boisson; a December 1942 report by Free France’s military 
mission to West Africa claimed that Boisson had imposed on AOF “a political system 
directly inspired by fascist and Nazi doctrines.”268  He had instituted “a regime of 
repression and absolute terror without precedent in the history of our African empire.”269  
Among his repressive measures were the purging and reorganization of police forces and 
the civil service, the establishment of military tribunals, and the banning of dissident 
parties and organizations.270  De Gaulle had no intention of leaving Boisson in power, 
and he expressed as much to American representatives in early 1943.  Both Eisenhower 
and Robert Murphy saw Boisson as one of America’s better assets in the region, but to no 
avail.  By July 1943, Boisson had resigned as head of AOF, no longer having the 
sympathies of the European community in Dakar.  Despite volunteering for Free French 
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forces against Italy shortly thereafter, he was arrested in late 1943, largely due to his 
repressive policies against Gaullists in the early months of the war.  He dies in 1948, 
before a full proceeding could be brought before France’s postwar Haute Cour de Justice, 
which conducted the purge trials.271  It would be left to colonial administrators free of the 
taint of Vichy to plan French policy for Africa going forward.   
 
Conclusion 
 With the fall of Madagascar and AOF to pro-Allied forces, Vichy’s direct 
influence in Africa had essentially ended by the close of 1942.  However, despite the loss 
of virtually all of its African territories to the Allies, pro-Vichyites continued to scheme 
about Africa’s postwar future.  To provide one example, in 1943 the Société de 
Géographie Commerciale and the Comité d’Etudes de l’Economie Impériale de Grande 
France published “Revue économique française” which surveyed the current state of the 
war and the colonies, and included several speeches from prominent Vichy officials.  
While unreliable as a realistic assessment of Vichy’s economic standing at this stage of 
the war, the publication provides insight as to Vichy’s mentality toward Africa, 
regardless of the ultimate victor. Noting that “l’Afrique Noire” was an important source 
of resources for Europe, the publication emphasized France’s importance to the 
international community in securing these vast resources after the war.  It favorably 
contrasted France’s system of colonialism, which purportedly did not consider Africans 
as slaves or inferiors and allowed for the cultivation of an elite class, with Britain’s, 
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whose system of colonial education could not match France’s.272  This emphasis on 
Britain suggests that Vichy may have begun to more seriously consider the possibility of 
a British victory and a continued British threat in Africa.  However, regardless of the 
outcome, the study observed that:  
Europe will need France as a bridge to a moral union between Europe and Africa, 
because only France is capable through its colonial methods to obtain from the 
African people a collaboration without coercion…Whatever happens, only France 
can provide the essential moral and intellectual link between Africa, Europe and 
other parts of the world, and this moral and intellectual link is essential for the 
proper balance of future economic agreements.273 
 
 While France’s relationship with Africa was portrayed as beneficial to Europe in a 
postwar environment, another article in the same publication noted the benefit to France 
in remaining involved in Africa.  Noting that “imperial mystique” could help provide 
postwar unity in France, it suggested that France’s future lay in a federated empire.  Such 
an arrangement was now necessary because of France’s diminished status in the world: 
“France, whose interests and prestige will in all ways in the future be quite limited in 
Europe, can do nothing in peacetime but continually move towards an Empire that should 
bring it consolations and reasons to hope, live, and  increase its stature.”274  The 
publication concluded with several declarations from prominent Vichy ministers, 
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in AOF was not abolished until 1946.  During the war, over 200,000 Africans were swept up in 
Vichy’s system of forced labor.  Ruth Ginio, French Colonialism Unmasked, 76-85. 
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including Pétain and Laval, promising that France would regain its place in Europe and 
the world after the war was over.275 
In many ways, their predictions were correct.  Maintaining the empire was indeed 
important to France’s stature after the war, as de Gaulle and his followers also realized.  
What Vichy never really anticipated, possibly due to its deep resentment of communism, 
was a divided balance of power in which the Soviet Union, not Nazi Germany, would act 
as the counterbalancing force to the United States.  Regardless of this lack of foresight, 
there could be no question that in the face of France’s humiliation, the nation required a 
revival of its national prestige after the war.  The colonies in west and central Africa 
could play a crucial role in that revival.  Vichy recognized this fact from the moment it 
surrendered to Hitler, and endeavored to protect its colonies in Africa from all foreign 
encroachment, and especially from the British. 
 Vichy’s legacy in Africa – namely, fear of the Anglo-American threat to French 
power on the continent, as well as the fierce desire to maintain sovereignty and influence 
in Africa – would endure long beyond the fall of the regime.  Although the rivalry with 
Britain in Africa had predated World War II, the battle for France’s territories during the 
war further antagonized Vichy functionaries charged with protecting French imperial 
interests.  It is certainly true that as a political system, Vichy was diametrically opposed 
both to the resistance movements and the Fourth Republic that succeeded it.  The policies 
of collaboration with Germany, oppression of Jews, jailing of political dissidents, and 
irrational hatred of democracy would not have been carried out under an accountable 
government in the model of the republics that both preceded and succeeded Vichy.  Yet, 
as the following chapters will demonstrate, parts of Vichy’s ideology vis-à-vis Africa is 
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readily identified in the policies of both the Fourth and Fifth Republics.  The 
consideration of Francophone Africa as “France’s best card”, which would enable the 
preservation of French international influence, was shared throughout the political 
spectrum during the latter half of the twentieth century.  Fifty years after Vichy’s fall, one 
of its former low-level functionaries would cite the dual principles of maintaining French 
power in Africa at all costs and resisting “Anglo-Saxon” aggression, while supporting a 





Restoring Grandeur: De Gaulle, Free France, and Africa, 1940-1944 
 
…We must, with precision and dignity, form a close-knit front against the foreign 
interference that compromises not only the current unity among the French, but 
also the future independence of our country… We shall show the Anglo-Saxons 
that we are able to maintain our sang-froid and clarity, and that we have enough 
courage and tenacity to prevent this strangulation.276 
 
-Telegram from Félix Éboué, governor-general of Afrique Équatoriale 
Française, to Gabriel Fortune, governor of Moyen-Congo, regarding 
American and British efforts to prevent Charles de Gaulle from asserting 
Free French authority in North Africa, April 8, 1943. 
 
…France cannot be France without greatness.277 
 
-Charles de Gaulle 
  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the main themes of Vichy’s experience in 
Africa were loss and insecurity, starting with the defection of Afrique Équatoriale 
Française (AEF) to the Allies in August 1940 and culminating with Darlan and Boisson’s 
betrayal of Pétain in late 1942.  The tenuous situation in Africa was Vichy’s own 
responsibility; the moment it signed the armistice with Germany in June 1940, it agreed 
to have its empire diminished in some form.  The events of the war would determine 
exactly what shape Vichy’s postwar empire would take.  Given Japan’s seizure of 
Vietnam and Italy’s designs in the Mediterranean, the notion of a postwar Vichy France 
preserving its entire empire was nothing short of fantasy.  Essentially, despite its 
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collaboration with Germany, there was no possibility of Vichy France emerging from the 
war as one of the “winning” powers in Europe, regardless of what the outcome might be. 
 In this sense, the experience of Charles de Gaulle’s Free France movement in 
Africa was vastly different from that of its counterpart in Vichy.  De Gaulle’s 
unequivocal stance against both Vichy and the Nazis, embodied in his famous radio 
address from London on June 18, 1940, enabled him to align himself and his followers 
with an ally that would help restore the French empire after the war.278  Indeed, it was 
precisely this possibility that helped legitimize Free France in the eyes of the French 
public.  De Gaulle made certain to emphasize it in his speeches; for example, on August 
16 he attacked Vichy by stating that “the restoration of the country is totally impossible 
under the armistice regime.”279  There could be no hope, de Gaulle and his followers 
would argue, of France preserving its entire empire if it had to rely on Hitler’s whims. 
Free France also enjoyed considerably greater military success in Africa than 
Vichy.  The defection of most of AEF to de Gaulle in August 1940 presented him with a 
stable base of operations on the continent from which he could win back the remainder of 
the empire.  There were clear setbacks early on – the failed offensive on Dakar in 
September 1940 being the most obvious.  But unlike Vichy, which struggled to prevent 
losses in Africa on two fronts – from both British/Gaullist forces and the Axis – de 
Gaulle’s Free French movement began the war on the offensive in Africa and gradually 
reunited almost all of France’s prewar African territories under one flag.  This 
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progressive reunification of the empire culminated in its ultimate symbolic triumph – the 
marching of de Gaulle and Free French forces through the Arc de Triomphe and down 
the Champs-Elysées on August 25, 1944, almost four years to the day when Félix Éboué 
and AEF swung their allegiance to the general.280 
Despite this profound difference between Free France and Vichy’s war 
experiences in Africa, de Gaulle’s sentiments about his allies are not so readily contrasted 
with those of Vichy.  de Gaulle benefitted greatly by allying himself with Britain and the 
United States, but his relationships with them were not always harmonious.  Much has 
been written about the political disagreements between de Gaulle and Roosevelt, and to a 
lesser extent Churchill.281  These disagreements were generally limited to political 
matters, and de Gaulle exhibited a measure of cooperation with Allied military 
authorities, albeit with a few notable exceptions discussed below.  In terms of the war, 
their interests were the same – defeat Nazi Germany and restore France as an independent 
democratic entity.  Postwar plans certainly differed, but this did not necessarily threaten 
cooperation – the wartime relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union 
was the most obvious example of this principle.  Nevertheless, even with these common 
aims in mind, de Gaulle and his Free French followers chafed under British and 
American control of the war effort, and they exerted an inordinate amount of energy 
fixated on France’s disagreements with her allies.  
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To be fair, some legitimate disagreements existed.  Throughout the war, tensions 
between de Gaulle and the allies arose over a variety of issues.  De Gaulle’s frustration 
with the British grew mainly from management of French colonial territory during the 
war, most notably during the invasion of Madagascar in 1942 and Britain’s opposition to 
the French crackdown on the Lebanese independence movement in 1942-1943.  At times, 
only Britain’s steadfast patience and its gratitude to de Gaulle for his June 1940 stance 
against Nazi Germany prevented a full deterioration of Anglo-French relations.  Of 
course, de Gaulle’s relationship with Franklin Roosevelt was notoriously volatile, mostly 
due to Roosevelt’s refusal to recognize him as the rightful head of the resistance 
movement for most of the war.  Consequently, the two leaders sharply disagreed on much 
of America’s policy in Africa, and especially regarding U.S. cooperation with the Darlan-
Boisson regime in North and West Africa in late 1942.  Finally, as liberation neared, de 
Gaulle and his followers also evinced strong concerns about the potential influence the 
United States would have over France’s colonial possessions.  These aggregate factors 
were sufficient to foster de Gaulle’s long-standing suspicion of Anglo-American 
intentions in Africa. 
To be sure, one must be careful not to overstate either the rivalry that existed 
between de Gaulle and his British and American allies during the war, or the long-term 
effects of that rivalry.  Unlike Pétain and Laval, there is no indication that de Gaulle or 
his top lieutenants viewed Britain as France’s existential enemy.  Nevertheless, 
similarities existed between Vichy’s and Free France’s views concerning the Allies.  
First, both recognized that the war experience had changed France’s role in the world.  
While leaders in the Vichy and Free French regimes debated how to maximize French 
106 
 
influence in the postwar atmosphere, there was a clear realization by both that France’s 
stature would be diminished after the final peace settlements.  More specifically, both 
Vichy and Free France recognized that France would be drawn between two poles after 
the war – in Vichy’s case, between Germany and the United States, and in Free France’s, 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Consequently, both planned for a 
postwar situation in which American power threatened to have significant influence over 
France’s future.  Additionally, members of de Gaulle’s regime tried to make sense of 
America’s professed anticolonial ideals, and how they would affect the French empire 
when the war concluded.  Finally, both Vichy and Free France worried about the threat 
that Britain posed to French interests in Africa, albeit with different degrees of virulence. 
Tracing these contours is important because they suggest deeper-rooted French 
mentalities about the role of the empire and the impact that the war had on France’s place 
in the world.  Ultimately, both Vichy and Free France were deeply traumatized by the 
invasion of 1940.  The heightened importance of the empire was one of the critical 
outgrowths of that sense of loss.  Of course, there are fundamental reasons why France’s 
postwar policy toward Africa, which culminated in the Fifth Republic’s coddling of 
dictators on the continent, has generally been viewed as an outgrowth of Gaullism.282  
But Vichy and Free France’s similar outlooks about the Allies’ intentions and the future 
of the continent suggest a more distinct French component.  The comparison becomes 
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more appropriate when considering both sides’ views on their African subjects.  While 
Vichy’s overall attitude about the indigènes was marked by a decree of racism generally 
not evident in the colonial administrators who followed Free France, both treated 
Africans with condescension and incredible skepticism about their aptitude for self-
government.  As just one example, there are remarkable similarities between Pierre 
Boisson’s ideas about France’s role in civilizing Africans and those put forth by Félix 
Éboué and other colonial administrators at the 1944 Brazzaville Conference, which 
established the guidelines for France’s colonial future in Africa. 
Nevertheless, de Gaulle and Free France’s particular role in shaping the future of 
French policy in Africa should not be understated.  Vichy’s colonial officers had been 
limited both by their racial outlook – which ultimately prevented any real consideration 
of decentralized administration or political reforms in the colonies – and by their 
weakened position vis-à-vis the Axis.  In contrast, de Gaulle and his followers were 
afforded significantly more flexibility in planning the postwar French presence on the 
continent.  They were certainly not free from racial prejudice; the condescending 
attitudes exhibited toward their African subjects at the Brazzaville Conference stand as 
the clearest example of this.  Nor were they immune from the potential for postwar 
interference by the Allies; try as he may, de Gaulle could not seriously hope to restore 
France’s status on par with that of the United States.  But France’s postwar position under 
a restored republic was markedly different than it would have been under a defeated 
Vichy.  In short, Free France had more latitude to consider more progressive reforms, and 
was pressed to do so by the western allies. 
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Remarkably, very little has been written about the de Gaulle regime in sub-
Saharan Africa.  Tony Chafer has examined the Free French regime and the Brazzaville 
Conference as preludes to postwar policy in Africa.283  And Catherine Akpo-Vaché and 
Martin Thomas have detailed the course of the war throughout Africa.284   This chapter 
goes beyond the existing scholarship through a more comprehensive examination of Free 
French colonial mentalities. Like Vichy’s Africa policy, Free France’s would be 
influenced by the contributions of a few select individuals.  At the forefront was de 
Gaulle, who rose from obscurity as a relatively unknown military officer before the war 
to become the heroic embodiment of the nation by the war’s conclusion.  Prior to the 
Brazzaville Conference, he took no great interest in the future of France’s African 
subjects.  He rarely engaged in debates about the some key issues of colonial policy, such 
as the benefits or implementation of the French civilizing mission.  Nevertheless, from 
the moment he gave his speech in London in June 1940, de Gaulle’s articulation of the 
need to restore French power and influence – or grandeur – underscored every debate on 
the future of Africa.  For Pétain, Africa had always been a mere card to play in a zero-
sum game of realpolitik.  But for de Gaulle and Free France, Africa was not a mere chip 
to be sacrificed for a better standing in Europe.  Rather, Africa represented French 
power; it was a manifestation of the projection of French grandeur throughout the world.  
Its presence in the French orbit also complimented de Gaulle’s view of France as an 
indispensable nation – in his words, “eternal France.” 
                                                 
283 Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization? 
(Oxford: Berg, 2002), 43-50, 55-61. 
284 Catherine Akpo-Vaché, L’AOF et la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (Paris: Karthala, 2000); Martin 
Thomas, The French Empire at War, 1940-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2007).  See also Edward L. Bimberg, Tricolor over the Sahara: The Desert Battles of the Free 
French, 1940-1942 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002).   
109 
 
It would be left to his followers to articulate exactly what that sense of French 
identity would mean for French colonial policy.  This was somewhat unclear in the first 
two years of the war, as de Gaulle’s Free France movement was limited by the need to 
consolidate its power and influence vis-à-vis the other liberation movements.  In these 
early months, Africa held primarily military interest as the territorial center of the 
movement.  Prior to 1943, less attention was paid to the problems of colonial policy, 
although AEF enjoyed certain advantages, as Free France’s base in Africa, in establishing 
the terms of the debate.  Led by its governor-general, the fervent Gaullist Félix Éboué, 
AEF served as both the colonial rallying point for those who opposed Vichy and a 
positive example of the role Africans could play in the postwar order.  During these early 
years, Éboué played an important part in discussing this role for the continent in France’s 
future. 
The defection of North Africa to the Allied cause and the subsequent 
consolidation of the liberation movements under de Gaulle provided the increased 
confidence that Free France could expand its influence beyond military matters and into 
the realm of policy.  As it became clear in 1943 that the direction of the war was turning 
in the Allies’ favor, Free France’s colonial administrators turned toward planning for the 
postwar order in Africa, culminating in the Brazzaville Conference of early 1944.  The 
conference would provide the foundation for French policy on the continent through 
decolonization.  René Pleven, de Gaulle’s Minister of Colonies, was the most important 
figure in developing a clear direction for postwar policy in Africa, but Henri Laurentie, 
his secretary of political affairs, also made significant contributions.  They were faced 
with the challenging task of both consolidating French power in the postwar order and 
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maintaining control over France’s possessions of Africa – all in light of the loss and 
humiliation that the métropole had been subjected to by the war experience.   
In retrospect, it was a futile effort.  The war had provided the death knell for the 
imperial age, and Free France’s colonial reforms could only represent a delaying action.  
By 1960, most of France’s African empire had achieved its independence.  But the views 
of these administrators would serve as a rough outline for the postcolonial affiliations 
with African rulers that would later mark de Gaulle’s presidency in the 1960s. 
 
Grandeur and De Gaulle’s Vision of France in Africa 
 There is no indication that Charles de Gaulle had any significant interest in Africa 
prior to his courageous stand against Nazi Germany in June 1940.  His biography has 
been well covered by numerous historians and will not be repeated in any great length 
here.285  Nevertheless, de Gaulle’s roots are important in evaluating the vast influence 
that his policies – and his legacy – would have on sub-Saharan Africa in the twentieth 
century.  By all accounts, de Gaulle’s interests were almost purely military prior to 1940, 
and specifically rooted in the European war experience.  He completed several tours in 
both Poland and Russia after World War I, and his writings on military tactics and 
strategy, prescient in hindsight for their promotion of offensive tank warfare and rejection 
of the Maginot Line, were exclusively focused on fighting wars on the continent.286  
Unlike the numerous Vichy and Free French politicians and bureaucrats who would play 
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an active role in determining Africa’s future, he never attended the école coloniale, nor 
did he travel extensively in Africa prior to the war.  In summary, it is fair to say that prior 
to 1940, Africa was very much on the periphery of de Gaulle’s experience – 
acknowledged as part of the empire, but of uncertain importance to the destiny of the 
nation itself. 
 The war would force him to reconsider this perspective.  With the defection of 
AEF in August 1940, Free France gained its first significant base of operations on French 
territory.  During these early months, de Gaulle gained a newfound knowledge of the 
African empire, as he shuttled between London and Brazzaville.  As de Gaulle’s 
reference point was his military background, an appreciation for the complexities of 
colonial policy would take some time to develop.  He initially saw Africa as a typical 
French officer in wartime would – namely, as having only military significance in the 
ongoing struggle against Germany.  To this end, in his initial speeches urging his 
countrymen to rally to the resistance, he cited the empire’s military assets, including 
bases in North Africa, a navy, and France’s vast imperial holdings.  For de Gaulle, these 
belied Pétain’s claims of France’s military exhaustion, which had been used to justify the 
decision to capitulate to Germany.287   
Indeed, Pétain’s decision to demilitarize the empire was incomprehensible to de 
Gaulle, as it sharply contrasted decades of military and colonial tradition and policy.  It 
also threatened upheaval and revolt in the colonies, as France’s subjects could not 
possibly respect Pétain’s cowardly decision to collaborate.288  On July 2, 1940 de Gaulle 
invoked the memory of historical military figures Thomas-Robert Bugeaud and Louis-
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Joseph de Montcalm, and colonial administrators Hubert Lyautey and Joseph François 
Dupleix, and asked whether they “would have ever consented to evacuate, without a 
fight, the strategic points of the Empire; would they ever have supported, again without 
any combat, the control of the empire by the enemy?”289  This empire, he said on August 
29, contained a “bundle of capital” – namely, its population and resources – that 
remained “of great importance to France as trump cards in this struggle where her destiny 
will be played out.”290  The greatest crime of the armistice, he noted, “was to have 
capitulated as if France did not have an Empire.”291 Put simply, for de Gaulle, the 
colonies were a means for France to get back into the war.  He did little in these early 
months to indicate that he saw in them any other inherent value. 
He had a somewhat firmer grasp on his views of France’s rightful place in the 
world.  For de Gaulle, resistance against Vichy and the Nazis provided a critical 
opportunity for France to regain its international standing, or grandeur.  This notion had 
many implications, spanning military, cultural, and colonial influence, and would 
continue to develop over the next 30 years of de Gaulle’s life in French politics.  The 
opening paragraph of his War Memoirs, written in 1954 before he returned to French 
political life, provides a useful summary of his feelings about the role of his country: 
All my life I have thought of France in a certain way.  This is inspired by 
sentiment as much as by reason.  The emotional side of me tends to imagine 
France, like the princess in the fairy stories or the Madonna in the frescoes, as 
dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny.  Instinctively I have the feeling 
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that Providence has created her either for complete success or for exemplary 
misfortunes… But the positive side of my mind also assures me that France is not 
really herself unless in the front rank; that only vast enterprises are capable of 
counterbalancing the ferments of dispersal which are inherent in her people; that 
our country, as it is, surrounded by the others, as they are, must aim high and hold 
itself straight, on pain of mortal danger.  In short, to my mind, France cannot be 
France without greatness.292 
 
The notion of France returning to greatness was so fundamental to de Gaulle’s ideology 
that grandeur became one of his central war aims.  On August 7, 1940, he made an 
explicit agreement with Churchill concerning Free France’s ongoing participation in the 
war effort, by which the resistance movement pledged its ground, naval, and air forces to 
support Britain against Germany.  De Gaulle announced this policy on August 12, and he 
proudly noted that in return for military support, “the British government has taken on the 
responsibility to integrally restore, after victory, the independence and grandeur of 
France.”293  This British promise would become a constant refrain in de Gaulle’s 
speeches, as he sought to bolster French support for the British war effort.294   
At first, de Gaulle’s efforts to reassert French power were limited to the war.  On 
November 15, 1941, he noted that “the first article of our policy consists of… giving the 
greatest extension and the greatest power possible to the French effort in the conflict.”295  
But as the war progressed, he gradually came to consider France’s status in the postwar 
order.  In November 1942, he noted in a speech at the Royal Albert Hall in London that 
France “intends to play a role that reflects her effort and her genius in a world system that 
has been defined by the Atlantic Charter and which will place the progress and security 
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of all on an international basis.”296  And as the allied victory approached, he more clearly 
articulated his notion of French grandeur.  In November 1943, he emphasized that 
France’s goal was “a return by a great power to its place as a great power through the war 
and her efforts.”297  De Gaulle ultimately saw France as indispensable in the coming 
world order: 
…present events have confirmed the belief that France must reassume, to the 
benefit of all, its great international role.  France believes that any European and 
important world affair that might be resolved without her would not be good 
business.  She believes this for reasons inscribed on the map and in history and 
the universal consciousness.  She believes this, too, because such resolutions will 
be found to be inadequate at the time when, sooner or later, [France] rediscovers 
those elements essential to the overall balance – France’s power and influence.298 
 To be sure, de Gaulle had few illusions about France’s status vis-à-vis the allies 
during the war.  While he zealously asserted French interests in his dealings with 
Churchill and Roosevelt, he privately understood France’s actual position.  This was the 
theme of a speech he gave in liberated Algiers to the provisional Constituent Assembly in 
March 1944, when he noted “difficulties in France’s external relations in the present 
conditions.”  These conditions left France with diminished power that was out of 
proportion to her rightful place in the world: 
While the Government must assert the rights and interests of the country – that is 
to say, the rights and interests that extend to all parts of the world and persist into 
a vast future, the conditions in which [the government] finds itself does not 
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provide for it, vis-à-vis the other major powers, an audience commensurate with 
its sacred obligations. There results, in some major policy and strategic issues 
posed by the war and its consequences, a kind of relative absence of France which 
is felt profoundly by the nation herself and by many of her friends.299 
 
De Gaulle astutely tied France’s diminished role and her need to regain international 
stature to his calls for his countrymen to rally to the resistance.  Only through significant 
sacrifice to the Allied effort could France regain the leverage to assert herself in the 
postwar atmosphere.  It was for precisely this reason that he deeply resented not only 
British and American attempts to limit Free French political control over sovereign 
French territories, but also any slight that prevented his followers from cooperating 
militarily with the allies.  This would ultimately lead to virulent disagreements with the 
British over operations in Madagascar and with the Americans on Operation Torch in 
North Africa in November 1942. 
Because of his focus on the larger question of France’s postwar standing, he 
engaged very little with the problems of France’s African subjects.  Nevertheless, it 
should come as no surprise that as a military man, de Gaulle came to appreciate Africans 
through the sacrifices they were making on the battlefield.300  Of course, as Gregory 
Mann has demonstrated, rhetorical appreciation had very little bearing on the horrible 
conditions endured by African soldiers after demobilization.301  But for de Gaulle, their 
                                                 
299 Speech, March 18, 1944.  Ibid., 386. “Tandis que le Gouvernement doit faire valoir au-dehors 
les droits et les intérêts du pays, c’est-à-dire des droits et des intérêts qui s’étendent à toutes les 
parties du monde et se prolongent dans un vaste avenir, les conditions dans laquelles il se trouve 
placé ne lui procurent pas, vis-à-vis des autres grandes puissances, une audience proportionnée à 
ses obligations sacrées.  Il en résulte, dans certains des grands problèmes politiques ou 
stratégiques posés par la guerre ou par ses conséquences, une sorte d’absence relative de la 
France qui ressentent profondément la nation elle-même et beaucoup de ses amis.”   
300 For more on France’s African soldiers, see Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: the 
Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960 (London: Currey, 1991).   
301 See Gregory Mann, Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 
116 
 
contributions to the defense of the empire nevertheless became a powerful theme in his 
speeches.  These sacrifices had shown how indispensable the empire was to France; de 
Gaulle noted on June 18, 1942 that “there is an element that, in these terrible trials, 
reveals itself to the nation as essential to its future and necessary to its grandeur.  That 
element is the Empire.”302  Further, these sacrifices by France’s African subjects 
demonstrated the united and resolute qualities of the empire; in an August 1943 speech in 
Casablanca he noted the “exceptional cohesion of eternal France” and further emphasized 
the strength that diversity brought to the empire.303  De Gaulle was convinced that 
France, thus unified, would recover its former grandeur; he noted in his Casablanca 
speech that “the grandeur of a people can only proceed from the people.”304   
But if his war speeches reveal de Gaulle’s gradual realization of the vital 
contributions of Africans to the military effort and the importance of Africa to the future 
of the empire, there is little to be found regarding his views on how France’s subjects 
should be governed or what rewards they should reap from their sacrifice.  In this sense, 
he acted as a head of state, concerning himself only with the military situation and 
management of Free France’s relationship with the Allies. What mattered was that the 
empire would be retained intact and that the winning powers would accord France the 
measure of respect she deserved as a colonial power.  He certainly knew the status quo 
on the continent could not continue; France could not return to a traditional colonial 
policy that excluded Africans from virtually all forms of self-governance.  But the nature 
and form of postwar African society were details of little interest to the general.  It would 
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be left to his lieutenants to define the contours of the debate about postwar African 
policy. 
 
Félix Éboué and Free French Policy in Africa 
 De Gaulle had little knowledge of Chad’s governor when the colony rallied to the 
general in August 1940.  But Félix Éboué’s heroic action represented a crucial break for 
Free France; it provided de Gaulle his first foothold on sovereign French territory.  It 
would also ensure de Gaulle’s gratitude to Éboué for the rest of the governor’s life.  This 
led to Éboué’s appointment as high commissioner/governor-general of Free French 
Africa in November 1941.  By all accounts, de Gaulle deeply respected and trusted 
Éboué, and the feeling was reciprocated, as Éboué gave de Gaulle his undivided loyalty.  
On the surface, Éboué was a powerful symbol to rally the empire to France.  His status as 
a governor-general with African heritage served as testament to the success of the French 
civilizing mission.  But his impact far outweighed this symbolic value.  Over the next 
four years, he capitalized upon his standing in Free France to help establish the 
foundation for France’s postwar policy in Africa. 
 Éboué was born in 1884 in French Guiana, located on the northern coast of South 
America.  Originally colonized in the eighteenth century, it remains one of France’s 
départements today.  The colony prospered economically through the nineteenth century, 
in part because of slave labor imported from West Africa.  Éboué’s roots derived from 
this African heritage.  His father was involved in gold prospecting and gradually rose to a 
high management position at one of the colony’s mines, while Éboué’s mother was left to 
care for Éboué and his siblings.  By all indications, she encouraged young Félix’s studies, 
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and he proved himself capable enough to earn a scholarship to a lycée in Bordeaux in 
1898.  Éboué’s academic achievement was a testament to the French establishment’s 
appreciation for merit, which was unusually progressive for the time.  Over the next 
decade, he studied throughout Europe, and gradually developed a desire to serve the 
French colonial service.  Through connections in Paris, he eventually earned a place in 
the prestigious école coloniale, from which he graduated in 1908 with a specialty in 
law.305  His French education, coupled with his birth in French Guiana, made him a 
complex figure, for he was an outsider both to the Africans he would eventually govern 
and to the colonial administrators whose respect he sought.  But as his tenure as 
governor-general reveals, he unquestionably considered himself a French citizen. 
 Nevertheless, his African heritage may have hindered his career path.  Over the 
next thirty years, he advanced through a number of positions in the colonial service, 
taking posts in Oubangui-Shari (modern day Central African Republic), Madagascar, 
Martinique, and eventually Guadeloupe.  However, Europeans with less intelligence and 
ability than Éboué had risen through the ranks more quickly.  Despite this, Éboué 
remained a fervent believer in the French civilizing mission and an admirer of the 
colonial system – most notably the work of administrator par excellence Hubert Lyautey, 
the military governor and resident-general of French Morocco from 1907-1925.306  
Lyautey had encouraged colonial administrators to better understand and respect the 
traditions of peoples over whom they exercised authority; this message resonated with 
Éboué, whose African heritage provided him with a unique perspective.  For Éboué, the 
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French mission was not an abstract policy to be implemented on faceless individuals; it 
had real impact on Africans, to whom French administrators had to develop stronger ties 
based on mutual respect and affection.  “We must come to love the blacks of our Afrique 
Équatoriale Française,” he noted in 1941.  “We have been entrusted by them with an 
investment.”307 
The breakthrough in his career would come in Guadeloupe, where he was 
appointed in 1936 by the Popular Front’s Minister of Colonies Marius Moutet as interim 
governor to soothe rising labor unrest in the colony.  He quickly earned the good faith of 
France’s subjects in the colony, but bureaucratic infighting at the colonial ministry and 
the fall of the Popular Front ultimately signaled Éboué’s demise.  He was removed in 
1938 and eventually assigned as governor of Chad – essentially a demotion, and given 
Chad’s remote location, it was taken as a humiliation by Éboué.  This reassignment helps 
puts Éboué career on the eve of World War II in perspective.  In one sense, Éboué’s 
prewar rise through the colonial ranks had prepared him for the responsibilities he would 
assume in 1940.  But when considering the 1938 demotion to his post in Chad, one must 
also honestly say that the mark he made on the French empire would not have been 
possible without the war.        
 Éboué remained governor of Chad when France fell in June 1940.  During that 
month, as Vichy engaged in armistice talks with Germany, Éboué initially declared his 
intention to follow de Gaulle after the latter’s speech in London.  The June 22 armistice 
and subsequent orders from Vichy seem to have brought him marginally in line with 
collaboration; in July, he adopted a “wait-and-see” approach after Boisson’s appointment 
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as head of French Africa.  But as Vichy’s position vis-à-vis Germany became clear, 
Éboué had second thoughts.  On August 26, Éboué and Colonel Marchand, the military 
commander for Chad, issued a joint proclamation to de Gaulle in the name of both the 
colony and France’s military forces there.  Echoing de Gaulle’s arguments concerning 
Vichy’s betrayal of the empire, they first noted the colony’s discontent with the armistice.  
Over the previous two months, they had observed that it not only “obliges France to 
abandon the battle, but also, under the obvious constraint of the enemy, the [Vichy] 
government is forced to take hostile measures toward Great Britain and to impose on 
French Africa a policy of economic isolation which is leading both the indigènes and the 
Europeans to ruin.”308  Under these circumstances, it was clear to both of them that Vichy 
was both incapable and unwilling to restore the stature France had lost in June.  Indeed, 
the loss of French prestige was the fundamental reason why the two decided to rally to de 
Gaulle: 
The Governor of Chad and the military commander of the territory, observing that 
every type of interest entrusted to their care was placed in peril by a policy that 
ignores the necessities of the wellbeing of the territory, and convinced that the 
restoration of grandeur and French independence requires that overseas France 
continues to fight at the side of Great Britain, decides to proclaim the union of the 
territory and troops that they protect with the Free French forces of General de 
Gaulle.309 (emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
308 Proclamation of Félix Éboué and Colonel Marchand, Aug. 26, 1940, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 
2557, Dossier 5.  “Au cours ses deux derniers mois les Français d’Afrique ont constaté que 
l’Armistice ne se borne pas à obliger la France à abandonner la lutte, mais que, sous la contrainte 
évidente de l’ennemi, le gouvernement métropolitain est obligé d’accumuler les mesures 
d’hostilité envers la Grande-Bretagne et d’imposer à l’Afrique Française une politique 
d’isolement économique qui mène les populations indigènes aussi bien que les Européens à la 
ruine.”   
309 Ibid.  “Le Gouverneur du Tchad et le Commandant Militaire du territoire, constatant que les 
intérêts de toute nature confiés  à leur garde sont mis en péril par une politique qui ignore les 
nécessités de la vie du territoire, convaincus que la restauration de la grandeur et de 
l’indépendance française exige que la France d’outremer continue à se battre aux côtes de la 
Grande Bretagne, décident de proclamer l’Union du territoire et des troupes qui le protègent aux 
Forces Françaises Libres du Général de Gaulle…”   
121 
 
On August 27, the die was cast; Éboué telegraphed Boisson, indicating that he was 
allying himself with de Gaulle “in the interests of France and the Empire.”310 
 Éboué’s decision to rally to Free France marked a significant turning point for the 
resistance.  However, he would make his greatest impact by establishing the foundation 
for France’s postwar policies for governing her African subjects.  Scholarship examining 
Free France’s plans for a postwar Africa has rightfully focused on the Brazzaville 
Conference of January 1944.311  But three years earlier, Éboué had already begun to 
advocate for some of the principles later adopted by the conference.  In January 1941, he 
distributed a circular concerning Free France’s presence and role in AEF.  The purpose of 
the circular was twofold: to inspire those in AEF to continue fighting the war, and 
improve living conditions for France’s colonial subjects.  Éboué’s circular provides a 
clear indication that he did not consider himself an outsider in the French colonial 
mission.  He readily adopted the same language used by the colonial administration, and 
focused on France’s “special mission” in Africa.  Noting that French citizens and subjects 
in Africa had a “common destiny to reconquer France and save the Empire,” Éboué 
emphasized that France had the advantage of particular virtues in both its colonial efforts 
and the fight against Germany, namely a “deep spiritual strength” and “absolute moral 
precept.”312  Such sentiments were well in line with the Gaullist notion of an “eternal 
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France” whose innate qualities marked it as exceptional in the community of nations.  
Éboué later noted in a December 1943 speech that it was not proper to speak of a “new 
France” because “France is always France.”313  De Gaulle approved of Éboué’s ideas; 
after reading the January 1941 circular, he wrote to Éboué indicating that “the spirit that 
appears in these directives is the same and only one that will permit the French Empire to 
survive the war and to revive itself during the peace.”314 
 Éboué also saw a vital opportunity for Africa – like de Gaulle, he believed that the 
example provided by AEF during the war would be recognized as the basis for renewal of 
the entire empire.  This recognition could galvanize France to reform the colonial system.  
Éboué blamed the June 1940 capitulation to Germany not just on the failure of the 
military, but also on a “polluted” colonial bureaucracy that had squelched independent 
thinking and initiative.315  In French Africa, this had led to “chains of paper that retard its 
progress.”316  Essentially, while the goals of the French civilizing mission were sound, 
both the colonial administration and the implementation of policy had to be overhauled.  
This would commence with decentralization of the colonial bureaucracy and the 
devolution of powers to local officials.  Éboué saw this as a process of “spiritual 
renovation” that could lead to a renewal of France and her empire in the postwar 
atmosphere.  He noted that AEF “has to be the place from where the example and proper 
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qui parait dans ses directives est celui-là même et celui-là seul qui permettre de l’Empire Français 
de survivre à la guerre et de revivre dans la paix.”   
315 Félix Éboué, Politique générale de l’Afrique Équatoriale Française, 3. 
316 Ibid., 2 
123 
 
thinking originate, which, spreading out little by little to all of the empire, will finally win 
back France and assure its renaissance after the victory.”317 
The January circular, focused mainly on winning the war, contained only broad 
prescriptions for the improvement of colonial policy.  However, in May of that year, 
Éboué distributed a memo to all of Free France’s colonial heads, establishing his vision 
of France’s role in Africa after the war.  The memo clarified a number of issues, 
including the need for administrative decentralization, and reforms in medicine and 
education, public works, and industry.318  This would lead to Éboué’s establishment of an 
advisory commission to discuss general French policy in AEF that autumn.  The 
commission met from November 6-8 of that year in Brazzaville, and included numerous 
representatives from throughout AEF, including governors Pierre Lapie (Chad), Gabriel 
Fortune (Moyen-Congo), and André Latrille (Oubangui-Chari); Catholic bishops from 
Loango, Libreville, Bangui, Brazzaville, and Berberati; presidents of various chambers of 
commerce, and leaders from the forestry and mining industries.  At the heart of their 
concerns was the relatively slow rate of “progress” in the colonies, and what could be 
done to remedy the situation after the war.  To this end, the commission had as its 
mission to “take notice of the situation of the native population, the troubles that menace 
it and that threaten all productive works in the country, and finally, the proposed 
remedies.”319  While the commission concerned itself with the impact of the political 
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situation on living conditions, it was most interested in the productivity of African labor.  
The final report noted France’s dedication to “a new work law tending to protect no 
longer just the individual, but also the collective; to reconstitute the life and fertility of 
villages in the zones of production and to establish a program in which all the energies of 
the colony will be called to collaborate.”320 
 The commission’s final work product was a circular that would serve as a starting 
point for discussions about the future of French Africa throughout the remainder of the 
war.  Like Vichy’s administrators, the commission realized that the war had changed 
everything.  Noting that “French Africa has arrived at a defining moment in its 
existence,” the document acknowledged that France would now have to rededicate itself 
to renewing African society; the task was to “establish native society on foundations such 
that the colony will have entered upon the path to prosperity.”321  Essentially, France 
would have to serve its colonies just as expected its subjects to serve France.  This 
required France to first acknowledge her own errors in Africa.  These errors had 
destroyed African communities and produced a disoriented colonial population that was 
not able to organize or provide for itself: 
The colony is threatened, threatened from within, like a granary that is being 
emptied.  As we seek the cause in the extensive system of large concessions, 
chaotic economic exploitation, a sometimes awkward proselytizing, 
postponement of education, and, finally and especially, the neglect, and one might 
say contempt, in which the native political and social cadres are held, we find the 
effect and put our finger on it – it is a population that does not increase here and 
                                                                                                                                                 
indigène, des maux qui la menacent et menacent avec elle toute œuvre productrice dans le pays, 
et enfin des remèdes proposés…”   
320 Ibid.  “…de se prononcer sur ces remèdes, et notamment sur un nouveau statut du travail 
tendant à protéger, non plus seulement l’individu, mais la collectivité, à reconstituer la vie et la 
fécondité du village dans les zones de production et à établir dans ce dessein un programme 
auquel toutes les énergies de la Colonie fussent appelées à collaborer.” 
321 Ibid.  “Voici donc la besogne préalable et urgente qui nous est dictée: établir la société 
indigène sur des bases telles que la colonie entre enfin dans la voie de la prospérité.” 
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that declines there; it is a country unable to provide for the commerce, 
construction sites, administration, auxiliary staff and experienced personnel that 
are absolutely indispensable.  It is a mass that disintegrates and disperses; it is a 
voluntary failure and syphilis that spreads in a budding proletariat.  All of these 
are the evils of an absurd individualism inflicted on the colony.322 
 
 Éboué and his committee linked French colonial failure to some of the same 
reasons that Vichy had identified – most importantly, a naïve belief in the prospect of 
assimilation.  In tracing a future policy for French Africa, administrators had to 
understand that African societies were different than the European society that hoped to 
administer them: 
To make or remake a society, if not in our own image, then at least according to 
our own mentalities, is to ask for certain failure.  The indigène has a way of 
behaving, a set of laws, and a country which are not the same as ours.  We do 
nothing for their happiness through the principles of the French Revolution, which 
is our revolution; nor by applying to them the Napoleonic code, which is our 
code, nor by substituting our functionaries to think for them, but not about them. 
We will instead assure his equilibrium by dealing with him on his terms, that is to 
say, not as an isolated, interchangeable individual, but as a human person, charged 
with traditions, a member of a family, of a village, and a tribe, capable of progress 
in his own community, and very likely lost if he is removed from it.323 
 
                                                 
322 Ibid., p. 2-3.  “La colonie est menacée, menacée par l’intérieur, comme un grenier qui se vide.  
Qu’on en cherche la cause dans le système prolongé des grandes concessions, dans une 
exploitation économique désordonnée, dans un prosélytisme parfois maladroit, dans la mise en 
sommeil de l’enseignement, enfin et surtout dans l’oubli, on pourrait dire le mépris, où l’on a tenu 
les cadres politiques et sociaux indigènes, la conséquence est là, et nous la touchons du doigt: 
c’est une population qui ici n’augmente pas et qui là diminue, c’est un pays incapable de fournir 
au commerce, aux chantiers, à l’Administration, le personnel auxiliaire et le personnel de maitrise 
strictement indispensables, c’est une masse qui se désagrège et se disperse, c’est l’avortement 
volontaire et le syphilis qui se répandent dans un prolétariat naissant, ce sont tous les maux d’un 
individualisme absurde infligés ensemble à la colonie.”   
323 Ibid., p. 3.  “Faire ou refaire une société, sinon à notre image, du moins selon nos habitudes 
mentales, c’est aller à un échec certain.  L’indigène a un comportement, des lois, une patrie qui ne 
sont pas les nôtres.  Nous ne ferons son bonheur, ni selon les principes de la Révolution 
Française, qui est notre Révolution, ni en lui appliquant le code Napoléon, qui est notre code, ni 
en substituant nos fonctionnaires penseront pour lui, mais non en lui. 
Nous assurerons au contraire son équilibre en le traitant à partir de lui-même, c’est-à-dire non pas 
comme individu isolé et interchangeable, mais comme personnage humain, chargé de traditions, 
membre d’une famille, d’un village et d’une tribu, capable de progrès dans son milieu et très 
probablement perdu s’il en est extrait.” 
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Here, then, was a hard turn against a previously assimilationist colonial policy that sought 
to make the indigènes more French.  It was not incompatible with the civilizing mission 
per se – Éboué still emphasized the importance of progress in African societies – but it 
certainly articulated a new way for France to further the cause of progress on the 
continent.324  The foundation for this new policy would no longer be top-down colonial 
administration.  Instead of imposing French education and culture on African society, the 
circular encouraged colonial administrators to identify leaders from within those societies 
with whom the French government could collaborate.  Fittingly, Éboué invoked the 
words of Lyautey, who had noted that “in every country, there are cadres.  The great 
error, for the European powers that come to conquer, is to destroy these cadres.  The 
country, deprived of its framework, then falls into anarchy.  One must govern with the 
mandarin, not against the mandarin.”325 
 France, therefore, had to take African leaders as she found them.  There was no 
use in wishing for better or more enlightened chiefs; power was a fact unto itself.  “There 
is no best chief,” the circular noted, “there is one chief, and we do not have a choice.”326  
Chiefs were not akin to functionaries or interchangeable bureaucrats trained to manage 
colonial affairs.  They were “aristocrats” who were not bound by the regulations that 
                                                 
324 Tony Chafer has made a similar observation in discussing the Brazzaville Conference, which 
was partially influenced by Éboué’s contributions.  As Chafer has noted, association and 
assimilation “co-existed and the conference recommendations represented an uneasy balancing 
act between the two.  Thus, the ‘universalism’ of assimilation, with its underlying assumption that 
everyone, African, Asian and European, could ultimately, through education and cultural 
assimilation, be brought up to the same level, accorded the same rights and governed within the 
same institutional framework, was tempered by the ‘pragmatic’ acceptance of the ‘particularism’ 
of different peoples that made it difficult, if not impossible, for them to follow the same path of 
development as Europeans.”  Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 57. 
325 Politique Indigène de l’Afrique Équatoriale Française, p. 4, ANOM, 5D202.  “Dans tout pays, 
il y des cadres.  La grande erreur, pour le peuple Européen, qui vient là en conquérant, c’est de 
détruire ces cadres.  Le pays, privé de son armature, tombe alors dans l’anarchie.  Il faut 
gouverner avec le mandarin, et non contre le mandarin.”   
326 Ibid., p. 5.  “Il n’y a pas de meilleur chef, il ya un chef, et nous n’avons pas le choix.”  
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France placed on its own officials.  This power structure existed before France’s 
involvement on the continent, and local custom dictated who these figures were.  It was 
only left to France to “recognize them” in a manner akin to a diplomatic relationship.  
Failing to do so would create confusion in the colonies and would lead to a situation 
where authority and legitimacy would be divided between France’s “official” leader and 
the “true” one.  By recognizing the latter group, France would be better positioned to 
affect the lives of their subjects.  “We no longer seek to move the masses ourselves,” 
Éboué’s report noted.  “Having discerned who the legitimate chiefs are, we will give to 
them all our effort, and it is through those who have become able to lead their subjects, 
that we will reach and elevate the masses.”327  Essentially, the circular espoused a 
dynamic of influence, rather than direct control over France’s subjects – a dynamic that 
would be facilitated by France’s relationships with local chiefs. 
 In advocating for this new dynamic, Éboué acknowledged the fundamental 
concern that by relinquishing control over the appointment of Africa’s leaders, France 
had less ability to prevent abuses of power committed by those leaders, such as 
corruption and continuation of the slave trade.  But Éboué viewed many of these abuses 
as having been exaggerated, and compared them to the abuses committed by French 
colonial administrators in the past.  However, even granting that abuses had been 
committed, Éboué noted that it was not up to France to punish local chiefs.  They should 
not have to answer to French law; rather “a chief…is restrained by custom, by certain 
invisible sanctions and by the sentiment that he is the master, I would say the proprietor, 
of his people.  If it happened that a chief poorly administered his house, it is rare that it 
                                                 
327 Ibid., p. 7.  “Nous ne chercherons plus à mouvoir de nous-mêmes la masse, mais, ayant 
distingué les chefs légitimes, nous porterons sur eux tout notre effort, et c’est par eux, devenus 
aptes à diriger leurs sujets, que nous atteindrons la masse et que nous l’élèverons.” 
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would turn a blind eye to its own destruction.”328  The solution was not to censure or 
remove these leaders from power; rather, France should attempt to educate them to 
follow better practices.  And even if this effort failed, pragmatic concerns still had to be 
paramount.  What mattered was French influence over African leaders, not their everyday 
practices in the colonies.  “Respecting chiefs does not signify an approval of all their 
ways of acting,” Éboué noted.  If a chief himself did not deserve France’s regards, then 
“it is his standing that merits it.”329  Essentially, power mattered more to Éboué than any 
concerns about the abuses of France’s subjects by African chiefs. 
 Éboué’s emphasis on direct relationships between the colonial administration and 
organically rooted African leaders was not a radical turn.  It clearly reflected the practice 
of association, already widely implemented in parts of west and central Africa that were 
far removed from Dakar and other urban centers.  This already-existing practice did not 
necessarily conflict with the more ideological policy of assimilation; as Alice Conklin has 
demonstrated, the two could broadly co-exist, and the use of one or the other often 
depended on conditions in a particular colony.330  Put differently, the pre-war coexistence 
of assimilationist policy in the four communes of Senegal with associationist policies 
followed in French Soudan, Niger, and Oubangui-Shari can be reconciled by 
acknowledging the simple reality of resources: France did not have the necessary colonial 
and military personnel to effect a top-down conversion of all of its African subjects to 
                                                 
328 Ibid., p. 9-10.  “Le chef, au contraire, est retenu par la coutume, par certaines sanctions 
invisibles et par le sentiment qu’il est le maitre, j’allais dire le propriétaire, de son peuple.  S’il 
arrive qu’un chef de famille administre mal sa maison, il est rare qu’il s’aveugle jusqu’à la 
détruire.”   
329 Ibid., p. 8.  “…je répète que des égards sont dus au chef: s’il ne les mérite pas lui-même, c’est 
son rang qui les mérite…Respecter les chefs ne signifie pas approuver toutes leurs façons d’agir.”   
330 See Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in French West 
Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). 
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French culture and civilization, and especially not in more remote areas.  But Éboué’s 
argument abandoned the pragmatism of this divided policy to argue that association was 
the better policy to implement across the board.   
 In addition to his proposals about French treatment of African chiefs, Éboué was 
greatly concerned about the state of the general population in French Africa, and 
especially in the cities.  Although there existed a stable element in Africa’s urban areas, 
composed of functionaries, veterans, artisans, and commercial employees, the colonies 
were also plagued by an “unstable element” which Éboué referred to as a “floating 
population.”331  This population represented a growing discontented proletariat that posed 
a threat to stability in French sub-Saharan Africa: 
These built-up areas, born of our presence and our needs at all levels, pose a 
serious problem: they have cleared out the bush, without giving us a collaboration 
proportionate to the damage they cause to the indigenous society: alongside the 
useful inhabitants of the cities, a band of half-unemployed and half-vagrants live 
there at the expense of Europeans and indigènes; the former are lost for the 
villages and crops they have abandoned, lost from repopulating for want of a 
household, lost physically due to sexually transmitted diseases, and lost morally 
due to managing for themselves and neglecting all social discipline.332 
 
As Frederick Cooper has also argued, Éboué’s solution to this problem was strikingly 
similar to recommendations that his counterpart Pierre Boisson was making at the same 
time for Vichy West Africa – namely, the need for a renewed emphasis on discipline 
                                                 
331 Politique Indigène de l’Afrique Équatoriale Française, p. 18, ANOM, 5D202. 
332 Ibid.  “Ces agglomérations, nées de notre présence et de nos besoins de tous ordres, posent un 
problème grave: elles vident la brousse, sans nous donner une collaboration proportionnée aux 
dommages qu’elles causent à la société indigène: à côté des habitantes utiles, une bande de demi-
chômeurs et demi-vagabonds y vit aux dépens des Européens et des indigènes, perdus pour les 
villages et les cultures qu’ils ont abandonnées, perdus pour la repopulation faute d’un ménage, 
perdus physiquement par les maladies vénériennes et moralement par la pratique du débrouillage 
et l’oubli de toute discipline sociale.”   
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among indigène populations and a return to manual labor.333  Éboué further noted that 
“discipline, and only discipline, will be the great remedy for this social plague.”334  
France had to “return to their villages those unoccupied individuals” so that they could 
participate in society through manual labor.335  And like Boisson, Éboué emphasized that 
this manual labor involved a “return to the soil” for France’s African subjects: 
The indigène masses, as a whole, are and will remain predominantly agricultural. 
Every policy that we have outlined depends on the rooting of the indigène in the 
soil, and his development within traditional community institutions.  Working the 
soil is the most proper and most probably the only proper way to ensure this 
progress, this social enrichment of the village and the tribe, this fertile stability of 
the indigène population.336 
 
Although Éboué had placed some of the blame on Europeans for the existence of Africa’s 
disaffected masses, he nevertheless foresaw a significant role for westerners in the new 
colonial order.  European corporations were needed in Africa to invest their capital and 
provide as many opportunities for manual labor as possible.337  They could also provide 
technical expertise and planning in a number of specialized areas, such as forestry, 
mining, and public works projects.338  But the most important role for westerners, both in 
business and the colonial administration, was to demonstrate to the indigènes the value of 
                                                 
333 See Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: the Labor Question in French and 
British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
334 Politique Indigène de l’Afrique Équatoriale Française, p. 18.  ANOM, 5D202. 
335 Ibid. 
336 Ibid., p. 29.  “La masse indigène, dans son ensemble, est et restera essentiellement agricole.  
Toute la politique que nous avons exposée suppose la fixation de l’indigène au sol, son 
développement au sein des institutions collectives traditionnelles: le travail de la terre est le plus 
propre et sans doute le seul propre à assurer ce progrès sur place, cet enrichissement social du 
village et de la tribu, cette stabilité féconde de la population indigène.”  
337 Ibid., p. 19. 
338 Ibid., p. 32. 
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manual labor; it was their duty “to make known to the indigène that labor is the basic 
element of his progress.”339   
 It should be noted that Éboué’s circular, written in 1941, was focused mainly on 
the future of AEF, and did not specifically apply to France’s territories in West Africa, 
which were still under Vichy control.  But in the short term, it certainly influenced the 
mentality of other governors in AEF regarding policy in their colonies.  In February 
1942, Gabriel Fortune, governor of French Moyen-Congo, published a circular citing 
Éboué’s November 1941 suggestions and incorporating his recommendations.  Like 
Éboué, Fortune argued for recognizing the importance of local rule and cooperating with 
chiefs.  He noted that “any action will be ineffective that neglects the existence of two 
stable elements in the colony: French sovereignty and the authority of the indigène, 
which each have the right of respect and obedience.”340  Working with local authority, 
inculcating a labor ethic by enabling rural agriculture, and educating the indigènes were 
all keys to stabilizing African society, and by extension, solidifying French control over 
Moyen-Congo. 
So long as Free France only controlled AEF, the reach of Éboué’s ideas was 
limited.  But as de Gaulle’s movement began to reunify France’s African empire, 
Éboué’s November 1941 circular had significant influence on planning France’s postwar 
policy on the continent as a whole.  De Gaulle had already approved of many of Éboué’s 
initial ideas for the colonies, including administrative decentralization, in a note to Éboué 
                                                 
339 Ibid., p. 36.  “Il est d’ailleurs de notre devoir de faire comprendre à l’indigène que le travail est 
l’élément primordial de son progrès.”  
340 Gabriel Fortune, La Politique Indigène au Moyen Congo, Feb. 11, 1942, p. 2, ANOM, 5D202.  
“Toute action serait donc stérile, qui négligerait l’existence des deux éléments stables de la 
colonie: la souveraineté française et l’autorité indigène, qui, chacune, ont droit au respect comme 
à l’obéissance.”   
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in May of 1941.341  While it would be unrealistic to apply the policies Éboué advocated 
for AEF to the entire empire, they could nevertheless serve as a framework for France’s 
colonial future.  Numerous colonial administrators would pay tribute to Éboué’s ideas 
upon the opening of the Brazzaville Conference in January 1944, and the conference’s 
final recommendations acknowledged Éboué’s pivotal contribution, albeit in a more 
restrained form that will be discussed below.342  These tributes to Éboué demonstrate that 
through his rallying to de Gaulle and his subsequent articulation of the need for 
realignment of French colonial policy, the governor-general had made a significant 
impact on the future of France’s empire in Africa. 
 
Tensions with Britain and America 
 Of course, underlying Éboué’s plans was the assumption that France would regain 
its rightful place as an international power and retain its colonies intact.  Throughout the 
war, Britain had made numerous promises to this effect.  The United States made similar 
verbal commitments to both Vichy and Free France, albeit somewhat more vaguely.  But 
from de Gaulle’s viewpoint, these assurances did not necessarily manifest in the Allies’ 
plans for the administration of the war and the postwar order.  The Allies disagreed on a 
variety of issues that affected the French empire, and the result was escalating tension 
between Free France and its principal allies for most of the duration of the war.  To be 
                                                 
341 Note from Charles de Gaulle to Félix Éboué, May 20, 1941, ANOM, 5D202. 
342 Recommandations adoptées par la Conférence Africaine Française, Jan 30 – Feb. 8, 1944, 
ANOM, 17G130.  Noting that “traditional political institutions must be maintained, not as an end 
for themselves, but as a means permitting municipal and regional society to express itself with 
maximum vigor,” the report noted the principles of Éboué’s circular as a means to achieve this 
result. “Les institutions politiques traditionnelles doivent être maintenues, non comme fin en soi, 
mais en tant que mode permettant à la vie municipale et régionale de s’exprimer dès à présent, 
avec le maximum de vigeur.”     
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sure, de Gaulle remained indebted to Great Britain for supporting Free France.  But the 
relationship between the two nevertheless existed against the same ideological backdrop 
that motivated Vichy’s hatred of Great Britain – namely, the Anglo-French rivalry in 
Africa and France’s need to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity of its colonies.  
These tensions culminated in 1942, when Britain decided to invade and later administer 
Madagascar without Free French participation.   
But de Gaulle had already expressed significant reservations about his British ally 
significantly earlier in the war.  France had been given a mandate over the former 
Ottoman territories of Lebanon and Syria by the League of Nations in 1923.343  After the 
June 1940 armistice, Vichy retained the territories until the Syria-Lebanon campaign of 
June-July 1941, a joint British/Free France operation through which the two allies 
captured the mandated territories from Vichy.  Tensions were already high given the 
significant deployment of Free France forces against their Vichy countrymen during the 
campaign.  But the operation also began to strain the relationship between de Gaulle and 
Britain.  As joint allied forces were advancing into eastern Syria from British Iraq on July 
3rd, de Gaulle evinced concern about potential British designs on France’s mandates in a 
letter to Éboué.  He believed that Britain and Belgium were genuinely trying to help 
France in Africa, if for no other reason than “if we were to lose our position [on the 
continent], the position of the English and the Belgians on the African continent would be 
gravely compromised.”344  Nevertheless, de Gaulle made clear that “... I do not place my 
                                                 
343 For more on French colonial interests in the Middle East after World War I, see the discussion 
in Stuart Michael Persell, The French Colonial Lobby, 1899-1938 (Stanford: Hoover University 
Press, 1983). 
344 Telegram from Charles de Gaulle to Félix Éboué, July 3, 1941, Archives Nationales de Paris 
(hereinafter ANP), 3 AG I 280.  “…si nous perdions notre position, toute la position des Anglais 
et des Belges dans le continent Africain serait gravement compromise.”   
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trust in the current British command. What I see in Syria gives me the conviction that 
their command is unfit for modern warfare. I have decided therefore not to risk our major 
interests and our modest means under the command of the English.”345  Accordingly, 
Éboué was ordered not to allow his troops to fall under British control, and especially not 
in French territory.  Nor was he allowed to commit French troops to engagements on 
British territory.   
 However, the entry of the United States into the war in December 1941 presented 
a more significant problem for de Gaulle.  A victorious United States, professing staunch 
anticolonial views, could potentially influence the shape of France’s empire after the war.  
A more immediate concern was American reaction to de Gaulle himself.  U.S. officials 
remained suspicious of the general throughout the war, and were particularly worried 
about his commitment to democratic ideals.  They kept him at arm’s length through 1942, 
and during that period he was not treated by Roosevelt or the State Department as if he 
had any legitimate political authority.  It was not until his consolidation of all of the 
resistance movements under one banner in mid-1943 that the relationship would change 
in his favor. 
For his part, de Gaulle seems to have tried early on to establish good ties with 
American authorities.  In October 1940, he offered the use of French colonies in the 
western hemisphere to the United States as air or naval bases.346  He spoke favorably of 
the United States and its commitment to freedom on many occasions, and was grateful to 
                                                 
345 Ibid.  “…je ne suis pas s’accorder ma confiance au commandement britannique actuel.  Ce que 
je vois en Syrie me donne la conviction que ce commandement est inapte à la guerre moderne.  
J’ai décidé, en conséquence, de ne plus risquer nos grands intérêts et nos modestes moyens sous 
les ordres des Anglais.”   
346 Telegram from American consul Mallon at Leopoldville to the Secretary of State, Oct. 27, 
1940.  Foreign Relations of the United States 1940, Vol. II, General and Europe (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 504-5. 
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the U.S. contribution to the war effort via the Lend-Lease Act.  In July 1941 he directed 
René Pleven to send a memo to the United States to ask for help in Africa.  Noting that 
“the hopes of the French colonial population are turned toward the United States,” Pleven 
petitioned the State Department for medical and food supplies, and measures to protect 
Free French shipping.347  De Gaulle also made repeated efforts to obtain Free France’s 
diplomatic recognition as a political entity by the United States. 
These early efforts had decidedly mixed results.  As early as May 1941, Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull expressed to British Ambassador Lord Halifax that the United 
States would rather not deal with de Gaulle, and was instead hoping for Vichy’s General 
Maxime Weygand to “stand up” in Africa and oppose Germany, thus providing an 
alternative to de Gaulle’s movement.348  That July, upon receiving Pleven’s request for 
aid from the British ambassador, Assistant Secretary Sumner Welles cautioned that “it 
would be difficult for the United States to maintain diplomatic relations with Vichy” 
should the U.S. grant Pleven’s request.349  While the U.S. did extend some lend-lease aid 
to Free France, this was most likely due to a perception that Britain would benefit from 
the arrangement.  As the Allies began to discuss a joint declaration of war aims in late 
1941, Roosevelt expressed his opinion to Hull that Free France should not be included in 
the document – an opinion that he would not change for three months, and only after de 
Gaulle protested and Churchill wrote to FDR to persuade him otherwise.350  At the same 
                                                 
347 Memorandum submitted by M. Pleven on behalf of General de Gaulle, July 1941.  Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1941, Vol. II, Europe (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1959),  574-5 
348 Memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, May 21, 1941.  Ibid., 180. 
349 Memorandum of conversation by the Acting Secretary of State, July 8, 1941.  Ibid., 573-4. 
350 President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, Dec. 27, 1941.  Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1942, Vol. II, Europe (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 13.  
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time, Welles expressed deep skepticism about de Gaulle to Lord Halifax, the British 
ambassador to the United States, noting that “there were no outstanding men with 
qualities of leadership and initiative directing the Free French movement” and that he 
“could not see that either General de Gaulle or his associates provided any rallying point 
for French patriotism.”351   
It was one thing for U.S. officials to express these views before its direct 
involvement in the war.  But with the attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent U.S. entry 
into the war, Roosevelt could now have legitimate influence over the military and 
political situation in Free France’s territories.  To be sure, the State Department had tried 
to reassure Free France that it would not interfere with the empire in Africa.  On January 
12, 1942, it sent word to Free France in London that “the policy of this Government as 
regards France is based upon the maintenance of the integrity of France and of the French 
Empire and of the eventual restoration of the complete independence of all French 
territories.”352  Nevertheless, both Roosevelt and the State Department remained 
suspicious of de Gaulle and Free France’s motives for most of the war.  As late as 1942, 
the State Department still doubted whether de Gaulle would restore democracy in France, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Memorandum by Samuel Reber of the Division of European Affairs, Jan. 12, 1942.  Ibid., 33.  
Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt, February 27, 1942.  Ibid., 37-8. 
351 Memorandum of Conversation by the Under Secretary of State, Dec. 27, 1941. Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1941, Vol. II, Europe (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1959),  205. 
352 Memorandum by Samuel Reber of the Division of European Affairs, Jan. 12, 1942.  Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1942, Vol. II, Europe (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
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and many officials hoped to attenuate de Gaulle’s influence over the Free French 
movement.353 
Conflicts also developed pertaining to American actions on French territory.  At 
first, these conflicts were limited to territories in the Americas and the Pacific Ocean – 
the Antilles, French Guiana, and Saint Pierre and Miquelon in particular, with Hull 
expressing extreme displeasure about de Gaulle’s forces seizing the latter islands in 
December 1941.354  But by May 1942, the United States had begun to involve itself in 
Martinique and New Caledonia in the South Pacific, the latter in contravention of the 
authority of Thierry d’Argenlieu, Free France’s military representative.355  Free French 
officials viewed America’s actions as aiming to “neutralize” Vichy-held territory so as to 
keep it out of the war.  Thus neutralized, it would not be able to re-enter the war under 
the Free French banner.  Of course, this directly undermined de Gaulle’s policy of using 
the war to regain France’s grandeur.  Consequently, Free France sent a memo to the State 
Department whereby it reminded the United States of recent Allied agreements (such as 
the one on Madagascar), by which they had agreed to restore France’s territories.356  The 
memo stressed that “the occupation and administration of French territories by foreign 
forces or authorities… can only discourage the spirit of resistance in France and delay the 
time when all French territories, both Metropolitan France and the Empire, may take part 
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with the maximum effectiveness in the fight against the Axis powers.”357  It asked the 
U.S. government to coordinate operations on Vichy territories with Free France forces, 
and in particular when dealing with territories in the western hemisphere.358   
America’s actions also provoked suspicion about plans for the future of the 
French empire.  On May 17, de Gaulle wrote to Éboué, noting conflicts with the British 
in Syria and Madagascar, and with the Americans in New Caledonia in Martinique.  
These conflicts sapped the morale of the Free French movement – a phenomenon, de 
Gaulle claimed, that the Allies were well aware of.  This suggested that “their instincts 
might lead them to wish for a more malleable France.”359 He wrote Éboué again on May 
25, noting that the situation “forces on us a great caution concerning the presence of 
Americans in our Free French Africa.  Naturally, you must refuse on your soil the arrival 
of any foreign naval or air military element without the formal authorization of the 
National Committee.”360  Most likely in response to similar sentiments expressed by de 
Gaulle in other circles, Anthony Eden met with the general in June, during which the 
latter noted “his deep suspicions with regard to British and American intentions” 
concerning territories in France’s empire, and in particular about American plans.361  Free 
French officials would make clear the following month that U.S. policy represented a 
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threat to France’s standing in the world.  Noting that “the future of France will depend in 
a very large measure on the active part she will have taken in the war and the victory,” 
the Free French delegation in the U.S. emphasized that neutralization of French territories 
“deprives France practically of the last elements of force which remain with her to win 
back her place in the world.”362 
These tensions resulted in a sternly written letter from de Gaulle to Roosevelt in 
late October 1942.  Noting that “only Frenchmen can be the judge of their national 
interests,” de Gaulle cautioned Roosevelt against interfering in the French empire, 
because “the French people have become extremely sensitive to the fate of their empire, 
and any appearance of abuse of these interests on the part of any ally is exploited by the 
enemy and by Vichy in a manner dangerous to the national sensibilities.”363  The 
remainder of de Gaulle’s letter illustrates his refusal to openly acknowledge France’s 
changed position vis-à-vis the U.S. and Britain.  He insisted that Free France be consulted 
“each time there is question either of the general interests of France, or of French 
participation in the war, or of the administration of those French territories which the 
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June 11, 1942.  Ibid., 525.  This suspicion affected the shape of the agreement between Free 
France and the United States on the use of the port city of Point Noire, on the South Atlantic in 
Moyen-Congo.  The U.S. had requested its use earlier that year as an airbase for use as a stopping 
point to Australia.  Memorandum of conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle), Feb. 
26, 1942.  Ibid., 564.  This would eventually expand to the use of the base to move American 
troops to other theaters of operation.  Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United 
Kingdom, Aug. 3, 1942.  Ibid., 578.  By August, Adrien Tixier, the head of the Free French 
delegation in Washington, had written to the assistant secretary of state for assurances that the 
base and any improvements made by the U.S. would remain Free French property after the war.  
Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Adrien Tixier, Head of the Free French Delegation, Aug. 27, 
1942.  Ibid., 586.  Assistant Secretary of State Berle agreed to this request, but there would be 
later disagreement on whether the installations constructed by the United States would be left 
behind for France after the war.  Memorandum by Mr. Perry N. Jester of the Division of Near 
Eastern Affairs, Dec. 4, 1942.  Ibid., 595. 
363 Charles de Gaulle to President Roosevelt, late Oct. 1942.  Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1942, Vol. II, Europe (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 542. 
140 
 
developments of the war may gradually place in a position where they can again take part 
in it.”364  He closed his letter by chastising Roosevelt for his failure to include Free 
France in his considerations, insisting that “France still represents a power in the world 
which must not be ignored.”365  The letter seems to have been so off point as to have 
caused the chief of the State Department’s European Affairs division to note de Gaulle’s 
“blindness” about U.S. intentions and the relationship with Vichy in a note to Welles.366 
 
Madagascar and the Middle East 
As tensions mounted with the United States, Free France also found itself at odds 
with Britain in Madagascar and the Middle East.  Tensions over Madagascar had existed 
starting in late 1941, when de Gaulle and Free French officials began insisting that they 
play a substantial military role in any British invasion of the Vichy-controlled territory.  
By April, De Gaulle raised the issue directly with Anthony Eden, but to no avail.367  Not 
surprisingly, Britain’s landing on May 5, 1942  – without consulting de Gaulle or 
including his forces – provoked a lengthy memo from Free France to the British 
government.  By going it alone in Madagascar, it argued, Britain had undermined the 
movement’s legitimacy and had denied France the opportunity to fight, upon which the 
future of France’s standing in the world depended.  More importantly, Britain’s attack on 
Madagascar without French help or advice threatened “the breakup of the French 
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Europe (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 544. 
367 Charles de Gaulle to Anthony Eden, April 9, 1942, ANP, 3 AG I 280, Dossier 4. 
141 
 
empire.”368  Consequently, Britain’s actions damaged the future relationship between the 
two powers.  The memo noted that “the occupation, even temporary, of a French territory 
by Allied troops, without the participation of the National Committee, provides an easy 
argument to the enemy and its accomplices, who are always inclined to denounce Anglo-
Saxon imperialism.”369  Of course, the subtext of the memo implied that Free France, not 
the Axis, was accusing its ally of imperial designs on French territory. 
Britain’s initial failure to take the island in the May offensive temporarily allayed 
the question of French military participation and political administration.  During the 
summer, Britain continually reassured its ally that a French administration would be 
quickly established once British forces managed to drive Vichy out.370  Anglo-French 
tensions might have dissipated on their own in advance of the September campaign.  But 
events in Lebanon and Syria reminded both allies of the traditional Anglo-French 
colonial rivalry.  After the campaign in summer 1941, Free French administration in the 
territories had promised independence to both territories.  However, the timing of that 
independence became a subject of dispute between Free France and the British.  The 
disagreement was exacerbated by the volatile relationship between General Georges 
Catroux, De Gaulle’s High Commissioner to the Levant territories, and British General 
Edward Spears, the latter of whom wanted France to move much more quickly in 
granting independence to her mandates.  By July, the situation had deteriorated so badly 
that the American consul at Beirut noted that Spears was actively working against French 
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interests and even perhaps hoped for the British to carve out a sphere of influence in the 
Levant after the French departure.371   
For his part, de Gaulle had no trust in Spears; he blamed him for the failure of the 
aborted Dakar offensive of September 1940.  As tensions rose in 1942, de Gaulle directly 
petitioned Churchill to remove him, or risk ending collaboration between Britain and 
Free France.372 By mid-August, convinced that Great Britain intended to supplant 
France’s influence in the region, de Gaulle even raised the prospect of the use of force by 
Free France to protect its Levant states against the British, telling the American 
representative in Beirut that the situation there “might lead to conflict and that the 
Fighting French might be beaten but they preferred that rather than to cede without being 
defeated in an open fight.”373 Despite an assurance from Churchill on August 22 that 
Britain had no such designs on French territory, De Gaulle continued to view British 
actions in the region as an affront to both France’s interest and his own personal pride.  
This culminated in his speech of September 8, in which he delivered a veiled attack at the 
United States and Britain.  Without naming the allies, De Gaulle implied that they were 
“false friends…who are pleased with [France’s] defeat and cultivate those who betray 
her; who instead should be shouting to her the only thing which might save her: Rise up, 
here are arms!”374 
The events in Syria, and De Gaulle’s reaction, had a significant effect on the 
British disposition toward French administration of Madagascar.  In September, Viscount 
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Halifax, the British ambassador to the United States, complained to the State Department 
about de Gaulle’s “recent embarrassing behavior in Syria.”375  Just before the renewed 
offensive in Madagascar, the Foreign Office notified Free France that “it had been [our] 
intention to invite the National Committee to assume the administration of the occupied 
territory… In view however of General de Gaulle’s present attitude about the Levantine 
States and of his unqualified suspicions of the good faith of His Majesty’s government, 
[we] cannot at present proceed on lines proposed.”376  Britain re-launched its Madagascar 
offensive in early September; by early October, the British controlled the island.  But it 
would not be until December that administration would be turned over to Free France. 
This delay in the handover of Madagascar provoked sharply-worded letters to the 
British Consul in Brazzaville from both Éboué and General Philippe LeClerc that 
October.  Both men saw the situation in Madagascar as a direct threat to the sovereignty 
of the French empire.  LeClerc, who had served in several military expeditions in Africa 
and would later participate in the liberation of Paris, reminded the Consul General that 
French resistance had been “founded on the promises made by the British government 
two years ago to restore France in its integrity,” and he indicated his concern that Britain 
was going back on that promise.377  Although Free France still generally trusted the 
British, there had been several troublesome incidents over the past few months, including 
the situation in Syria and uncertainty about Britain’s intentions in Djibouti and West 
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Africa.378  But Madagascar posed the greatest problem, as the British had repeatedly 
promised that administration of the island would be turned over the De Gaulle’s 
followers after Vichy had been evicted.  The British failure to do so promptly had led 
Free France to question Britain’s intentions for the continent: 
This raises for us the tragic question: What does Great Britain seek? Why is it, 
that when once it seemed ready to help us with all of its resources, it apparently 
wants to stop now when our movement is everywhere identified with the will of 
national resistance to the invader? Does [Great Britain] seek to divide the French 
who want to fight against German hegemony? For what purpose?  For two years, 
and especially during the rallying [to Britain], how many times have we answered 
with conviction the questions that have worried many French: "Are you certain 
that Great Britain will restore France’s integrity?"379 
 In his own correspondence with the British consul-general, Éboué articulated 
many of the issues raised by LeClerc, but with an even more forceful approach.  
Complaining of alleged British interference with telegrams between London and 
Brazzaville, Éboué noted that a “profound malaise” marked Anglo-French relations.380  
This malaise had only been exacerbated by the situations in Madagascar and Lebanon, 
where Éboué accused the British of ignoring the French mandate.  Éboué noted that the 
two incidents would threaten long-term friendship between the two nations.  More 
startlingly, he indicated that Britain was threatening France’s cooperation during the war 
itself: 
I am obliged to tell you that such a situation cannot last without preparing as a 
single body and soul all who bear the French name and who can speak freely.  I 
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am obliged to reiterate that to my deep regret the delay of the British Government 
in meeting its commitments has made it necessary for us to cease cooperation 
between our two countries in Equatorial Africa.381 
 
Neither LeClerc’s appeal nor Éboué’s threats had any immediate effect on the political 
situation in Madagascar; it would not be turned over to Free French administration until 
December of that year.  But De Gaulle and Éboué continued to proclaim Free France’s 
authority over the territory during this interim period.  The same day that he wrote to the 
British consul-general, Éboué instructed Free France’s chief of information services to 
assert French rights over Madagascar.  Absent British recognition of these rights, soldiers 
should refuse to take orders from the British.  Éboué told him to remind French citizens 
and subjects that “French laws prohibit all French functionaries or military members from 
serving under the orders of any foreign authority.  The French National Committee is the 
only qualified authority to lead and control the administration of French forces.”382  In 
essence, British defiance in Madagascar represented a clear threat to the exercise of 
French sovereignty. 
 
North Africa and Growing French Concerns about American Intentions 
 Free France’s discontent over the situation in Madagascar would pale in 
comparison to its reaction to developments in North Africa.  The November 1942 deal 
with Admiral Darlan and Pierre Boisson, under which the United States allowed French 
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authorities to keep North and West Africa under their control in exchange for their 
rallying to the Allied cause, was discussed in the previous chapter.  Roosevelt and 
Eisenhower’s decision to back an alternate French political movement in Africa enraged 
de Gaulle and his followers.  Taken in conjunction with Great Britain’s alleged 
undermining of French sovereignty in Madagascar and Syria, the U.S. action in North 
Africa presented a clear threat to de Gaulle’s legitimacy as political leader of the 
resistance movements.  Not surprisingly, having opposed Vichy and the Nazis from the 
moment of the armistice, de Gaulle saw himself as the only legitimate leader of the 
resistance – a belief that loyal lieutenants like Éboué made sure to emphasize in 
communications with the British and the Americans.  De Gaulle had taken great care to 
establish a measure of control over the clandestine resistance movements on the mainland 
throughout 1942, having dispatched Jean Moulin on his infamous parachute mission in 
January of that year.383  This process was delicate enough without the prospect of de 
Gaulle and his followers having to cede authority to men it considered fascist criminals – 
an understandable sentiment given the previous repression of Free French sympathizers 
by both Boisson and Darlan.384  By recognizing Darlan, the United States had greatly 
undermined the vast political capital that de Gaulle and Free France had rightly earned.   
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The American recognition of Darlan would have repercussions even after 
Darlan’s death that December.  After the latter’s assassination in Algiers at the hands of a 
Gaullist sympathizer, the Allies turned to General Henri Giraud to assume Darlan’s 
duties.  Giraud was a significantly more heroic and respectable figure than Darlan; like de 
Gaulle, he played a crucial role in the defense of France during the Nazi assault in May 
1940.  He managed to escape Nazi captivity two years later, and tried (albeit 
unsuccessfully) to persuade Pétain to cease collaboration with Germany.  His installation 
as Darlan’s successor in early 1943 threatened a schism in the external resistance 
movement, and de Gaulle was initially forced to defer to Giraud’s more exalted military 
reputation.  The split between de Gaulle and Giraud, with the latter favored by the 
Americans, would not be resolved for several months.385 
De Gaulle’s followers made their feelings clear about American support for 
Darlan, and later Giraud.  As previously discussed, de Gaulle’s October letter protesting 
American policy had already irked both Roosevelt and top officials at the State 
Department.  A meeting between Roosevelt, Sumner Welles, and French representatives 
Adrien Tixier and André Philip that November only exacerbated the problem.  Roosevelt 
was firm in his dealings with the two men; he was open to meeting with de Gaulle 
personally, but was determined to maintain American control over the situation in North 
Africa.  After Tixier reasserted Free France’s concerns about the U.S. recognition of 
Darlan, Roosevelt emphasized that the question of who administered North Africa after 
the Allied invasion would be one for the United States to decide.  Tixier and Philip were 
visibly outraged, stating that this was categorically unacceptable to Free France, and that 
they “would never ‘permit’ any liberated French town, village, or farmhouse to be 
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administered by foreign powers.”386  The American reception of these comments was 
summarized by Welles, who noted in a memorandum that “[i]t is noteworthy that 
throughout the entire conversation which lasted some fifty minutes, neither one of them 
expressed the slightest gratitude or recognition of the liberation of North Africa by 
American forces…”387 
Nor did de Gaulle express any gratitude to the United States the following day.  In 
a speech broadcast on Radio Brazzaville, he emphasized that despite the Allied success in 
North Africa, the Vichy regime still remained intact in Algiers.  He then openly 
questioned American commitment to eject Darlan and his fellow Nazi collaborators from 
North Africa: 
A large area of France is occupied by an Allied army with the consent of the 
people. The nation wonders whether or not the regime and the spirit of Vichy will 
remain there in force; whether or not the Vichy traitors will remain in power; 
whether or not that part of the French Empire will be able to reunite with the part 
that is already at war under a badge of honor; whether or not the national 
liberation of the free Empire will become dishonored by a handful of guilty men, 
disguised by the occasion under an additional lie?388 
 
Free French officials also made their feelings clear about the American 
recognition of Darlan through unofficial channels.  Éboué had cultivated a friendship 
with a Colonel Merrick, an American Air Corps military representative in Brazzaville 
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who had helped negotiate the agreements between the United States and Free France 
regarding the use of a base at Point-Noire in French Congo earlier that year.389  After a 
visit by Merrick in December 1942, Éboué wrote him to explain his sentiments about the 
recent U.S. action in North Africa.  Although he claimed to understand why the United 
States had decided to strategically ally itself with Darlan, Éboué nevertheless labeled the 
recent action as an “immense deception.”  Consequently, the recognition of Darlan was 
viewed as a personal affront to Free France: 
And we think at the same time that France does not merit this treatment.  Having 
paid in 1940 and since then for [Vichy’s] shortcomings… France has the right to 
respect just as she has the right to victory.  It is contrary to her national dignity for 
one to impose upon her today the same masters that were imposed upon her by 
Germany, and it is France which is unduly prohibited from participating in the 
common victory, only to preserve a regime which made surrender, inaction and 
submission the central principles of its government… In a word, we maintain that 
France has the right to honor.390 
 
 For his part, de Gaulle now expressed openly his resentment for American 
interference in Africa. On January 2, he blasted the situation in Algiers, which had 
created “confusion” about French authority in the colony and had separated France from 
its empire.391  On January 19, he complained to a member of the British foreign service 
that the Americans had plotted to prevent him from communicating with Giraud and were 
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manipulating events in North Africa.392  A meeting between de Gaulle and Roosevelt in 
Casablanca at the height of the controversy only exacerbated the problem.  Much to de 
Gaulle’s dismay, Roosevelt was unwilling to recognize his political authority in French 
Africa, noting that “the sovereignty of France… rested with the people, but that 
unfortunately the people of France were not now in a position to exercise that 
sovereignty.”393  The clear implication was that de Gaulle, as a military leader, had no 
democratic legitimacy that the United States was willing to recognize.  The meeting did 
not leave a good impression with de Gaulle; a month later, he indicated to an American 
representative that he believed that the United States “favors the establishment of fascist 
regimes in all European countries.”394 
 A note written by Félix Éboué on April 8, 1943 to Gabriel Fortune, governor of 
French Congo at Brazzaville, is revealing as to Free France’s mentality regarding the 
U.S. actions in North and West Africa.  Noting that de Gaulle’s recent voyage to North 
Africa had been “the object of a systematic obstruction by the American government, and 
to a certain extent, the British government”, Éboué suggested that the French needed to 
shift their disposition regarding the Allies.395  Although outright hostility was to be 
avoided, Éboué indicated that French dealings with the British and Americans should be 
                                                 
392 The Chargé in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State, Jan. 20, 1943.  Foreign Relations 
of the United States 1943, Vol. II Europe (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 
43. 
393 Roosevelt-de Gaulle Conversation, Jan. 22, 1943.  Foreign Relations of the United States: The 
Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1968), 695. 
394 Secretary of State to the Ambassador for the United Kingdom, Feb. 19, 1943.  Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1943, Vol. II Europe (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1964), 59. 
395 Telegram from Félix Éboué to the governor of French Moyen-Congo, April 8, 1942, ANOM, 
5D292.  “Général de Gaulle confirme ce que nous supposions.  Stop.  Son voyage en Afrique du 
Nord est l’objet d’une obstruction systématique du Gouvernement Américain et dans une certaine 
mesure du Gouvernement Britannique.”   
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marked with a degree of defiance.  Taken in isolation, his words could have been 
mistaken with any of Pierre Boisson’s speeches prior to the Eisenhower-Darlan accords: 
…We must, with precision and dignity, form a close-knit front against the foreign 
interference that compromises not only the current unity among the French, but 
also the future independence of our country… We shall show the Anglo-Saxons 
that we are able to maintain our sang-froid and clarity, and that we have enough 
courage and tenacity to prevent this strangulation.396 
 
In closing, Éboué noted that Allied interference with de Gaulle in North Africa was “the 
greatest crisis since 1940.”397 
 Éboué also wrote the following day to both the British and American consulates 
in Brazzaville. Noting the difficulties between the Allies and de Gaulle, he emphasized 
that the relationship was leaving a terrible impression with French authorities.  “We are 
sad,” he indicated, “to realize that the two great allied peoples cannot show the respect 
owed to the dignity and the independence of France.”398  Given the recent actions of the 
two governments, Éboué could only assume that the Allies did not really want to install a 
government that could truly represent French interests.  He contrasted the Allies’ 
seemingly unclear intentions with the principles of their previous statements – notably the 
Atlantic Charter and “repeated declarations of the British and American governments, 
according to which France will be restored in its integrity and in its grandeur.”399  These 
declarations, he emphasized, required the recognition of a Gaullist government in 
                                                 
396 Ibid.  “Mais devons former avec précision et dignité un front serré contre ingérence étrangère 
qui compromet non seulement union actuelle entre français mais même indépendance future notre 
pays telle que la concevons et devons la concevoir.  Stop.  Nous montrerons aux Anglo-Saxons 
que savons conserver sang-froid et lucidité mais que avons aussi assez de courage et ténacité pour 
empêcher cet étranglement.” 
397 Ibid. 
398 Telegram from Félix Éboué to British Consul-General in Brazzaville, April 9, 1943, ANOM, 
5D 292.  “Nous avons peine, en effet, à supposer que les deux grands peuples alliés puissent 
contredire jamais le respect qu’ils doivent à la dignité et à l’indépendance de la France.”   
399 Of course, Éboué made no mention of whether the principles of the Atlantic Charter should 
also apply to France’s colonies. 
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Algiers.400  For his part, the American consul wrote back to Éboué on April 13, noting 
that the United States was still dedicated to the reconstruction of France and that Éboué 
was reading too much into the situation.  He closed by noting that “the apprehension and 
the lack of confidence mentioned in your letter are regrettable, and there is no foundation 
for them.”401 
 This response did nothing to assure de Gaulle or Free France about American 
intentions, nor did Roosevelt’s continued refusal to accord de Gaulle political 
recognition.  On May 3, de Gaulle wrote to General Catroux, and suggested that the 
United States might eventually be the power against which the French needed to focus 
their forces.402  Later that month, he expressed his fears to Catroux that the United States 
would attempt to buy off Italy with French territory.403  Relations between the two 
powers became so strained that Hull expressed to Roosevelt on May 10 that “de Gaulle’s 
political propaganda… immediately threatens the military success against the Axis 
powers to which we have dedicated every effort.”404  For his part, Roosevelt noted to 
Churchill that month that de Gaulle’s “course and attitude is well nigh intolerable.”405 
Indeed, Free French propaganda during this period attempted to sow suspicion of 
the United States in order to bolster general opposition to American-backed authorities in 
                                                 
400 Telegram from Félix Éboué to British Consul-General in Brazzaville, April 9, 1943, ANOM, 
5D 292.  “Je ne doute pas d’ailleurs qu’elle ne soit clairement et résolument favorable; la Charte 
d’Atlantique, les déclarations répétées des gouvernements britannique et américain selon 
lesquelles la France sera restituée dans son intégrité et dans sa grandeur…”   
401 Letter from Laurence Taylor, American Consul-General in Brazzaville, April 13, 1942, 
ANOM, 5D292.  “L’appréhension et la besoin de confiance mentionnés dans votre lettre sont 
regrettables, et ne sont certainement pas fondés.”   
402 Consul General at Algiers to the Secretary of State, May 6, 1943.  Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1943, Vol. II Europe (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 109-
110. 
403 Consul General at Algiers to the Secretary of State, May 18, 1943.  Ibid., 121. 
404 Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, May 10, 1943.  Ibid., 113. 
405 Memorandum by President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, May 8, 1943.  Ibid., 111. 
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Africa.  Pierre Boisson was particularly useful for anti-American propaganda, as 
Gaullists spread rumors that he had “sold Dakar” to American interests.406  In June, de 
Gaulle and Giraud agreed to officially unify their respective movements into the Comité 
Française de la Libération Nationale (CFLN).  But the intrigues against Giraud 
continued; de Gaulle considered him a puppet of the American authorities, and Free 
French rhetoric reflected this belief.  The rumors would prove overwhelming to Giraud.  
Once the CFLN had been established, he was quickly out-maneuvered from his position 
by de Gaulle.  On June 9, de Gaulle, citing a lack of unity in the CFLN, resigned his post 
as president; the result was an expansion of the CFLN’s executive committee to include 
more Gaullist supporters, with de Gaulle quickly returning to the top spot.407  A key 
defection during de Gaulle’s gambit was Jean Monnet, who would later become famous 
for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community.  Monnet had previously 
been a staunch supporter of Giraud, but his change in allegiance was the catalyst in 
shifting the balance of power between the two generals.  The American consul general at 
Algiers had already warned Hull about this in a telegram that May, indicating that 
Monnet “feels as strongly as possible like de Gaulle that French rights and sovereignty 
must be more aggressively asserted in respect of the Allies.”408   
 De Gaulle’s heavy-handedness in pushing out Giraud and criticizing the 
Americans only furthered U.S. reluctance to recognize de Gaulle’s movement as 
legitimately speaking for French interests.  After being notified of the power struggle 
within the CFLN, Roosevelt wrote Churchill, indicating that “[w]e must divorce 
                                                 
406 Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in French West Africa to the Secretary of 
State, June 23, 1943.  Ibid., 162. 
407 Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State, June 13, 1943.  Ibid., 151.  Consul 
General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State, June 16, 1943.  Ibid., 152. 
408 Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State, June 16, 1943.  Ibid., 152. 
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ourselves from de Gaulle…”409  By this point, such a course of action was not possible; 
de Gaulle and his followers were too well-entrenched.  But the United States could still 
limit the legitimacy it accorded to the general.  Therefore, in recognizing the CFLN in 
August 1943, the U.S. took care to emphasize the CFLN “as functioning within specific 
limitations during the war” and further noted that “this statement does not constitute 
recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire…”410  It would not be 
until July of the following year that Roosevelt was willing to consider recognizing the 
CFLN as the legitimate political head of France, and it would take until October for the 
United States to actually do so.411 
 Free French concerns about American power were not limited to the war.  An 
internal Free France memo from January 1944, written by Renée Stricker, and sent to de 
Gaulle, Pleven, and other prominent members of the CFLN cabinet, summarized the 
anxiety that Free France felt regarding the United States’ postwar interest in France’s 
empire.  “The United States is not a colonial power,” it noted, “but this war has forced it 
to turn its eyes toward the colonial problem.  The peace will force it to take a position on 
this problem, according to its interests and according to its conception of the world.”412  
This conception, the memo argued, was based on a particular mentality that France would 
                                                 
409 President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill), June 17, 1943.  Ibid., 155. 
410 Statements on Relations with the French Committee of National Liberation, Aug. 22, 1943.  
Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and 
Casablanca, 1943 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), 1170. 
411 President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill), July 10, 1944.  Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1944, Vol. III, the British Commonwealth and Europe 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 723.  The Secretary of State to the 
American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Paris, Oct. 19, 1944.  
Ibid., 741. 
412 Les États-Unis et le Problème Colonial, Jan. 15, 1944, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 880.  “Les États-
Unis ne sont pas une puissance coloniale; mais cette guerre les a forcés à tourner les yeux vers le 
problème des colonies, la paix les forcera à prendre position sur ce problème, à la fois selon leurs 
intérêts et selon leur conception du monde.”   
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have to understand if she hoped to “defend her vital interests” to her American ally.413  
America had been born out of an anticolonial struggle against Great Britain; its colonial 
holdings were limited, and those that it did possess, like Cuba and the Philippines, had 
been granted a measure of autonomy and were economically successful.  What infused 
the American colonial mentality was a particular form of idealism of economic and 
political liberty, for which America’s soldiers were currently fighting.414  The memo 
further noted that American officials had made numerous, and sometimes conflicting, 
statements on colonialism.  These ranged from Cordell Hull’s seeming acknowledgement 
of a role for the colonial powers in preparing the colonies for self-government, to Sumner 
Welles, who while acknowledging that some societies may not be ready for self-
government, nevertheless had asked “how can we hope for the coming of a free and 
stable world, if half the population remains in slavery?”415  Therefore, the United States’ 
disposition toward empires after the war remained an open issue.  Essentially, American 
ideals could pose a threat to French interests; the memo questioned whether, in deciding 
the role of other nations in the postwar order, “will the United States push them to apply, 
more or less faithfully, the principles that follow from its own tendencies?’416 
                                                 
413 Ibid., p. 1. 
414 Ibid., p. 4. 
415 Ibid., p. 5.  “Comment pouvons-nous espérer l’avènement d’un monde libre et stable, si la 
moitié de sa population demeure en esclavage?”  
416 Ibid.  “Une seule question cependant reste en suspens: par une participation active à la 
reconstruction et à l’organisation du monde d’après-guerre, les États-Unis entraineront-ils les 
autres Nations-Unies à appliquer, plus ou moins fidèlement, les principes issus de ses 
tendances…?”   
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Planning for a Postwar Empire in Africa  
 Free France’s squabbles with the United States and Britain did not prevent it from 
planning for its postwar empire in Africa.  But the split between de Gaulle and Giraud in 
North Africa had hindered the movement’s ability to announce a clear policy for the 
continent.  Until June 1943, the empire was unclear as to which leader would win the 
power struggle.  Only after de Gaulle had established himself as the unquestioned head of 
the resistance and earned a measure of U.S. recognition for the CFLN in August 1943 
could Free France’s colonial leaders turn their attention toward developing a direction for 
all of France’s colonies in Africa.  Of these leaders, the most significant contributions 
came from Éboué, Minister of Colonies René Pleven, and Henri Laurentie, his secretary 
of political affairs. 
Prior to the war, there was very little in René Pleven’s background to suggest his 
rise to leadership in de Gaulle’s Free French regime.417  Born in 1901, he had no military 
training and little experience in politics.  He passed the “hollow years” of the 1930s in 
North America in a variety of business pursuits.  This experience led Third Republic 
leaders to ask him to coordinate production and purchase of aircraft for the coming war 
from the United States in 1939.  In 1940, he rallied to de Gaulle in London, and 
immediately began trying to persuade France’s African colonies to follow the general’s 
lead.  His successes in these efforts, along with his loyalty to de Gaulle, were rewarded 
with a series of cabinet-equivalent Free French posts throughout the war.  From 1941-
1942, he held the dual portfolios of finances and the colonies; he would exchange the 
former in 1942 for foreign affairs, which he held for a year.  With two brief breaks in 
                                                 
417 The authoritative biography of Pleven remains Christian Bougeard, René Pleven: un Français 
libre en politique (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 1993). 
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service, he served as the equivalent of Free France’s Minister of Colonies from 1941 to 
1944.  By 1943, the empire was his sole responsibility, most likely because of the 
necessity of planning a new colonial policy for the postwar atmosphere.   
He made a series of visits that year in his capacity as Minister of Colonies, 
highlighted by a sixteen-day tour in October that took him to a series of brief stops 
throughout the French Empire in Africa, spanning North Africa, AOF, and AEF.  In all of 
these visits, Pleven was charged with encouraging continuing support for the war effort 
and articulating France’s colonial policy in Africa going forward.  With Giraud’s faction 
subordinated, Pleven’s October trip was his first opportunity to travel extensively through 
a reunited French Africa now completely under Gaullist control.  The centerpiece of the 
trip was his stop in Brazzaville from October 6-10, during which he addressed the city’s 
cercle civil.  After discussing the war effort, Pleven turned his attention to France’s 
future.  He acknowledged that France had been crippled by the war, noting that she 
would need “two or three years to recuperate, to recharge, as it were, the number of red 
blood cells in our arteries in order to be sufficient…to begin the role, the grand role of 
France.”418  Nevertheless, Pleven emphasized that France’s role in the postwar order 
would be significant.  This was because France had certain exceptional qualities that 
suited her to address the problems that the postwar atmosphere would present: 
Throughout the world, and in the heart of each of us there is, gentlemen, a 
certitude that the world is in a transitional period…What will be the destiny of our 
civilization, what will be the destiny of mankind?  Mankind has always been at 
the foundation of our French happiness and our French humanity, and if I may say 
so, of the religion of the vast majority of our fathers.   Great, powerful and, we 
must not deny, fertile ideologies are preparing to fight over the possession of the 
                                                 
418 Conférence de Pleven au Cercle Civil à Brazzaville, Oct. 6, 1943, ANP, 560 AP 28.  “Il nous 
faudra deux ou trois ans sans doute pour réparer, soit pour faire que dans nos artères le nombre 
des globules rouges, comme on dit ici sera redevenu suffisant, et alors, à ce moment-là, devra 
commencer le rôle, le grand rôle de la France.”   
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world.  But we French, who remain a civilization where beauty is the measure of 
man, know that we have a role to play… 419 
 
This special role in the world would be vital to France’s postwar rebirth.  Pleven 
emphasized that France’s African colonies were pivotal to this process.  Africa served as 
an embodiment of French unity during the war, and was a clear example of France’s 
ongoing contribution to mankind.  This was the theme of Pleven’s speech in Cameroon 
on October 13, when he promised that France would not repeat the mistakes of the past.  
After thanking Cameroonians for their contributions to the war effort, Pleven noted that 
“the role of the colonies in the reconstruction of our country and the renovation of France 
will be equally crucial.”420  Pleven added that “unity” of the colonies and the métropole 
had been a central principle of Free France since the consolidation of the resistance 
movements under de Gaulle in 1943.  This unity, he noted, “should be our ultimate goal, 
our only goal when we liberate France. I am confident that the colonies will know how, 
as in 1940, to give the world a great example, and that, contributing to make France great 
and strong, they will remain for the entire country, living witnesses of what the French 
can do when they are resolute and united.”421 
                                                 
419 Ibid.  “Dans le monde entier, et dans le cœur de chacun de nous, il y a, Messieurs, une 
certitude, vous le savez bien, c’est que le monde est dans une période de transition…Quelle va 
être la destinée de notre civilisation, quelle va être la destinée de l’homme.  L’homme, cet 
élément qui a toujours été à la base et de notre félicité française et de notre humanité française, et 
même, je puis le dire, de la religion qui est celle de l’immense majorité de nos pères.  De grandes, 
de puissantes et, de n’en disconviens pas, de fécondes idéologies se préparent à se disputer la 
possession du monde.  Mais nous Français, nous qui sommes sortis d’une civilisation dont la 
beauté c’est d’être à la mesure de l’homme, nous savons bien que nous avons un rôle à jouer…”   
420 Speech of René Pleven in Cameroon, Oct. 13, 1943,  ANP, 560 AP 27.  “le rôle des colonies, 
dans la reconstitution de notre pays et la rénovation de la France, sera également capital.”   
421 Ibid.  “Camerounais, c’est cette union de tous les Français qui doit être notre but final, notre 
seul but quand nous libérerons la France.  Je suis persuadé que les coloniaux sauront, comme en 
1940, donner à tous un grand exemple et que, contribuent à faire la France grande et forte, ils 
resteront pour le pays tout entier, les témoins vivants de ce que peuvent faire des Français, quand 
ils sont résolus et unis.”  
159 
 
But Pleven also made clear that the terms of this relationship would be defined by 
the métropole, not by France’s colonies.  When France’s African subjects wrote Pleven 
with suggestions about the continent’s future, he simply ignored them.  An earlier trip to 
Dakar in August 1943 had been publicized throughout Senegal; consequently, Pleven 
received several letters from Senegalese French wishing to air their grievances about 
French administration or the state of the colony.  One of these, Amadou Cisse, president 
of the Association Professionnelle des Fonctionnaires des Cadres Superieurs Originaires 
de l’AOF, wrote to Pleven on August 10 to seek an audience with him when he arrived in 
Dakar on the 14th.  In the letter, he emphasized a growing discrepancy in salaries between 
European and African workers and the need for greater assimilation of Africans into 
French social and political life.  Pleven wrote back on August 25, vaguely promising to 
look into the matter, but he never met with Cisse.422  Another letter, also written on 
August 10, came from the Union Républicaine Sénégalaise, and emphasized the 
increasing tension between Africans and colonial administrators.  The letter suggested a 
series of steps that could alleviate this situation: 
Equality between all French citizens without distinction of color, in the army as 
well as in other branches such as administration and commerce, because if the 
native is to remain French he must be so totally.  
Genuine development in our country with well-defined interests for the métropole 
and the Africans; 
General elevation and continued development of the intellectual, moral, and 
spiritual levels of the indigène; 
… 
The native should have free choice of his leaders and representatives.423 
                                                 
422 Correspondence of René Pleven, ANP, 560 AP27. 
423 Ibid.  “Nous avons l’honneur de vous signaler ci-après les seuls moyens qui, selon notre point 
de vue pourrait dissiper la malaise existant : 
Égalité de fait entre tous les citoyens français sans distinctions de couleur, dans l’armée aussi bien 
que dans les autres branches de l’activité humaine.  (Administration – Commerce) car si 
l’indigène veut rester français il entend l’être totalement. 




The letter concluded by noting that “equal responsibilities must engender equal rights” 
and reaffirmed the organization’s dedication to France.  Despite this impassioned plea for 
equality, Pleven virtually ignored the demands made by the Union; his response on 
August 25 only acknowledged the Union’s profession of loyalty to France at the end of 
the letter.424 
 
The Brazzaville Conference 
 Pleven’s dismissal of African suggestions for reform would foreshadow practices 
followed at the Brazzaville Conference of January 1944.  The conference, organized in 
late 1943, brought together France’s top colonial leaders (most notably the governors of 
all African territories and major colonial administrators) to discuss France’s future role 
on the continent.  It has since been rightfully criticized for not providing a voice to 
Africans – Éboué and Raphael Saller (governor of Côte Française des Somalis) were the 
only ones there who had any significant role.425  And as Tony Chafer has noted, there 
were no attendees who proposed anything as radical as independence; the conference 
program clearly noted that it had rejected “the idea of ‘self-government’ and we have 
considered the exercise of internal political rights in the colonies as a still-evolving 
                                                                                                                                                 
Élévation générale et continue du niveau intellectuel moral et spirituel de l’indigène. 
… 
L’indigène veut avoir le libre choix de ses dirigeants et ses représentants. 
En conclusion : L’égalité des devoirs doit engendrer l’égalité des droits.” 
424 Ibid. 
425 In writing this section, I drew from materials in the Archives Nationales, Section d’Outre-Mer 
in Aix-en-Provence, as well as some general information about the Brazzaville Conference found 
in Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa: (Oxford: Berg, 2002), esp. 56-61.  I have 
taken care to credit Professor Chafer where appropriate.  See also Raymond Lemesle, La 
Conférence de Brazzaville de 1944: contexte et repères : cinquantenaire des prémices de la 
décolonisation (Paris : C.H.E.A.M., 1994). 
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question.”426  Africa would maintain its place in the French empire, and Free French 
leaders firmly believed that a reinvigorated and victorious France was best positioned to 
plan that future.  But given the participation of colonial subjects in the war, reforms were 
clearly needed to maintain French influence.  As the program noted, “the Empire, which 
has played a decisive role in the resurrection of France, must officially continue to play a 
role in the country’s new life.”427  Planning and hosting a conference before the 
conclusion of the war gave Free France the freedom and initiative to assert what shape 
those reforms would take. 
 There was another reason for arranging the conference before the conclusion of 
the war.  The Free French movement had largely been shut out of the discussions among 
the “big three” regarding the postwar order, and had not yet been accorded full political 
recognition by the United States.  De Gaulle’s followers evinced concern that this would 
prevent France from having significant input into the shape of its empire.  In late 1943, 
the Tehran Conference had brought together Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin to discuss 
the last phases of the war.  Although little, if any, discussion focused on the future of the 
French empire (the only item on the agenda dealing with France concerned the coming 
Allied invasion of western Europe), Pleven worried that France needed to establish a 
policy for the future of the colonies before the Allies did it for them.  In December 1943, 
Pierre Cournarie, Boisson’s successor in AOF, wrote to Pleven, expressing his view that 
there had not been sufficient time to prepare for a colonial conference of Brazzaville’s 
magnitude.  On January 4, Pleven responded, noting that the recent discussions at Tehran 
required urgency on Free France’s part: 
                                                 
426 Programme Général de la Conférence de Brazzaville, p. 15, ANOM, 5D293. 
427 Ibid., p. 14. 
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I realize that the date for the Brazzaville Conference does not allow you as much 
time for preparation as you would hope for…All the information I have received 
from Great Britain and the United States indicates to me that we cannot wait for 
any advantage in clarifying the orientation of our colonial policy, and the rumors 
circulating about the discussions at Tehran confirm this.428 
 
Pleven was not the only one who expressed concern about the effects of an Anglo-
American postwar policy on France’s colonies.  An internal Free France report, drafted 
by Henri Laurentie two weeks before the opening of the Brazzaville Conference, 
addressed the same concerns.  Laurentie emphasized that once France was liberated, “the 
situation also will not depend on us alone; in the colonial order, postwar international 
treaties will certainly be invoked and have profound repercussions on relations between 
the métropole and the colonies.”429  Consequently, one of the goals of France’s policy in 
the colonies should be its “contribution to the maintaining of France among the great 
powers.”430   
 As the conference approached, Pleven also sought to convince France’s subjects 
of the organizers’ good intentions.  Echoing his comments to the Brazzaville cercle civil 
(as well as Éboué’s earlier suggestions on cultivating closer ties with African subjects), 
Pleven emphasized France’s particular concern for humanity.  It was this quality that best 
                                                 
428 Letter from René Pleven to Pierre Cournarie, Jan. 4, 1944, ANP, 560 AP 27.  “Je sais que la 
date de la Conférence de BRAZZAVILLE ne vous permet pas une préparation aussi longue que 
vous auriez pu le souhaiter....Tous les renseignements que j’ai reçus de Grande Bretagne et des 
États-Unis me montrent que nous ne pouvons pas attendre d’avantage pour préciser l’orientation 
de notre politique coloniale et les rumeurs qui circulent au sujet des discussions de TEHERAN le 
confirment.”   
429 Relations Métropole-Colonies, Jan. 17, 1944, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 2201.  “Mais, une fois le 
territoire libéré, la situation ne dépendra pas encore de nous seuls: dans l’ordre colonial, les 
tractations internationales, d’après-guerre, seront certainement appelées à avoir de profonde 
répercussions sur les relations métropole-colonies.”   
430 Ibid., p. 3.  It should be noted that these concerns came at the same time that France had 
agreed to cooperate with Britain on a number of issues in West Africa, a policy which emerged 
from the Accra Conference of December 1943.  The conference assembled high profile colonial 
representatives (Cournarie and Lord Swinton were the most prominent) to discuss a wide range of 
issues including agriculture, the war effort, and repatriation of subjects from British and French 
colonies.  Note Relative à la Conférence tenue à Accra, Dec. 1, 1943, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 406. 
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qualified France to plan a future for Africa – a point he made in a radio address in 
Brazzaville on January 22: 
The Brazzaville conference will demonstrate our commitment to continue 
France’s African mission after the war with faith and a renewed energy. This is 
not because of the labor and capital we have invested in Africa, nor even because 
of the dreams of our explorers, our military, or our missionaries…but because we 
feel in ourselves a vocation to be guardians of a humanity that loves our flag as 
much as we love it ourselves. It is because we are men convinced twenty 
centuries of Christianity and humanity, during which we were instructed in a faith 
founded on equality among men, have historically and naturally prepared us to 
love and understand the needs and aspirations of our African subjects..431 
 
Pleven would echo these comments in his speech opening the conference on January 30, 
noting that “it is the African, it is his aspirations, his needs, and we do not hesitate to 
recognize, his faults…that will be the constant preoccupation of this conference.”432  De 
Gaulle’s opening remarks also focused on the needs of Africa, but were more blatantly 
paternalistic; he compared France’s special role in the development of the colonies to the 
relationship between parents and children.  De Gaulle noted that “If there is one colonial 
power that has been inspired in its lessons by events and that has chosen nobly and 
                                                 
431 Speech by René Pleven on Brazzaville Radio, Jan. 22, 1944, ANP, 560 AP 27.  “La 
Conférence de Brazzaville témoignera de notre volonté de poursuivre, après la guerre, avec une 
foi et une énergie redoublées, la mission africaine de la France.  Ce n’est pas à cause du travail et 
des capitaux que nous avons investis en Afrique, ni même vertu du songe de nos explorateurs, de 
notre armée, de nos missionnaires – nos colonies y sont généralement répondu – que nous sentons 
en nous la vocation d’être les moniteurs d’une humanité qui aime, autant que nous l’aimons nous-
mêmes, notre drapeau.  C’est parce que nous sommes des hommes convaincus que vingt siècles 
de chrétiennité et d’humanité, pendant lesquels nous avons été instruits dans la foi en fondant 
l’égalité parmi les hommes, nous ont historiquement et comme naturellement préparés à aimer et 
à comprendre les besoins et les aspirations de nos sujets africains.” 
432 Speech given by René Pleven at the opening of the Brazzaville Conference, Jan. 30, 1944, 
ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 392.  “C’est l’homme, c’est l’Africain, ce sont ses aspirations, ses besoins et, 
n’hésitons pas à la reconnaitre, ses faiblesses… qui seront la préoccupation constants de cette 
conférence…”   
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liberally the route of a new era in which she intends to lead sixty million people who find 
themselves associated with the fate of 42 million children, that power is France.”433   
These comments reveal the paternalistic attitude that France had vis-à-vis its 
African colonies, but there was a more pragmatic reason for maintaining influence on the 
continent.  Pleven’s opening speech to the conference on January 30 is illustrative of the 
growing realization within the resistance concerning the importance of Africa to the 
nation’s future.  After recognizing de Gaulle for his efforts in bringing France’s overseas 
territories together, Pleven turned his attention to the future of the empire.  He noted that 
Africa could play a particularly important role in re-establishing French power: 
This gathering indicates that a new phase is beginning in the reorganization of 
France.  It reveals that, having already cleared itself of the debris of the past and 
the ruins of the present, France is turning its attention toward the future.  It 
underscores the determination of men who want the liberation of the country and 
who also hope for its renaissance.  It demonstrates that we understand that, just as 
they endured their misfortunes together, the people of France and the subjects of 
our Empire are full partners in the benefits that we hope for from our renewal.434 
 
Éboué had already spoken of this dynamic of renewal in a speech to the conseil 
d’administration of AEF the previous December.  He indicated that France would embark 
                                                 
433 Speech, Jan. 30, 1944.  Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages 1940-1946, 372.  “S’il est 
une puissance impériale que les événements conduisent à s’inspirer des leurs leçons et à choisir 
noblement, libéralement, la route des temps nouveaux où elle entend diriger les soixante millions 
d’hommes qui se trouvent associés au sort de ses quarante-deux millions d’enfants, cette 
puissance c’est la France.”   
434 Speech given by René Pleven at the opening of the Brazzaville Conference, Jan. 30, 1944, 
ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 392.  “Sa convocation est l’indice que commence une phase nouvelle du 
redressement français.  Elle révèle que, se dégageant déjà des débris du passe, des ruines du 
présent, la France lève les yeux vers son avenir.  Elle souligne la détermination des hommes qui 
voulerent la libération du pays de vouloir aussi sa renaissance.  Elle démontre que nous entendons 
que, de même qu’elles prirent leur part à nos malheurs, les populations françaises ou autochtones 
de notre Empire soient pleinement associés sur bienfaits que nous espérons de notre renouveau.”   
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upon a new colonial policy that would be more humane and would conform to France’s 
political traditions, and through which “the honor of France will endure.”435 
 The conference’s direction illustrates the priority placed by Free French colonial 
authorities on the importance of the empire to renewing France’s international standing.  
Henri Laurentie, Pleven’s secretary of political affairs, drafted the agenda for the 
Brazzaville Conference.436  He divided the main themes of the conference into four 
general areas: first, the immediate needs of the war, such as recruitment efforts in France 
and in the colonies; second, the need for administrative reforms within the colonial 
bureaucracy; third, internal policy for the colonies; and finally, the political structure of 
the French empire and relationship between the métropole and the colonies.437  In 
considering the last two areas, Laurentie had been greatly influenced by Éboué’s earlier 
recommendations on increased autonomy for African leaders and respect for African 
traditions.  The program noted that “the role of the métropole must be reduced to a 
minimum” and that France “must be the inspirer, not the administrator” of the 
colonies.438  Laurentie would later echo Éboué in an essay published immediately after 
the Brazzaville Conference, where he noted the tension between France’s traditional 
assimilationist mission and its actual results in the colonies.  For Laurentie, France 
needed to contemplate “how to undo the intimate contradiction of an action that seeks to 
safeguard human principles, but at the same time threatens the destruction of the 
expression of traditional customs – an expression that is beloved by those same 
                                                 
435 Félix Éboué, L’AEF et la Guerre: Discours prononcé devant le Conseil d’Administration de la 
Colonie le 1er Décembre 1943 (Brazzaville: Éditions du Baobab, 1944), 49. 
436 Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa:, 56.   
437 Programme de la Conférence Impériale de Brazzaville, p. 1, ANOM, 5D293. 
438 Ibid., p. 6. 
166 
 
principles?”439  In Laurentie’s view, the assimilationist policies followed by France 
before the war had been driven by a notion that France represented the height of human 
civilization.  The postwar situation, Laurentie suggested, would require considerably 
more humility: 
The human quality is contingent. There is no such thing as the best man in the 
absolute. The soil of France, the life of France will form in France, an authentic 
human life; the soil and the life of Madagascar will form, in Madagascar, another 
human life, no less authentic.440 
 
Reflecting this view, Laurentie would recommend that Africa be given more political 
autonomy in the postwar order, with a federal legislature governing the entire empire and 
assemblies within the colonies managing local affairs.441   
However, despite Laurentie’s impassioned remarks on the merits of increased 
self-government for the colonies, such radical reforms were not in the cards in 1944.442  
As Tony Chafer has noted, the Brazzaville Conference would establish that “political 
power resided exclusively with the métropole, and any future possibility of the colonies 
governing themselves was emphatically ruled out.”443  The old imperial structure would 
be retained, and questions as to specific political rights for France’s subjects would be 
deferred until a later date.  Debates at the conference about the relative values of 
                                                 
439 Henri Laurentie, “Notes sur une philosophie de la politique colonial française” in 
Renaissances: Revue Politique (Paris: Renaissances, 1944), 12.  “Comment annuler la 
contradiction intime d’une action qui tend à sauvegarder les principes humains d’une société tout 
en menaçant de destruction l’expression coutumière, l’expression aimée de ces mêmes 
principes?”   
440 Ibid., 14.  “La qualité humaine est contingente.  Il n’y a pas un meilleur homme dans l’absolu.  
Le sol de France, la vie de France formeront, en France, une authentique qualité humaine; la vie 
et la sol de Madagascar formeront, à Madagascar, une autre qualité humaine, non moins 
authentique.”   
441 Brazzaville Conférence, Procès-verbal de la séance du 6 Février 1944, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 
392. 
442 Brazzaville Conférence, Procès-verbal de la séance du 4 Février 1944, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 
392. 
443 Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 56-7. 
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assimilation, versus Éboué’s thoughts on respecting African traditions, most likely played 
a role in the conference’s ultimate disposition on such reforms.  It would probably be an 
overstatement to say that the traditional policy of assimilation was victorious at the 
conference, but there was certainly a measure of skepticism concerning some of Éboué’s 
ideas.   
A crucial turning point in the debate over Africa’s cultural and political autonomy 
came on February 3, when Pleven invited opinions on Éboué’s views concerning 
recognition of traditional African political institutions.444  Raphael Saller in particular 
objected to Éboué’s recommendation of increased respect for customs and recognition of 
the powers of local chiefs.  To do so, he argued, would undercut France’s civilizing 
mission; after all, how could France allow its subjects to be governed by leaders who she 
considered to be of inferior political and cultural evolution?  Those gathered at 
Brazzaville had to remember that the colonial subject “places his hopes in us, because he 
is still persuaded that certain abuses, certain ideas do not represent France, as our country 
has a reputation for generosity and justice… he hopes for a prompt change in his 
condition and… he instinctively relies on us to obtain it.”445  In response, Laurentie 
recommended a more moderate interpretation of Éboué’s ideas about African institutions 
– they could be viewed by colonial administrators as not “an end to themselves” but 
rather as interim structures that would allow the indigènes to learn a “sense of 
                                                 
444 Brazzaville Conférence, Procès-verbal de la séance du 3 Février 1944, p. 7, ANOM, 1 
AFFPOL 392 
445 Ibid., p. 10.  “Il espère en nous, parce qu’il est encore persuadé que certains abus, certaines 
idées ne représentent pas la France, tellement notre Patrie a réputation de générosité et de 
justice… il souhaite un prompt changement de sa condition et s’il compte instinctivement sur 
nous pour l’obtenir…”  
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responsibility.”446  The session attendees unanimously adopted Laurentie’s compromise, 
and the conference’s final report indicated that traditional political institutions would be 
carefully managed by the colonial administration in order to lead the indigènes toward a 
higher stage of political evolution whereby they could exercise political authority.447 
With this distinction made, the conference’s ultimate recommendations 
concerning Africa’s immediate political future followed naturally.  If African institutions 
were not to be accorded the level of respect that Éboué had seemingly advocated in his 
1941 circulars, then how could France’s African subjects be expected to assume 
substantial control over their day-to-day interests, regardless of how provincial those 
interests might be?  There would be no question of an immediate transition to the federal 
system that Laurentie had advocated prior to the conference; instead, the unity and 
structure of the French empire were reaffirmed, and the final report of the conference 
promised an increased role for Africans in advising the colonial administration about 
internal policy.448  To be clear, these were not mere token reforms; as Chafer has also 
noted, forced labor was to be gradually eliminated, and France’s dealings with African 
society were to be marked by heightened respect for African culture and traditions.449  
The colonial administration also dedicated itself to increased education for its subjects, 
more legal protections for workers, economic progress in the colonies, and evolution 
toward political consciousness and responsibility.450  But these were reforms that would 
be strictly overseen by French administration, with political power remaining in Paris.  
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449 Ibid., p. 9-10; see also Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 56-7. 




As the final recommendations of the conference noted, “we want the political power of 
France to be exercised with precision and rigor on every territory of her Empire.”451  Of 
course, without such strict control over her colonies, it would be a more difficult task for 
France to re-establish its standing in the world after the war had concluded. 
 
Selling French Colonialism after Brazzaville 
Free French colonial administrators immediately set about convincing the empire 
of the necessity of the Brazzaville reforms.  This message was often carefully tailored to 
particular audiences.  When discussing the Brazzaville recommendations with Europeans, 
a major emphasis of de Gaulle’s colonial administrators was that the new colonial policy 
would help maintain France’s status after the war.  This was the theme of Pleven’s speech 
to the Free France provisional constituent assembly on March 15.  He noted that the war 
had entered its final stages, during which France had to assemble “the elements of a 
program of action that clearly marks France’s resolution to continue to fulfill her mission 
as a great colonial nation and consequently to remain a great power in world affairs.”452  
The reforms at Brazzaville represented a significant step in this direction; they would 
solidify the ties between the métropole and the colonies and help preserve France’s 
colonial empire. 
But the importance of the colonies to France’s future prestige was not the only 
selling point for the Brazzaville reforms.  Pleven also focused on the importance of 
France’s civilizing mission for her African subjects.  French Africa, he noted, could be 
                                                 
451 Ibid., p. 1. 
452 Discours de René Pleven à l’Assemblée Consultative Provisoire, March 15, 1944, ANOM, 
17G130.  “…les éléments d’un programme d’action qui marque clairement la résolution de la 
France de continuer à remplir sa mission de grande nation colonisatrice et par conséquent de 
rester une grande puissance aux intérêts mondiaux.”   
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divided into two categories – elites who had previously benefitted from the colonial 
project, and the African masses, who had been mildly influenced by French culture, but 
were largely shaped by local customs.  The French mission was to enable the former 
group to assume leadership roles in the colonies, and to lead the latter group toward 
modern ways and material prosperity.453  Pleven argued that France’s subjects were 
dependent on her for advancement in the modern world: 
Western civilization has an intense attraction for people who have not 
experienced it.  The appeal of material goods, respect for individuals, their 
participation in the management of public affairs ... Like all men, the African 
feels this longing for renewal that characterizes the present era, and he relies on 
France, in which he has immense confidence and which he does not confuse with 
the abuses which he can suffer here or there, to give him more freedom after the 
war, more justice, more well-being.454 
 
His description of the relationship of Africans to her French colonizers reflected both de 
Gaulle’s paternalistic views as well as traditional colonial ideology, both of which 
viewed Africans as unable to “evolve” without western assistance. 
Pleven and his followers also appealed directly to France’s African subjects.  The 
benefits of the French civilizing mission were a particular point of emphasis.  In this 
regard, Éboué was the most useful example, as he was the living embodiment of France’s 
commitment to the education and integration of Africans into French society.  Colonial 
administrators missed no opportunities to point to Éboué’s example when addressing 
their subjects, and Éboué did not hesitate to use his position to argue that France offered a 
future of racial harmony and political evolution via the colonial system.  In his December 
                                                 
453 Ibid. 
454 Ibid.  “Le civilisation occidentale exerce une attraction intense sur les peuples qui ne l’ont 
point pratiquée.  L’attrait du bien-être matériel, le respect de l’individu, sa participation à la 
gestion de la chose publique… Comme tous les hommes, l’Africain éprouve cette aspiration de 
renouveau qui caractérise l’époque actuelle, et il compte sur la France, en qui il a une immense 
confiance et qu’il ne confond pas avec les abus dont il peut souffrir ici où là, pour lui donner 
après cette guerre plus de liberté, plus de justice, plus de bien être.” 
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1943 speech to the conseil d’administration of AEF, he marveled at the continued loyalty 
of Africa’s indigènes to France during the course of the war, noting that “in the saddest 
hours, the solidarity of our indigènes has spontaneously manifested, as they have loyally 
declared their fidelity.”455  This loyalty, Éboué noted, could be traced in part to their 
belief in the French system: 
Gentlemen, in the coming judgment that men here and there will want to bring 
upon the methods of French colonialism, it will be right, it will be honest, to 
guard these sentiments, these simple and moving tributes made spontaneously to a 
country which has always seen past and will always see past racial discrimination, 
to this country that did not simply content itself with proclaiming the equality of 
men in order to make it a simple position of the general spirit, but who also made 
the equality of men into a concrete reality. 456  
 
Éboué’s example provided France’s best positive message about the benefits of its 
presence in Africa.  But without question, her most powerful argument lay in the contrast 
between France’s colonial ideals and the racist ideology of the Nazi regime.  Of course, 
the evils of Nazism could also be used to illustrate the hypocrisy of those who fought 
against it but still maintained an empire – a tension that would be exploited by 
anticolonial movements in Algeria and Vietnam in the 1950s.  But Nazism also presented 
the perfect foil to France’s civilizing mission – one devoted to a racist ideology that saw 
non-Aryans, and certainly all Africans, as inherently subhuman; the other professing its 
devotion to assimilating Africans into citizenship and the body politic.  The stakes were 
clear: if the Germans won the war, Africa’s fate would be considerably more dire than the 
                                                 
455 Félix Éboué, L’AEF et la Guerre: Discours prononcé devant le Conseil d’Administration de la 
Colonie le 1er Décembre 1943, 37.  “Pendant les heures les plus sombres la solidarité de nos 
indigènes s’est spontanément manifestée, comme s’est loyalement déclarée leur fidélité.”   
456 Ibid.  “Messieurs, dans le jugement que les uns et les autres voudront porter sur les méthodes 
de colonisation française, il sera juste, il sera honnête, de retenir ces sentiments, hommages 
simples et émouvants rendus spontanément au Pays qui a toujours ignoré et ignorera toujours les 
discriminations raciales, à ce pays qui ne s’est pas simplement contenté de proclamer l’égalité des 
hommes pour en faire une simple position de l’esprit, mais qui en a fait une réalité concrète.”   
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one planned by Free France at the Brazzaville Conference.  Pleven noted this in his 
March 1944 speech to the Free France constituent assembly: 
The black man, although primitive, resembles the white man in many ways.  We 
have explained to him that in this war Hitlerism and German methods, of which 
he has preserved an astonishingly vivid memory in the areas where he 
experienced them, threatened him more than we did.  He knows that France, 
which has brought to him above all internal peace and protection against the 
gravest abuses, is a great nation for which colonizing means civilizing, that is to 
say, the spread of freedom. When he knows that in Brazzaville we have worked to 
improve his lot, provide the means to grow up, be educated, and to become a 
person, he is more ready than ever to respond to our call and produce more for 
France.457 
 
The contrast between France and the Nazis was also the theme of a speech given 
by Paul Vuillaume, governor of Gabon, in June 1944, upon his dedication of a monument 
in Libreville to Charles Tchorere, a Gabonese captain who had served in the colonial 
infantry in France during the Nazi invasion of 1940.  Tchorere had been summarily 
executed by the Nazis after he refused to separate himself from French officers and join 
other disarmed African soldiers.  This Nazi crime helped crystallize the benefits of the 
French mission in Africa and the evils of Nazism.  For Vuillaume, Tchorere, who had 
worked his way through the ranks of the colonial army, had been a symbol of “the 
magnificent success of the colonizing genius of our country” in the same vein as Félix 
Éboué.458  This stood in stark contrast to Nazi ideology: 
                                                 
457 Discours de René Pleven à l’Assemblée Consultative Provisoire, March 15, 1944, ANOM, 
17G130.  “L’homme noir, même primitif, ressemble bien des points à l’homme blanc.  Nous lui 
avons expliqué que dans cette guerre l’hitlerisme et les méthodes allemandes dont, dans les 
régions où il les a connues, il a conservé étonnamment vivace le souvenir le menaçaient plus 
encore que nous.  Il sait que la France qui lui a apporté d’abord la paix intérieure, la protection 
contre les abus les plus graves, est une grande nation pour qui coloniser signifie civiliser, c’est-à-
dire propager les libertés.  Quand il sait qu’à Brazzaville on travaille à améliorer son sort, à lui 
donner les moyens de s’élever, de s’instruire, à faire de lui une personne, il est prêt plus que 
jamais à répondre à notre appel et à produire davantage pour la France.”   
458 Speech, June 5, 1942, ANOM, 5D 290.  “…une magnifique réussite de Génie colonisateur de 
notre pays.”   
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Our enemies are also the enemies of humanity – that is, humanity as we 
understand it… When Hitler treated the African races like races of half-bred 
monkeys, he was thinking of French colonialism primarily, and it was France that 
he insulted, or at least that he believed he insulted.  Hitler understood very well 
that the day when millions of Africans still immersed in the darkness, would be 
removed to see the light of civilization would be the day when so many millions 
of men would be opposed to intolerant and cruel pan-Germanism.  And Hitler 
knew well that to hasten that dawn of liberation, France had labored quickly and 
well.459 
 
In closing, Vuillaume emphasized that the recent Brazzaville Conference would provide 
the basis for a vast revision of French colonial practice for the benefit of her African 
subjects.460  Two months later, de Gaulle’s forces entered Paris, giving his followers the 
opportunity to implement the reforms that Vuillaume and other Free French leaders had 
promised.   
 
Conclusion 
 De Gaulle and his Free France followers had reason for optimism in surveying the 
state of the empire in the fall of 1944.  France had been liberated by the Allies, who had 
accorded to Free France some of the prestige and credit for the victory.  The empire, and 
particular the colonies in Africa, had played a central role in liberation; indeed, one has a 
hard time conceiving of de Gaulle becoming the unquestioned leader of the resistance 
movement without Éboué’s rallying to him in August 1940.  Further, the CFLN had been 
able to reunite virtually all of France’s colonies under the Free French flag during the 
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war, and it had notably won back all of its African territory.  Perhaps most importantly, 
the movement’s ability to maintain control over French African territory gave it the 
flexibility to plan postwar domestic policy for the territories.  Positioned against a racist 
Nazi regime, and supported by a relatively loyal African population, Free France rightly 
saw the opportunity for colonial renewal that could legitimize France’s presence on the 
continent for the foreseeable future.  In this sense, the desire to maintain French influence 
in Africa, which culminated in the disastrous policies of the postcolonial period, was the 
natural outgrowth of France’s wartime experience. 
 To be clear, that future was not preordained by the events of the war.  While de 
Gaulle would oversee both decolonization in the 1960s and the subsequent transition of 
some of France’s former colonies into client-states, Africa’s destiny was very much an 
open question after the liberation of Paris.  But notable themes had begun to emerge in 
France’s thinking about its future on the continent.  Éboué’s notion of abandoning the 
assimilationist civilizing mission in favor of recognizing and dealing with local power 
structures was perhaps the most important.  These sentiments had inspired some of the 
reform proposals at the Brazzaville conference.  They would later inform de Gaulle’s 
decision to relinquish direct control over Africa after his election as president in 1958.  
Also significant were rising concerns about British and American involvement on the 
continent, based upon clear conflicts – both personal and political – between de Gaulle 
and the Allies.   
 None of this could sway France’s belief that her role on the continent was stable 
and would continue for as long as anyone could foresee.  France’s presence in Africa, 
colonial administrators argued, was based on the nation’s special qualities and her role in 
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the world, which the war had only made more necessary.  As Éboué explained in his 
seminal pamphlet from November 1941, despite her past errors, only France was 
equipped to enable progress in Africa, and history would eventually acknowledge that 
vital contribution: 
French Equatorial Africa, as a whole, will have its own indigenous policy, this 
policy, an expression of the thought and efforts of all – industrialists, settlers, 
missionaries, traders and officials, which will survive from regime to regime.  
French Equatorial Africa, as a whole, will have its own indigenous policy, this 
policy, an expression of the thought and desire of all – industrialists, settlers, 
missionaries, traders and officials, which will survive from regime to regime.  
When one considers the results in twenty or thirty years, one will recognize that 
this policy was not born of an individual whim, but rather of the unanimous 
resolution of a team that, having been brought here to redeem and liberate France, 
also decided to save French Equatorial Africa.461 
 
Éboué would not live to see how his hopeful outlook for France’s participation in Africa 
would turn out.  On May 17, 1944, he succumbed to a bout of pneumonia in Cairo and 
passed away.  France would have to plan for the postwar order in Africa without his 
extraordinary talents and influence.  But he had already laid the foundation for France’s 
African policy both in the immediate postwar era and in the postcolonial age.  France’s 
colonial administrators would now attempt to preserve that foundation in light of 
France’s reduced role in the world and the realities of the coming Cold War.                        
  
                                                 
461 Politique Indigène de l’Afrique Équatoriale Française, p. 2, ANOM, 5D202.  “L’Afrique 
Équatoriale, dans son ensemble, aura sa politique indigène; cette politique, expression de la 
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Defending the Empire after the War: the French Provisional Government, 1944-
1946 
 
This transformed America, which we will encounter from now on in all parts of 
the world…will use its [influence] to ensure that the “colonies” achieve 
independence, and in the meantime, that they are controlled by an international 
organization in which the United States will play a vital role. 
… 
You can now estimate the exact position in which the French colonies, and 
notably your territory, are placed. The world has changed during the past four 
years, and our possessions, which we could [govern by ourselves] until 1939, 
must now face criticism and know how to respond. 462 
 
-Minister of Colonies Paul Giacobbi to Governor of Cameroon Henri- 
Pierre Nicolas, February 17, 1945. 
 
 In many respects, de Gaulle’s progressive reunification of France’s African 
empire from 1940 to 1944 was remarkable.  By rallying the territories to resist the Vichy 
regime and Nazism, de Gaulle accomplished a stunning reversal of fortunes for France’s 
colonial prospects on the continent.  Under Vichy, the future of the empire was very 
much in question; it remained to be seen what parts of Africa would have to be sacrificed 
in a prospective postwar order dominated by the Nazis.  But the struggles against Vichy 
in North Africa, and the loyal support of colonial populations in Afrique Occidentale 
Française and Afrique Équatoriale Française, had demonstrated the unity of the empire 
                                                 
462 Paul Giacobbi, Minister of Colonies, to Henri Pierre Nicolas, Governor of Cameroon, Feb. 17, 
1945, Archives Nationales de Paris (hereinafter ANP), 3 AG 4 23.  “Cette Amérique 
métamorphosée, et que nous rencontrerons désormais sur tous les points du monde, tendra dans 
ses interventions à effacer ce que l’Amérique de toujours n’a cessé de considérer comme un 
illogisme choquant et, sans s’inquiéter des contradictions qu’elle-même recèle (attitude à l’égard 
de ses nationaux du couleur), elle pèsera de toute sa force pour que les « colonies » parviennent à 
l’indépendance et, en attendant pour qu’elles soient contrôlées par une organisme international ou 
les États-Unis tiendraient une place importante. 
Vous pourrez estimer désormais la situation exacte devant lesquelles les colonies françaises, et 
notamment votre territoire, se trouvent placés.  Le monde a changé durant ces quatre dernières 
années et nos possessions qui pouvaient s’arranger, jusqu’en 1939, d’un régime familial et un peu 
fermé, doivent désormais affronter la critique et savoir y répondre.” 
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and the importance of the African colonies to France.  Regaining a foothold in Africa had 
also allowed Free France’s colonial administrators to plan for France’s future on the 
continent.  The Brazzaville Conference enabled colonial policymakers to chart a new 
course for the colonies that would grant increased rights to France’s African subjects and 
better insure their loyalty to continued French rule.  Of course, preservation of the empire 
could also buttress France’s continued status as an international power.   
 But while de Gaulle’s forces had been successful in preserving France’s hold on 
sub-Saharan Africa, a series of events during the war’s late stages presented significant 
challenges to the future of the empire.  The first sign came from the riots in Setif, Algeria 
in May 1945, during which native Algerians rose against the colonial administration, 
leading to a cycle of violence that resulted in the massacre of over a hundred Europeans.  
French forces were able to quell the unrest, but only at the expense of hundreds more 
Algerian casualties, thus causing lingering resentment among the Algerian population 
that would explode a decade later in a painful and protracted war.463  In Vietnam, de 
Gaulle’s loyalists, initially faced with an entrenched Japanese puppet regime for much of 
1945, regained control of the colony by autumn of that year.  But France’s triumphant 
return was short-lived, as French administrators faced growing resistance to outside rule 
from Ho Chi Minh and his followers, who were inspired by communist ideology and 
feelings of nationalism stirred up first by Vichy, and then by Japan.464  As in Algeria, 
events in Vietnam would eventually explode into war, starting with the shelling of 
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Haiphong by the overzealous French admiral Thierry d’Argenlieu in November 1946.  
Finally, as discussed in chapter two, France had gradually lost its grip over Lebanon and 
Syria, having been pressured by Britain and the United States to promise independence to 
both mandates in 1943.  By 1946, France no longer had a significant presence in the 
Middle East.465 
 It is in this context that France’s postwar policy in Africa must be considered.  
Given the importance of Africa to France during the war, surprisingly little has been said 
about the impact of the international situation on the continent’s political development in 
the war’s aftermath. While Tony Chafer has rightly focused on the role of Africans in 
fighting for greater political autonomy after the war, he does not extensively discuss the 
influence of external events on French colonial administrators in Africa.466  This chapter 
addresses some of these questions by examining the opinions of those charged with 
establishing the Fourth Republic.  Like Vichy in 1940, the new Provisional Government 
in 1944 faced the victorious powers from a position of relative weakness.  To be sure, 
matters would have been much worse for France under a Nazi-led Europe.  But while de 
Gaulle had successfully managed to position France on the winning side, no one could 
argue that France emerged from the war with the same international standing it enjoyed 
in 1940.  This had already been made abundantly clear by France’s exclusion from many 
of the major conferences that planned for the postwar order, including the Moscow 
Conference of 1943, the Yalta meeting between Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill of 
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March 1945, and the Potsdam Conference in the spring and summer of that year, also 
held by the “Big Three”.  
As foreshadowed by de Gaulle’s relations with Roosevelt and Churchill during 
the war, France’s newly-reduced status was also evident in France’s direct relations with 
Britain and the United States.  While France was seen as a necessary partner in rebuilding 
Europe, and later, in resisting Soviet domination of the continent, she was never 
considered an equal one.  De Gaulle was extremely sensitive to this new status, as seen in 
his prickly dealings with President Roosevelt.  When Roosevelt offered to meet with him 
in Algiers in February 1945, de Gaulle pointedly refused, incensed that the American 
president would see fit to invite himself to a meeting with the French head of state on 
French soil, after having not included him with the other allies in the postwar planning 
process.467  Things were not much better with the Soviet Union.  Although de Gaulle 
successfully negotiated a defensive treaty with the Soviets in December 1944, he had 
very little leverage with Stalin.  As an internal French Provisional Government memo 
noted in March 1945, the general opinion among Soviet leaders was that they “do not 
consider France as a great power…in practice, they treat France as a great power of the 
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second rank, who cannot pretend to be in the same place as the other three great 
powers.”468   
 To make matters worse, the immediate postwar situation suggested that the notion 
of empire – a fundamental component of France’s international influence – would 
eventually be relegated to the dustbin of history.  Neither the United States nor the Soviet 
Union favored the continuation of traditional colonial policies after the war.  From a 
purely ideological standpoint, Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, and other 
significant figures in American leadership saw colonialism as inherently undemocratic – 
a relic of the past contrasted by the values of the Atlantic Charter.  In American military 
and diplomatic circles, the breakup of empires was one of the long-considered 
consequences of the postwar order.  From the Soviet perspective, colonialism represented 
the worst evils of bourgeois capitalism; it was Lenin’s “highest stage” that foreshadowed 
the collapse of exploitative regimes.469   Confronted with this hostility from the two 
emerging superpowers, the French imperial project could not hope to survive in the 
postwar order in its traditional form.  Even Churchill seemed to have reconciled himself 
to the end of the imperial system, telling de Gaulle in November 1944 that “colonies are 
today no longer a gauge of fortune or a sign of power.”470   
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 Not surprisingly, it was also during this time that existing French views of the 
Anglo-American threat to Francophone Africa were exacerbated.  As discussed in the 
first two chapters, France’s long rivalry with England, as well her suspicion of American 
postwar intentions, were manifest in the opinions of officials from both Vichy and Free 
France throughout the war.  But with the conflict approaching its conclusion and a new 
age of American global power and influence dawning, this perceived threat became more 
pronounced.  Before the war, the generic term “Anglo-Saxons” had been pejoratively 
employed to describe France’s cross-channel rivals.  But by the conclusion of the war, the 
term was increasingly applied to the United States.  With the founding of the United 
Nations  and the beginning of the Cold War, it became apparent to those interested in 
France’s colonial future that the “Anglo-Saxon” bloc of the United States and the United 
Kingdom represented the greatest threat to French power in Africa.    For French colonial 
administrators, the greatest fear was “internationalization”, or the increased scrutiny on 
French colonies by the international community so as to subvert French power and 
influence.  They increasingly worried that American anti-colonial rhetoric and promises 
of independence were masking more nefarious intentions to destabilize French power in 
Africa so as to better open and establish markets for American goods abroad.  In this 
sense, the postwar experience became a prism through which traditional – and less 
virulent – strains of Anglophobia were refracted and intensified. 
In addition to these outside pressures, France also had to deal with the challenges 
of fulfilling the promises of the Brazzaville Conference, as well as drafting and ratifying 
a new constitution.  Although de Gaulle and his followers had insisted that Vichy was an 
illegal regime and that the French Republic had never ceased to exist, the memory of the 
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Third Republic’s inability to manage the early months of the war and the subsequent Nazi 
invasion forestalled any return to the old constitution.  What was needed, both in de 
Gaulle’s opinion as well as that of many in the Free French movement, was a constitution 
that could provide for a stronger executive, in the mold of the American system.  
Constitutional reform could also help further the proposed reforms of Brazzaville, as it 
was seen by many colonial administrators as a means to further ingratiate the indigènes 
into the French body politic.  Therefore, the Provisional Government focused during this 
time on transforming the former French empire into a French Union, which would allow 
for central representation in Paris and the devolution of some powers of government to 
local assemblies.  This would be accomplished first by setting aside seats for Africans in 
the constituent assembly of 1945-46, and once the constitution was passed, to allow them 
some form of representation in both the elected National Assembly and a new assembly 
for the broader Union.  But such sweeping reforms were not widely welcomed in colonial 
administrative and commercial circles.  Therefore, political transformation in Africa had 
to walk a delicate line between satisfying the scrutiny of the international community and 
placating powerful European interests in the colonies.  Most importantly, France had to 
renew its imperial project so as to appear less colonial and more democratic.  This new 
system would have to inspire loyalty in its citizens to the French union and gratitude for 
France’s role in “civilizing” its subjects. 
 
Planning a Future Federated Empire 
 Perhaps the greatest challenge facing French administrators in the final years of 
the war was determining how to fulfill the promises of the Brazzaville Conference while 
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maintaining the métropole’s full control over France’s overseas colonies and territories.  
Planning for a new imperial system encompassed a variety of issues, including what form 
the new National Assembly would take; what type of arrangement would govern the 
relationship between the métropole and the colonies; whether colonial populations would 
have representation just at the local level, or in addition, in Paris as well; how 
representatives from colonial populations would be chosen; what citizenship status would 
be accorded to those in the colonies; and who would be given the right to vote.  The 
answers to all of these questions would eventually have to be set forth in the new 
constitution for the Fourth Republic.   
The brief period from 1944-1946 saw a remarkable structural and rhetorical shift 
in France’s imperial project, with a transformation from an imperial nation into a federal 
union.  What was generally agreed upon was that traditional imperial arrangements had to 
end, both in structure and in name.  The men who planned France’s future were well 
aware of rising discontent from colonial populations, and the threat of increased scrutiny 
from the international community.  Not surprisingly, political and administrative changes 
followed.  The Minister of Colonies was renamed the Ministry of Overseas Territories; 
governors-generals’ powers were to be shared with local assemblies, and colonial 
populations were no longer subjects, but citizens, albeit in somewhat limited form.  The 
governing arrangement from overseas would have to be replaced with one that could 
maintain a delicate balance between too much integration into an egalitarian republic, and 
too much autonomy vis-à-vis the métropole.     
De Gaulle had already begun to allude to this system as early as July 1944, when 
he noted in a press conference in Washington that “each territory over which the French 
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flag flies must be represented internally by a federal system in which the métropole will 
be a part and where the interests of each [territory] can be made known.”471 With the war 
ending, Provisional Government administrators began to conceptualize the future of the 
empire in terms of a loose Union between métropole and colonies, which would maintain 
both centralized authority and local flexibility in governing.  As Robert Lassalle-Séré 
(who would later be elected as a Senator from Oceania during the Fourth Republic) noted 
at one gathering of experts that same month: 
Between assimilation, which is unrealizable, and autonomy, which is dangerous, 
this new [federal] formula appears the right one in reconciling the two necessities 
which are imposed on us right now: permit the colonies to evolve, each on its own 
path, while endowing them with a political personality, but, at the same time, 
maintain and tighten the relationship among the French that this evolution tends to 
loosen.472 
 
Numerous commissions were formed to discuss these issues in 1944 and 1945.  While a 
complete study of the various commissions is beyond the scope of this dissertation, a 
general review of some of the proceedings is helpful in understanding some of the 
dilemmas faced by the Provisional Government. 
Perhaps the most notable of the commissions was one assembled by René Pleven 
in spring 1944.  Those invited were chosen as experts on policy, constitutional law, or 
colonial administration.  Pleven’s committee included the governor of Chad, Pierre-
Olivier Lapie; Free France’s jurist (and eventual drafter of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights) René Cassin; director of political affairs for the colonies Henri Laurentie; 
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member of the consultative assembly Jules Moch; Parti Communiste Française (PCF) 
member Henri Lozeray; and several other prominent politicians and administrators.  
During the first meeting, held on May 1, Pleven introduced a number of issues that the 
government would have to resolve after the war.  The main goal, as Pleven saw it, was to 
“find new methods to integrate the Empire into the French constitution.”473  It was no 
longer possible to govern overseas territories in the traditional colonial manner, whereby 
colonial administrators in Paris would have absolute say over affairs affecting colonial 
populations: 
Everyone is convinced by the events of 1940 and by all of the developments that 
have occurred since 1940, that the new constitution that must be given to the 
Republic must include representation from the Empire, and not simply leave, to 
the sole discretion of the métropole’s power, the livelihood and the political role 
of the Empire.474 
 
Instead, Pleven insisted, colonial populations would have to be given legitimate 
representation in a parliamentary assembly.  There were two options – either a separate 
colonial parliament or a “federal assembly” whereby representatives from the métropole 
would sit in common with colonial representatives to address issues that interested both 
sides.  Pleven was staunchly against the first option; in his opinion, it was “dangerous to 
create institutions which could lead to antagonism between metropolitan and colonial 
points of view.  It is preferable, in my opinion, that if there are to be divergences, that 
they should be in the same assembly, without a line of demarcation between 
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representatives of the métropole and representatives of the colonies.”475  The idea of a 
federal assembly would later be adopted by the constitution for the Fourth Republic. 
 Another important question addressed by Pleven’s commission was the nature of 
the relationship between the métropole and the colonies.  Although it was imperative to 
promote the status of the indigènes in the new federated system, the commission had no 
desire to inaugurate a truly federal republic in the American style, where each component 
state or territory was equal in its sovereignty, subordinate only to the central government.  
Instead, this would be a federated system whereby all of the overseas territories would be 
subordinate not to one overarching sovereign, but to a privileged territory (the métropole) 
within the union.  Pleven made it clear that the French government (presumably, the 
President and his cabinet of ministers) would be responsible only to the metropolitan 
National Assembly, not the federal assembly.476  As for France’s power vis-à-vis the 
territories, Pleven specified that “a federation will no longer be a federation of colonial 
territories.  A federation is France in which France is the most meritorious member, the 
most loyal of the federation.”477 
 By early 1945, the exact structure of the new federal union had begun to take 
shape.  That March, Laurentie established another commission under the Ministry of 
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Colonies “to study the way to install the colonies in the new constitution.”478  By this 
point, it was generally agreed upon that terminology which unnecessarily suggested the 
old colonial relationship had to be abandoned; therefore, the committee officially adopted 
the phrase “Union Française” to label the new federated structure.479  In addition, 
Laurentie’s committee agreed to divide France’s overseas territories into three distinct 
groups – overseas provinces/departments with significant numbers of French citizens 
(e.g., Algeria), “countries of the union” already endowed with their own political 
structure (Vietnam, Morocco, Tunisia), and other “territories of the union” (Madagascar, 
AOF, AEF, Djibouti).480  Representation would be provided in a new federal assembly to 
which residents from all territories would be elected, and additional limited 
representation would be granted in the métropole’s new National Assembly in Paris.  
Cognizant of the outside pressures that the Provisional Government was facing, Laurentie 
indicated to the committee that France had to use terminology that had “positive 
connotations” and that would be “well understood abroad, and notably in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, who are paying close attention to our colonial policy.”481  
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After Liberation – An Attempt to Consolidate Standing in Europe 
 As Laurentie’s comment suggested, efforts to restructure France’s relationship 
with her colonies must be considered in light of the international situation facing the 
Provisional Government.  That body, formed in June 1944 from the structure of the 
former CFLN, would be responsible for governing France for more than two years.  From 
the moment de Gaulle and his followers entered Paris in August 1944, they moved 
quickly to consolidate and improve France’s standing in Europe.  Their main concern was 
the defeat and long-term neutralization of German military power.  To this end, de Gaulle 
immediately pursued a formal bilateral defensive arrangement with Britain against future 
German aggression.  But by that September, French officials were already complaining 
that they were being excluded from allied talks on Germany’s future in Europe.482  
Frustration mounted against Roosevelt, who was seen by French officials, and by de 
Gaulle in particular, as attempting to exclude France from key decisions and hesitant to 
fully recognize the Provisional Government.483  At first, the Provisional Government 
hoped that Britain would stand up for its cross-channel ally in its talks with the United 
States and the Soviet Union.  That fall, French Ambassador to Britain René Massigli 
spoke with numerous British MPs and journalists, indicating that the British government 
had to state publicly its support for French interests in order to maintain the relationship 
between the two countries.484  But this hope for the intervention of the British 
government was short-lived, as Churchill was loathe to undermine his close ties with 
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Roosevelt.  In addition, tension still existed between the two sides concerning the 
Lebanon and Syria issue, with de Gaulle complaining in October of “the duplicity of 
London’s policy” in the region.485  By December 1944, he was explaining to Soviet 
representatives that it would be difficult to conclude any long-term postwar pact with 
Britain because of “certain serious divergences” between the two.  British attitudes 
toward Germany’s future, he concluded, did not conform to French interests.486 
Faced with the problem of trying to assure France’s security against Germany 
without any meaningful input into decisions being made by his British and American 
counterparts, de Gaulle decided to renew the traditional alliance between France and 
Russia.  In this sense, his willingness to work both sides of the coming Cold War rift 
would foreshadow his later tenure as president of the Fifth Republic.  For their part, the 
Soviets had already taken steps earlier in the war to cultivate ties with de Gaulle and his 
followers.  In September 1941, the Soviet ambassador had written to de Gaulle, 
promising “the full restoration of the independence and grandeur of France” after the 
war.487  This assurance was repeated by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov the 
following May.488  Similar representations were made at the Moscow meeting between 
French and Soviet advisors that December.   
The centerpiece of de Gaulle’s effort was a bilateral security agreement with the 
Soviet Union, prepared by the respective foreign ministers, and consummated by de 
Gaulle in a personal visit to Stalin in Moscow in December.  The pact provided for 
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mutual assistance between the two sides against Germany until the end of the war, a 
pledge not to negotiate a separate peace, promises to take all necessary measures to 
disarm Germany after the war, and collective security should a resurgent Germany later 
attack one of the two countries.489  De Gaulle believed that the Soviets understood the 
German threat better than the other countries in Europe.  In his view, the fact that German 
aggression had succeeded in 1939-1940 reflected both this lack of understanding by the 
British, as well as the failure of the Versailles agreement.490  In addition, de Gaulle took 
care to disavow any concerns Stalin may have had about a western alliance or “bloc”, 
insisting instead that French interests were only concerned with not being attacked by 
Germany again.491 
De Gaulle was no Russophile, and given his internal struggles with the 
communist resistance parties, he had no sympathy for Soviet ideology.492  His treaty with 
Stalin must therefore be analyzed in the context of traditional realpolitik; given the new 
situation in Europe, he accepted that he simply had to deal with the winners.  For de 
Gaulle in 1945, France would have had no natural ally after the war.  He expressed as 
much in a meeting with American ambassador Jefferson Caffery in May 1945, in which 
he noted his alarm at the rapid pace of Soviet movement across Eastern Europe.  After 
noting that the United States and Soviet Union would be the “only two real forces in the 
world” after the war, he told the ambassador that he was forced to work with whoever 
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could provide France the best advantage.  “I would much rather work with the USA than 
any other country,” he said to Caffery.  “The British Empire will not be strong enough 
after this war to count for much.  If I cannot work with you I must work with the Soviets 
in order to survive even if it is only for a while and even if in the long run they gobble us 
up too.”493 
 With the Franco-Soviet agreement concluded, de Gaulle’s colonial ministers 
urged him to re-focus his attention on the colonies and their importance to France.  As 
discussed in chapter two, American attitudes about colonialism presented a significant 
ideological threat to France’s future involvement in Africa.  There was no secret about 
the U.S. mentality; Roosevelt had made it quite clear in numerous statements during the 
war, and his advisor Harry Hopkins reaffirmed it personally in a meeting with de Gaulle 
in January 1945, in which he noted that Roosevelt “is convinced that colonial empires are 
only a terrain of exploitation that benefit businessmen from colonial powers, and that all 
expressions of policy supposedly in the interest of indigenous populations are nothing 
more than decoration.”494  For his part, the Provisional Government’s foreign minister 
Georges Bidault asserted in the same meeting that French public opinion “would be 
united in condemning any attack on the sovereignty of the empire.”495 
Given America’s attitudes about imperialism, French observers of American 
politics began to call for greater solidarity among the colonial powers, as evidenced by a 
letter sent by French delegate to Washington Henri Hoppenot to Georges Bidault in 
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December 1944.496  Solidarity could also protect French interests in Europe; despite de 
Gaulle’s longstanding suspicion of the British, members of his cabinet nevertheless 
believed that France had to draw closer to Britain while it still could.  As French 
ambassador to Britain René Massigli noted to Bidault in January of 1945, Britain could 
act as a powerful counterweight to the Soviet Union in Western Europe.  Further, he 
reminded Bidault that “if Great Britain is certain that it will be the United States at her 
side in Europe, she will perhaps have less interest in an alliance with France…”497  The 
previous December, French representatives were already laying the groundwork for a 
conference in Accra, Ghana with Great Britain to discuss a wide variety of issues 
pertaining to colonial administration.498  France also pursued cooperative arrangements 
with Belgium, envisioning a larger regional system in Africa whereby the colonial 
powers could meet to discuss common problems.499  These collaborative efforts were 
meant to improve efficiency of administration, but were also aimed at uniting a common 
front against potential American interference in Africa.   
 
                                                 
496 M. Hoppenot, Délégué du G.P.R.F. à Washington, à M. Bidault, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangères, Dec. 20, 1944.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1944 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1996), 471. 
497 M. Massigli, Ambassadeur de France à Londres, à M. Bidault, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangères, Jan. 9, 1945.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1945, Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1998), 26.  “Si la Grande-Bretagne est certain qu’elle aura l’Amérique à ses côtes en 
Europe, elle trouvera peut-être moins d’intérêt dans une alliance française…” 
498 M. Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. Massigli, Ambassadeur de France à 
Londres, Dec. 16, 1944.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1944 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1996), 453-4. 
499 M. Brugère, Ambassadeur de France à Bruxelles, à M. Bidault, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangères, Dec. 21, 1944.  Ibid., 482-3. 
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Resistance to the Brazzaville Reforms in the Colonies 
The pressure of continued U.S. scrutiny also led to an increased campaign by the 
government to expand rights in the colonies.  On December 28, shortly after de Gaulle 
returned from Moscow, Henri Laurentie wrote him to discuss the future of France’s 
empire.  Given the recent ratification of the Franco-Soviet pact, Laurentie noted, France 
had greatly alleviated some of its main concerns in Europe.  Consequently, he urged that 
“we must pause to consider our position overseas.  This position does not solely depend 
on our territories in North Africa or the colonies, but it depends on them in a very 
important part.”500  Although Laurentie noted the promising development of solidarity 
among the colonial powers, he nevertheless emphasized the need to focus on the attitudes 
of the indigènes toward France.  Because of the promised reforms at Brazzaville, they 
were looking to France to improve their daily situation.  Laurentie noted that “native 
opinion, while sometimes confused…has expressed itself well enough to let us know that 
the indigènes expect us to grant the promised reforms.”501   
But despite the importance of the Brazzaville reforms to the future of the empire, 
Laurentie expressed frustration that they were not being implemented quickly enough.  
This stemmed from a combination of bureaucratic resistance and lack of comprehension 
by colonial ministers as to the reforms’ importance to France’s future: 
                                                 
500 Note personnelle pour Monsieur Général de Gaulle from Laurentie, Dec. 28, 1944, ANP, 3 
AG 4 22.  “Il est sans doute justifié de penser après la signature du traité franco-soviétique que la 
plus grande préoccupation de la France en Europe se trouve fortement atténuée et que nous 
pouvons et par conséquent devons songer à rasseoir notre position au-delà des mers.  Cette 
position ne dépend pas que nos territoires nord-africains ou coloniaux mais elle en dépend pour 
une part très importante.” 
501 Note personnelle pour Monsieur Général de Gaulle de Laurentie, Dec. 28, 1944, ANP, 3 AG 4 
22.  “L’opinion indigène, si confuse et parfois si bridée soit-elle, s’exprime assez bien pour nous 
faire savoir qu’elle attend de nous les réformes promises.  La satisfaction que nous lui donnerons 
ne comptera pas moins dans le succès de notre politique que l’appoint offert à la cause coloniale 
de nos Alliés.” 
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…to keep our obligations, we must have the colonies active and conscious of the 
essential role that is expected of them in French policy.  But that is not the case 
now.  The French colonists are tired, mentally and physically, and hostile, 
unreceptive and indifferent to our intentions.  In addition, they are not guided; our 
governors and even our governors-general are, without exception, good agents, 
conscientious and very attentive… but they are also very unsympathetic to 
general political problems.  Brazzaville did not open their eyes; they interpret it as 
the caprice of a disreputable minister, and page by page, they have abandoned the 
[Brazzaville] charter to termites.502 
 
Laurentie’s recommendation to de Gaulle was for a change of colonial leadership, 
starting with Minister of Colonies Paul Giacobbi, who had been appointed in November 
1944 after Pleven had been moved to the Ministry of Finance.  Giacobbi was a relative 
newcomer to colonial affairs; he was a Corsican who had served in the Senate of the 
Third Republic and had voted against the investiture of Pétain in July 1940.  Laurentie’s 
believed that Giacobbi had not taken sufficient steps to implement the Brazzaville 
reforms.503  Giacobbi was one of several prominent colonial officials subjected to an 
intense lobbying campaign throughout 1944 from a variety of colonial interests.  These 
included corporations operating in the colonies, as well as lobbying associations 
promoting colonial interests, most notably the reconstituted Comité de l’Empire 
Français.504 
                                                 
502 Ibid.  “Or, pour tenir nos obligations, il faudrait que nous eussions des colonies actives et 
conscientes du rôle essentiel qu’on attend d’elles dans la politique française.  Ce n’est pas le cas.  
Les coloniaux français sont fatigués, mentalement et physiquement, et hostiles, imperméables ou 
indifférents à nos intentions.  En outre, ils ne sont pas guidés : nos gouverneurs et même nos 
gouverneurs généraux sont, sauf exception, de bons agents, consciencieux et moyens, fort 
attentifs aux soucis d’une subdivision, fort incompréhensifs des problèmes politiques généraux.  
Brazzaville ne leur a pas ouvert les yeux ; ils l’interprètent comme le caprice d’un Ministre en 
mal de réputation et, page par page, ils en livrent la charte aux termites.” 
503 Ibid. 
504 The Comité had consolidated the former associations L’Union Coloniale, Le Comité de 
l’Indochine, and L’Institut Colonial.  See letter from Comité de l’Empire Français to Paul 
Giacobbi, Dec. 28, 1944, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 2097, Dossier 1. 
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 It is unclear whether de Gaulle agreed with Laurentie’s recommendation to 
remove Giacobbi, but by early 1945, Giacobbi was beginning to take more aggressive 
steps to emphasize the Brazzaville reforms in discussions with the colonial governors.  In 
January, he wrote to Pierre Cournarie, governor-general of AOF, to remind him that 
“international public opinion and internal evolution of our overseas territories are pushing 
us to enter without delay onto the path of realization [of the Brazzaville reforms].”505  
Cournarie had noted protests in AOF against the Brazzaville recommendations, 
especially from European planters and colonists.  After emphasizing that de Gaulle 
himself had prominently supported the path of reform, Giacobbi advised Cournarie that 
France had to think practically about how it treated its colonies.  “We are no longer in 
1939,” he noted.  “We are obliged to think about defending the integrity of our 
empire.”506  In order to do so, and therefore preserve the larger French community, the 
Brazzaville reforms had to be implemented “without delay” in order to “warn of the 
American menace” and provide for the evolution of colonial populations.507   
While Giacobbi’s correspondence referred to a wide range of reforms, one of the 
key items discussed at the Brazzaville Conference had been the eventual suppression of 
the indigénat, which had first been instituted by the French colonial administration in 
Africa in 1924.  The indigénat constituted a widespread series of practices that allowed 
European colonists to impose a variety of summary punishments on African subjects for 
any number of perceived infractions.  These included traditional corporal punishments, 
                                                 
505 Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur-Général de l’Afrique Occidentale 
Française, Jan. 1945, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 2201.  “L’opinion publique internationale et l’évolution 
interne de nos Territoires d’Outre-Mer nous poussent à entrer sans délai dans la voie des 
réalisations.” 
506 Ibid., p. 2.  “Nous sommes donc obligés de penser à défendre l’intégrité de notre empire.” 
507 Ibid.  “Il faut le faire sans retard d’abord pour prévenir la menace américain et aussi pour 
reconnaitre en toute justice l’évolution de nos populations coloniales.” 
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arbitrary taxes, and most commonly, forced labor.508  It was the latter that had provided 
significant human capital for commercial projects throughout the colonies, and especially 
in AOF and AEF.  As Tony Chafer has noted, there was strong resistance to abolishing 
the practice at Brazzaville.509  But the prevailing winds increasingly made clear that 
freedom of labor would be one of the central principles of reform after the war.  And with 
the exigencies of the war effort dissipating, the Provisional Government could not 
tolerate the practice, given prevailing international sentiment.   
Not surprisingly, colonial interests were staunchly opposed to any sweeping 
reforms that threatened the status quo.  The resulting tension was evident in 
correspondence between Giacobbi and the newly-appointed governor of French 
Cameroon, Henri Pierre Nicolas, in early 1945.  Cameroon was an exception within the 
French colonial system; having been captured from Germany after World War I, it was 
placed under the postwar League of Nations mandate system under France’s control.  As 
such, it was not part of France’s more traditional colonial possessions in AOF and AEF, 
and would be subject to more international scrutiny after the war concluded.  The 
territory rallied to de Gaulle in 1940, with Pierre Cournarie, who was eventually 
appointed as head of AOF, serving as governor for most of the war.  Nicolas was 
appointed governor in November 1944 in the midst of what René Pleven (in a letter to de 
Gaulle two days before Nicolas’ appointment) had termed “a violent campaign against 
the colonial policy of the government” by French residents in Cameroon.510  In his letter 
                                                 
508 A recent study of the indigénat and its application has been provided by Olivier le Cour 
Grandmaison, De l’indigénat: anatomie d’un monstre juridique: le droit colonial en Algérie et 
dans l’empire français (Paris: Zones, 2010).  
509 Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 59. 
510 Note for General de Gaulle from the Minister of Colonies (Pleven), Nov. 14, 1944, ANP, 3 
AG 4 23.   “Depuis la réunion de la Conférence de Brazzaville, et avant même que les résultats en 
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to de Gaulle, Pleven noted the dueling pressures of an intense lobbying effort by 
European planters in Paris, as well as intense international scrutiny about France’s 
promised reforms in the colonies.511  As he indicated, “French colonial policy is closely 
observed and all our actions are watched…We cannot afford a failure, a deviation in our 
line of conduct, and especially not in Cameroon.”  France would eventually have to 
account for its actions in the colony before an international body, and Pleven noted in 
particular the interest that the “Anglo-Saxons” would take in this colonial accounting.512  
French private interests, and most notably the planters of Cameroon, had to be convinced 
that “France could not permit itself, under the eyes of the world, to sacrifice 2.7 million 
indigènes to the interests of 300 planters.”513 
However, it was a difficult prospect to persuade colonial governors to ignore the 
complaints of their European settlers.  On January 30, Nicolas wrote to Giacobbi, noting 
that a “wave of emotion” had swept the two cities of Douala and Youandé following the 
recent announcement of the future abolishment of the indigénat.  The sentiment built on 
already-existing reaction to the Brazzaville Conference, causing great concern among 
private French interests in the colony uncertain about the coming changes to the colonial 
status quo: 
                                                                                                                                                 
aient été exactement connus du public, certains milieux français du Cameroun ont entamé une 
violente campagne contre la politique coloniale du Gouvernement.”   
511 Ibid. 
512 Ibid.  “La politique coloniale française est étroitement observée et tous nos actes sont épiés : si 
nous avons tiré sur le plan international le plus grand bénéfice de la Conférence de Brazzaville, 
nous n’en sommes que plus étroitement surveillés et guettés aux réalisations.  Nous ne pouvons 
pas nous permettre une défaillance, une déviation dans notre ligne de conduite, et au Cameroun 
moins qu’ailleurs.... 
Tôt ou tard, nous serons appelés à rendre nos comptes de tutelle devant un organisme 
international et ces comptes seront sévèrement examinés. 
Des multiplices indices attestent l’intérêt que les puissances anglo saxonnes portent au Cameroun, 
intérêt dont on ne citera ici que quelques manifestations.” 
513 Ibid.  “… la France ne peut se permettre aux yeux du monde de sacrifier 2,700,000 indigènes 
aux intérêts de trois cents planteurs.” 
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In short, we can say that for the majority of the European traders, industrialists, 
and planters of Cameroon, all of the ills which white colonists are suffering, or 
which they imagine they are suffering, can be blamed on the Brazzaville 
Conference.  In truth, we are not well-informed about the work of the conference, 
which is sharply accused of having systematically excluding the representatives of 
private interests, and of being directly responsible for the wave of laziness 
currently sweeping through all of the indigènes…514 
 
Nicolas added that European private interests – and in particular the local Chamber of 
Commerce – were primarily concerned with the effect on local manual labor that the 
suppression of the indigénat would have.  Given these complaints, as well as Nicolas’ 
personal evaluation that the indigènes were not ready for an expansion of political rights, 
he emphasized to Giacobbi that more immediate material concerns had to take precedent 
over implementation of the Brazzaville conference program.  Rather than sweeping 
reforms, he asked Giacobbi to limit French action for the time being to measures such as 
increased recruitment of workers for private enterprise, price controls, better health 
measures, and development of professional and technical education.515 
 Giacobbi’s response to Nicolas, sent on February 17, reflects the awareness 
within the colonial ministry that France’s colonial and international position had changed 
greatly.  While acknowledging some of Nicolas’ fundamental concerns, Giacobbi noted 
upfront that the purpose of his response was to help Nicolas understand the situation, “as 
                                                 
514 Henri Pierre Nicolas, Governor of Cameroon, to Paul Giacobbi, Minister of Colonies, Jan. 30, 
1945, ANP, 3AG 4 23.  “En bref on peut dire que pour la majeure partie des commerçants, 
industriels et planteurs européens du Cameroun, tous les  maux dont souffre actuellement la 
colonisation blanche, ou dont s’imagine qu’elle doit souffrir, sont imputables en bloc à la 
Conférence de Brazzaville.  A la vérité on n’est pas très exactement renseigné sur les travaux de 
cette conférence, à laquelle précisément on reproche d’avoir systématiquement écarté les 
représentants des intérêts privés, mais on la rend quand même directement responsable de ce 
qu’on appelle la vague de paresse qui déferlerait actuellement à travers toutes les populations 
indigènes, au point qu’on devrait, d’après certains se demander si on n’assiste pas à une tentative 
de sabotage en règle de toute l’action colonisatrice européenne.” 
515 Ibid.    
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the government sees it.”516  He first noted the changed role of the United States and its 
impact on France’s future: 
There is nothing new in saying that European “colonialism” has always been 
regarded with a kind of revulsion in the United States. The war has not 
diminished this sense – quite the contrary. But while it was once expressed in a 
[theoretical] form by a nation whose power only had inner application, it is now 
made by a country that is well-armed, on land, sea and air, and whose strength is 
proven.  
This transformed America, which we will encounter from now on in all parts of 
the world…will use its [influence] to ensure that the “colonies” achieve 
independence, and in the meantime, that they are controlled by an international 
organization in which the United States will play a vital role... 
You can now estimate the exact position in which the French colonies, and 
notably your territory, are placed. The world has changed during the past four 
years, and our possessions, which we could [govern by ourselves] until 1939, 
must now face criticism and know how to respond.517 
 
In the face of this American threat, Giacobbi insisted, the solution lay in rallying African 
opinion to the French colonial administration in order to inspire “a public and strong 
testimony of their absolute preference for France.”518  This was especially true given 
recent unrest in Algeria and Vietnam, which demonstrated the precariousness of the 
                                                 
516 Paul Giacobbi, Minister of Colonies, to Henri Pierre Nicolas, Governor of Cameroon, Feb. 17, 
1945, ANP, 3 AG 4 23. 
517 Ibid.  “Ce n’est pas une nouveauté de dire que le « colonialisme » européen a toujours 
considéré avec une sorte de répulsion aux États-Unis.  La guerre n’a pas atténué ce sentiment, 
tout au contraire.  Mais tandis qu’il était exprimé naguère sous une forme platonique par une 
nation dont la puissance n’avait d’autre application que le progrès intérieur, il est aujourd’hui le 
fait d’un pays bien armé, sur terre, sur mer et dans les airs et dont la force est éprouvée. 
Cette Amérique métamorphosée, et que nous rencontrerons désormais sur tous les points du 
monde, tendra dans ses interventions à effacer ce que l’Amérique de toujours n’a cessé de 
considérer comme un illogisme choquant et, sans s’inquiéter des contradictions qu’elle-même 
recèle (attitude à l’égard de ses nationaux du couleur), elle pèsera de toute sa force pour que les 
« colonies » parviennent à l’indépendance et, en attendant pour qu’elles soient contrôlées par une 
organisme international ou les États-Unis tiendraient une place importante. 
Vous pourrez estimer désormais la situation exacte devant laquelle les colonies françaises, et 
notamment votre territoire, se trouvent placés.  Le monde a changé durant ces quatre dernières 
années et nos possessions qui pouvaient s’arranger, jusqu’en 1939, d’un régime familial et un peu 
fermé, doivent désormais affronter la critique et savoir y répondre.” 
518 Ibid.  “Nous cherchons à assembler autour de nous toutes les masses indigènes par une 
politique de confiance et à recevoir d’elles, en échange de notre bonne volonté et de notre bonne 
foi, le témoignage public et durable de leur préférence absolue pour la France.” 
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French colonial position.  Further, if Cameroon resisted progressive reforms given their 
implementation in nearby British West Africa, “the position of France will become 
untenable in international negotiations, where the destiny of our mandate [in Cameroon] 
will be inescapably discussed.”519  Despite the protests of commercial interests, only 
through a comprehensive reform plan that abolished the worst evils of colonialism could 
the French position be consolidated.   
 The correspondence between Giacobbi and Nicolas is illustrative of the internal 
battle in France’s colonial administration during this time.  It also reveals the complex 
array of factors that helped determine development of political reforms in Africa after the 
liberation of Paris.  Tony Chafer has noted a general retreat by colonial administrators 
from the Brazzaville principles almost immediately after the conference concluded.520  
These regressive tendencies were tempered by events beyond France’s control, such as 
the United States’ interest in the future of colonial regimes and its numerous statements 
in favor of independence for colonized peoples.  For this reason, the French colonial 
administration cannot be considered as one homogenous bloc.  Rather, a split developed 
between those in Paris, who were forced to moderate their imperialist leanings by the 
reality of the international situation, and those in the colonies, who were more apt to be 
influenced by those favoring the traditional system.  As Laurentie indicated in a speech 
that May, there was a “difference of rhythm” between the métropole and colonial 
                                                 
519Ibid.  “Si le Cameroun, territoire sous mandat, restreint les chances de progrès offertes partout 
ailleurs, notamment dans les colonies britanniques voisines, aux indigènes, la position de la 
France sera proprement intenable dans les conversations internationales ou le destin du mandat 
sera précisément évoqué d’une manière inéluctable.” 
520 See Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa. 
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administrators; as he noted, “the ideas of Paris are moving a bit quickly, and the current 
[colonial] administration marches perhaps a bit slowly.”521 
 Colonial administrators’ recalcitrance was troubling enough because of its 
potential impact on international opinion pertaining to French colonialism.  But 
reluctance to support the Brazzaville reforms also impaired the Provisional Government’s 
efforts to improve relations with the indigènes.  During the height of the war, discontent 
had generally focused upon poor conditions for African soldiers fighting in the French 
Army.  This was the impetus for a mutiny at the Thiaroye military camp outside Dakar, 
and the subsequent massacre of African troops during November-December 1944.522  But 
as the war drew to a close, France’s African subjects began raising significant civil and 
political grievances against the colonial administration.  As Chafer has demonstrated, this 
led to a rapidly expanding African political consciousness.523 
This heightened political involvement was evident from correspondence between 
René Saller and Léopold Sédar Senghor, who had already established himself as a 
prominent intellectual before the war and was trusted by the colonial administration as 
being loyal to France.  That February, Senghor, whose political career began after his 
imprisonment in a Nazi concentration camp and his subsequent work for the resistance, 
informed Saller about a number of abuses committed against Africans, some of which 
                                                 
521 Chronique faite par Monsieur le Gouverneur Laurentie, directeur des affaires politiques au 
Ministère des Colonies, May 28, 1945, ANOM, 17G 176.  “J’ai déjà expliqué qu’il n’y avait pas 
la véritable contradiction mais seulement différence de rythme: les idées à Paris vont un peu vite, 
l’administration sur place marche sans doute un peu lentement.” 
522 For a discussion of the Thiaroye mutiny, see Gregory Mann, Native Sons: West African 
Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 116-9. 
523 Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 55-78. 
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were a holdover from the former Vichy regime.524  These included purges from the 
colonial administration, the exclusion of Africans from local lycées, and the wrongful 
imprisonment of African soldiers.525  The result, according to Senghor, was a deep 
malaise within the African population: 
Black Africans believe that they are less privileged than North Africa, Indochine 
(which has been promised extensive autonomy), and even Madagascar – but not 
because of a lower degree of evolution... They think it is only because Africa is 
black, and after the West Indies (also black), they are the group of colonies most 
loyal to France. 
Black Africans believe that if the Provisional Government does nothing for them, 
they will only have a choice between two options: either join the French 
communist party (the U.S.S.R. being the only European country which has given 
to the colonial problem a fully satisfactory solution), or instigate nationalist 
insurrection (the option they prefer least) and call for an international organization 
of colonies.  
The disappointment of black Africans is therefore serious; the malaise is 
profound.526 
 
Saller forwarded Senghor’s letter to Pierre Ruais, a decorated resistance officer and one 
of de Gaulle’s top military advisors.  In his correspondence with Ruais, Saller 
emphasized that “the diminishing of confidence signaled by Mr. Senghor exists, and it 
would be imprudent to ignore its gravity.”527  
Perhaps the best example of the influence of external events on the development 
of France’s colonial policy was the rapidly changing situation in Vietnam.  On March 9, a 
                                                 
524 For more on Senghor, see Janet Vaillant, Black, French, and African: A Life of Léopold Sédar 
Senghor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
525 Senghor to René Saller, Feb. 1945, ANP, 3 AG 4 22. 
526 Ibid.  “Les noirs d’Afrique pensent que, s’ils sont moins favorisés que l’Afrique du Nord, 
l’Indochine, à qui l’on promet déjà une large autonomie, ou simplement Madagascar, ce n’est pas 
à cause de leur moindre degré d’évolution... Ils pensent que c’est uniquement parce que l’Afrique 
Noire est, après les Antilles – noires, elles aussi – le groupe de colonies le plus fidèles à la France. 
Les Noirs d’Afrique pensent que, si le Gouvernement provisoire ne fait rien pour eux, ils n’auront 
plus le choix qu’entre deux solutions : ou se rallier, dans le cadre français, au communisme, 
l’U.R.S.S. étant le seul pays d’Europe qui ait donné au problème colonial une solution pleinement 
satisfaisante, ou bien faire de l’agitation nationaliste, - ce qu’ils aiment moins, et demander une 
organisation internationale des Colonies.  
La déception des Négro-Africains est donc sérieuse, le malaise y est profonde.” 
527 René Saller to Pierre Ruais, Feb. 19, 1945, ANP, 3 AG 4 22. 
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Japanese force invaded the French colony, taking over complete control and inaugurating 
the short-lived Empire of Vietnam, which was essentially a Japanese puppet-state.  The 
regime had little popular appeal, and by late August, it would be overthrown by the Viet 
Minh.  In the meantime, the Japanese invasion presented the Provisional Government 
with two problems: first, the real problem of long-term Japanese control of the French 
colony; and more worrisome given the state of the war, the possibility that Japan’s 
occupation would further galvanize nationalist forces opposed to any form of foreign 
control.  Before the Japanese invasion, there had been widespread recalcitrance in most 
colonial circles about any rapid implementation of the Brazzaville reforms, but as Martin 
Shipway has noted, “[t]he Japanese takeover in Indochina clearly put paid to such 
complacency.”528  On March 14, de Gaulle ordered the Provisional Government to move 
quickly to provide a public statement regarding its plans for Vietnam and its future within 
a larger French Union.  An internal cable from the Minister of Colonies, sent to AOF six 
days later, emphasized “the importance which the Government attaches to this present 
crisis” – especially in light of the coming UN San Francisco Conference, which would 
undoubtedly discuss the future of colonial empires.529 
 The subsequent hand-wringing within the colonial administration resulted in the 
Vietnam Declaration of March 27, ostensibly meant to reassure French colonial interests 
(and those Vietnamese still loyal to the colonial power) that France planned for a liberal 
expansion of political and social rights after the war.  The declaration stated that Vietnam 
held “a particular place in the organization of the French community” and that it would 
therefore enjoy a measure of liberty appropriate for its degree of evolution and its 
                                                 
528 Shipway, The Road to War, France and Vietnam 1944-1947, 62. 
529 Telegram from Minister of Colonies, Paris to Dakar, March 20, 1945, ANOM, 17G 176. 
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capacities.530  Residents of Vietnam would from now on enjoy status as citizens of the 
territory, as well as citizenry in the French Union.  Vietnam would have its own federal 
government, presided over by the governor-general, and its citizens would have access to 
jobs in both the local government and in the broader French Union – “without 
discrimination by race, religion, or origin.”531  The Provisional Government also 
promised gains in education and more autonomy in the economic sphere.  As a whole, the 
Declaration constituted a series of cobbled-together promises inspired by the Brazzaville 
Conference, infused with the urgency that the political crisis sparked by the Japanese 
invasion had brought. 
While the obvious focus of the declaration was the crisis in Vietnam, its 
publication was also meant for consumption in other parts of the Empire.  On March 25, 
just before the declaration was issued, Minister of Colonies Paul Giacobbi telegrammed 
Pierre Cournarie, governor-general of AOF, ordering him to emphasize to governors in 
Africa the importance of the coming declaration.  As he noted: 
The idea upon which it is essential that you insist is that the French Union, whose 
creation follows from this declaration, does not constitute a mere measure of 
expedience, but a real system that will determine the fate of all French 
possessions.  Within the Union, French possessions will effectively have the right 
to orient themselves toward assimilation, in the example of the Antilles, or 
towards association, of which Vietnam will be the example.532   
 
                                                 
530 Déclaration du Gouvernement sur le futur statut de l’Indochine, March 25, 1945, ANOM, 17G 
176. 
531 Ibid. 
532 Minister of Colonies Paul Giacobbi to Dakar, March 25, 1945, ANOM, 17 G 176.  “Idée sur 
laquelle il importe essentiellement insister ce que union française dont la création découle de cette 
déclaration constitue non pas une mesure d’occasion, mais un véritable système qui, déterminera 
destin toutes les possessions françaises.  Dans l’union possessions françaises auront en effet 
faculté de s’orienter ou d’être orientées soit vers une assimilation, dont les Antilles donnent 
exemple, soit vers une association dont Indochine sera le type.” 
205 
 
The telegram added that the colonial administration should work with the indigènes to 
promote a better “fusion” between the two sides.  “Liberty must be the manifest goal of 
all your efforts in your territories,” the memo urged.  “The declaration on Vietnam is the 
necessary conclusion of the new colonial policy inaugurated at Brazzaville.”533  On 
March 29, Pierre Cournarie, the governor-general of AOF, forwarded the declaration to 
all of the governors in his territory, along with a memo on its implications for the rest of 
the empire.  As he noted, the new Vietnam policy represented “a decisive turn in our 
colonial policy.”534  Given this turn, he ordered the governors to undertake a widespread 
information campaign to Europeans, African cadres, and the general colonial population, 
in order to educate them about the new progressive French policy.535 
 The need for reforms in Africa became even more evident as the spring of 1945 
approached. As already noted, the month of May saw the outbreak of riots in Setif, 
Algeria, which started as a protest against the colonial administration and devolved into 
ethnic violence between Algerians and European pieds-noirs.  But signs were also 
pointing to further unrest in sub-Saharan Africa.  In May, Pierre Ruais wrote to de Gaulle 
to indicate that “a heightening of aspirations toward independence, or towards greater 
freedom and autonomy, and in a word a surge of nationalism, has clearly manifested 
itself in recent months among many residents of the French Union.”536  This was 
particularly pronounced in Senegal and Cameroon, but it could also be observed to a 
                                                 
533 Ibid. 
534 Pierre Cournarie aux gouverneurs des Colonies du Groupe, March 29, 1945, ANOM, 17 G 
176. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Note pour Général de Gaulle de Pierre Ruais, May 4, 1945, ANP, 3 AG 4 22.  “Une montée 
d’aspirations vers l’indépendance, ou vers l’autonomie, ou vers des libertés plus grandes, et un 
mot une poussée de nationalisme, s’est incontestablement manifestée au cours de ces derniers 
mois chez les ressortissants de l’union française.” 
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lesser extent in AEF.  Later that month, Ruais followed up with de Gaulle after having 
spoken with Senegalese politician Lamine Gueye, who had brought to his attention 
various grievances from the African population.  These included separate food queues for 
black Africans and Europeans, rollbacks in compensation and political rights for indigène 
functionaries, and a reduction in educational scholarships.537 
That same month, René Saller wrote to de Gaulle to discuss popular 
demonstrations in AOF and AEF which could no longer be ignored.  Much of the unrest 
had been inspired by the American rhetoric of freedom and independence, and 
exacerbated by the failure of Vichy’s repressive policies.  The result was a tinderbox of 
popular unrest.  “The discontent of the indigènes, at first sporadic and individual, is now 
widespread,” Saller warned.  “It may be partially unjustified, and it is undoubtedly fueled 
by the Americans.  But after having read the writing on the wall, one cannot deny that it 
exists, and from one end of Africa to the other, it wins over all of the indigenous 
populations and grows stronger each day.”538  Given this rising nationalist sentiment, 
France’s task was clear; it had to deliver political and economic reforms which could 
effectively raise the status of France’s subjects in Africa.  Otherwise, Saller warned, 
“French sovereignty will, in both fact and appearance, cease to exist in the lands of 
Africa.”539  
 
                                                 
537 Ibid. 
538 Note de Saller à Général de Gaulle, May 11, 1945, ANP, 3 AG 4 22.  “Le mécontentement de 
l’indigène, d’abord sporadique, presque individuel, est aujourd’hui généralisé.  Il peut être, en 
partie, injustifié, il est sans aucun doute attisé par les Américains ; mais après avoir lu le bulletin 
on ne peut pas nier qu’il existe et, que d’un bout de l’Afrique à l’autre, il gagne toutes les 
populations indigènes et grandit chaque jour.” 
539 Ibid.  “Ils devront surtout être profondément convaincus de la nécessité absolue de cette tâche, 
se dire que, si elle ne réalisé point, la souveraineté de la France aura, en fait, sinon en apparence, 
cessé d’exister sur les terres d’Afrique.” 
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Preparations for the San Francisco Conference 
 As already mentioned, the promulgation of the Atlantic Charter had put colonial 
powers and their territories on notice that the United States would prominently advocate 
for the principle of independence after the war.  French colonial officials expressed 
frequent concern about the implications of the Charter for the future of the empire.540  
American idealism was a particularly dangerous concept in the spring of 1945 given the 
coming San Francisco Conference, which aimed not only to establish a new international 
organization to keep the peace, but also implement rules of international state conduct 
and set forth guidelines as to how dependent territories would be governed.  As the 
conference approached, French colonial administrators knew that colonialism would be 
on trial, and France would have to put on its best face.  As a March 15, 1945 internal 
memo from the Ministry of Colonies noted, the San Francisco Conference “constitutes 
the first great public test of our colonial sovereignty.”541 
 The San Francisco Conference (officially known as the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization) was held from April to June of 1945 and 
addressed many of the major issues pertaining to the founding of the United Nations.  
The general framework for the new organization had been established at Dumbarton 
Oaks in Washington, D.C. the previous August through October, with a few issues 
clarified by the Big Three at Yalta the following February.542  Because of de Gaulle’s 
irritation at France’s exclusion from major decisions taken by the Allies, as well as 
American reluctance to incorporate French proposals to adopt certain amendments to the 
                                                 
540 See L’inspecteur général des Colonies Lassalle-Séré à Monsieur le Commissaire aux Colonies, 
Oct. 31, 1944, p. 3, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 2201. 
541 Aide-mémoire pour Monsieur le Ministre, March 15, 1945, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 2662. 
542 For a general history of the birth of the United Nations, see Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of 
Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003). 
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Dumbarton Oaks proposals, France refused to sign on as an official sponsor at San 
Francisco.543  Nevertheless, given the potential impact on its international standing, 
France took an active role in all major talks concerning the future of the United Nations.  
Many of these issues – such as structure and membership of the Security Council, the role 
of the General Assembly, and the use of force under international law – had been 
addressed initially at Dumbarton Oaks, as well as the subsequent Moscow Conference 
that October.  In addition, the Yalta Conference envisioned that a postwar international 
organization would deal with the issue of dependent territories in the hands of allied 
powers after the war.  However, the specific details of the future of these dependent 
territories were explicitly left for the victorious powers to address at a later time.  Some 
territories would be held in “trusteeship” and administered by an international 
organization after the war, but no definitive plans had been made.  But it was understood, 
as Secretary of State Stettinius explained to Roosevelt in April 1945, that the trusteeship 
system involved “a special arrangement in which the title-holders, the present or 
prospective administering power, and the world organization would be the parties.  The 
arrangement would specify in each case the rights and responsibilities of the 
administering power…”544 
                                                 
543 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery), Feb. 25, 1945.  Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1945, Vol. I: General, the United Nations (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1967), 91.  For their part, U.S. representatives indicated their 
annoyance to French Ambassador Henri Bonnet about this controversial decision.  Given 
France’s refusal to co-sponsor the conference, American Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr. 
asked Bonnet “whether the French government was coming to San Francisco in a spirit of 
cooperation and helpfulness, or whether they expected to make trouble.”  Memorandum of 
Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn), March 16, 1945.  Foreign Relations of 
the United States 1945, Vol. IV: Europe (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), 
678. 
544 The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, April 9, 1945.  Foreign Relations of the United 




 Various frameworks for the trusteeship negotiations were proposed before the 
conference commenced.  Shortly after Dumbarton Oaks, an independent American group, 
the Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace, composed mainly of American 
academics, published a short pamphlet, “The United Nations and Non-Self Governing 
Peoples: A Plan for Trusteeship” in December 1944.545  The commission’s chairman, 
James Shotwell, a history professor at Columbia University, would later attend the San 
Francisco Conference as a paid advisor to the American delegation.  The concerns raised 
by the pamphlet helped set the tone of the debate at the conference.  From a structural 
standpoint, the commission recommended that regional committees be established to 
monitor issues relevant to trusteeship, and that the United Nations should form a 
Trusteeship Council to administer those territories placed in trust after the war.  These 
would include territories already mandated under the post-World War I system, territories 
taken from Germany and Japan after the conclusion of the war, and “any colony or 
dependency of one of the United Nations which might be placed under the direction of 
the Trusteeship Council with the consent of such nation.”546  The American delegation 
would later incorporate these classifications into its proposal.  As will be explained 
further below, it was the latter category pertaining to colonies that greatly concerned the 
French delegation at San Francisco. 
Perhaps most importantly, the commission established a series of principles to 
which the victorious powers should be faithful in administering dependent territories.  
Although they were set forth in the context of the trusteeship system, they could also be 
applied to all colonial territories.  The commission’s study called for the UN to embrace 
                                                 
545 The United Nations and Non-Self Governing Peoples: A Plan for Trusteeship (New York: 
Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace, 1944), p. 7, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 408. 
546 Ibid., p. 7. 
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“a broad recognition of the international interest involved in the administration of 
dependent territories by individual nations, and acceptance by such nations of a measure 
of accountability to the international community for the conduct of such administration, 
for the wellbeing of the dependent peoples, and for the progressive development of these 
peoples toward self-rule…”547  The study also pointedly recommended a pledge by the 
UN to guard civil rights, insure economic equality, and eliminate forced labor in 
dependent territories – as we have already seen, the latter was an area of particular 
concern for French colonial administrators, in large part because of American opinion. 
Despite repeated assurances from the allies that the trusteeship system would not 
apply to the vast majority of the colonial territories, French officials remained suspicious 
about the upcoming proceedings at San Francisco.  De Gaulle had already been warned 
of the forces arraying against France in a memo sent to him that March by Gaston 
Palewski, the former director of political affairs for Free France and de Gaulle’s Chef du 
Cabinet.  In Palewski’s estimation, there was now a struggle between most of the colonial 
powers and the forces of “internationalization” – namely, the United States, and to a 
lesser extent, Great Britain.  As Palewski described it, the core of the “internationalist” 
view was that “there still exists in the world millions of human beings subjected to the 
exploitation by imperial powers, and that it is up to the United States to release them.”548  
This belief was strongly supported by the American public, which “would never accept 
that [their] sacrifice would help reestablish and consolidate the privileges of the 
                                                 
547 Ibid., p. 4. 
548 Palewski to de Gaulle, March 12, 1945, ANP, 3 AG 4 22.  “La doctrine des internationalistes 
repose tout d’abord sur une idéologie dont j’ai indiqué déjà le principe et les postulats, à savoir 
qu’il existe encore dans le monde des millions d’êtres humains soumis à l’exploitation de 
puissances impérialistes et qu’il appartient aux États-Unis d’Amérique de les libérer.” 
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imperialist powers.”549  Of course, like many other figures in the new French 
government, Palewski saw in these stated American intentions a more nefarious motive: 
the desire to open up former colonial markets for American goods.550  This was 
contemptuously referred to, both by Palewski and numerous colonial administrators, as 
America’s “open door policy.”  To make matters worse, Great Britain seemed to be 
actively cooperating with United States ideals, with committees in the British government 
having already met to discuss how to raise standards of living in the British Empire and 
promote “self-government.”551  According to Palewski, this would eventually have a 
great impact on French colonial practices: 
There is no doubt that all the colonial powers and, in particular, France and 
Holland will be forced to adopt the same provisions as Great Britain and its two 
dominions. The time has passed when we could consider the colonies as reserved 
areas, which their mother country could manage and exploit at will ... ... We can 
no longer refuse to open the colonies to good-faith observers, but we cannot 
ignore that, in no longer being the sole guardians responsible for our 
possessions… we are abandoning, from this moment forward, part of our 
sovereign rights.552 
 
Despite this, Palewski nevertheless saw a colonial role for France in the postwar order.  
Although most of the benefits of the old colonial pact could be expected to disappear, he 




552 Ibid.  “Il n’est pas douteux que toutes les puissance coloniales et, en particulier, la France et la 
Hollande seront forcées d’adopter les mêmes dispositions que la Grande Bretagne et ses deux 
dominions.  Les temps sont révolus ou l’on pouvait considérer les colonies comme des territoires 
réservés que leur métropole pouvait diriger et exploiter à sa guise... 
...Nous ne saurions davantage refuser d’ouvrir nos colonies à des observateurs de bonne foi qui 
viendraient constater les résultats obtenus, mais on ne peut se dissimuler qu’en acceptant de 
n’être plus dans nos possessions que les mandataires responsables de la Société des Nations de 
demain, nous abandonnons, dès maintenant, une part de nos droits souverains...” 
212 
 
emphasized that “even with the reduced maintenance of our sovereignty, we will 
maintain a privileged position, both materially and morally.”553   
 Officials within the Ministry of Colonies were also well aware of the possibility 
of American interference in France’s overseas territories.  An internal memo, written 
before the outset of the conference, noted America’s “puritan and humanitarian 
tendencies” which were within the “Anglo-Saxon tradition to fight against slavery.”554  
To make matters worse, American public opinion was staunchly aligned against colonial 
interests, with American dignitaries like Wendell Willkie publicly advocating for the 
abolishment of the colonial system.555  Therefore, the memo suggested that France 
emphasize the contributions that its colonial project had made to “native” society, and 
warn the attending powers at San Francisco that the loss of France’s colonies could lead 
to general instability.  “We must prove,” it noted, “that the dissolution of the French bloc 
will constitute a menace to the peace of the world.”556 
 Because of the concerns about the potential ramifications of the trusteeship talks 
at San Francisco, the Provisional Government took extensive steps to coordinate France’s 
presentation and strategy.  On the surface, France was willing to pledge its support for 
collective security and for modest limitations on its exercise of sovereignty, provided that 
an international organization more effective than the failed League of Nations could be 
                                                 
553 Ibid. “Tous les vestiges de l’ancien pacte colonial, tout ce qui subsiste encore du tarif général 
des douanes, tous les avantages matériels que nous nous étions assurés par le seul exercice de 
notre autorité, sont appelés à disparaitre, mais le maintien de notre souveraineté, même réduite, 
nous permettra de conserver, matériellement et moralement, une situation privilégiée.” 
554 Essai sur la thèse coloniale française à soutenir à San Francisco, p. 1-2, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 
409. 
555 Ibid., p. 2. 
556 Ibid. p. 8-9.  “Il nous faut donc prouver que la dissociation du bloc français constituerait une 
menace pour la paix du monde.” 
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established.557  But this did not mean that France was willing to renounce its standing or 
grandeur.  The official instructions to the French delegation to San Francisco emphasized 
that “France must reaffirm that it is a great power.” 558 The delegation therefore 
formulated a series of policies for the conference, some of which directly contradicted 
American plans for the postwar order.   
Among these was a general opposition to the principle of trusteeship, based on 
various reasons.  First, trusteeship threatened plans for Togo and Cameroon, as France 
intended to incorporate these two post-World War I mandates into the larger French 
Union.559  Second, international control of trusteeship territories could set a precedent for 
greater international interference in colonial territories.  France also sought to eliminate 
the third category of territories to be placed in trust – namely, those voluntarily handed 
over to the system by colonial powers – most likely out of a fear that the “voluntary” 
system could be used to pressure colonial powers to relinquish their empires.560  As a 
memo to French ambassador Paul-Emile Naggiar indicated, “France cannot accept, under 
either direct or indirect form, the institution of international control over all or part of her 
colonial empire, or over countries placed under her protection.  [She should also discard] 
any proposal which would tend to impose an “open door” colonial regime.”561   
                                                 
557 Note du Secrétariat des Conférences, Situation actuelle de la conférence de San Francisco, 
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Avant Projet Français, May 5, 1945, p. 2, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 409. 
561 Note du Département pour M. Naggiar, April 4, 1945.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 
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In addition to these issues, France went to the conference intending to pursue 
better coordination with other colonial powers to make sure that their interests were being 
represented at San Francisco.  In March, Giacobbi wrote to Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Georges Bidault, indicating that he considered it “urgent and indispensable” that France 
enter into conversations with Britain, Holland, and Belgium in order to ascertain what 
positions they were taking at San Francisco, and “to obtain, as much as possible, the 
construction of a well-articulated colonial front in the face of the other powers.”562 This 
was to include a more coordinated approach in the area of trusteeship.  As Stephen 
Schlesinger has noted, the campaign included talks in Paris between de Gaulle and the 
foreign minister of the Netherlands prior to the conference.563 
 French hostility to American intentions was no secret as the San Francisco 
conference approached.  Anti-American propaganda emanated from a variety of sources, 
most notably the communist newspaper L’Humanité.  There was a distinct concern 
among the French public about how America’s victory would impact the future of the 
French empire.  American ambassador to France Jefferson Caffery, who assumed his post 
in late December 1944 after the United States had re-established diplomatic relations, 
wrote to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr., indicating his concerns about the state 
of French opinion regarding the United States: 
                                                                                                                                                 
empire colonial ou des pays places sous son protectorat.  Doit également être écartée de piano 
toute proposition qui tendrait à imposer aux territoires coloniaux le régime de la porte ouverte.” 
562 Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, March 1945, 
ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 2662, Dossier 3.  “...je considère comme urgent et indispensable 
d’entreprendre des conversations avec les Britanniques, les Hollandais et les Belges en vue de 
connaître leurs positions exactes devant les problèmes coloniaux qui nous seront soumis à San-
Francisco et dans le dessein d’obtenir autant que possible la constitution d’un front colonial bien 
articulé en face des autres puissances.” 
563 Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations, 99. 
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…the population of France, however much it likes to fancy itself immune to 
German and Vichy propaganda, actually swallowed a great deal.  One of the 
themes of German propaganda was “American imperialistic designs.”  The 
French were inoculated with the idea that Americans proposed to snaffle French 
territory everywhere in the world.  It is clear that a Fifth Column still exists in 
France, and the “American imperialism” motif is circulated with great craftiness. 
… 
[Further], the delicate state of French sensibilities is hardly to be exaggerated.  
Physical privations and moral humiliation have left a mark on French mentality.  
Nearly all Frenchmen betray their frame of mind by aggressive statements 
concerning France’s place in the world and by their willingness to entertain 
suspicions on everything and anything.564 
 
Caffery’s analysis was well-founded.  France’s participation at the conference, and its 
resistance to many of the proposals set forth by the American delegation, illustrated a 
genuine fear that the United States was determined to sink France’s imperial interests at 
San Francisco. 
 
Proceedings at the San Francisco Conference 
As already noted, the proposal of the Commission to Study the Organization of 
the Peace, as well as draft language set forth by the United States delegation, provided 
the rough guidelines for the talks on trusteeship held at San Francisco.  In addition, each 
of the other four major powers provided their own draft language on a potential 
declaration on trusteeship.565  The issue was addressed by the four sponsoring powers 
(United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China), along with France, in a series 
of meetings beginning on April 30.  This “Committee of Five” was to debate general 
                                                 
564 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, Jan. 3, 1945.  Foreign Relations 
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principles and language to be adopted in the basic draft agreement on trusteeship, then 
pass the task of the final draft to a separate committee.  This latter body was Committee 
Four of Commission II, which was composed of the five powers along with several other 
allied nations not represented in the committee of five.566     
The French delegation to the preliminary talks of the five powers included René 
Pleven, ambassador Paul-Emile Naggiar, Thierry d’Argenlieu, and Jean de la Roche, who 
had been part of the French delegation at a conference in Hot Springs, Virginia in 
January.567  At San Francisco, the delegation pursued a series of strategies during the 
Committee of Five meetings, including moderating the American position on colonial 
territories held by France, protecting the French empire from a UN mandate, and 
attempting to build solidarity among the colonial powers in the face of the postwar threat 
from the United States and the Soviet Union.  Later, during the Committee Four 
meetings, the delegation sought to hold France’s ground in the face of more rampant anti-
colonial sentiment. 
 A variety of concerns unfolded during the Committee of Five meetings.  The 
French delegation zealously argued a number of seemingly marginal points, but which 
they nevertheless viewed as having important ramifications for the future of the empire.  
Nowhere was this better illustrated than during the debate about the terminology to be 
used when describing the political goals of the trusteeship system.  The Chinese and 
Soviet delegations had consistently referred to the need for eventual “independence” in 
                                                 
566 The work of the San Francisco conference had been divided into four commissions; 
Commission II addressed issues pertaining to the General Assembly.  Committee Four, which 
was chaired by Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand, was subordinate to that more 
general purpose. 
567 Shipway, The Road to War: France and Vietnam 1944-1947, 66-7. 
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the trusteeship territories at issue.568  However, the American and British delegations 
preferred a more moderate phrase – “progressive development toward self-
government.”569  But even this latter proposal troubled the French delegation.  With 
French politicians and legal experts already debating the future structure of the empire, 
any language that suggested broader autonomy for the colonies was viewed as dangerous.  
Consequently, during the Committee of Five meetings,   Pleven and Naggiar noted their 
discomfort with the term “self-government”.  During the group’s third meeting on May 5, 
Pleven explained that the use of the term threatened France’s ongoing work of 
establishing a new political order that would encompass both the métropole and the 
colonies: 
…it was a phrase employed twenty-five years ago, and many new conceptions 
with respect to undeveloped territories have appeared since that time, and many 
other forms of dealing with such territories other than self-government have been 
devised which are more modern and practical…The French, he continued, are 
working on the reconstitution of the French constitution with a view to permitting 
each overseas territory to develop its own political constitution on a federal basis.  
M. Pleven stated that he was not at all sure that the world would benefit from a 
multiplication of small political units.  For these reasons the French had 
considered it advisable to use a much broader formula.570 
 
The broader formula Pleven envisioned was for powers holding territories in trust to 
move governed populations toward the development of “political institutions.”571  Of 
course, this language would be less threatening to French power in her mandated 
territories and colonies, as it was envisioned that overseas territories would develop their 
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own political institutions without breaking their bonds to France.  This was in contrast to 
the American proposal, which raised the possibility that self-government could lead to 
eventual independence.  Paul-Emile Naggiar reasserted these concerns on May 14, when 
he noted at the committee’s fifth meeting that the final draft’s statement of political 
objectives for trust territories “should be so worded as not to appear to be pressing for 
independence or self-government for any territory at the present time.”572  In the June 12 
meeting, the French delegation went so far as to compare the planned future of France’s 
colonies to the federal situations in the United States and the Soviet Union, in which all 
citizens would be granted the same rights.573 
Pleven and the French delegation did not tolerate other perceived infringements 
on the French exercise of power in her overseas territories.  In the May 5 meeting, Pleven 
also strongly opposed the idea that any future trusteeship council should have a robust 
power of investigation, noting that “power of investigation…tends to create the 
impression among the native people that the administering authority has precarious 
authority.  Such procedure is not good from the standpoint of sound administration.”574  
Nor did the French delegation want the committee to establish standards for how 
occupying powers should administer their mandates or colonies.  This latter idea had 
been put forth by the British delegation, which had noted that “[t]he fact that a particular 
territory is not placed under [trusteeship] does not mean that the parent State is not being 
guided, or that it is absolved from being guided, by the general principle of trusteeship in 
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the administration of territories outside the system.”575  According to one member of the 
French delegation, this British recommendation represented a threat to French 
sovereignty in Africa: 
What worries me is that the English call for inclusion in the section on 
Trusteeship a paragraph concerning the duties of [colonial] powers in respect of 
backward people subject to their jurisdictions, whether these people live in 
Trusteeship [territories] or not.  In short, this is a sort of declaration of the duties 
of colonial powers, obviously not having any control mechanisms or sanctions, 
but which in my view would likely fuel dangerous propaganda in our empire.  
The language the English have already offered is dangerous in that it provides for 
the evolution of all backward peoples into a regime of self-government.576   
 
This logic could also be seen in France’s resistance to the inclusion of any provisions in 
the final draft mandating non-discrimination in trusteeship territories.  Rather than being 
held accountable to an international standard, France wanted to be left alone to administer 
her territories as she saw fit – especially given what Pleven viewed as an excellent track 
record in the area.  Noting that “non-discriminatory treatment provisions… have not 
worked in the interests of the people of the territory,” Pleven insisted that administered 
territories could be better served without them, incredibly claiming that “there had been 
no discrimination in French Africa with respect to anyone in the French empire.”577  
                                                 
575 Territorial Trusteeship: An explanatory note on the draft Chapter submitted by the United 
Kingdom delegation, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 409. 
576 M. Burin des Roziers, Conseiller du Cabinet du Président du G.P.R.F., à M. Palewski, 
Directeur de Cabinet du Président du G.P.R.F., May 15, 1945.  Documents Diplomatiques 
Français 1945, Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2000), 639.  “Ce qui m’inquiète c’est que 
l’Anglais plaident pour l’insertion dans le chapitre de Trusteeship d’un paragraphe concernant les 
devoirs des puissances à l’égard des populations arriérées soumises à leurs administrations, que 
ces populations habitent ou non des territoires sous Trusteeship.  C’est en somme une espèce de 
déclaration des devoirs des puissances coloniales, ne comportant évidemment aucun mécanisme 
de contrôle ou de sanctions, mais susceptibles à mon avis d’alimenter une propagande dangereuse 
dans notre empire.  Cette déclaration, sous la forme où les Anglais la proposent, est déjà 
dangereuse en ce qu’elle prévoit l’évolution de toutes les populations arriérées vers un régime de 
self government.” 
577 Approved Informal Minutes, Preliminary Consultations on Trusteeship by Representatives of 
the Five Powers, Fourth Meeting, May 8, 1945, p. 6, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 408. 
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 The ongoing talks in the preliminary Committee of Five were closely followed by 
members of the Provisional Government in France.  While the French delegation in San 
Francisco was careful in pushing against the anti-colonial agenda of some of the other 
attendees, French officials back in Paris were considerably less diplomatic.  For many, 
the San Francisco conference was seen as an Anglo-Saxon plot against French 
international power and influence.  On May 27, Georges Bidault appeared before the 
Consultative Assembly, noting that “intolerable suggestions” were being made at San 
Francisco concerning the Empire, and claiming that other powers were attempting to 
dispossess France of her territories.578  Pierre Lapie, the former governor of Chad, angrily 
indicated at the same session that the United States was simply trying to assure itself of 
having military bases around the world and was blatantly violating France’s established 
rights.579 
These sentiments were somewhat justified in light of the steep opposition the 
French delegation faced in the broader Committee Four talks on final drafting.  During 
the discussion in the Committee of Five, there had been a manifest hostility to colonial 
empires.  But this hostility was even more evident in Committee Four.  Membership in 
this latter body was not limited to the five members of the future Security Council.  
Instead, representatives from ten additional nations participated, including Belgium, 
South Africa, Mexico, Greece, and Haiti.  Anticipating a less sympathetic atmosphere for 
France’s colonial project, Naggiar opened the May 11 session by noting that a trusteeship 
                                                 
578 African Transcripts, May 1945, p. 15-16, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 408. 
579 Ibid., p. 16. 
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system “was not the only way of promoting the development of dependent peoples.”580  
He also emphasized to the committee members that they should remember the general 
principle of nonintervention in states’ domestic affairs.581   
While Belgium and the Netherlands could be counted on as French allies in the 
Committee Four talks, the colonial powers were largely unsuccessful in heading off the 
largely anti-colonial agenda of the other members.  Among the draft committee’s 
recommendations was that countries “having responsibilities for the administration of 
territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government” – 
essentially the colonial powers – should make a declaration affirming that the interests of 
populations in those territories were paramount.  Committee Four was careful to note that 
this declaration would apply to all administered territories, presumably to include both 
trusteeships and colonies not placed under the trusteeship system.582  This pointedly went 
beyond the more limited goal of regulating a finite number of trust territories, essentially 
following the British initiative of setting standards for trust territories but having them 
followed for all dependent territories.  As French representative Jean de la Roche would 
later complain, 
We have arrived, in effect, at this paradox that 50 nations, some absolutely 
ignorant of colonialism, others just out of this stage, others opposed to the 
colonial system because of their own national interests, were induced to vote a 
text which only engaged in reality four or five nations, some of whom, like France 
and Holland, which have their future closely tied to their territories overseas. 
These colonial nations were at the mercy of... the American delegate, or the 
fantasies of the British delegate.  At the head of these [colonial] nations was 
                                                 
580 Summary Report of the Third Meeting of Committee II/4, May 11, 1945.  United Nations 
Conference on International Organization Documents, Vol. X (New York: United Nations 
Information Organization, 1946), 433. 
581 Ibid. 
582 The United Nations Conference on International Organization, Draft Report of the Rapporteur 
of Committee II/4, June 19, 1945, p. 2, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 408. 
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certainly France, which was reduced to silence by the events in Syria and Algeria, 
and whose good faith in colonial matters was placed openly in doubt.583   
 
The French delegation was unable to stop most of Committee Four’s avowed goals.  
Chapters XII and XIII of the U.N. charter would contain the final language on 
trusteeship.  Among other provisions, it established social and political guidelines for 
administering powers, designated three categories of territories that would be placed in 
trusteeship (including the “voluntary” category that the French delegation had opposed); 
and delegated the power of investigation to the trusteeship council, which consisted of 
administering nations, members of the Security Council, and a few other elected member-
states.584  
 Given the frustration felt in the French delegation about the direction of talks at 
San Francisco, it is not surprising that correspondence back to Paris reveals increased 
                                                 
583 L’administrateur des Colonies détaché au Service de Presse de New York à Monsieur le 
Ministre des Colonies, July 13, 1945, p. 16, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 409.  “On arrivait en effet à ce 
paradoxe que 50 nations, les unes absolument ignorantes de la colonisation, les autres à peine 
sorties de ce stade, d’autres opposées au système colonial par leurs propres intérêts nationaux, 
étaient amenées à voter un texte qui n’engageait en réalité que quelques quatre ou cinq nations 
dont certaines, comme la France et la Hollande, ont leur avenir intimement lié à celui de leurs 
territoires d’outre-mer.  Ces nations coloniales étaient à la merci d’un fléchissement du délégué 
américain, ou d’une fantaisie du délégué anglais.  A la tête de ces nations était certainement la 
France qui était réduite au silence par les évènements de Syrie et d’Algérie, et dont la bonne foi 
en matière coloniale était ouvertement mise en doute.” 
584 See United Nations Charter, articles 76, 77, and 87, respectively.  Article 76 provides that the 
objectives of the trusteeship system are: 
a. to further international peace and security; 
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the 
inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of 
each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, 
and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement; 
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the 
interdependence of the peoples of the world; and 
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of 
the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the 
administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives...  
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cynicism – and at times antipathy – about perceived American intentions in France’s 
empire.  On July 13, after the committee meetings on trusteeship had concluded, de la 
Roche sent a report on the conference to Giacobbi back in Paris.  Despite the modest 
successes that the French delegation had achieved in pushing back some of the perceived 
anticolonial agenda at San Francisco, de la Roche remained overwhelmingly skeptical 
about French prospects going forward.  The conference had taken place in a particularly 
hostile environment; in addition to overwhelming anticolonial sentiment among the 
American people and in the American press, de la Roche believed that the United States 
government was actively hostile toward the French empire.  He noted that the direction of 
the trusteeship debate had been unduly influenced by the conference’s international 
secretariat, which “had been planned out by the United States, and which was composed 
of a large majority of Anglo-Saxons.”585   
To make matters worse, there was no difference, de la Roche claimed, between 
the British and American positions.  Given this united anticolonial front, along with the 
structural disadvantage faced by France during the committee negotiations, he warned 
that the proceedings at San Francisco would greatly benefit American power in the 
postwar order: 
The Government of the United States has brilliantly made itself the champion of 
the independence of colonial peoples on the international plane. For its part, 
Britain no longer counts among the colonial powers, in the sense that it has now 
made itself the champion of the international exploitation of colonies.  This has 
eliminated the causes of serious frictions between itself and the United States on 
one hand, and the [colonies] on the other hand.  The Anglo-Saxon world is 
therefore united against the survival of a national type of colonial system.  The 
                                                 
585 L’administrateur des Colonies détaché au Service de Presse de New York à Monsieur le 
Ministre des Colonies, July 13, 1945, p. 2, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 409.  “D’une façon générale, le 
sens des débats n’a pas manqué d’être influence par le fait que le Secrétariat international avait 




"trusteeship" formula will make possible the moral and material undermining of 
this system, and also the liquidation of potentially embarrassing situations [for the 
United States], such as Puerto Rico, which is seeking its independence or to be the 
49th state, but which will ultimately be placed under “trusteeship” so that the 
United States can once again give the world an example worthy of emulation.586   
 
In de la Roche’s view, it was France, both during the Committee of Five negotiations, as 
well as the subsequent talks of Committee Four, which was being targeted by the 
international community.  In the international crusade against colonialism, he noted, “it is 
evident that France represents the principle adversary.”587   While the Americans had 
somewhat moderated their views during the official five power talks, the subsequent 
direction of the conference during Committee Four showed their true nature.  De la 
Roche noted that during the negotiations, “the American delegation has progressively 
returned to the ideology of President Roosevelt on colonial matters, that is to say the 
liquidation of the current system for the benefit of international exploitation, and most 
particularly Anglo-Saxon [exploitation].”588   
Given this context, France was faced with difficult choices: 
In summary, the goal pursued by the American policy, which has been consented 
to by England and the British dominions, was to open the colonies to the 
beginning of international control.  A power like France now has the choice, 
under the terms of this Anglo-Saxon policy, between two solutions: consent to the 
common exploitation of the colonies, including North Africa, and therefore 
                                                 
586 Ibid., p. 21.  “Le Gouvernement des États-Unis s’est fait, d’une façon éclatante et sur le plan 
mondial, le champion de l’indépendance des peoples coloniaux.  De son côté, l’Angleterre ne 
compte plus parmi les puissances coloniales, en ce sens qu’elle s’est faite maintenant le champion 
de l’exploitation internationale des colonies, ce qui supprime des causes de frictions graves entre 
elle et les États-Unis d’une part, et les Dominions d’autre part.  Le monde anglo-saxon est donc 
uni contre la survivance du système colonial du type national.  Le formule du “trusteeship” va 
permettre d’ébranler moralement et matériellement ce système et de liquider des situations 
gênantes, telles que celle de Porto-Rico qui demande soit son indépendance, soit à être 49ème 
État et qui, en définitive, sera place sous “trusteeship” international, les États-Unis donnant une 
fois de plus au monde un exemple digne d’être suivi.” 
587 Ibid., p. 17. 
588 Ibid.  “…la délégation américaine est revenue progressivement à l’idéologie du Président 
Roosevelt en matière coloniale, c’est-à-dire à la liquidation du système actuel au profit d’une 
exploitation international, et plus particulièrement anglo-saxonne.” 
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recognize the universality of American interests; or morally resign ourselves to be 
relegated to banishment by civilized nations, and materially, to see ourselves 
gradually detached from our territorial populations, on whom it is easy to impress 
the varied effects of effective propaganda.589 
 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn was that France had to adapt to the realities exposed 
at San Francisco.  French colonial policy without radical change, de la Roche warned, 
“will mean the moral liquidation of France.”590 
 
Relations with Britain and the United States after San Francisco 
 The summer of 1945 presented a low point for France in its dealings with the 
victorious powers on colonial issues.  To make matters worse, France continued to be 
excluded from key discussions on Germany and future security in Europe.  The situation 
was summarized by Étienne Burin des Roziers, a former functionary of General Georges 
Catroux, in a memo to de Gaulle that July: 
To monitor the evolution of the international situation since the beginning of the 
year, we cannot fail to be struck by the continuing isolation of France.  Having 
been kept away from the councils of the great powers, excluded from inter-allied 
war councils as well as bodies responsible for allocating essential economic 
resources, absent from the Reparations Commission, our presence in Germany 
and Austria kept to the bare minimum, France finds no recourse from any of her 
allies when trying to break the quarantine under which she is held.  Everywhere 
her interests are menaced and her rights are threatened; yesterday in Syria, today 
in Tangiers, perhaps tomorrow in Djibouti or in Vietnam; France can only count 
on herself.591 
                                                 
589 Ibid., p. 22.  “En résumé, le but poursuivi par la politique américaine, à laquelle ont consenti 
l’Angleterre et les Dominions britanniques, était d’ouvrir les colonies à un commencement de 
contrôle internationale.  Une puissance comme la France a maintenant le choix, aux termes de 
cette politique anglo-saxonne, entre deux solutions: consentir à l’exploitation en commun des 
colonies, Afrique de Nord comprise, en reconnaissant par conséquent l’universalité des intérêts 
américains, ou bien se résigner moralement à être reléguée au ban des nations civilisées, et 
matériellement, à voir se détacher d’elle les populations de ses territoires sur lesquelles il est 
facile de faire porter les effets variés d’une propagande efficace.” 
590 Ibid.   
591 Note de M. Burin des Roziers pour le Général de Gaulle, July 9, 1945.  Documents 




 Unquestionably, a key part of French malaise was the state of relations with 
Washington.  Most of de Gaulle’s complaints, as well as those of key members of his 
administration, focused on America’s treatment of France.  As one French diplomat put it 
that summer, the idea had spread in the United States that “France is an obsolete country 
that, economically and politically, provides nothing new.”592  But French diplomats 
expressed hope that with the death of Roosevelt in April, things would change between 
the two countries.593  That August, relations began to improve when de Gaulle accepted 
President Truman’s invitation to visit him in the White House in Washington.  With the 
focus on United States designs for the future of Germany, no serious discussions were 
held during those meetings regarding the future of France’s empire.  But Truman did 
address the deteriorating relationship between the United States and France, mentioning 
“a number of unjustified criticisms directed against the United States which had appeared 
in the French press.”594  Despite this and de Gaulle’s deep concerns that the United States 
was not doing enough to prevent an eventual resurgence of Germany in Europe, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
près l’évolution de la situation internationale depuis le début de l’année, l’on ne peut manquer 
d’être frappe de l’isolement persistant de la France.  Tenue à l’écart des conciliabules des grandes 
Puissances, exclue des conseils de guerre interalliés comme des organismes charges de répartir 
les ressources économiques essentielles, absente de la Commission des réparations, réduite en 
Allemagne et en Autriche à la portion congrue, la France ne trouve de recours dans aucun de ses 
alliés lorsqu’elle s’efforce de rompre la quarantaine où on la tient.  Partout où ses intérêts sont 
menaces et ses droits mis en cause, hier en Syrie, aujourd’hui à Tanger, demain peut-être à 
Djibouti ou en Indochine, elle ne peut compter que sur elle-même.” 
592 M. Berard, Conseiller de l’Ambassade de France à Washington, à M. Chauvel, Secrétaire 
Général du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, July 23, 1945.  Ibid., 145.  “L’idée inconsciemment 
se répand que la France est un pays désuet qui, économiquement et politiquement, n’apporte rien 
de neuf.” 
593 M. Massigli, Ambassadeur de France à Londres, à M. Bidault, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangères, July 30, 1945.  Ibid., 161. 
594 Memorandum of Conversations at the White House on Aug. 22, 1945, between President 
Truman and General de Gaulle.  Foreign Relations of the United States 1945, Vol. IV: Europe 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), 708.  See also Compte Rendu des 
Conversations du Général de Gaulle à Washington, Aug. 22, 1945.  Documents Diplomatiques 
Français 1945, Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2000), 319. 
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meeting ended relatively amiably, with both leaders pledging friendship, and Truman 
promising to restore France’s prosperity and well-being.595  These efforts, along with 
increased outreach to Britain, resulted in a variety of breakthroughs that summer, 
including France’s inclusion on both the Inter-Allied Commission of Foreign Ministers 
and the Reparations Commission. 
Nevertheless, de Gaulle and his followers were unable to rid themselves of their 
suspicions of the “Anglo-Saxon” powers.  In early June, France and Britain stalemated 
over the deteriorating situation in Syria, where anti-colonial elements had been protesting 
France’s continued presence in the country.  After a brutal crackdown by French troops, 
Churchill intervened, practically ordering de Gaulle to end the hostilities, and threatening 
to send in British reinforcements.  For his part, de Gaulle referred to the incident as an 
“international crisis,” accused the British of not living up to promises to allow France to 
administer her mandates in the Middle East as she saw fit, and suggested that his allies 
had ulterior motives – namely, taking over in Lebanon and Syria.596  By the fall, France 
and Britain still vehemently disagreed over the governance and political future of 
Lebanon.  In addition, de Gaulle looked warily at Britain’s military presence in Vietnam, 
indicating to D’Argenlieu in September that he simply did not trust British motives 
there.597  Nor did de Gaulle’s followers appreciate American promises of independence to 
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Italy’s former colony in Libya within ten years – an action that was certain to reverberate 
in France’s territories in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.598 
 France also continued to search for ways to leverage its position between the 
Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union.  That June, the French chargé d’affaires in 
Moscow, Pierre Charpentier, wrote a lengthy memo to Minister of Foreign Affairs 
George Bidault, explaining the contrast between Soviet and American views on 
colonialism.  Charpentier noted that the Soviets were absolutely in favor of the idea of 
independence for the colonies; they considered the colonial system as “incompatible not 
only with its own ideology, but also with the organizations of a durable peace based of 
democracy.”599  Nevertheless, the Soviets were highly suspicious of America’s avowed 
anticolonial ideology; as Charpentier noted, they saw it as a front for an “open door” 
colonial policy that benefitted only Wall Street.600  Nor was the Anglo-Saxon principle of 
“self-government” satisfactory to the Soviets; they saw it as a paternalistic system 
whereby the western powers would decide when colonial territories were “ready” to 
govern themselves.601   
This memo was passed on to Giacobbi, who in turn forwarded it to Cournarie 
three months later.  In his cover letter, Giacobbi indicated to Cournarie that Charpentier’s 
memo suggested a window for collaboration with the Soviet Union to check America’s 
anticolonial intentions.  France could find common cause with the Soviets both in its 
                                                 
598 Note du Général Catroux sur le problème des colonies Italiennes, Sept. 17, 1945.  Ibid., 490.  
See also discussion on American proposal, M. Massigli, Ambassadeur de France à Londres, à M. 
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colonial ideology and her opposition to the “open door” policy of the United States.  
Surprisingly, he seemed to find more commonality with Soviet concepts of political 
rights than those of the United States: 
The French Union wants to permit all its colonial peoples who have the vocation 
and the ability to freely lead a national life from now on, and to prepare those who 
are not yet ready.  These principles of national equality and liberty are also at the 
base of the U.S.S.R. 
That Soviet Russia is skeptical about our sincerity, and even more so our efforts 
to promote political and social revolution, is possible and even perhaps probable.  
In any case, it is only for this [reason] that the Soviets believe that the colonial 
policy of France, and even more so the desire to not play the game of the United 
States...stands against this American anti-colonialism which above all calls for an 
open door policy.602  
 
The temptation to exploit negotiating space between the Soviet and American positions 
existed for the remainder of the Provisional Government.  The following February, an 
internal memo emphasized the differences between the colonial positions of the major 
three powers, summarizing that the Soviets were primarily worried that American 
conceptions of self-government would make the former colonies “de facto protectorates, 
and not genuinely independent nations.”603 
 The American threat was very much still on the mind of Giacobbi when he wrote 
to all of the governors-general and colonial governors that October.  In reflecting on the 
future of the colonies, Giacobbi noted that they had entered into a difficult period.  The 
                                                 
602Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur-Général de l’Afrique Occidentale 
Française, Sept. 12, 1945, p. 2-3, ANOM, 17G 135.  “L’Union française veut permettre à tous les 
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603 E.M.G.D.N. Section Afrique, 2ème Bureau, Trusteeship et Territoires Africains, February 
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greatest contributor to this uncertain future was American and English imperialism.  
Giacobbi noted that “[t]he interest that the Anglo-Saxon world has in African affairs 
cannot be denied.  For fairly obvious reasons, it is more vivid at present than it was 
before the war.”604  But Giacobbi did not want to overstate the threat posed by the Anglo-
Saxons.  Instead, colonial administrators had to realize that “colonialism has been 
condemned, and that certain forms of colonialism have perished.  We must therefore 
substitute [in its place] a form of association.”605  This new form of colonialism could 
demonstrate to the world that France could play a vital role in Africa: 
We thus find ourselves with a moral obligation to prove by effective economic, 
social and political reforms that France… understands their demands and, far 
from being closed to their aspirations, she intends to integrate the people whom 
she leads, into the nation, but an enlarged nation where all are equal under the law 
and all will have the freedom to give themselves the institutions that fit their 
personality as well as their particular needs.606 
 
In Giacobbi’s view, the future French Union was well-equipped to accomplish these 
goals.  Perhaps more importantly, only through the realization of a colonial union could 
France begin to regain its international status.  “By the French Union,” Giacobbi noted, 
“we intend to assure the grandeur of our country and the influence of our civilization.”607 
  
  
                                                 
604 Le Ministre des Colonies à MM. les gouverneurs généraux, gouverneurs des colonies, 
commissaires de la République, généraux commandants supérieurs, secrétaires généraux, et chefs 
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605 Ibid. p. 2. 
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particuliers.” 
607 Ibid. p. 4. 
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The Constituent Assembly and the New Constitution 
As discussions continued in San Francisco about the future of the colonial and 
trusteeship systems, policymakers in Paris were debating the process for a new draft 
constitution that would usher in the birth of the Fourth Republic.  French leaders knew in 
1945 that only comprehensive political reform could best ensure France’s colonial future.  
The constitution had to restore the parliamentary republic while successfully enabling the 
indigènes to vote and take part in local elections.  These reforms were presented as 
consistent with France’s humanizing mission.  Top colonial administrators conducted a 
high-profile campaign in late 1945 and throughout 1946 to advertise to both the world 
and France’s subjects that significant progressive reforms were coming to the colonies.  
On August 21, Paul Giacobbi gave a radio address in which he highlighted the 
participation of the overseas territories in the Constituent Assembly and emphasized 
France’s benevolent intentions.  Referring to the coming colonial realignment as a “great 
democratic reform”, Giacobbi added that “the colonial project of France has been 
humane; it has been emancipating”608 
As already discussed, by early 1945 the central government in Paris had strongly 
signaled to colonial administrators that the indigénat needed to be abolished.  This was 
complicated by resistance from the colonial bureaucracy, as well as the value of forced 
labor to the war effort.609  But by late summer, the campaign against the indigénat had 
intensified.  That August, Giacobbi wrote to the governors-general in Africa, indicating 
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that the indigénat “must completely disappear at the end of hostilities.”610  However, the 
practice had not yet been abolished in December, when Giacobbi’s successor Jacques 
Soustelle recommended that something be done quickly “to clearly mark the intentions of 
the métropole, in regards to native populations.”611  Shortly thereafter, in a decree on 
December 22, de Gaulle officially ended the practice throughout AOF, AEF, Cameroon, 
Togo, Madagascar and New Caledonia, effective January 1.612  By 1946, one of the most 
reviled of France’s colonial practices had been swept away. 
The year also saw another significant political breakthrough in the election of an 
assembly to draft the new constitution.  From the very beginning, there had been 
overwhelming support among de Gaulle’s administrators for Africans – as well as other 
colonial subjects – to be represented in the Constituent Assembly.  This had been the 
focus of a committee of experts chaired by Giacobbi in early 1945 to study representation 
for the colonies.613  The committee made several recommendations, including that all 
French citizens and subjects would be represented on the Constituent Assembly; that the 
Assembly would be chosen by universal suffrage to the extent it was possible; that non-
citizens would participate through an electoral college (they would designate electors, 
who would then elect representatives); and that all those over 25 would in theory be 
allowed to vote.614  Most of these recommendations were be implemented in the final 
                                                 
610 Le Ministre des Colonies à (governors-general of AOF, AEF, and Madagascar, and governors 
of Cameroon, Djibouti and New Caledonia), Aug. 6, 1945, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 937. 
611 Soustelle à gouverneurs, Dec. 10, 1945, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 937. 
612 Décret no. 45-0137, portant suppression en Afrique occidentale française, en Afrique 
équatoriale française, au Cameroun, au Togo, à la Côte française des Somalis, à Madagascar et 
dépendances et en Nouvelle-Caledonie des sanctions ordinaires de l’indigénat, Dec. 22, 1945, 
ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 937. 





decree on the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, which was elected on October 
21, 1945.615   
This assembly, which was comprised of 586 seats, was dominated by three parties 
– the PCF, the Section Française d’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO, or socialists), and the 
Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), a center-right Christian Democrat party led 
by Georges Bidault.  The PCF and the SFIO gained 159 and 146 seats respectively, 
giving the left-wing parties a majority in the assembly.  This leftward alignment had 
significant effects on the first constitutional draft.  First, both parties were less inclined to 
accept de Gaulle’s suggestion of the creation of a strong executive – preferring instead 
that the fulcrum of governmental power should reside within the legislature.  Further, 
confident in their ability to win parliamentary elections, the communists successfully 
pushed for a unicameral, rather than bicameral assembly.  In addition, both parties were 
sympathetic to the implementation of colonial reforms.  The socialists had a history of 
doing so during the Third Republic, and the communists (at least at this point) were 
inspired by the anti-colonial rhetoric coming out of Moscow. 
 The first draft constitution, officially completed on April 19, 1946 and submitted 
for referendum on May 5, contained a number of provisions that recognized the 
heightened role of the empire in the French Union.  Articles 1 through 39 provided an 
extensive list of political, social and economic rights to be accorded all men and women 
under the law.  Article 41, perhaps the most controversial of the colonial provisions, 
established the French Union as one “freely consented to” by the overseas territories and 
the associated states.  Article 44 guaranteed that “all the residents of the French Union 
                                                 
615 For a useful political narrative of this period, see Maurice Larkin, France Since the Popular 
Front: Government and People 1936-1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 136-150.  I 
have relied in part on Larkin for a chronology of the events in this section. 
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enjoy the rights and liberties of the human person guaranteed by Articles 1 through 
39.”616  It also provided for election of deputies from the colonies to the unicameral 
National Assembly, which was allocated the greatest share of power in the new republic’s 
governing institutions.617  However, the number of deputies, along with the exact nature 
of voting rights to be granted to colonial populations, would be left to the legislature; the 
draft constitution simply stated that these issues would be decided in accord with 
electoral law.618  Title VII provided for the election of local assemblies in the overseas 
territories to address purely local matters.  Finally, the April 19 constitution established 
an advisory Council of the French Union, composed of members elected from both the 
métropole and the overseas territories.  This body would meet to discuss issues referred 
to it by the National Assembly or the Council of Ministers (cabinet).619   
 Those in favor of the first constitutional draft faced significant opposition.  The 
MRP viscerally opposed the unicameral assembly, as well as many of the proposals 
pertaining to the empire.  To make matters worse, the campaign in favor of ratification 
suffered a serious blow when de Gaulle left the Provisional Government in January 1946.  
The past year had taken its toll on de Gaulle, who grew tired of the reinvigoration of 
partisan politics.  The general had hoped to present himself as a figure above the political 
fray who could unify France by mere strength of his personality and character.  This 
formula would work 12 years later, but in 1946, he did not have sufficient political 
capital.  When it became clear that the constitutional assembly was being dominated by 
traditional party politics, he resigned his duties – the operative excuse being the refusal of 
                                                 
616 Projet de constitution du 19 Avril 1946, Art. 44, http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/histoire/constitution-projet-avril-1946.asp. 
617 Ibid., Art. 48. 
618 Ibid. 
619 Ibid., Art. 73. 
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the SFIO to provide for necessary military funding.  At the time, it seemed to most that 
he would return shortly, after popular appeal for a constitution with a stronger executive 
function.  As discussed in chapter two, this gambit had worked previously, when he was 
challenged by Giraud for leadership of Free France.  But now, liberated France’s 
politicians took advantage of the opportunity to be rid of the general.  His retirement from 
public life was not absolute; he gave speeches against the provisions in the first 
constitutional draft regarding a weak executive and devolution of autonomy to the 
colonies.  But he would not return to the government until 1958, in the midst of a 
constitutional crisis and a brutal struggle in Algeria.  
The referendum of May 1946 turned out to be a disaster for the first constitution.  
Without de Gaulle’s support, and with the socialists increasingly wary of a communist 
takeover of a unicameral assembly, the first draft constitution of the Fourth Republic was 
defeated at the polls.  But the first Constituent Assembly wanted to make clear that many 
of the reforms promised by the rejected constitution would still be upheld.  As colonial 
minister Marius Moutet would later note, the campaign against the constitutional 
referendum had not really been mobilized around the issues pertaining to the French 
Union.620  Therefore, the assembly moved quickly to implement via legislation some of 
the provisions in the rejected constitution.  On May 7, it declared all residents of the 
French empire citizens of France, effectively ending the subject status of 50 million 
Africans.  The legislature then promulgated additional laws on May 9 and 10 providing 
                                                 
620 Memo from Marius Moutet to colonial governors, June 4, 1946, p. 1, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 216. 
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for the establishment of territorial assemblies in the colonies to address strictly local 
matters.621 
A new constituent assembly was elected on June 2, 1946 to draft a second 
constitution for eventual referendum.  This time, the MRP would make the most gains, 
with 166 of 586 seats in the assembly.  With the socialists less willing to deal with the 
PCF, the MRP was able to push the constitutional draft in a more centrist direction.  The 
eventual draft, which would eventually be adopted as the constitution for the Fourth 
Republic in October, changed the legislature from unicameral to bicameral, with the 
Council of the Republic sharing power with the National Assembly.  This change made 
the draft more palatable to some of the moderates who had rejected the first draft in May.  
In addition, the second draft had decidedly mixed implications for the progressive 
colonial reforms envisioned in the April 19 constitution.  As Tony Chafer has indicated, 
many of these progressive reforms were rolled back, including the provisions for free 
consent of states to membership in the Union and comprehensive establishment of the 
local assemblies.  As Chafer notes, the effect of this was “to restore power over the 
empire to the Colonial Ministry in Paris and to the overseas local colonial 
administrations.”622    
In the second constitution, control over the French Union was essentially divided 
into three areas.  First, the President of the Republic, who was to be elected by the 
National Assembly and the Council of the Republic, was also designated as President of 
the French Union.623  He shared power with the High Council, a collection of advisors 
                                                 
621 Projet de loi relatif aux assemblées locales dans les Territoires d’outre-mer, présenté au nom 
de M. Georges Bidault par M. Marius Moutet, Sept. 20, 1946, p. 1, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 212. 
622 Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 66.  
623 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, Art. 64. 
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from both the government of the métropole and the associated states.  Finally, all citizens 
would be represented in the Assembly of the Union, which was evenly split between 
representatives from the métropole and representatives from the overseas territories.624  
Representatives from the overseas territories would be elected by local assemblies.  The 
Assembly would meet at the President’s discretion, although a petition from half could 
force the opening of the session.  It was able to discuss matters pertaining to the French 
Union but would have little to no impact on the domestic politics of the métropole itself.  
It did have the capacity to send matters to the National Assembly in Paris for 
consideration, but this latter body would have final say on such matters.625   
In addition, the constitution also provided for representation in the National 
Assembly and the Council of the Republic, although in more limited scope than 
representation in the Assembly of the Union.  A separate statute later established the 
precise numbers allotted to the colonies.  In the National Assembly, the new system 
allotted 15 seats for AOF, five for AEF, five for Madagascar, three for Cameroon, and 
one for Togo.  In the Council of the Republic, the numbers were slightly higher – 19 for 
AOF, eight for AEF, five for Madagascar, three for Cameroon, and two for Togo.626  
These allotments may seem generous until one considers that in the National Assembly, 
citizens from sub-Saharan Africa held just over 5% of the seats; in the Council of the 
Republic, the figure was just over 10%.  In contrast, in the Assembly of the Union, which 
held only advisory power, sub-Saharan Africans were allotted almost 25% of the seats. 
                                                 
624 Ibid., Art. 66. 
625 Ibid., Art. 71. 
626 United Nations Trusteeship Council, Les Territoires sous Tutelle dans l’Union Française, Feb. 
8, 1949, p. 12, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 409. 
238 
 
 Regardless of this disparity in political power, by the end of 1945, significant 
progress had been made in establishing social and political rights in the colonies.  The 
inclusion of former colonial subjects in the constituent assemblies, the abolishment of the 
indigénat, and the establishment of both federal and territorial assemblies had all been 
transformative steps in France’s colonial system.  These reforms helped rally colonial 
populations to France and enabled the government to portray its continued possession of 
colonies in a more positive light.  But it is important to remember that reforms would not 
have happened – and most certainly not so quickly – had the external factors of the war 
and international pressure not given the government and colonial administrators the 
motivation to change the colonial system.   
 
Conclusion 
 With the constitution firmly in place in October 1946, the organization of the 
French Union was stabilized.  While France could no longer stake a legitimate claim as 
one of the world’s major powers, the previous two years had nevertheless allowed her to 
maintain some of her former influence.  American and Soviet rhetoric about granting 
independence to colonial territories had been largely negated.  With the notable exception 
of Lebanon and Syria, France had retained virtually all of the overseas territory she had 
held before the start of the war.  Further, with the rapid deterioration of events in Eastern 
Europe, and the rise of the communist party in France, the provisional government finally 
had chips it could bargain with.  American desires to end colonial empires ebbed once it 
became clear that French influence could be vital in areas of the world where communist 
movements threatened to take power.  Essentially, the concept of French empire, which 
had briefly teetered on the edge of extinction, had been restored by the reality of the Cold 
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War.  De Gaulle alluded to the new situation on July 28, 1946, when he noted in a speech 
that a restored France could serve as the leader of a unified Europe, which could “hold 
the moral balance” between the two superpowers.627 
 Perhaps more importantly, the two years following France’s liberation had 
allowed France to consolidate its position in the overseas territories.  To be sure, as many 
of de Gaulle’s advisors had observed, the exercise of French power would never be the 
same.  But French power and influence in Africa did continue, despite the setbacks of the 
war.  The new constitution, along with the reorganization of the empire into a federal 
union, were pivotal in this regard.  In Africa, this meant the beginning of the 
implementation of the Brazzaville reforms and the long-awaited granting of civil and 
political rights to subject populations.  But without de Gaulle leading the government, the 
direction of France’s policy would have to be defined and protected by a new group of 
leaders, many of whom were not among the Free France partisans who had reconquered 
and defended the Empire.   
 These leaders would face challenges not imagined at the Brazzaville Conference 
in 1944 or during any of the postwar discussions on the nature of the French Union.  Just 
weeks before the successful constitutional referendum, French forces led by Thierry 
d’Argenlieu shelled the Vietnamese port of Haiphong, thus instigating France’s eight-
year war with the Viet Minh.  The trauma of losing that war in 1954 was exacerbated by 
the beginning of yet another eight-year war in Algeria, which led to the loss of the former 
colony in 1962.  These two wars, along with France’s increasingly diminished role on the 
                                                 
627 Foreign Relations of the United States 1946, Vol. V: the British Commonwealth, Western and 
Central Europe (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 467.  See also Speech, 
July 28, 1946, in Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages: dans l’attente, 1946-1958 (Paris: 
Plon, 1970), 12-17. 
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international stage, would heighten the necessity of continued French power and 
influence in Africa.  With the empire shrinking, sub-Saharan Africa would become 






The Threat of the International Community to the Fourth Republic, 1946-1954 
 
In my view, it would be a serious mistake to think that it will be possible to 
convert Anglo-Saxon opinion to our concept of the French Union.  It remains 
fundamentally disbelieving of what comprises our fraternal and universal political 
organization. We are simply not interested in the same human problems. It is 
disappointing to think that the generosity and enthusiasm that led to the birth and 
development of the French Union are still suspected by the Anglo-Saxons! 
 
--Memo prepared for François Mitterrand, Ministre d’Outre-mer, July  
1950628 
 
 On July 28, 1946, Charles de Gaulle gave a speech in the town of Bar-le-Duc, part 
of the Lorraine region in northeastern France recaptured from the Germans at the end of 
the war.  Since his departure from the Provisional Government in January of that year, De 
Gaulle had toured the country and urged citizens to vote against the constitutional drafts 
put forth by the Constituent Assemblies.  He also continued to articulate his views on the 
future of French foreign policy.  Taking stock of the postwar situation, De Gaulle 
referenced a prediction made by Alexis de Tocqueville a century earlier, in which he 
foresaw the eventual rise of the United States and Russia to the status of world powers.629  
Given the ideological struggle between the two, De Gaulle saw this new power dynamic 
as a direct threat to international peace and stability.  But France could still play a role in 
this new world order.  In his view, as a representative of “old Europe”, France could help 
bridge the gap between east and west: 
                                                 
628 Note pour Monsieur de la France d’Outre-Mer, July 24, 1951, p. 3, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 3416.  
“C’est, à mon sens, se faire une grave illusion que de penser qu’il sera possible de convertir à 
notre conception de l’Union Française l’opinion anglo-saxonne.  Elle demeure foncièrement 
incrédule devant ce que comporte de fraternel et d’universel notre organisation politique.  Nous 
n’abordons pas de la même façon les problèmes humains.  Il est décevant de penser que la 
générosité et l’enthousiasme qui ont présidé à la naissance et au développement de l’Union 
Française demeurent toujours suspects aux Anglo-Saxons!” 
629 Speech, July 28, 1946.  Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages: Dans l’attente 1946-1958  
(Paris: Plon, 1970), 15. 
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What then can restore the balance, if not the Old World, between the two new 
[superpowers]? Old Europe, which for so many centuries was the world’s guide, 
is able to provide, at the heart of a world that is dividing itself into two camps, the 
necessary element of compensation and understanding.  The nations of the 
traditional West, which had as their vital lifelines the North Sea, the 
Mediterranean, and the Rhine, are geographically located between the two new 
superpowers and are determined to maintain an independence that would be 
seriously exposed in the case of a conflagration..”630 
 
Of course, De Gaulle’s speech was reflective of his earlier policies as head of the 
Provisional Government, when he cultivated the support of both the United States and the 
Soviet Union for France’s postwar security.  But signs already suggested that such 
double-dealing would not be tenable in the long term.  With the ascension of Harry 
Truman to the U.S. presidency after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, the United States 
took a decidedly tougher stance against Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe.  And in 
March 1946, Winston Churchill had famously warned an American audience about the 
descent of an “Iron Curtain” across Eastern Europe.631  Weakened by the war, France 
would quickly be faced with a choice between the two superpowers. 
 Given his exile from government service, De Gaulle would not be the one to 
make that choice.  Instead, his successors in the Provisional Government, and eventually 
the Fourth Republic, were faced with the very delicate problem of preserving France’s 
influence in the world in the face of its rapid division into two polarized camps.  By May 
1947 the die was cast, when Prime Minister Paul Ramadier expelled communists from 
                                                 
630 Ibid., 15-16.  “Quoi donc peut rétablir l’équilibre, sinon l’Ancien Monde entre les deux 
nouveaux?  La vieille Europe,  qui, depuis tant de siècles, fut le guide de l’univers, est en mesure 
de constituer, au cœur d’un monde qui tend à se couper en deux, l’élément nécessaire de 
compensation et de compréhension.  Les nations de l’antique Occident, qui ont pour artères 
vitales la mer de Nord, la Méditerranée, le Rhin, géographiquement située entre les deux masses 
nouvelles, résolues à conserver une indépendance qui serait gravement exposée en cas de 
conflagration...”   
631 Winston S. Churchill, His Complete Speeches: 1897-1963, vol, VII, ed. Robert Rhodes James 
(New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), 7285-7293. 
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Fourth Republic ministries in an attempt to curry favor with the United States.632  
Although the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union had already 
begun, Ramadier’s choice effectively brought that struggle to France’s doorstep.  Given 
the continued growth of international anticolonial sentiment, the future of France’s 
empire hinged in large part on the support of the United States. 
 This new dependence on the United States – both political and economic, given 
the Marshall Plan – could not have come at a less opportune time.  Postwar France now 
faced the same predicament that plagued its predecessor in Vichy during the war – 
namely, escalating threats to France’s sovereign colonial territory.  The fall of Dien Bien 
Phu and the abandonment of North Vietnam by French forces in 1954 would be the 
clearest example of this worrisome trend.  But the story of empire during the Fourth 
Republic’s short 12 years was rampant with such losses.  Starting in 1947, when the 
government brutally suppressed a revolt in Madagascar (killing 90,000), and culminating 
in Algerian war of independence that led to the Fourth Republic’s demise in 1958, France 
was plagued by unrest in its empire that threatened to dissolve the fragile French Union.  
France’s colonial administrators found themselves constantly re-adjusting to the realities 
of this situation.  The task was especially challenging given debates within the 
international community concerning the merits of colonialism. 
 In addition to these external realities, the political situation in France was not 
particularly suited to formulating a unified front to combat the empire’s disintegration.  
Throughout the Fourth Republic, the proliferation of political parties often prevented 
                                                 
632 An account of the decision to expel the PCF from the Fourth Republic ministries can be found 
in John W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance 1944-49: French Foreign 
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general political consensus on a variety of issues.  The early republic was marked by the 
phenomenon of “tripartisme” whereby three parties – the Parti Communiste Française 
(PCF), the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) – equivalent to the Christian 
Democrats in Germany and Italy – and the Socialists, or Section Française de 
l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) – were forced to govern together in the National 
Assembly.633  These parties were joined by numerous others, most notably the Union 
Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance (UDSR), an initially center-right party that 
included François Mitterrand and the Gaullist René Pleven; the Parti Radical, whose 
leaders included Georges Bidault and Pierre Mendès France; and eventually, the 
Rassamblement du Peuple Français (RPF), a center-right Gaullist party formed in 1947.  
The development of the latter, as well as the expulsion of the PCF from government in 
1947, would lead to a second phase of the republic after 1947, whereby parties of the 
middle – namely the SFIO and the MRP – formed a “third force” to prevent parties 
opposed to the constitution of the republic, notably the PCF and RPF, from gaining 
power.  Although this aim was achieved, coalition governing did not prevent government 
instability.  21 different ministries served the Fourth Republic under the office of the 
Président du Conseil, the equivalent of Prime Minister.634  However, despite this 
                                                 
633 For a political history of the Fourth Republic, see Jean-Pierre Rioux, La France de la 
Quatrième République, 2 vols. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1983). 
634 In addition to the President du Conseil, the cabinet posts relevant to colonial policy were the 
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères at the Quai d’Orsay, and the Ministre de la France d’Outre-mer, 
who directly oversaw most of the territories of the French Union.  During the 12 years of the 
Fourth Republic, eight men served in the former post, while 13 men served in the latter.  For the 
first several years of the Republic, the MRP dominated the Quai d’Orsay, with Georges Bidault 
and Robert Schuman combining for three terms and seven years there.  Afterward, the office was 
shared among the several parties, including the SFIO (Christian Pineau), the Radicals (Pierre 
Mendes-France), and the UDSR (René Pleven).  The full list of Ministers for Overseas France 
during the Fourth Republic included Marius Moutet (SFIO), Paul Coste-Floret (MRP), Jean 
Letorneau (MRP), François Mitterrand (UDSR), Louis Jacquinot (RI), Pierre Pfimlin (MRP), 
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fractured political society, Fourth Republic colonial policy in Africa remained relatively 
consistent and generally transcended party affiliation.  As François Mitterrand, former 
Ministre d’Outre-Mer, noted in 1957, the constant governmental turnover “produced no 
significant change in France’s policy in Black Africa.”635  
While French colonial policy during the Fourth Republic was largely defined by 
reaction to events beyond France’s control, there were continuities in policies previously 
followed by both the Vichy regime and Free France.  Like De Gaulle and Vichy’s leaders 
before him, Fourth Republic colonial administrators relied on the notions of grandeur 
and the importance of the colonies to maintaining French international influence.  Louis 
Jacquinot, an independent republican who served four times as the Ministre de la France 
d’Outre-mer (with the longest total number of years during the Fourth Republic in that 
post) often emphasized these ideas in his speeches on the French Union.  As he noted in 
an address to the Journées d’Etudes du Centre des Indépendants-Paysans in 1953: 
French grandeur is assuredly preserved by its métropole, a European and Atlantic 
nation, but also by all of its Overseas Territories which are located at all latitudes. 
Without them, France would be unbalanced, politically and economically. The 
association of the Republic and the Union guarantees their mutual strength and 
prestige in the world. This is why, first and foremost, the development and 
prosperity of this great ensemble is the object of our attention and our care.636 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Robert Buron (MRP), Jean-Jacques Juglas (MRP), Pierre-Henri Teitgen (MRP), Gaston Deffere 
(SFIO), Gérard Jaquet (SFIO), André Colin (MRP), and Bernard Cornut-Gentille (UNR). 
635 François Mitterrand, Présence française et abandon, (Paris: Plon, 1957), 201.  “Mais 
l’instabilité du pouvoir exécutif n’entraîna aucun changement notable dans sa politique en 
Afrique Noire.” 
636 Discours de M. Louis Jacquinot, Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer aux Journées d’Études du 
Centre des Indépendants-Paysans, ANOM,  1 AFFPOL 217, Dossier 4.  “La grandeur française 
est assurément faite de sa Métropole, Nation européenne et Nation atlantique, mais aussi de tous 
des Territoires d’Outre-Mer qui sont situés sous toutes les latitudes.  Sans eux, la France serait 
déséquilibrée, politiquement et économiquement.  L’association de la République et de l’Union 
garantit leur force mutuelle et leur prestige dans le monde.  C’est donc d’abord le développement 
et la prospérité de ce grand ensemble qui est l’objet de nos efforts et de nos soins.”   
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Further, as with the wartime French regimes, there was little discussion by leaders of the 
early Fourth Republic about the possibility of imminent colonial loss.637  As President du 
Conseil Pierre Mendès-France – no colonial hardliner himself – noted in a speech to the 
overseas territories in October 1954, France and its empire had a “common destiny” that 
would be ensured by the mutual cooperation of French citizens and subjects in the 
métropole and abroad.638 
 Despite this continuity in ideology, the Fourth Republic faced challenges that 
would change both colonial mentalities and eventual policy.  This shift was largely driven 
by an already well-developed hostility to colonialism within the international community.  
These sentiments were evident in debates within the United Nations, which now had the 
power to investigate colonial policy in overseas territories and hold colonial governments 
accountable for their perceived failures.  Adversity at the United Nations would also 
force cooperation among the colonial powers on an unprecedented scale.  Quite naturally, 
this resulted in the necessary abandonment of France’s suspicions of the United 
Kingdom.  While there was still hesitation about the motivations of the Anglo-Saxon 
power across the Channel when it came to Africa, French leaders initiated a policy of 
collaboration with Britain during this period.  Growing from its initial purpose of 
technical coordination within the colonies, by the 1950s, French, British, and eventually 
Belgian cooperation would span a wide variety of areas, including methods to best defend 
their colonial regimes before the UN General Assembly.  The hallmark of this new 
collaboration was a series of conferences held in the capitals of the three colonial powers, 
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attended by the highest-ranking figures in their respective colonial administrations.  
While occasional tensions with Great Britain simmered – most notably regarding the Ewé 
affair in Togo, and Britain’s developing relationship with the United States – the Fourth 
Republic presented an interlude in an otherwise tense dynamic of Anglo-French relations 
in Africa. 
 However, French suspicion lingered regarding the other Anglo-Saxon power, the 
United States.  While the Cold War would bring the two countries much closer together, 
the colonial question remained a source of disagreement – and particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa.  Although the United States frequently pledged its willingness to 
maintain the French empire intact, French leaders worried that American ideals about 
self-determination undermined the very foundation of the new overseas Union that 
France hoped to build.  This was evident in debates about policy before the United 
Nations General Assembly and its subcommittees, but it would also remain a 
troublesome point in a variety of other negotiations, including Marshall Plan aid and 
American military assistance in Vietnam.  French diplomats and colonial administrators 
skillfully reacted to these concerns by exploiting the one piece of leverage they had with 
the United States – the growing Cold War divide.  By the late 1940s, French leaders 
realized that they could best firm up American support for the French Union by 
emphasizing the communist threat in Africa.  They capitalized on the resulting American 
concern by presenting themselves as the natural means to preserve order and prevent 
communist infiltration on the continent. 
 Through all of this, the French administration remained confident that it would 
continue to play a vibrant and important role in Africa.  While concessions were granted, 
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and adjustments were made to international realities, French colonial officials were 
adamant that France’s presence in Africa would endure, and that it was largely welcomed 
by France’s African subjects.  As René Pleven, who held several important posts during 
the Fourth Republic noted in 1949: 
Associated states with a long historic past tend to more and more autonomy, 
greater independence, and finally full independence.  On the other hand, their 
more responsible leaders recognize that in a world like the one in which we are it 
is good not to be alone, and that the French family of nations is run in a 
democratic bon enfant manner inspired by a most genuine lack of racial prejudice.  
People in Africa who really did not belong to a nation but to a race, to a continent, 
find themselves at ease in a French way of life.639 
 
Of course, Pleven would be proven wrong by events a decade later.  But in the early 
Fourth Republic, France’s response to numerous international challenges to its empire 
provided hope that the French presence in Africa would endure for the foreseeable future. 
 
Addressing Colonial Unrest in the Early Fourth Republic 
 Like its predecessor regimes in Vichy and Free France, the Fourth Republic was 
immediately beset by colonial unrest and military threats to its overseas territories.  
Without question, the most significant of these was the beginning of the war in Vietnam.  
After the breakdown of negotiations between Ho Chi Minh and the French Provisional 
Government in 1946, the likelihood of a peaceful settlement in North Vietnam seemed 
remote.  On November 23, 1946, French naval forces commanded by colonial hardliner 
Admiral Thierry d’Argenlieu shelled Haiphong harbor, beginning the French Vietnam 
War.640  The following month, hostilities spread with the opening of a ground campaign 
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in Hanoi by French forces seeking to put a quick end to the war.  Despite initial success, 
France soon faced a determined guerilla campaign to liberate the North, and potentially 
all of Vietnam, from colonial occupation.  The war, which lasted eight years and claimed 
over 70,000 lives from citizens of the French Union, ensured that Fourth Republic 
governments would operate in an atmosphere of constant political crisis.  It also served as 
a constant reminder of the insecurity of France’s empire.  
 The outbreak of the Madagascar Revolt in 1947 made matters significantly worse.  
As previously discussed, Madagascar suffered significant devastation during World War 
II from battles between Vichy forces and a combined British-Free French effort to retake 
the island.  In the process, the conflict helped foment pro-independence nationalist 
sentiments among the Malagasy tribes on the island.  In late March 1947, they attacked 
French positions in eastern Madagascar, seeking to overthrow the French government and 
gain independence.641  Given the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, French colonial 
leaders took this threat quite seriously.  Jules Marcel de Coppet, the governor-general of 
Madagascar, quickly emphasized to Marius Moutet, Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer, 
that the Malagasy Revolt constituted “a generalized enterprise coordinated against French 
sovereignty.”642  Over the next year, French troops brutally suppressed the rebellion, 
killing tens of thousands of France’s Malagasy subjects.643  Along with Vietnam, the 
action signaled the increasing unwillingness of French leaders to tolerate any serious 
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resistance to French rule in the colonies – a policy correctly predicted by de Coppet at the 
very outbreak of the revolt.644 
 These military threats were accompanied by the rise of political consciousness 
throughout France’s overseas territories.  Independence movements had already begun to 
take shape and gain popularity in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, with the already-
mentioned riots in Setif in 1945 serving as a clear example of the potential for the 
explosion of violence.  The threat was somewhat less serious in French sub-Saharan 
Africa, although there had been sporadic outbreaks of violence in AOF immediately after 
the war, including riots in Ivory Coast.  In addition, as Tony Chafer and Fred Cooper 
have demonstrated, labor unrest became a particular concern for colonial officials, in the 
wake of a 1947-1948 railway strike in West Africa.645  These labor concerns were 
amplified by the rise of nationalism throughout France’s African territories.  As Henri 
Laurentie, now France’s representative to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, 
warned in an internal note in 1948: 
Pan-Africanism, tribal nationalism, and territorial nationalism – these three forms 
of the same xenophobia now exist with certainty in West Africa, especially on the 
Gulf of Guinea, from Côte d'Ivoire to Nigeria. The contradiction that exists 
between these various trends will not offer – to us Europeans – any relief, as all 
three are in agreement upon, and coordinate themselves around an essential point: 
the fastest possible elimination of European sovereignty, and a united Africa, or 
African republics.  Either outcome would be realized in the minds of African 
leaders at our expense.646 
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There was no question that French leaders took the threat of nationalism quite seriously; 
Laurentie emphasized in his memo that “the situation in West Africa requires an urgent 
solution.”647 
 Perhaps more worrisome for the French authorities was the assembly of pro-
autonomy political movements into the Rassamblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), 
which spanned most of France’s West African colonies.  Led by the charismatic Félix 
Houphouet-Boigny, already a member of the French National Assembly, the RDA 
declared itself a party at the Bamako Congress, in then French Soudan (now Mali) in 
October 1946.648  Although the RDA’s professed goals were to work within the French 
Union to obtain greater political rights and local autonomy, it presented numerous 
problems to French administration.  First, as a cross-territorial political party, it hindered 
French attempts to deal with pro-autonomy or independence movements on an individual, 
and therefore, more weakened basis.  More importantly, the RDA would quickly affiliate 
itself with the métropole’s PCF, signaling its initial unwillingness to deal with the SFIO 
and MRP, the parties primarily running the foreign and colonial offices. 
 With all of these events developing rapidly, the postwar Provisional Government 
realized it had a problem on its hands concerning international perception of France’s 
empire.  Given this threat, the Fourth Republic initiated a massive public relations effort 
to brighten France’s reputation around the world.  The Quai d’Orsay, the Ministère 
                                                                                                                                                 
diverses tendances ne nous sera – à nous Européens – d’aucun secours; toutes trois se rejoignent 
et se coordonneront sur un point essential: la suppression le plus rapide possible de la 
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d’Outre-Mer, the high commissioners and other prominent overseas officials all played a 
role in disseminating positive information about the French Union.  One example of this 
early effort by the Fourth Republic was a lengthy pamphlet published in 1947, “Critiques 
relatives à la politique coloniale française,” distributed by the Service d’Information 
Coloniale within the Quai d’Orsay.649  The pamphlet contained a thorough recounting of 
all criticisms of the French Union and the French civilizing mission from throughout the 
world, along with a list of talking points to counter these arguments.  It encompassed all 
relevant areas of colonial policy, including political rights and reforms, administration, 
economic policy, social reforms, and other general issues.  However, it placed its main 
emphasis on general criticisms of colonialism by the United States and U.S.S.R., who 
believed that “all colonial systems are anti-democratic in their essence, because they can 
only survive by force – the French empire in particular.”650  Consequently, the pamphlet 
highlighted the civilizing benefits of the French mission, the reforms of the Brazzaville 
Conference, and laws passed by the Provisional Government that expanded political 
rights and provided for more autonomy within the colonies.651 
 An exchange between Marius Moutet, Ministère de la France d’Outre-Mer and 
several high-ranking colonial officials is instructive of the importance of both this 
brochure and the public relations campaign to France’s continuing presence in sub-
Saharan Africa.  On September 30, 1947, Moutet wrote to René Barthès, governor-
general of AOF about the pamphlet.  Moutet emphasized that the project would “place at 
the disposition of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs throughout the world, 
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some arguments that permit them to defend our overseas project, and at the same time 
when this problem has been posed with a certain clarity and has interested the United 
Nations.”652  However, at the time of Moutet’s letter, the project lacked certain statistical 
information about AOF’s economy and political situation that could help justify the 
French imperial project within the international community.  He therefore asked that this 
information be provided as quickly as possible.653  When several territories – including 
Senegal, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, French Soudan, and Guinea – refused to do so, 
Moutet’s successor Paul Coste-Floret made sure to write the governor-general in January 
1948 to remind him of the need for information to portray France in a favorable light.654  
Such information was vital to convincing the international community concerning the 
significant progress already being made in Africa, as well as the need for France to 
continue to play a role there. 
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The Growing Threat of the United Nations 
 Of course, a campaign to counter anticolonial sentiments was especially important 
given the worsening political situation for France at the United Nations.  As chapter three 
discussed, the creation of the new international body had profound implications for the 
French colonial project, as the UN stood for a principle of self-determination that 
threatened the end of colonial empires.  Even worse for France, it enabled anticolonial-
oriented nations to gather and express their resentment for the continuing imperial 
presence of western Europeans in the developing world.  Further, working on a blank 
slate, the UN and its members were capable of completely transforming the international 
legal landscape, and redefining what constituted acceptable behavior within the 
community of nations.  The idea of binding international law had received a fresh 
mandate, given the need to prevent abuses on the scale committed by Nazi Germany 
during the Holocaust.  Consequently, the wishes of colonial powers to pursue their own 
interests were restrained by the need for a certain level of deference in the face of the 
international community. 
The two most prominent codifications of international standards were passed by 
the General Assembly in 1948 – the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR).  The former, a direct response to the Holocaust, was largely 
uncontroversial.655  However, the latter agreement, although not considered binding in 
itself on member states, nevertheless caused great concern among French colonial 
officials for its potential impact on the French Union.  Although drafted with significant 
contributions from Gaullist lawyer René Cassin, the ideals espoused by the UDHR had 
                                                 
655 An account of the drafting of the Genocide Convention can be found in Samantha Power, A 




the potential to be used as a standard to measure colonial behavior within the General 
Assembly, which could accept petitions and conduct hearings on virtually any issue.656   
Immediately after the passage of the UDHR in December 1948, French diplomats 
and colonial officials quickly realized that numerous colonial practices were not in accord 
with the UDHR’s principles.  These ranged from the availability of political freedoms to 
shortcomings in economic and social rights like education and labor.657  As indicated by 
an internal memo from the Ministère d’Outre-Mer’s office of political affairs in February 
1949, ratification of the UDHR could have a vast effect on colonial policy: 
A frank acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights raises very 
serious problems for political, cultural, and social plans, and, last but most of all, 
on our economic and financial plans, given the weakness of our resources and the 
need to resort to foreign capital in order to defend French sovereignty or interests 
in the French overseas territories, trust territories and associated states.658 
 
Consequently, during the ratification process, the head of the political affairs division 
within the Ministre d’Outre-Mer, Robert Delavignette, ordered that distribution of the 
text of the UDHR to the overseas territories be accompanied by a caveat that it was 
merely “an ideal to be attained” rather than a text immediately applicable under law.659  
But the threat posed by the UDHR to French sovereignty was minimal compared 
to work being done by General Assembly committees.  In particular, France faced 
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hostility in both the Trusteeship Council, as well as the Special Committee on 
Information from Non-Self Governing Territories.  The former committee had control 
over only those territories established as trust territories under Chapters XII and XIII of 
the UN Charter, such as French Togoland and the French Cameroons.  The Special 
Committee on Information, first established by General Assembly resolution 66 in 
December 1946, operated under the General Assembly’s Chapter XI power, which 
addressed those non-self-governing territories not covered by the trusteeship system.  
Chapter XI established duties by colonial powers to “accept as a sacred trust the 
obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security 
established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these 
territories.”660  The Committee was charged with collecting information from non-
autonomous areas for consideration by the General Assembly.  Most of France’s sub-
Saharan African territories fell under this classification. 
From France’s perspective, the problem with both of these committees was that 
non-colonial state parties sought to constantly undermine the French colonial project and 
infringe on French sovereignty.  By January 1947, the battle lines had already been 
drawn.  Out of the 54 states admitted to the United Nations at the time, only eight – 
France, Great Britain, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Netherlands, and 
Denmark – were considered reliable votes on colonial matters.661  Of the remainder, 17 of 
20 Latin American states, along with five Arab nations, were deemed “anticolonial” by 
French authorities.  Seven states in particular – India, China, the Philippines, Ethiopia, 
Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iran – were determined to vote down French colonial interests 
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in the General Assembly, with India in particular playing a key role in galvanizing 
support for anticolonial measures.662  And of course, both the Soviet Union and the 
United States espoused distinctly anticolonial views.  Given its ideology and newly-
achieved international stature, the United States was reluctant to strongly support the 
colonial powers in the early years of the United Nations.  With the development of the 
Cold War, the ongoing existence of both the French and British empires served as a 
powerful propaganda point to be used by the Soviets against the United States and its 
allies.   
 
The UN Trusteeship Council 
 This anticolonial movement was active in the initial meetings of the Trusteeship 
Council.  Comprised of both colonial and noncolonial member states, one of its 
fundamental goals was to “promote the political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development 
towards self-government or independence...”663  This was to be done in coordination 
with, and with a certain deference to, the colonial powers.  To this end, the Council was 
empowered to accept petitions, visit trust territories, and send annual questionnaires to 
administering powers for use in the Council’s regular reports.664  Led by India and the 
Soviet Union, the anticolonial nations sponsored a series of unsuccessful resolutions 
attempting to curb the power of colonial nations over trust territories.  These included 
preventing them from becoming part of an administrative or customs federation like the 
French Union, opposing the unilateral naturalization of their residents as French subjects, 
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and setting a date certain for independence, despite the wishes of the respective 
administering power.665  Of course, these proposals ran directly counter to plans France 
already had for Togoland and Cameroon, as the new constitution had specifically 
attempted to include them within the newly formed French Union.666  The anticolonial 
powers also attempted to extend the power of the Trusteeship Council over non-trust 
territories, albeit unsuccessfully.   
 One example of France’s resentment of Trusteeship Council actions was the issue 
of the Ewé peoples in southern Togo, in West Africa.667  The Ewés, who numbered 
approximately 800,000 after the war, had been scattered across colonial boundaries since 
the beginning of the European presence in West Africa.  The problem was exacerbated 
after World War I, when Togo was confiscated from Germany and placed under a joint 
British-French League of Nations mandate.  The resulting split of Togoland between 
British and French zones separated the Ewés between two different colonial 
administrations.  To make matters more complicated, a sizeable Ewé minority could be 
found in Britain’s bordering Gold Coast colony.  Before World War II, discussions had 
already begun about reuniting the Ewés under one colonial territory.  When both British 
and French Togoland were named as trust territories under the United Nations Charter, 
the issue was bound to come up once again in the Trusteeship Council. 
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The problem came to international attention after the all-Ewé conference of June 
1946 in Accra (Gold Coast), when Ewés from Gold Coast and both Togolands met to 
discuss their plans to unite in one territory drawn from both British and French Togo, 
thus forming an independent Ewé nation.668  The conference attendees agreed to “set up 
an organization to coordinate and direct the Ewé people towards bringing about the 
unification of Ewé land under a single administration.”669  The idea was immediately 
unacceptable to the French authorities there; they had no intentions of giving up 
significant parts of French territory in Africa, or of abandoning their plans to incorporate 
Togo into the French Union.  The proximity of Gold Coast and British Togoland also 
raised concerns about the aggrandizement of British power in West Africa – a scenario, 
as John Kent notes, the British scrupulously tried to avoid so as to maintain good 
relations with France.670   
But the Trusteeship Council was determined to resolve the Ewé question.  
Consequently, when the Council announced in 1947 that it would allow representatives 
from the Ewés to come to New York to personally petition for unification, it greatly 
concerned French colonial officials.  While France had accepted a certain measure of 
control over Cameroon and Togo through the establishment of the Trusteeship Council, 
its leaders had not anticipated interference on this scale so quickly.  Therefore, French 
officials moved quickly to collaborate with their British counterparts to head off any 
action taken by the council.  As a preemptive measure, the two governments promised to 
take steps “calculated to resolve, and eventually to remove the difficulties created by a 
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frontier drawn across an area inhabited by peoples of common origin...”671  The two also 
established a Consultative Council, which included representatives from the various Ewé 
factions, to discuss matters pertaining to the Ewé diaspora.  Behind the scenes, Britain 
and France agreed to form a common front in the Trusteeship Council against any 
attempts to redraw the boundaries of Togo or unite the Ewés under one land.672 
But France could not delay the work of the Trusteeship Council indefinitely.  In 
1949, Council representatives visited the area to assess the state of the Ewé peoples.  The 
visit led to Trusteeship Council Resolution 250, which ordered the expansion of the 
Consultative Committee to make it more representative of the various Ewé political 
factions, and to “ascertain the real wishes of the whole population of the two Trust 
Territories.”673  The French interpreted this as significantly interfering in their own 
affairs, as they had attempted to prevent representatives from the Comité de l’Unité 
Togolaise (CUT), a pro-independence group in French Togoland, from getting access to 
the Consultative Committee.  These actions included arrests of members of the CUT in 
the run-up to the elections to the committee in 1950.674  When the United States and other 
Trusteeship Council members proposed new elections in February 1951, French 
representatives indicated that any further election supervision or interference by the UN 
would be unacceptable.675  Later that month, French ambassador Roger Garreau strongly 
                                                 
671 Ibid., 8. 
672 Rapport au Ministre: Problème de la pétition Ewé au Conseil de Tutelle, Sept. 19, 1947, p. 1, 
ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 3284, Dossier 2. 
673 Department of State Instruction for the United States Delegation to the Eighth Session of the 
Trusteeship Council, Jan. 12, 1951.  Foreign Relations of the United States 1951, Vol. II: The 
United Nations, The Western Hemisphere (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 
522. 
674 Ibid., 523. 




emphasized to U.S. officials France’s lack of support for the work of the Trusteeship 
Council, noting that it was not “competent to deal with a question involving a change of 
political boundaries.”676 
 But the Trusteeship Council had other means of exerting pressure.  In December 
1954, through Resolutions 853 and 858, the General Assembly provided for direct 
representation on the Trusteeship Council of peoples governed under trust arrangements, 
and also allowed for hearings in the Council on petitions drawn from general public 
opinion.677  French officials saw these resolutions as further infringements on 
sovereignty, as the Trust arrangements had specifically designated the administering 
powers as responsible for political affairs.678  The resolutions also further inflamed 
sentiments in favor of autonomy for the Ewés.  Trusteeship Council representatives now 
threatened to re-unite Togo under one flag, and possibly annex it to the Gold Coast so as 
to create one Ewé state.679  Given this possibility, France was forced to support a separate 
proposal to incorporate British Togo into Gold Coast (forming the eventual state of 
Ghana), thus allowing France to maintain control over a separate French Togo.680  As 
French officials reasoned, it was better to risk the expansion of British power in the 
region than to sacrifice France’s presence there altogether.   Of course, France’s defiance 
of the Trusteeship Council was only a pyrrhic victory, as French Togo would soon gain 
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its independence.  And Togo was just one of many battles remaining to be fought in the 
General Assembly. 
 
The Special Committee on Information 
 From France’s perspective, the Trusteeship Council at least had the virtue of 
having its power relatively limited by the UN Charter.  More problematic for France’s 
Africa policy was the ongoing work of the Special Committee for Information from Non-
Self Governing Territories.  The committee was established by the General Assembly 
under Article 73 of the Charter, which required colonial powers to “to transmit regularly 
to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security 
and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a 
technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories 
for which they are respectively responsible.”681  Committee membership was split 
between colonial (or administering) member states, and eight states elected by the 
General Assembly – most of which were distinctly anticolonial.   
In its early meetings, the Committee claimed no additional authority over colonial 
matters beyond the power allotted by the Charter itself.  But French officials openly 
worried that the Committee would eventually interfere with colonial policy.  An internal 
memo from January 1947 noted that the Special Committee “is a threat to national 
sovereignty, and our adversaries in this area will not waste any opportunity to undermine 
our sovereignty.”682  What made the Special Committee particularly dangerous was the 
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imprecise language of Chapter 11 of the Charter, as Article 73 left room for debate 
regarding how much power the Special Committee had over colonial policy.  As a 
January 1947 memo noted, this “permits anticolonialist delegations to interpret it liberally 
and also abusively, with the goal of restraining sovereign rights of colonial states, to the 
advantage of the United Nations.”683 
France’s fears about the potential for interference were quickly justified.  Almost 
immediately, three issues arose from the committee’s work – first, which territories had 
to supply information to the committee; second, what type of information was to be 
supplied; and finally, what should be done with the information, either by the UN 
Secretary-General or the General Assembly.684  Regarding territories affected, French 
officials strongly believed that despite their colonial past, overseas territories considered 
as departments of France (like Algeria) should not have to submit information to the 
Special Committee, given the extensive political reforms that had already been 
implemented.685  But it was quickly determined by the General Assembly that “non-
autonomous territories” included former colonial territories within postwar administrative 
arrangements, such as the French Union.  Consequently, Resolution 66, passed in 1946 
by the General Assembly, took note of such territories for which information had already 
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been submitted by the administering powers, including AOF, AEF, and Madagascar.686  
Regarding the type of information to be provided to the committee, U.S. representatives 
at the UN were able to prevent political information from being considered by the Special 
Committee.  But starting in 1947, the anticolonial voting bloc attempted to provide the 
Special Committee with broader powers, which would have allowed it to mandate the 
inclusion of political information in reports and make recommendations to administering 
powers in order to improve conditions in their respective territories.  Quite naturally, this 
enraged French officials, who viewed the Special Committee – and by extension the 
General Assembly – as trying to obtain the same authority over the colonies as the 
Trusteeship Council had for the Trust territories. 
 The discontent of France and other colonial powers with the Special Committee 
erupted in 1949, when the General Assembly formally proposed that its work be 
expanded.  First, the Assembly approved a plan to extend the committee for an additional 
period of three years.687  In addition, the General Assembly gave the committee further 
power to determine which territories required the submission of information under 
Article 73.  Until 1949, the colonial powers, including France, had maintained that they 
could make unilateral determinations as to whether territories had achieved self-
government, and could therefore cease supplying information to the Special Committee.  
In France’s case, this determination had already been made for nine territories, although 
it continued to submit information for AOF, AEF, and Madagascar.688  The justification 
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was that these nine territories had become part of France and already had political 
representation under the constitution of the Fourth Republic.  But the General Assembly 
made clear that such unilateral determinations would not be accepted.  Resolution 334, 
passed in December 1949, stated that “it is within the responsibility of the General 
Assembly to express its opinion on the principles which have guided or which may in the 
future guide the Members concerned in enumerating the territories for which the 
obligation exists to transmit information under Article 73.”689  More importantly, the 
resolution enabled the newly-extended Special Committee “to examine the factors which 
should be taken into account in deciding whether any territory is or is not a territory 
whose people have not yet attained a measure of self-government.”690  This latter 
provision would essentially allow the anticolonial powers, which occupied half the seats 
on the Special Committee, to determine whether the UN would exert political authority 
over colonial territories. 
Not surprisingly, the colonial powers, and particularly France, perceived this as a 
serious infringement of their sovereignty, and especially in Africa.  From France’s 
perspective, one of the main justifications for the new French Union was that it was no 
longer a traditional colonial arrangement, and instead had afforded to France’s subjects a 
measure of self-government that had not been granted by the other colonial powers to 
their own colonies.  By its action, the General Assembly essentially declared that any 
decisions made by the French authorities as to the political evolution of their African 
                                                                                                                                                 
French territories in India, and Indochina.  Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, 
Volume III: United Nations Affairs (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
1979), 1220. 





territories were invalid.  Quite naturally, this threat of further UN involvement led to 
increased coordination among the colonial powers regarding strategy before meetings of 
the Special Committee.  France, Britain, and Belgium initially threatened to withdraw if 
the mandate exceeded a year.691  They also asserted that the Special Committee had gone 
beyond the legal authority granted by the UN Charter.692  While neither of these 
arguments would have any effect on the eventual extension of the Committee’s mandate, 
French protests about U.S. unwillingness to strongly oppose the enlargement of the 
committee’s power would come up frequently in discussions between the two powers, 
and lead to more U.S. efforts to cooperate with France in advance of Special Committee 
meetings.693 
 With the aforementioned resolutions passed, by 1951, the Special Committee had 
begun discussing the factors to determine whether previously non-autonomous territories 
had become self-governing.  Its subsequent report led to General Assembly Resolution 
567, which established a tentative list of factors and invited input from administering 
states by May of the following year.694  Although France was given representation on an 
ad hoc committee to further study these factors, the creeping power of the Special 
Committee to determine colonial questions was now greatly alarming French colonial 
officials.  Therefore, these issues, along with various other UN-related questions, were 
addressed in series of talks with Britain and Belgium in 1952.  First, British and French 
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officials gathered to discuss colonial issues in March, during which both sides agreed that 
“a stage had now been reached in the relations of the Administering Powers with the 
United Nations when it was necessary to halt the growing pretentions of the United 
Nations to interfere in the internal affairs of non-self-governing territories.”695  The issue 
was also the subject of tripartite talks in Brussels that May.  Although the Belgian 
delegation tended to be more extreme in its opposition to UN initiatives, the three did 
come to agreement on a variety of issues, including a general opposition to further UN 
control over non-autonomous territories, any extension of the mandate of the Special 
Committee, and the tactical use by anticolonial powers of information provided to the 
Special Committee.696  Specifically, the three opposed any discussion of political 
questions by the Committee, the possibility of the Committee hearing petitions from non-
autonomous peoples, and the right of the Committee to send special missions to non-
autonomous territories, as the Trusteeship Council already had a right to do under the UN 
Charter.697  All three agreed that “in the case that decisions in this realm would be 
adopted, the participation of these governments in the work of the Committee would be 
placed in question.”698 
 By the following May, when the three powers resumed talks in London on 
colonial cooperation at the UN, an internal memo had noted a sharp increase in 
anticolonial mentalities in numerous General Assembly committees, including the First, 
which addressed international security issues; the Third, which focused on social and 
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cultural issues, and the Trusteeship Council.699  More worrisome for the colonial powers, 
the Special Committee had been renewed once again for an additional three-year term in 
December 1952 by General Assembly Resolution 646.700  Even worse, the General 
Assembly also passed Resolution 637, declaring “the rights of peoples and nations to 
self-determination” as a fundamental human right.701  Therefore, colonial powers were 
encouraged to voluntarily submit information to the Special Committee under its Article 
III power regarding “the extent to which the rights of peoples and nations to self-
determination is exercised by the peoples of those territories...”702    This latter resolution 
concerned the French and Belgian delegations, who agreed that the consideration of such 
political information constituted an extrajuridicial extension of the Special Committee’s 
power.  Consequently, the three powers agreed that henceforth they were willing to 
cooperate with the Special Committee to the extent that it was empowered by the Charter, 
but not with any General Assembly resolutions that further extended its mandate – 
especially the submission of political information encouraged by Resolution 637.703  
Essentially, the General Assembly’s actions had convinced the colonial powers to 
consider a policy of noncooperation with UN institutions – a practice that would have 
been unthinkable immediately after the war.  By 1954, Belgium had pulled its support 
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from the Special Committee, and French officials were at least strongly considering the 
possibility of doing so as well.704 
 
Cooperation with the United Kingdom and Belgium 
 While the actions of the General Assembly led to further cooperation among 
European powers in colonial matters, this collaboration had already been well underway.  
As previously discussed, underscoring French colonial policy during the war was a 
distinct suspicion of British intentions for France’s African colonies.  This would 
continue during the Fourth Republic, but in a significantly diminished form.  Part of this 
ebb can be attributed to the end of the Vichy regime, which despised Britain for reasons 
that went beyond colonial rivalries.  De Gaulle’s exile from power also helped, as he had 
viewed Britain as an obstacle to France regaining her international prestige.  With such 
ideological leaders out of the way, both sides could focus on practical issues that united 
the two nations.  This cooperation could be traced to two areas.  First, France and Britain 
initiated an unprecedented effort to coordinate their technical efforts in sub-Saharan 
Africa in a variety of areas, including education, public health, agriculture and labor.  
Eventually, technical cooperation facilitated awareness of the need to collaborate on 
political problems, both within the colonies and in the international arena.  By the late 
1940s, Britain and France were sharing information on independence movements and the 
threat of communism within their African colonies.  As already seen in the case of the 
Special Committee, this initial cooperation would lead to a more aggressive push by 
France to better coordinate strategy at the United Nations.   
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Anglo-French colonial collaboration had its roots in the final stages of the war.  In 
early 1944, Free France established a French liaison in Accra, Gold Coast to improve 
relations between the French Ministry of Colonies and British administration in West 
Africa.  Upon taking his post, the liaison René Clap indicated to the resident British 
minister that “the cause of the African continent cannot be defended nor won by a single 
power,” and urged British and French solidarity.705  At the time, René Pleven had 
emphasized to Clap the need to better understand what influence the Americans were 
having over the British in Africa, and what interest the Americans had in British 
territories and the continent in general.706  Most importantly, Pleven hoped to forge an 
alliance of interests between the two powers on the African question.   
Broader collaboration had been hindered by the exigencies of the war and 
disagreement with Free France over Lebanon and Syria.707  However, a breakthrough 
occurred in November 1945, when talks were held in London between representatives of 
the respective colonial ministries.  The initial purpose of the collaboration was to 
“harmonize the development of diverse African regions.”708  According to an internal 
Provisional Government memo, these initial talks were “extremely favorable.”709  By 
January 1946, the relationship had developed into what the new Minister of Colonies 
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Jacques Soustelle indicated was a “steady and active cooperation.”710  This included 
collaboration on public health measures, agriculture, education, implementation of a 
legislative regime, and labor protections.711  In June, the two agreed to extensive sharing 
of political information in West Africa.712   
But France hoped to move beyond these technical matters toward a more wide-
ranging relationship, based on common international interests.  Increased collaboration 
with the British could provide stability in West Africa and increased legitimacy for 
France’s imperial project in the international community.  In his instructions to the 
governor-general of AOF about cooperating with the British, Soustelle emphasized that 
“it is ultimately the extent to which we achieve this goal that we will be successful in 
convincing the world that France and Britain... intend to serve the African, and not make 
him a plaything at the bidding of world politics.”713  For its part, Britain was initially 
reluctant to extend collaboration in Africa beyond technical issues.  As John Kent notes, 
for Britain, “cooperation in Africa was important only for its general contribution to the 
preservation of good Anglo-French and Anglo-Belgian relations.”714  But the possibility 
of UN interference would lead Britain to consider a broader cooperation.  To be sure, the 
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impetus for this cooperation came largely from the French side.  In January 1947, René 
Massigli, French ambassador to Great Britain, wrote to Georges Bidault, then foreign 
minister, to warn of an increasingly hostile atmosphere at the General Assembly, and that 
it would be prudent “to examine in advance and together the line of defense that we 
intend to adopt.”715  By the first session of the Trusteeship Council in May 1947, a 
vigorous cooperation on UN policy between Britain and France was well underway, 
especially in light of the Council’s clear attempts to settle the question of the Ewés in 
Togoland, against both French and British wishes.716   
 The expanded Anglo-French collaboration led to the inclusion of Belgium in the 
cooperative arrangement, as the latter still controlled the Congo in Central Africa.  As 
Massigli noted to Bidault in February 1947, such collaboration would allow for better 
technical cooperation in Africa, and “will eventually permit us to respond to certain 
criticisms of the colonial powers.”717  While collaboration would not entirely prevent 
continued anticolonial criticisms, it could nevertheless enable “a defense that our 
representatives at the United Nations will be able to present.”718  A tripartite conference 
in Paris in May 1947 cemented the growing colonial relationship between the three, with 
extensive discussions held on the possibility of better technical cooperation, as well as 
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common problems faced before the UN.719  In the technical field, the three powers 
considered the establishment of a trilateral committee for coordination, by which each of 
the three colonial powers would designate a representative to liaison with their 
counterparts and centrally organize all technical collaboration.720  Regarding the United 
Nations, the main concerns were the encroachment by the General Assembly in the 
internal affairs of the colonial nations, especially regarding the work of the Special 
Committee and the Economic and Social Council.721  In June of 1949, the three powers 
met again in Brussels, where they discussed an even greater range of colonial issues.722 
 This collaboration would eventually expand to a six-power effort to pool technical 
efforts on the continent, the Combined Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa 
South of the Sahara (CCTA).723  As early as 1946, the idea of an intergovernmental 
coordinating body had been discussed.  But the three colonial powers were especially 
motivated by President Harry Truman’s January 1949 inaugural speech, which proposed 
a higher level of international aid to Africa in technical matters from both the United 
States and the international community.724   Truman’s speech, discussed further below, 
was seen as a significant threat to France’s colonial sovereignty on the continent.  His 
suggestion of more international aid presented the possibility of foreign interference in an 
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area France considered part of its exclusive purview.725  As noted by Ministère des 
Affaires Étrangères Robert Schuman in April 1949, American action also threatened the 
central purpose for technical collaboration on the continent – to justify the continuing 
presence of the colonial powers and thereby prevent international interference: 
As you know, all the efforts of European colonial powers since the end of the war 
have tended specifically to organize technical, administrative and economic 
cooperation in the overseas territories.  This has rendered useless the direct 
intervention of international organizations ... This effort is beginning to bear fruit 
in Africa, where it has led to a real sharing of the scientific and technical 
capabilities of the colonial powers. It would obviously be difficult to change this 
policy by accepting the direct meddling of international organizations, in which 
elements unfavorable to the work of the European powers in the underdeveloped 
territories take part..726 
 
Truman’s speech galvanized French efforts to harmonize technical cooperation in 
Africa.  As Bidault emphasized to Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer Paul Coste-Floret 
in February 1949, France had to expand its cooperation with Britain and Belgium so as to 
increase efficiency and possibly preempt a significant campaign of international 
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interference in France’s colonies in Africa.727  British minutes of the Anglo-French 
colonial discussions of April 1949 noted that “[t]he French were very strongly of the 
opinion that the technical knowledge and experience of the principal Colonial Powers in 
Africa were such that of they could be pooled, or brought together in some way, it would 
be seen that no other body of persons or organisation could really compare with them.”728  
That April, Schuman wrote to Coste-Floret, emphasizing that, in light of various aid 
projects being prepared by the UN, France had to “take measures in view of limiting to 
the best extent the intrusions that more and more mark our African territories, by 
organizations whose goals are never disinterested or limited to technical matters.”729  An 
internal memo written for Coste-Floret added that the committee’s first goal was to use 
“all efforts that are within its power to raise up the standard of living of the people of 
West Africa, in a way that tends to rapidly restore the standing of Europeans.”730  Given 
Truman’s speech, a separate memo from May 1949 indicated that “the urgency of 
establishing an organization [for technical cooperation], even if only temporary, is 
extreme.”731   
The idea for the CCTA grew out of joint Anglo-French colonial talks held in both 
June 1948 and May 1949.  The Commission, which met for the first time in London in 
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September 1949, included France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Portugal, South 
Rhodesia, and South Africa.  It contained technical bureaus capable of responding to 
regional problems; a Secretary-General to coordinate the work of the technical bureaus 
and serve as an intermediary between the respective governments and international 
organizations; and an intergovernmental committee to coordinate policy for African 
governments in matters of technical cooperation.732  However, while the CCTA 
sponsored technical conferences throughout the 1950s, John Kent notes that very few 
reforms ultimately came out of its work.  This further demonstrates its nature as an 
organization primarily meant to combat international interference rather than develop the 
continent.733  As Kent notes, “[t]he CCTA illustrated, not the virtues of meeting 
important African needs, but the necessity of attempting to preserve an exclusive but 
increasingly ineffective colonial mission in Africa.”734 
 France continued to cooperate with Britain through the CCTA and bilateral talks.  
For the next several years, the level of collaboration between the two in West Africa 
remained vibrant, including visits to each other’s respective territories, personnel 
exchanges, and joint research and education.735  Nevertheless, sources of tension 
remained in the relationship.  Given Britain’s strong relationship with the United States, 
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French officials often wondered if they could trust that Britain would honor its 
commitments to France should they conflict with the wishes of American officials.  
These strains were often evident in the context of the NATO treaty, where French 
officials openly worried about whether the organization would become an “Anglo-
Saxon” dominated agreement.736    These suspicions easily transferred to joint Anglo-
French plans in Africa.  As the two sides debated the establishment of the eventual CCTA 
in 1949, a confidential French memo warned of “the solidarity... that exists between the 
different parts of the Anglo-Saxon world.  The British government believes it is 
indispensable to avoid giving America the impression that, by creating an organization 
for technical cooperation in Africa, that it opposes technical and economic cooperation 
proposed and sought by Washington.”737 
There was also the matter of regional African politics, given the proximity of 
British possessions in West Africa to AOF.  Political coordination was especially 
necessary now given the uneven pace of development between Britain and France’s 
colonies in West Africa.  These concerns were already evident in October 1948, when 
Henri Laurentie warned of the rise of nationalism in West Africa, and urged for even 
                                                 
736 René Pleven, then Prime Minister of the Fourth Republic, said as much to Harry Truman in a 
visit to Washington in January, 1951, noting that “the Atlantic pact must not be made to appear to 
be run by one country or by two countries... the French did not want NATO to be an Anglo-
Saxon show.”  United States Minutes of the Second Meeting Between President Truman and 
Prime Minister Pleven, Cabinet Room of the White House, Jan. 30, 1951.  Foreign Relations of 
the United States 1951, Vol. IV, Europe: Political and Economic Developments (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 324. 
737 Confidentiel, June 23, 1949, p. 1-2, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 2177, Dossier 2.  “Il faut enfin tenir 
compte de la nature et du caractère des relations avec les États-Unis d’Amérique et ici apparait la 
solidarité, de raison et d’intérêts, qui existe entre les différentes parties du monde anglo-saxon.  
Le gouvernement britannique croit donc indispensable d’éviter de donner à l’Amérique 
l’impression que l’on cherche, par la création d’une organisation de coopération technique 
interafricaine, à s’opposer à une coopération technique ou économique proposée et recherchée par 
Washington.”   
278 
 
greater cooperation with Britain on the continent.738  As Louis Jacquinot, Ministre de la 
France d’Outre-mer noted in 1951 to Robert Schuman, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 
the difference in colonial philosophies between Britain and France had potential to 
negatively impact France’s presence in Africa.739  Britain’s more rapid movement toward 
self-government in her West African territories stood in stark contrast to France’s efforts 
to reform the colonies within the context of the French Union.  Of course, a significant 
source of tension came from the aforementioned Ewé independence movement, which 
threatened to expand the territory of the increasingly autonomous Gold Coast, at the 
expense of British and French Togoland.  But more worrisome was the acceleration of 
political rights in Gold Coast and Nigeria which threatened to spill over to France’s 
territories, possibly leading to colonial instability.  These tensions would plant the seed 
for the renewed Anglo-French rivalry in West Africa during De Gaulle’s presidency and 
beyond. 
 
Relations with the United States 
 While France’s relationship with its neighbor across the channel had improved in 
the postwar era, the same could not be said for the other “Anglo-Saxon” power.  
Throughout the Fourth Republic, French leaders looked warily across the Atlantic at 
America’s intentions for France’s empire, and wondered about the implications that 
United States policy would have for France’s international standing and influence.  These 
sentiments were largely responsive to American actions during the war; as René Pleven 
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noted to a meeting of the annual meeting for the Anti-Slavery Society in July 1949, “the 
Atlantic Charter, its Article Three, and the widespread propaganda broadcast through so 
many American channels on the emancipation of colonial peoples” had played a large 
role in forcing the French to grant wartime colonial concessions they may not have 
otherwise been ready to make.740  Of course, these resentments should not be overstated; 
France readily participated in the Marshall Plan, and gladly accepted American military 
and financial aid for the war in Vietnam.  But postwar leadership was well aware of the 
potential for American interference in Africa – stemming from both American military 
and economic interests there, as well as America’s general support for self-determination 
and autonomy throughout the world. 
 In terms of the diplomatic relationship between the two countries, one negative 
dynamic no longer existed – the prickly relationship during the war between Roosevelt 
and De Gaulle.  With Roosevelt’s death and De Gaulle’s departure from government in 
January 1946, leaders from both sides could reset the relationship between the two 
nations.  By all accounts, this was the case in many areas, especially regarding Marshall 
aid, and eventually (although not initially), allied cooperation in the occupied zones of 
Germany.   U.S. leaders also repeatedly emphasized to French representatives that the 
United States had no intention of breaking up the French empire.  But with the dawning 
of the Cold War, French leaders worried about whether the United States would protect 
the continent from the potential threat of the Soviet Union.  This danger was heightened 
when the Fourth Republic declared its allegiance to the West by expelling the PCF from 
the government in May 1947.  The following January, the concern was still very much 
present, as Georges Bidault, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, told American 
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representatives that France worried that “in the event of a war with Soviet Russia the 
United States does not plan to defend Western Europe but will abandon this area to the 
Soviets.”741  Of course, such fears may have been exaggerated by the French delegation 
so as to secure American aid, but there were nevertheless genuine concerns at the time 
concerning the possibility of American duplicity. 
In addition, Roosevelt’s death did not spell the end of American idealism and its 
potential impact on the French empire.  To be sure, Harry Truman’s main foreign policy 
concern was the spread of communism, and not the continued existence of European 
colonial regimes.  French leaders found both Truman and his subordinates more 
pragmatic than Roosevelt when it came to colonial matters.  Emile Naggiar, France’s 
representative to the United Nations, indicated in a 1947 memo to Léon Blum that 
American policy had evolved since Truman’s ascension to the presidency.  Although the 
United States continued to support independence movements in developing nations, it 
was no longer “at the head of the movement” and was playing a more moderate role in 
colonial discussions.742  Had Roosevelt survived the war, this would almost certainly not 
have been the case, as he wished to break up the French empire.  In contrast, with 
Truman, the French colonial administration believed that they had a man they could deal 
with. 
However, Truman was unwilling to completely ignore the inherent problems of 
colonialism.  With the growing Cold War, American actions had to match the rhetoric of 
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American leaders.  Consequently, Truman paid occasional tribute to the need for the 
colonial world to eventually transition to self-determination and independence.  These 
sentiments caused great concern among French leaders and occasionally strained the 
relationship between the two in the years immediately after the war.  As already 
discussed, nowhere was this fear more evident than in the French reaction to Truman’s 
inaugural address, given on January 20, 1949.  While the speech is most famous for 
Truman’s pledge to oppose communism, it also set forth a four point program for “peace 
and freedom” throughout the world.743  The first three points – support the United 
Nations, continue programs for economic recovery in Europe, and establish a collective 
defense arrangement (the eventual NATO agreement) – were relatively uncontroversial 
among French officials.  But the fourth point, upon which Truman focused the most time 
in his speech, caused significant concern within French colonial circles.  Truman 
promised to commit the United States to “a bold new program for making the benefits of 
our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth 
of underdeveloped areas.”744  And, he emphasized, such a program would be coordinated 
at the international level for the strict benefit of those less fortunate in the 
underdeveloped world. 
Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, 
to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more 
mechanical power to lighten their burdens.  We invite other countries to pool their 
technological resources in this undertaking. Their contributions will be warmly 
welcomed. This should be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work 
together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies whenever 
practicable. It must be a worldwide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty, 
and freedom.745 
                                                 







In introducing this program, Truman put the colonial powers on clear notice that he 
would not allow conceptions of entitlement or sovereignty to interfere; he emphasized 
that “[t]he old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our 
plans.”746 
 As already noted, French leaders saw the amelioration of living conditions within 
their own overseas territories as the direct duty and responsibility of the French empire, 
and not of any foreign power or international organization.   In addition to the 
aforementioned CCTA, France was already expending significant development funds in 
Africa through the Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social 
(FIDES) project.747  Not surprisingly, French diplomats and colonial officials reacted 
with alarm to Truman’s address.  On January 30, Robert Schuman, Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères, wrote to the French ambassador in Washington, noting that Truman’s speech 
had “considerable interest” for France.748 Although Truman’s suggestions were of a very 
general nature; there was nevertheless significant cause for concern, as they could have 
direct repercussions on France’s territories in Africa.  Schuman repeated this concern in a 
letter to Paul Coste-Floret a few days later.749  American efforts could also inspire the 
United Nations to initiate its own program of development on the continent.  As an 
internal memo from February 10 warned, “the intervention of the United Nations in an 
implementation of a development program concerning colonial territories will by nature 
facilitate certain interferences on the part of those UN members hostile to the colonial 
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powers.”750  Consequently, there had to be a coordinated response to the new American 
threat to France’s colonies in Africa.751   
 To make matters worse, Truman’s speech came at a time when French diplomats 
and colonial officials were becoming increasingly frustrated with American actions at the 
United Nations – specifically within the aforementioned Trusteeship Council and Special 
Committee of the General Assembly.  During the early years at the United Nations, the 
United States either sponsored or failed to defeat a number of General Assembly 
resolution that were either staunchly anticolonial in nature, or threatened to undermine 
the control of administering states over their respective colonial territories.  French 
leaders viewed the United States as unwilling to consistently act as a strong ally in the 
face of sharp anticolonial sentiment.  This discontent was made clear in November 1949, 
when members of the U.S. and French delegations to the United Nations met in New 
York, with the French representative complaining that Americans “were making great 
efforts to strengthen France and the countries of Western Europe and at the same time 
pursuing these other policies in the dependent areas field which had the effect of 
weakening the potential of France.”752 
These frustrations led to tripartite talks in London between France, Britain, and 
the United States in London in May 1950.  Initiated at the behest of U.S. Secretary of 
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State Dean Acheson that January, the conference was seen as an opportunity to clarify the 
American position on colonialism, and for the other two powers to provide information 
on the progress they had made in their African colonies since the end of the war.753  
French leaders went to the conference hoping to win American favor for French colonial 
policy and French interests at the UN.  But they realized that they had a weak hand to 
play, given the deep anticolonial feeling within the American population, as well as the 
reliance on American aid by numerous countries in West Africa.754  As a preparatory 
internal memo noted, the difficulty lay in strongly asserting French interests without 
alienating the United States from France: 
The problem today consists of conserving the initiative and authority in Africa for 
ourselves, without having to share them, in fact, with the United States. If we 
demonstrate to the Americans the inflexibility of the French Union, we will lose 
not only their support in the UN, but we will also convince them the idea of the 
French Union is inadequate and worthless in the current environment, which 
would therefore convince them to infringe upon it. It's their secret inclination; we 
would only increase their temptations and appeal to their enterprises.755 
 
Consequently, France made certain concessions to the United States at the talks.  French 
officials were willing to grant increased economic access to their territories to United 
States commercial interests.  They were also willing to promise that no further European 
immigration to French African territories would be allowed.  But they insisted that their 
sovereignty in their African territories was inviolable.756  In exchange for concessions, 
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French officials wanted less interference from the United States, as well as increased 
American support in the UN against demagogic anticolonial measures.  As one French 
representative noted, “it was important to prevent the progress of African peoples being 
retarded or diverted by interference from irresponsible and possibly malevolent critics in 
the United Nations or elsewhere.”757  Overall, the French delegation at the London talks 
emphasized that French Africa had to be provided the space and time to allow for 
political and economic progress to develop.758  For their part, United States leaders 
reasserted their desire for increased economic access to Africa, and pledged support for 
French and British attempts to lead their territories toward a measure of self-
government.759  They also promised a better coordination of Africa policy and further 
study of previous and current U.S. policy on colonial matters within the UN. 
 The May talks would lead to additional discussions between American and 
French officials.  In July, Henri Laurentie, now a member of the French delegation on the 
UN Trusteeship Council, along with French ambassador Henri Bonnet and other French 
officials, met in Washington with George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, and Secretary of State for UN Affairs 
John D. Hickerson.  In a meeting on July 11, Laurentie reaffirmed France’s strong belief 
that “we do not recognize at the United Nations any right of competence in matters 
concerning nonautonomous territories.”760  Hickerson reiterated the American position 
that it would be preferable for colonial territories to gain their independence, and added 
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that general sentiment in the United States stood in favor of anticolonial movements.  
Nevertheless, he supported France’s right to make decisions about its own colonial 
possessions, especially in the face of any potential interference by the UN.761   At a 
meeting on July 13, sensing French concerns about the overall U.S. orientation toward 
Africa, McGhee assured Laurentie that the United States had no interest in breaking up 
the French empire, either in North Africa or anywhere else.762  Hickerson later pledged to 
better support France in the General Assembly and in the Trusteeship Council.763   
The meetings temporarily reassured French officials about future American 
actions at the UN.  On July 18, foreign minister Robert Schuman wrote to François 
Mitterrand, Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer, to tell him that “the Americans now 
realize the mistakes they made during the last session of the General Assembly, and 
understand the importance of our concerns, to which they will now be more attentive.”764  
Bonnet, who had attended the meetings, followed up in a memo to Schuman the 
following day, giving his impression that the United States now understood that 
encouraging nationalist independence movements was not the best way to maintain order 
in Africa.765  Although the relationship in the UN between the two powers would ebb and 
flow throughout the decade due to a variety of issues, the mini-crisis of 1950 would 
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convince American diplomats that they were better served by attempting to coordinate 
UN issues with France.  This coordination would continue throughout the Fourth 
Republic, as seen in a series of talks between the two sides in October 1951, which 
focused on the Trusteeship Council, the Special Committee, and evaluation of non-self-
governing territories, among other key questions.766  By that point, French leaders had 
successfully integrated a new strategy into their dealings with the United States on 
colonial matters – emphasizing the threat to Africa from the Soviet Union and 
communism. 
 
The United States and the Fear of Communism in Africa 
 In their efforts to convince American leaders to better support the French empire, 
French officials were also able to take advantage of growing Cold War tensions.  They 
identified an “American paradox” whereby the United States was torn between its 
alliance with France and Britain and its deep-rooted anticolonial tradition.  The only way 
to solve this paradox was to find some other impetus for a shift in American policy on the 
continent.  As a key Cold War partner, France understood American fears about the 
potential for violent revolt in Africa and the possibility for the resulting spread of 
communism. As a July 1950 internal memo from the Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer 
indicated, “the United States certainly understands how the religious fervor for 
independence expressed by certain powers, especially by those who keep fresh the 
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memories of the colonial era, could create an anarchic situation in Africa – a 
fragmentation or 'Balkinisation' – that would be extremely dangerous for world peace.”767   
Consequently, French diplomats constantly emphasized the threat of the Soviet 
Union and local communist parties to France’s hold on its empire in North and sub-
Saharan Africa.  France could therefore justify its continuing presence on the continent as 
a bulwark against the spread of communism, at a time when the United States was 
already deeply concerned about the threat to Western Europe.  A communist takeover of 
French Africa could also undermine the Fourth Republic and plunge France into political 
chaos, paving the way for communist takeover in the métropole.  Of course, this strategy 
was simultaneously used to great effect in convincing the United States to support French 
efforts to pacify North Vietnam – as illustrated by Prime Minister René Pleven’s visit to 
the United States and Harry Truman in 1951, when he compared French efforts in 
Vietnam to the United States’ ongoing struggle in Korea.768 
 To be sure, there were genuine reasons to fear the spread of communism in 
Africa.  As previously discussed, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, affiliated 
with the mainland communist party, had formed in 1946 and already enjoyed great 
support throughout West Africa.769  An internal memo from 1950 indicated great concern 
that the RDA was closely coordinating its policy with the PCF, and had already recruited 
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hundreds of thousands of members in West Africa.770  To make matters worse, the PCF 
frequently attacked the government’s colonial policies, with a rousing speech by PCF 
leader Maurice Thorez in Paris in December 1949 standing as one of the clearest 
examples.771  And in the international realm, the Soviet Union frequently used 
anticolonial propaganda to great effect in the United Nations and at home against the 
western alliance.  As the French ambassador to Moscow Yves Chataigneau reported, one 
such vigorous campaign was well underway in the Moscow press in March 1950, largely 
directed against French policy in Africa.772  The intensity of this campaign – which 
attacked individual colonial administrators, accused the French of orchestrating 
massacres, and suggested that Africans would not obtain full rights until independence – 
revealed “the particular importance reserved by the Soviet press for Africa, and 
particularly black Africa.”773  Nevertheless, Chataigneau noted that this threat could be 
turned to France’s advantage, as it could “bring the attention of the State Department to 
the overall manifestation of Soviet propaganda toward the French Union, thus adding to 
their support in our favor.”774 
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 But while American officials were periodically concerned with the possibility of 
communist incursion into Africa, this threat was not considered nearly as serious as the 
threat to Europe or Asia.  Therefore, France made sure to remind the United States at 
every possible opportunity that its presence in Africa represented stability against the 
communist threat.  Indicative of this was French reaction in 1950 to a speech by George 
McGhee, who had just completed an extensive trip to Africa that had taken him to 
Mozambique, Liberia, South Africa, Belgian Congo, Rhodesia, Kenya, and Ethiopia – 
but notably, to nowhere in the French empire.775  In his speech, given on May 8, 1950 in 
Oklahoma City to the Foreign Policy Association, McGhee professed the United States’ 
dedication to seeing countries in the developing world gain autonomy and self-
government.776  While he noted that the United States needed to pay more attention to 
sub-Saharan Africa, he emphasized that “it is gratifying to be able to single out a region 
of 10 million square miles in which no significant inroads have been made by 
communism.”777  Indeed, in McGhee’s estimation, communist forces had met “failure” in 
their efforts to recruit local populations to their cause.  But this lack of communist 
penetration did not mean that the United States could ignore Africa in the future.  The 
U.S. had to maintain a larger presence on the continent to head off the dangers of 
communist aggression.  Overall, McGhee argued, “[w]e must play, in cooperation with 
others, the part which our position in the world requires that we play.”778  This meant 
supporting political movements for progressive development and self-government; 
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strengthening relationships between the colonial powers and the territories; increasing 
commercial trade between the United States and Africa, and facilitating the entry of 
African nations into the international community.779   
The seeming lack of concern by the United States about the active threat of 
communism greatly worried French officials.  At the aforementioned tripartite talks in 
London in May 1950, French officials made sure to highlight to U.S. officials that “our 
country protects all free nations [in Africa] against the expansion of communism.  
France’s presence in the overseas territories, is from this point of view, the best of 
guarantees.”780  Hindering France’s efforts in Africa could only lead to “anarchy.”781  On 
June 7, Jean Letorneau, then Minister for Overseas Territories, wrote to Schuman to 
inform him of McGhee’s remarks.  After emphasizing the real threat of communism to 
French Africa – both through the actions of local parties and through the influence of the 
PCF and Moscow – Letorneau petitioned Schuman to provide information to the United 
States government that would make the communist threat to Africa clear.782  On June 16, 
Schuman responded that he had already done so; he had provided to Henri Bonnet, the 
French ambassador to Washington, “a voluminous dossier concerning communist 
penetration in Africa, urging him to use it to convince Americans of the seriousness of 
the situation in the dark continent which, while not as grave as the situation of territories 
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in the Far East, could, if approached with too much optimism, present surprises.”783  The 
information included an overview of the development of communist movements in 
Africa since 1945, a description of the RDA’s loose affiliation with the communist party, 
and a list of African communist leaders.784  In a follow-up meeting with McGhee and 
numerous French officials from both the colonial and foreign offices that September, Guy 
de la Tournelle, director of the political affairs division of the Ministre des Affairs 
Étrangères, warned McGhee of the interest of international communism in Africa.  The 
best way to combat it, he argued, was to “persuade the native groups (a) that their 
aspirations for self-government be realized within the framework of the French Union, 
and (b) that their best interests, materially and otherwise, lie in close cooperation with 
France.”785 
The French effort seems to have made inroads with American diplomats.  
Although a December 1950 internal State Department paper dismissed the general 
penetration of communism in Africa, it nevertheless warned that “French West Africa is 
the weakest spot.  Conditions exist throughout ‘Black’ Africa which would play into the 
hands of Communist agitators.”786  A dispatch from the U.S. consul general at Dakar the 
following January also alluded to the growing communist threat, and approvingly noted 
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the efforts of French officials to contain its spread and limit the growth of the communist-
supporting RDA.787  By April of that year, the State Department’s Office of African 
Affairs seemed to have gotten the message, emphasizing the threat of the Soviet Union to 
the American consul general in Dakar: 
No one should doubt for a moment that the Soviet directorate is unaware of the 
importance of Africa to the Free World.  Since an aggressor usually gains 
advantages by initiative, we must constantly be on the lookout for the Soviets to 
accelerate their efforts to weaken Free World prestige and control in Africa, with 
the objective of ultimately including African territories and countries in the Soviet 
bloc.  We must never forget that anti-colonial feeling in certain African territories 
constitutes a formidable problem for the Free World because all of the Colonial 
Governments are aligned on the side of the Free World.  Such a condition 
facilitates rather than militates against Soviet encroachment.788 
 
 A speech by McGhee the following June 27 at Northwestern University illustrated 
the success of the French efforts.  In his remarks, which contained a comprehensive 
examination of the problems facing Africa, McGhee now acknowledged the active threat 
of communism to the continent.  More importantly, he modified his previous statements 
on the immediate importance of self-government in Africa – precisely the compromise 
the French were looking for.  McGhee now tied the prospect of premature independence 
to the rising threat of communism: 
Immediate independence is, however, not the cure all for colonial problems.  The 
United States Government has always maintained that premature independence 
for primitive uneducated peoples can do them more harm than good and subject 
them to an exploitation by indigenous leaders, unrestrained by the civil standards 
that come with widespread education that can be just as ruthless as that of aliens.  
Also, giving full independence to peoples unprepared to meet aggression or 
subversion can endanger not only the peoples themselves but the security of the 
free world.789 
 
                                                 
787 The Consul General at Dakar (Plakias) to the Department of State, Jan. 19, 1951.  Ibid., 1213. 
788 The Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) to William D. Moreland, Consul in 
the Consulate General at Dakar, April 23, 1951.  Ibid., 1219. 
789 Editorial Note (address delivered June 27, 1951).  Ibid., 1223. 
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The following year, State Department officials further validated the link between 
premature independence and the Soviet threat to Africa.  In talks between State 
Department officials and Quai d’Orsay representatives in October 1951, the Americans 
promised to combat an increasing Soviet propaganda campaign in Africa, noting that 
“Russian imperialism is truly more dangerous than traditional colonialism.”790  This 
Russian threat to the continent was also the subject of a speech in New York on October 
31, 1951 by McGhee’s successor General Henry Byroade, who warned of the dangers of 
rapid decolonization.  Byroade emphasized a new form of colonialism, more menacing 
than the traditional form that had plagued the third world – “the new Soviet colonialism” 
– under which millions of people around the world were already suffering.791   
Essentially, like the situation in Vietnam, the United States had now signaled that 
it was willing to compromise its principles on self-determination so long as colonial 
powers were able to contain the growing threat of communism.  This would be 
encapsulated in a new U.S. policy toward Africa in 1952, which, while emphasizing 
America’s traditional anticolonial past, nevertheless called for a more nuanced approach 
to independence in Africa, given “new factors” such as the rise of nationalist movements, 
the spread of communism on the continent, reforms by the colonial powers, and the 
attempts by the UN to gain further control over the colonial situation.792  Byroade made 
the new position clear on October 30, 1953, in a speech before the World Affairs Council 
in California.  Referring to the “new Soviet colonialism,” Byroade indicated that Soviet 
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support for African nationalist movements “is more subtle and more poisonous than the 
old [colonialism], because it often masquerades under the guise of nationalism itself...”793  
Given this new threat, the choice was clear: it was better to support the imperfect project 
of the colonial powers, than to allow these nations to fall prey to communism.  French 
ambassador to the United States Henri Bonnet was very pleased with this shift, later 
noting that Byroade’s statements on the French presence in Africa “allow us to take stock 
of the progress made in recent years” concerning the evolution of American policy.794   
However, these concessions from the United States on Africa policy could not 
completely allay French suspicions.  Even McGhee’s 1951 speech at Northwestern, 
which constituted a policy reversal in France’s favor, enraged French colonial officials on 
several fronts.  First, McGhee had overstepped his bounds by presuming to speak for 
parts of Africa already controlled by France.  An internal memo written to Ministre de la 
France d’Outre-Mer François Mitterrand that July noted that the United States seemed to 
have no understanding of the constitutional structure of the French Union and its 
sovereignty over parts of Africa.795  The memo also clearly illustrated deep French 
suspicion about joint American and British intentions for the continent: 
In my view, it would be a serious mistake to think that it will be possible to 
convert Anglo-Saxon opinion to our concept of the French Union.  It remains 
fundamentally disbelieving of what comprises our fraternal and universal political 
organization. We are simply not interested in the same human problems. It is 
disappointing to think that the generosity and enthusiasm that led to the birth and 
development of the French Union are still suspected by the Anglo-Saxons!796 
 
                                                 
793 Editorial Note.  Ibid., 1167. 
794 “Les déclarations de M. Byroade nous permettent ainsi de faire le bilan des progrès accomplis 
depuis quelques années.”  Monsieur Henri Bonnet, Ambassadeur de France aux États-Unis à 
Monsieur Georges Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Nov. 1953, 1 AFFPOL 2246, 
Dossier 4. 
795 Note pour Monsieur de la France d’Outre-Mer, July 24, 1951, p. 3, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 3416. 
796 Ibid. p. 3.  Original language provided in note 1 of this chapter. 
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The memo concluded by noting that France had to be vigilant in its colonial policy, as it 
“is not only menaced from the outside by the hatred of its enemies, but also by the 
incomprehension of its friends.”797  By the following year, despite aforementioned efforts 
by the United States to better coordinate with France on colonial issues before the UN, 
French colonial officials were once again complaining about the “disappointment felt 
because of the America attitude” before the General Assembly of the United Nations.798  
Despite their Cold War alliance, the two nations remained in fundamental disagreement 
when it came to colonial matters.   
 
Conclusion 
The early years of the Fourth Republic witnessed a marked change in France’s 
colonial policy.  Largely prodded by events within the empire, France was forced to adapt 
its colonial policy in order to maintain control over its overseas territories.  While the 
granting of more autonomy to the colonies was the obvious consequence of postwar 
developments, the period also witnessed significant developments in France’s 
relationships with other world powers.  Most significantly, while still underscored by 
occasional suspicion, France’s relationship with Britain took a dramatic turn during this 
period, stemming from a significant increase in colonial cooperation between the two 
powers.  With both colonial powers threatened by independence movements and active 
hostility within the United Nations, the colonial rivalries of the prewar era were no longer 
expedient.  By the early 1950s, France had won something of a reversal of fortune for its 
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798 Projet de résolution Franco-Britannique sur la participation des habitants autochtones des 
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colonial situation.  Despite relentless efforts by anticolonial member states within the UN 
General Assembly, France and its colonial allies had managed to preserve the majority of 
their sovereignty and influence in their colonial territories.  But this period of drawing 
closer to Britain would be accompanied by even greater suspicion of the United States, 
which now threatened French sub-Saharan Africa not only with its rhetoric, but also with 
active attempts to extend American influence on the continent.   
But none of this could forestall the traumatic events to come.  In 1954, France 
would witness the fall of its colony in Vietnam, and the beginning of the tragic war in 
Algeria.  Given this disintegrating situation in Algeria, and signs of unrest in Morocco 
and Tunisia, it became apparent that France could not maintain all of its overseas 
territories.  The postwar situation had already convinced French colonial administrators 
of the necessity of sub-Saharan Africa for France’s future.  But with the growing deluge 
in Vietnam and North Africa, France increasingly turned its eyes to Africa.  At the 
inception of the Fourth Republic, Algeria and Vietnam had been the two most important 
pieces of the French empire.  By its downfall in 1958, the Fourth Republic’s colonies in 





The Fourth Republic’s Decline and the Turn to Africa, 1953-1958 
 
Paris is the authentic and necessary capital of the French Union. The African 
world has no center of gravity if it is confined to its geographical boundaries ... 
Linked to France in a political, economic and spiritual ensemble, it will surmount 
four centuries and fulfill entirely its modern role... From the Congo to the Rhine, 
one third of the nation-continent will balance itself around our métropole.799   
 
--François Mitterrand, Aux Frontières de l’Union Française, 1953 
 
Introduction 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the Fourth Republic constantly found itself 
fighting to preserve France’s empire throughout the world, from Southeast Asia to the 
Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa.  By the 1950s, this struggle had assumed two forms.  
On one hand, France became embroiled in violent insurgent campaigns in its colonies in 
Vietnam, and later in Algeria.  The level of violence employed in both colonies was 
indicative of their importance to the empire, with Algeria, and to a lesser extent Vietnam, 
containing significant settler populations that had no intention of relinquishing control 
over their respective territories.  This dynamic was self-justifying, with the traumatic loss 
of Vietnam serving as a compelling reason as to why France could not abandon its 
departments in Algeria when violence erupted there in late 1954.  France’s tenuous 
situation in North Africa would worsen two years later, when both Morocco and Tunisia 
became independent, thus relegating French power in North Africa to Algeria alone.  By 
                                                 
799 François Mitterrand, Aux frontières de l’Union Française (Paris: Julliard, 1953), 34.  “Paris est 
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this point, it had become apparent that France could not maintain all of its overseas 
territories.   
 As dramatically punctuated by the loss at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, what the 
colonial campaigns of the 1950s also made starkly apparent was that French military 
power had declined since World War II.  Prior to this, the failure of the French military in 
June of 1940 could easily be painted as an aberration, rather than the rule.  But there 
could be no denying the implications for French military power in the face of 
ignominious defeat to a less well-equipped Viet Minh force.  Throughout the final years 
of the Fourth Republic, the trend would continue at an alarming pace.  There is little 
coincidence that the Algerian rebels initiated their campaign against France just months 
after the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the resulting peace talks in Geneva; they understood 
well the writing that was already on the wall for the French empire.  To further 
exacerbate matters, just two years later, France discovered it could not count on United 
States backing when, in conjunction with Great Britain and Israel, it attempted to use 
military force to put an end to the nationalization of the Suez Canal under Egypt’s Gamal 
Abdel Nasser. 
The loss of colonial territory in Vietnam and North Africa, as well as France’s 
declining military standing throughout the world, must be considered as the backdrop for 
the decision by French leaders to place a greater emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa’s 
importance to France’s future.  Despite growing unrest – and particularly in West Africa 
– French leaders and officials in the Quai d’Orsay believed that sub-Saharan Africa could 
be kept firmly within the French orbit through a series of political and economic reforms.  
As already discussed, this process was already underway with the Brazzaville 
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Conference, and continued with the extension of political rights through the constitution 
of the Fourth Republic.  The 1956 loi cadre, a statute which relinquished métropole 
control over key state functions in Afrique Occidentale Française and Afrique 
Équatoriale Française to local governments, would later constitute a significant step in 
the political evolution of France’s subjects within the French Union.  It would seem to 
make sense to claim – as French leaders did after independence in 1960 – that these 
reforms were planned steps on the way to further autonomy and eventual decolonization.  
But Tony Chafer has recently demonstrated that virtually to the end of France’s presence 
in AOF, there were no serious plans to renounce the colonial presence in Africa anytime 
in the near future.800  On the contrary, the promulgation of the loi cadre may be 
interpreted in the opposite vein from the colonial myths propagated during the Fifth 
Republic; instead of a clear signal of coming independence, it was actually one last 
attempt to maintain French control over Africa. 
But there was more to France’s policy in Africa during the late Fourth Republic 
than a pragmatic adjustment.  Of course, the primary goal of French African policy was 
to maintain the overseas territories within the French Union in the face of the turmoil 
spreading throughout North Africa.  But as the Fourth Republic came to an end, the idea 
of France’s future on the continent evolved from one in which France would hold 
sovereignty over large parts of Africa, to a more abstract notion of continued French 
influence on the continent.  The work of Tony Chafer has provided invaluable insight into 
the development of this ideology throughout the 1950s.  As he notes, “there was a clear 
and consistently pursued government policy, during the last years of French colonial rule 
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and after, to maintain the French presence in the region.”801  But Chafer’s work focuses 
primarily on the justification of this continued relationship to the African community.  
More can be said about the development of France’s new policy among French 
politicians and colonial administrators, as they could no longer rely on perceived 
traditional and legal rights over the areas they had once colonized.  Instead, they were 
now forced to argue for the French presence on the continent in terms of the positive 
impact of French relations with Africa.  Fourth Republic politicians would also borrow a 
Gaullist concept to explain France’s future there – namely, that the relationship between 
the two was necessary for the continuance of French grandeur throughout the world. 
 Like the defense of the empire in the international arena in the early Fourth 
Republic, the new recognition of Africa’s primary importance to France’s future spanned 
political ideologies.  As discussed in the previous chapter, France’s political institutions 
teetered on the brink of collapse throughout the Fourth Republic.  Yet when it came to 
the colonial field, most of the political parties were remarkably consistent.  This dynamic 
could be seen during the 1950s, when a gradual embrace of sub-Saharan Africa could be 
observed throughout France’s political class.  This chapter does not attempt a 
comprehensive survey of these ideas, but their embodiment in the speeches and beliefs of 
key figures during the Fourth Republic – including Pierre Mendès France, Charles De 
Gaulle, and François Mitterrand – reveals that, when it came to sub-Saharan Africa, a 
fundamental shift was occurring in the face of the disastrous setbacks taking place 
throughout France’s empire.   
 This recognition by French leaders and colonial administrators – that Africa 
would play an especially heightened role in international politics – was matched by the 
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dedication of African leaders to the French colonial project. Quite simply, many African 
leaders found it in their interest during the late Fourth Republic to link themselves to the 
future of the French Union, preferring to co-exist within it than risk political gains during 
an unpredictable and potentially destabilizing independence movement.  This chapter 
concludes by discussing two of these men – Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal and Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast.  Both framed their argument for greater political 
freedom and responsibility within a larger narrative of continued French presence on the 
continent.  In doing so, they played a significant role in justifying France’s African policy 
after decolonization. 
 
France in Crisis – Vietnam, Algeria and Suez 
By 1954, the French war in Vietnam had entered its eighth year.  In the beginning 
of the year, over 50,000 soldiers from the French Union had already died in the conflict, 
with hundreds of thousands more from France’s allies in South Vietnam also perishing 
during the struggle.  The number of casualties and the gradually deteriorating political 
situation led to the increasing unpopularity of the war in the métropole.  French military 
leaders knew the war would have to be won quickly if it were to be won at all; by early 
1954, France had already begun to assemble a force of thousands French Union and 
Vietnamese troops at Dien Bien Phu in North Vietnam.  The goals were to cut off Viet 
Minh supply lines to Laos and perhaps establish a strong foothold on Ho Chi Minh’s 
territory.  But the Viet Minh would turn the tables on their French occupiers, initiating a 
siege of the French base that March.  Located deep in a valley, the French garrison at 
Dien Bien Phu found it hard to obtain supplies or add reinforcements.  On May 7, after 
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two months of grueling trench battles and heavy shelling from Viet Minh artillery, it 
collapsed.  The casualties were overwhelming; over two thousand French Union troops 
died during the battle, with thousands more wounded.  More than ten thousand prisoners 
from the French Union army were taken by the Viet Minh; over eight thousand would 
later die in captivity.  The debacle, which essentially ended the French presence in North 
Vietnam, was the biggest defeat for the French military since the fall of France to the 
Nazis in June 1940.802 
Faced with disaster, the National Assembly voted for the investiture of Pierre 
Mendès France as President du Conseil to form a government and negotiate an end to the 
war.  Peace was achieved during the summer of 1954 in Geneva, with Vietnam being 
split in two between the communist government in the north and a western-friendly 
government led by Bao Dai in the south.  But the Geneva Accords did not signal the end 
of unrest within the French Union.  On November 1, 1954, guerilla forces in Algeria, led 
by the Front de Libération National (FLN), attacked almost thirty French military and 
civilian targets, killing a handful of European settlers in the process.  While unrest had 
persisted sporadically in Algeria since the Setif riots of 1945, the overwhelming and 
concentrated attacks by the FLN represented a particularly novel and worrisome threat to 
the French presence there.  Intent on sending a signal that France would not tolerate any 
further violence within her colonies, Mendès France immediately promised a determined 
French response, with Interior Minister François Mitterrand sending troops to Algeria to 
put down the rebellion.  But with Vietnam already lost, there was no turning back the 
anticolonial tide.  By late 1954, the conflict had spread beyond the Algerian cities into the 
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countryside.  Within two years, the FLN had begun to win significant support from 
Algerians in the urban centers, necessitating the sending of paratroopers by the métropole 
to quell the unrest.  The “Battle of Algiers” – during which urban warfare and torture 
were successfully employed by French forces to crack the inner circles of the FLN 
movement – temporarily set back the cause for independence.  But by 1958, the situation 
had once again spun overwhelmingly out of control, leading to the fall of the Fourth 
Republic that May.803 
The revolt in Algeria was further polarizing because of the escalating damage it 
inflicted upon France’s international reputation.  Opinion within the United Nations 
General Assembly was starkly against France and would remain that way throughout the 
Algerian crisis.  As Bernard Cornut Gentille, France’s representative to the United 
Nations, remarked in 1956, “international opinion... both through selfish hostility from 
some directed toward us, and  profound ignorance from others, remains convinced that 
our policy is reactionary and that we always want to do nothing in Algeria.”804  Attempts 
by the UN to mediate the conflict were met with indignant protest by the French 
delegation.  Echoing French feelings about the Trusteeship Council and Special 
Committee for Information, one representative argued in October 1957 that the UN had 
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“neither the right nor the means” to regulate the ongoing conflict in North Africa.805  
Revelations of the use of torture did not help matters; the publication of Henri Alleg’s La 
Question in early 1958, which chronicled the imprisonment and torture of the author at 
the hands of French paratroopers in Algeria, was received as a shock and caused severe 
embarrassment for France.806  Even France’s allies struggled to provide support at the UN 
and in the international community.  While the American government under Dwight 
Eisenhower initially supported French policy in North Africa, opinion in the United 
States remained starkly divided, with then-Senator John F. Kennedy attempting to 
sponsor a resolution to condemn France’s actions in July 1957.807  By the end of the 
Fourth Republic in 1958, virtually the entire international community supported at least 
some form of negotiated autonomy for Algerians.   
The situation in Algeria was not the only threat to France’s empire in North 
Africa.  In Morocco, French attempts to crack down on Islamic movements and 
manipulate Moroccan leadership led to violent unrest throughout the mid-1950s.  As in 
Algeria, significant attempts were made in the United Nations to restrain France’s actions 
and force some sort of peaceful settlement, but French leaders largely rebuffed these 
efforts.  By 1956, the situation was no longer tenable, and the country was granted its 
independence.808  In Tunisia, similar unrest had led to a campaign of repression 
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beginning in 1952.  After the fall of Dien Bien Phu, and with the Algerian situation 
turning violent, the country was granted a measure of autonomy in 1954, with full 
independence following in 1956.809  With Tunisia and Morocco gone, and Algeria under 
threat from insurgents, France’s presence in North Africa had been severely weakened. 
 The ongoing crisis in North Africa serves as the best explanation for France’s 
actions during the Suez Crisis of 1956.  After several years of escalating regional tensions 
between Egypt and Britain, Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal, a key point for commercial transit in the Middle East, 
on July 26, 1956.810  The canal, which had been developed almost a century earlier by 
Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps, had been operated since by the Compagnie Universelle 
du Canal Maritime de Suez, an Egyptian-chartered company backed heavily by French 
investors.  The nationalization of the canal threatened a variety of interests in the region, 
but most notably those of Britain, which still had an extensive presence in the Middle 
East; and Israel, less than a decade removed from war and still not diplomatically 
accepted by most of Middle Eastern states.  For France’s part, its leaders were greatly 
concerned about the link between Nasser and the existing independence movements in 
North Africa.  The seizing of the canal, for some, represented the first step in a larger bid 
for dominance in the region, at the expense of the western powers. 
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The problem for all three of the aforementioned countries was that their main ally, 
the United States, had no intention of backing any action against Egypt that had the 
potential to explode into a regional conflict.  Throughout the summer of 1956, American 
officials gave clear signals to their French counterparts that the United States was 
reluctant to join in or support any military action against Nasser to end the stalemate.811  
Consequently, the crisis exacerbated tensions between France and the United States, at a 
time when French leaders were already dissatisfied with what they perceived as an 
increasing American unwillingness to support them in the United Nations on the Algerian 
question.  Christian Pineau, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères at the time, was particularly 
outspoken about his disappointment with the United States’ failure to back France 
throughout the crisis.  In a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 
New York that October, Pineau lamented the growing gulf between the two powers, 
indicating that    
French public opinion on this subject is clear.  It is noteworthy that for the first 
time, the President of the National Assembly referred to a difference between 
France and England on the one hand, and the United States on the other... We 
don’t think the United States government realizes the importance that France and 
the UK attach to Suez.  It is not merely the canal, but all the Middle East, Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia, that are involved.812 
 
Two weeks later, Pineau’s colleague Maurice Faure once again questioned the United 
States’ loyalty, noting that “this was a case where the U.S. would have to decide which of 
                                                 
811 M. Couve de Murville, Ambassadeur de France à Washington, à M. Pineau, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, July 27, 1956.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1956 Tome II (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1989), 174; M. Couve de Murville, Ambassadeur de France à Washington, 
à M. Pineau, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, July 28, 1956.  Documents Diplomatiques 
Français 1956 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1989), 179-80; Visite de M. Dulles à M. 
Pineau, Aug. 1, 1956.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1956 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1989), 208. 
812 Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Suite, New York, Oct. 5, 1956.  Foreign 




her friends she preferred the most, the countries of Western Europe or the Bandung 
[anticolonial] powers.”  Unless the United States changed its position, Faure threatened, 
the Atlantic alliance would be finished.813   
These threats were not enough to sway President Dwight Eisenhower, who 
refused to support joint Anglo-French strikes to retake the canal, and subsequently 
brought the matter to the UN Security Council.  A UN resolution called for an immediate 
cease-fire; faced with overwhelming international opposition, Britain and France quickly 
withdrew.  American action to stop France, Britain, and Israel was seen as a grave 
betrayal by French leaders.  In January, Hervé Alphand, the French ambassador to the 
United States, made clear to Pineau that the dynamic of the Franco-American relationship 
had changed irrevocably due to the incident at Suez.  “It would be erroneous and 
dangerous to think that the United States is suddenly ready to repent, that it regrets its 
attitude during the months of October and November or that it will proceed to reestablish 
the compromised positions of France and Britain in the Middle East,” Alphand warned.814  
He also emphasized that France’s international standing would be greatly affected by the 
Suez fallout, noting that “[i]t seems that the role that we have played in the Middle East, 
and the defense of our investments and our institutions, must now be conceived within a 
                                                 
813 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, Oct. 20, 1956.  Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1955-1957, Volume VXI: The Suez Crisis (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1990), 761. 
814 M. Alphand, Ambassadeur de France à Washington, à M. Pineau, Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères, Jan. 4, 1957.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1957 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1990), 39.  “Il serait erroné et dangereux de penser que les États-Unis sont pris soudain 
de repentir, qu’ils regrettent leur attitude des mois d’octobre et de novembre et qu’ils vont 
désormais s’efforcer de procéder au rétablissement des positions compromises de la France et de 
la Grande Bretagne au Moyen-Orient.”   
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framework different from the one that we have been accustomed to for quite a long 
time.”815   
 In addition to the debacle in Vietnam and the situation in North Africa and the 
Middle East, France also faced intensified opposition from the anticolonial powers.  In 
April 1955, 29 states met in Bandung, Indonesia to condemn western colonialism and 
discuss ways to cooperate in the future.  Although the conference was composed of 
primarily Asian countries, and had no representatives from France’s African colonies, it 
concerned itself greatly with issues that had great relevance to France’s empire on the 
continent.  Of particular importance was the conference’s focus on ongoing racism 
throughout the world, and especially in colonial Africa, India, Pakistan, and South 
Africa.816  The participants also sought to further empower the UN to adjudicate colonial 
disputes and curb the power of the imperial nations.  As the French ambassador to 
Indonesia – who attended the conference as a nonparticipant – observed, the attendees 
labeled colonialism “in all its manifestations as an evil that must end soon...”817  Of 
course, determined opposition from the anticolonial powers was nothing new, as France 
had learned in its dealings in the UN General Assembly in the early years of the Fourth 
Republic.  But the Bandung Conference had potential to initiate a new, more determined 
wave of anticolonialism, especially in the United States.  That August, Maurice Couve de 
Murville, then ambassador to the United States, warned Christian Pineau, Ministre des 
                                                 
815 Ibid., 39-40.  “Il semble donc que le rôle que nous avons à jouer au Proche-Orient et au 
Moyen-Orient, la défense de nos investissements et de nos établissements doivent être conçus 
comme s’inscrivant dans une cadre différent de celui auquel nous sommes habitués depuis 
longtemps.”   
816 M. Sivan, Ambassadeur de France à Djakarta, à M. Pinay, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 
April 26, 1955.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1955 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 
1987), 511. 




Affaires Étrangères, that the Bandung Conference “has incited important sectors of public 
opinion to push for a change in mentalities in this part of the world, and to return to what 
they believe to be the source of their popularity: the affirmation of an active 
anticolonialism.”818   
International cooperation aimed at undermining the French Union would soon 
spread to the newly-independent African states.  In March 1957, just days after his 
country had declared independence from Britain, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (formerly 
Gold Coast) informed the British foreign office that he intended to call a conference of all 
African independent states to discuss pan-African issues.819  The idea of the conference 
posed a threat to France; Nkrumah already had a deserved reputation as a supporter of 
African unity and a skeptic of western influence on the continent.820  That April, the 
French chargé d’affaires in London warned Christian Pineau that Nkrumah did not intend 
to limit invitations to independent countries, but instead hoped to invite representatives 
from dependent territories on the continent – including from the French Union.821  By the 
middle of the month, Libya, Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Sudan had all accepted, and there was 
                                                 
818 M. Couve de Murville, Ambassadeur de France à Washington, à M. Pinay, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, Aug. 9, 1955.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1955 Tome II (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1988), 239.  “Tout d’abord, la conférence de Bandoung... a incité 
d’importants secteurs de l’opinion à prôner la reconquête psychologique de cette partie du monde, 
en retournant à ce qu’ils croient être la source de toute popularité: l’affirmation d’un 
anticolonialisme actif.”     
819 M. De Juniac, Chargé d’affaires de France à Londres, à M. Pineau, Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères, April 11, 1957.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1957 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1990), 594. 
820 See Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2006), 17-29. 
821 M. De Juniac, Chargé d’affaires de France à Londres, à M. Pineau, Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères, April 11, 1957.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1957 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1990), 595. 
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talk of a concurrent or rival conference in Morocco.822  But Nkrumah, looking to build 
his authority in Africa, decided to forge ahead for a conference in October.  It would 
include discussions on the future of non-autonomous territories in Africa, strategies to 
preserve independence of African states, ways to develop economic and technical 
cooperation in Africa, and cultural exchanges.823  While the latter two topics posed little 
threat to France, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères Pineau made clear to his subordinates 
that France could not support any efforts by independent African nations to inquire into 
thorny issues that might impact the French Union.  He instructed French diplomats to tell 
African leaders that “in the current state of things...the initiative of Ghana does not 
appear to be appealing.”824  While Nkrumah did not extend invitations to France’s 
territories, the conferences in Accra of independent African states were nevertheless 
highly threatening to France’s interests, with the April 1958 meeting taking on a 
“violently anticolonialist character.”825  The representatives also opposed France’s 
pending nuclear tests in the Sahara and all neocolonial economic exploitation.826 
  Much like the transformation of French policy in Africa after World War II, all of 
the aforementioned events, which took place over a period of less than four years, must 
be considered when evaluating the shift in mentalities that transpired in the last years of 
the Fourth Republic.  Essentially, the fall of North Africa and the emboldening of 
                                                 
822 M. Pineau, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, aux Représentants diplomatiques de France à 
Rabat, Tunis, April 20, 1957.  Ibid., 648   
823 M. Pineau, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, aux Représentants Diplomatiques de France, July 
27, 1957.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1957 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1991), 
150-1. 
824 Ibid., 152.  “Aussi semble-t-il, dans l’état actuel des choses, nous ne puissions qu’encourager 
discrètement, dans leur réservé, les états que l’initiative du Ghana ne paraît pas enchanter.”   
825 M. De Guiringaud, Ambassadeur de France à Accra, à M. Pineau, Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères, April 16, 1958.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1958 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1992), 469. 
826 Ibid., 470 
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international anticolonial movements in the face of French weakness necessitated a new 
approach if France wished to maintain its presence in its remaining overseas territories in 
the French Union.  Nowhere was this more necessary than in Africa, which, while having 
largely avoided the types of insurgency seen in Algeria and Vietnam, nevertheless had 
the potential to explode into violence.  By the mid-1950s, French leaders from across the 
political spectrum were taking heed of the lessons of the anticolonial struggle.  The 
contributions of two of them – François Mitterrand and Pierre Mendès France – were 
particularly important in reorienting French mentalities concerning the importance of 
sub-Saharan Africa to the future of a weakened French Union. 
 
François Mitterrand and the Turn to Africa 
Since recent revelations about France’s support for the genocidal Hutu regime in 
Rwanda in the 1990s, there has been significant scrutiny of François Mitterrand’s Africa 
policy during his presidency.827  More recently, his role in the early stages of the Algerian 
War has been documented by François Malye and Benjamin Stora.828  However, there 
has been a remarkable lack of attention to Mitterrand’s ideology about Africa during his 
formative political years.  Interest in these early years was originally sparked by the 1994 
publication of Pierre Péan’s Une jeunesse française: François Mitterrand, which 
revealed Mitterrand’s role in Vichy and his subsequent – and some argue opportunistic – 
                                                 
827 See Oliver Wallis, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the Rwandan 
Genocide (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008); Daniela Kroslak, The French Betrayal of 
Rwanda (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2008); Gaspard-Hubert Lonsi Koko, Mitterrand 
l’Africain? (Paris: Egrégore, 2007); Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow 
We Will Be Killed with Our Families (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998); Gerard 
Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press 
1995). 
828 Mitterrand’s role in the Algerian War has recently been documented in François Malye and 
Benjamin Stora, François Mitterrand et la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2010). 
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political transformation.829  Mitterrand faced some of the political fallout about his Vichy 
past at the end of his life, when he was forced to address questions about his involvement 
in the Légion Française des Combattants during the war.830  It is unclear whether Vichy’s 
views on sub-Saharan Africa were known to Mitterrand or even affected him, as he spent 
much of his time in the Vichy regime as a functionary dealing with prisoners of war 
issues.  But it is fairly well-established that Mitterrand was a deeply ambiguous figure 
during this period who straddled both sides of the ideological divide during the war.  As 
David S. Bell has noted, like many others of his generation, Mitterrand was generally for 
Pétain, but against the ongoing German occupation.831  His fortune lay in moving to the 
Resistance at precisely the right time, when support for the Vichy regime was already on 
a downward trajectory.  After the war, he joined the Union Démocratique et Socialiste de 
la Résistance (UDSR), a center-right party led by Gaullist René Pleven.  As Bell notes, 
“Mitterrand was not, in writing or conversation, a political idealist, policy specialist or 
reformer with a briefcase of plans.”  Consequently, his flexibility and interpersonal skills 
“admirably suited him for the shifting, unstable alliance politics in the Assembly of the 
Fourth Republic.”832   
His flexibility also made him well-suited to steer France’s policy in Africa toward 
a new phase.  Regardless of the interpretation, it is generally agreed that Mitterrand’s 
                                                 
829 Pierre Péan, Une jeunesse française: François Mitterrand 1934-1947 (Paris: Fayard, 1994).  
Other useful biographies of Mitterrand include Jacques Attali, C’était François Mitterrand (Paris: 
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transformation from a man of the right generally supportive of Vichy, to a man of the left 
who rose to the head of the French Socialist party, made its most significant strides 
during the Fourth Republic, when he held a series of cabinet posts.833  For purposes of 
this study, of particular significance is his time as Minister of Overseas France under 
Prime Ministers René Pleven and Henri Queuille, whereby Mitterrand was given 
administrative responsibility for much of the French Union, including sub-Saharan 
Africa.  During his tenure from July 1950 to August 1951, he oversaw a significant 
transition in the métropole’s dealings with political organizations in Africa, most notably 
the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), a left-oriented party led by Ivory 
Coast’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny.  The RDA, which had gained immense popularity with 
members of the expanding working class throughout West Africa, had become a 
particular bête noir of the colonial hardliners.  The party had been associated with civil 
unrest in Africa, and had allied itself with the out-of-power communists in the French 
National Assembly.  Starting in 1949, the French administration in Ivory Coast initiated a 
series of crackdowns against the RDA after riots in February and October.  Mitterrand’s 
signature achievement was to later persuade Houphouët-Boigny to reject further dealings 
with the PCF and enter the mainstream of French politics.  While controversial at the 
time, there can be no question that it laid the groundwork for future affiliation between 
France and the nascent political movements in West Africa.   
Part of the explanation for Mitterrand’s breakthrough with the RDA was his faith 
in both the French civilizing mission, as well as the ability of Africans to incorporate the 
                                                 
833Mitterrand’s cabinet positions during the Fourth Republic included Ministre des Anciens 
Combattants et des Victimes de Guerre (Jan. – Oct. 1947, Nov. 1947 – July 1948), Ministre de la 
France d’Outre-Mer (July 1950 – July 1951), Ministre d’État, without portfolio (Jan. – Feb. 
1952), Ministre d’État, delegate to the Council of Europe (June – Sept. 1953), Ministre de 
l’Intérieur (June 1954 – Feb. 1955), and Ministre de la Justice (Feb. 1956 – May 1957). 
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lessons of their French colonizers and become productive members of the French Union.  
Consequently, he spoke frequently of France’s “universal vocation.”834  This notion went 
beyond the mere strategic implications of the Cold War.  Unlike Georges Bidault and 
others in the Quai d’Orsay who dealt directly with the United States and the Soviet 
Union, Mitterrand did not view Africa as a mere pawn of Cold War policy.  Therefore, 
linking France’s future there on the ability to combat communism undermined the very 
nature of the French colonial project.835  Instead, France needed to assume its position at 
the head of mainland Europe; as such, it had a responsibility to emphasize its 
contributions to Africa and the fundamental unity between the métropole and the 
empire.836  Mitterrand’s time in the colonial ministry, as well as his subsequent writings, 
would be fundamental to articulating a new relationship between France and Africa, in 
which a more indirect relationship between the two continents, greater autonomy by 
African nations, and a more liberal colonial policy would become the hallmarks of the 
French project in Africa.   
Mitterrand left the Overseas Ministry in August 1951, but his short tenure there 
would have a great impact on the remainder of his political life.  Mitterrand’s eventual 
application of lessons learned in the Overseas Ministry to Africa policy during his 
presidency will be discussed at greater length in the conclusion of this dissertation.  But 
in the final years of the Fourth Republic, Mitterrand wrote extensively about his tenure in 
the ministry and his views on Africa’s importance to France’s future.  The most 
significant of these contributions were two books, Aux frontiéres de l’union française, 
                                                 
834 François Mitterrand, Aux frontières de l’union française: Indochine, Tunisie (Paris: R. Julliard, 
1953), 207. 




which discussed his time in the Overseas Ministry and included some of Mitterrand’s 
personal journal entries on the subject; and Présence française et abandon, a general 
critique of traditional forms of colonialism and France’s hardline colonial lobby.  In both 
works, Mitterrand advocated for a new French colonial outlook, one that would turn 
away from Southeast Asia and other parts of the world, and focus a renewed effort on 
France’s colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
As already noted, Mitterrand’s time in the Overseas Ministry was marked by a 
policy of openness to African political parties like the RDA which objected to various 
aspects of the French colonial system.  This shift was largely inspired by Mitterrand’s 
pragmatism; he did not wish to see Africa plunge into unrest as Vietnam already had.  He 
addressed this problem in Aux frontiéres de l’union française, published in 1953.  The 
book was an impassioned reminder that France had a responsibility to safeguard its 
territories in Africa.  Like De Gaulle, Mitterrand believed that Africa ensured France’s 
continued relevance in a world divided by the Cold War: 
... France approaches the second half of the twentieth century with an intact 
African domain.  It's almost insolent!  But the victory of 1945 in fact didn’t 
present much less danger for our overseas possessions than the remote defeat of 
1940 ... While all could have predicted that the two historic conclusions of the 
world conflict would be the hegemony of the continental nations, America and 
Russia, and the fall of large colonial empires, our misfortunes during the war 
suspended the march of time, as if those people affiliated with us did not want to 
seize from our weaknesses what they waited for by our consent.  Will France 
understand that this paradoxical moment will eventually end, and that, if it is 
wasted, France will lose it forever? Already the signal is being given in 
Indochine. 837 
                                                 
837 Ibid., 21.  “...la France aborde la seconde moitié du XXe siècle avec un domaine africain 
intact.  C’en presque insolent!  La victoire associée de 1945 n’offrait en effet guère moins de 
dangers pour nos possessions d’Outre-Mer que la défaite isolée de 1940... Alors que tout laissait 
prévoir que les deux conclusions historiques du conflit mondial seraient l’hégémonie des nations 
continents, l’américaine et la russe, et la chute des vastes constructions coloniales, nos maltemps 
de la guerre ont suspendu la marche du temps comme si les peuples liés à nous n’avaient pas 
voulu arracher à nos faiblesses ce qu’ils attendent de notre consentement.  La France comprendra-
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Therefore, Mitterrand argued, France had to change the way it did business with its 
colonies.  Up to this point, French colonial efforts had only served to “restore an extinct 
system.”838  Given the ongoing war in Vietnam, as well as significant colonial unrest 
throughout the era of the Fourth Republic, it was time to reconceptualize French colonial 
policy.  One had to wonder, Mitterrand suggested, whether “it will be necessary to 
change the formulas and to annul that which we ourselves have designed in the past.”839  
As he noted, most French people tended to identify the French empire with traditional 
forms of colonialism; this enduring mentality demonstrated that France was “behind the 
times on the continent.”840 
In Mitterrand’s view, this new policy meant two things.  First, the influence of the 
hardline colonial lobby, perhaps best epitomized by men like Thierry d’Argenlieu, who 
shelled Vietnam’s Haiphong Harbor in 1946 while France was trying to negotiate a 
settlement in Paris with Ho Chi Minh, had to be significantly curtailed.  As Mitterrand 
pointed out, France’s ongoing war with Vietnam had already been very costly, resulting 
in the death of thousands of French soldiers and significant financial expenditures.841  He 
noted that in 1946, France had invested 350 million francs for modernization projects in 
Africa, compared to three billion francs spent on the war in Vietnam.842  Mitterrand had 
nothing but contempt for those who favored such policies, noting in his later book that 
“the reforms that will save France’s work overseas will never be voluntarily accepted by 
                                                                                                                                                 
t-elle que ce moment paradoxal s’achève et que, s’il est perdu, elle se perd?  Déjà le signal est 
donné en Indochine.”   
838 Ibid., 22. 
839 Ibid.  “On se demande s’il ne sera pas nécessaire de changer les formules et d’annuler ce que 
nous avons nous-mêmes conçu.”   
840 Ibid., 28.  “...en 1953, nous sommes en retard d’un continent.”   
841 Ibid., 22-24. 
842 Ibid., 24. 
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factions blinded by hate or anger.”843  Essentially, he was making an argument for a more 
indirect form of influence overseas, noting that sending men, capital, and technology 
across thousands of miles “is a mad recklessness ultimately contrary to the interests of the 
Patrie.”844 
 Perhaps more importantly, France had to realize that of all its colonial 
possessions, its holdings in Africa were the most vital to its future prestige and 
prosperity.  For Mitterrand, France had the capacity to continue this relationship because 
it had already brought so much to Africans through expanded education and broader 
political representation.  But a danger nevertheless existed, because, as he noted, “we 
have not tried to determine its future nor create its unity.”845  The restoration of more 
liberal policies, and a move away from the more repressive approach taken in Vietnam, 
could better secure Africans within the French orbit.  “When I think of the French 
Union,” Mitterrand noted, “it is Africa I think of first of all, because Asia... holds only 
deceptions for us, and the ongoing battles there prevent any meaningful progress.”846  He 
added that “Africa is looking for its future... Africa loves France and places its hopes in 
its unity, its equilibrium, and its ideal.”847  This link between the two could also insure 
France’s position as a preeminent world power: 
                                                 
843 François Mitterrand, Présence française et abandon, (Paris: Plon, 1957), 232.  “En effet, les 
réformes qui sauveront l’œuvre de la France outre-mer ne seront jamais acceptées de plein gré par 
les factions qu’aveuglent la haine ou la colère.”   
844 François Mitterrand, Aux frontières de l’union française, 23.  “d’une folle imprudence 
finalement contraire à l’intérêt de la Patrie.”   
845 “L’Union Française est en vrac.  On n’a pas essayé de déterminer son avenir ni de créer son 
unité.”  Ibid., 26. 
846 “Quand j’évoque l’Union Française, c’est à l’Afrique d’abord que je pense, car l’Asie, dans le 
cadre des accords qui nous engagent, ne nous réserve que des déceptions, et les combats qui s’y 
déroulent empêchent toute construction valable.”  Ibid., 37. 
847 Ibid., 29.  “L’Afrique cherche son avenir...l’Afrique aime la France et espère d’elle son unité, 
son équilibre, son idéal.”   
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Paris is the authentic and necessary capital of the French Union. The African 
world has no center of gravity if it is confined to its geographical boundaries ... 
Linked to France in a political, economic and spiritual ensemble, it will surmount 
four centuries and fulfill entirely its modern role... From the Congo to the Rhine, 
one third of the nation-continent will balance itself around our métropole.848 
 
Therefore, for Mitterrand, Africa was an essential part of France’s future; one could 
easily separate Vietnam or other overseas territories from the métropole, but there still 
remained an inextricable link between France and its territories in Africa.  As he noted, 
“the historical future of France passes even more surely through the Mediterranean than it 
does through the Atlantic.  France of the 21st century will be African or it will not be at 
all.”849   
The loss of Vietnam in 1954 would only sharpen Mitterrand’s sentiments about 
the pernicious role of the colonial lobby and the importance of Africa to France’s future.  
In the wake of the military defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Mitterrand’s previous predictions 
about the end of French influence in Vietnam, the increased importance of Africa, and the 
futility of heavy-handed attempts to subdue civilian populations, were all completely 
vindicated.  These subjects were addressed in his follow-up work, Presence français et 
abandon (French Presence and Its Abandonment), published in 1957.  For Mitterrand, the 
loss in Vietnam was a tragedy on the level with the invasion of France by Nazi Germany 
in 1940.  Indeed, it served as a reminder of the fragility of France’s security situation in 
the postwar order.  The book opens by noting that “when the Vietnam War started, 
France could believe that the defeat of 1940 was only one lost battle, and that the 
                                                 
848 Ibid., 34.  “Paris est l’authentique et nécessaire capitale de l’Union Française.  Le monde 
africain n’aura pas de centre de gravité, s’il se borne à ses frontières géographiques...  Lié à la 
France dans un ensemble politique, économique et spirituel, il franchira d’un coup quatre siècles 
et remplira pleinement son rôle moderne, à la fois original et complémentaire.  Du Congo au 
Rhin, la troisième nation-continent s’équilibrera autour de notre métropole.”   
849 Ibid., 170.  “l’avenir historique de la France passe plus sûrement par la Méditerranée que par 
l’Atlantique.  La France du XXIe siècle sera africaine ou ne sera pas.”   
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armistice of 1945 had restored its power at the same time as its glory.”850  But Dien Bien 
Phu had shattered these illusions.  Consequently, the book advocated France’s continuing 
presence in Africa and the need for less oppressive means to ensure its continued 
existence within the French orbit. 
For Mitterrand, after the fall of Vietnam, France had to work harder to maintain 
its remaining overseas territories, and especially those in Africa.  He lamented that 
“mired in the Indochine war, France hesitated to define her purpose in Tunisia and 
Morocco, and she completely ignored Black Africa.”851  During this period of neglect, 
Mitterrand noted, the continent had been racked with instability, including the Suez 
Crisis; the rapid independence of Gold Coast, Libya, and Soudan; the Mau-Mau revolt in 
Kenya; and significant unrest in Nigeria.  Without a change in policy, he argued, these 
events “undoubtedly weighed slightly in favor of those who not only swore themselves 
against the French presence, but were determined to destroy its reasons for existence.”852  
In order to keep French Africa and maintain French presence there, France had to give 
Africans confidence so that they would turn away from destructive nationalism.  This 
would be done by expanding their political, social, and economic rights, and ensuring 
their equal status throughout the French Union.853 
Therefore, Mitterrand’s vision was for a federated Africa bound to France through 
ties of mutual respect.  While he had discussed the importance of the continent to France 
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in his previous work, Mitterrand now indicated that Africa was a necessary part of 
France: 
A highly structured central government in Paris, states and autonomous territories 
within a federated community, both egalitarian and fraternal, whose borders 
stretch from the plains of Flanders to the forests of the equator – this is the 
perspective it behooves us to clarify and to propose, because without Africa, there 
will be no history of France in the twenty-first century. And it's not so far away: 
only the length of a generation! How, indeed, will France, which borders on the 
Rhine [where the two great powers of France and Germany face each other] will 
she advance to the North?... Only the road south is available, with many people 
living in unoccupied space.  In order to reach the banks of the Congo, it takes only 
as much patience as to go from Leningrad to Vladivostok . France already knows 
that Africa is necessary to her. 854 
 
This relationship also went both ways for Mitterrand; he emphasized “the considerable 
positive contribution” of France, including schools, hospitals, financial investment, and 
military protection.855  But from now on, these contributions were now to be “made 
available to our black citizens, no longer as a thinly-disguised instrument of domination, 
but as a supplementary means of well-being, balance, and progress.”856  Not surprisingly, 
he welcomed the recent loi cadre, which allowed for Africans to control more 
governmental functions at the local level.  These new laws, he noted “not only have 
preserved the French presence, but also have better prepared the federal community, 
                                                 
854 Ibid., 237.  “Un pouvoir central fortement structuré à Paris, des États et territoires autonomes 
fédérés au sein d’une communauté égalitaire et fraternelle dont les frontières iront des plaines des 
Flandres aux forêts de l’équateur, telle est la perspective qu’il nous appartient de préciser et de 
proposer, car sans l’Afrique il n’y aura pas d’Histoire de France au XXIe siècle.  Et ce n’est pas 
tellement loin: la durée d’une génération!  Comment en effet la France butant sur ce Rhin où 
boivent tour à tour les chevaux de l’Europe irait-elle vers la Nord?  Ou vers l’Est?  Ou vers 
l’Ouest qui vient plutôt chez elle qu’il ne l’appelle à lui?  Seule la route de Sud est disponible, 
large, bordée d’innombrables peuples en même temps que d’espaces inoccupés, si longue que 
pour atteindre le bout, aux rives du Congo, il faut presque autant de patience que pour aller de 
Léningrad à Vladivostok.  Déjà la France sait combien l’Afrique lui est nécessaire.”   
855 Ibid., 183. 
856 Ibid.  “... mis à la disposition des citoyens noirs non plus comme un instrument à peine déguisé 
de domination mais comme un moyen complémentaire de bien-être, d’équilibre et de progrès...”  
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which through its association, will defeat separatism.”857  The ensuing dialogue would 
allow France to strengthen its friendship with Africans – the only friendship, Mitterrand 
argued, that now really mattered.858  The new French-African community would also 
enable France to move past its inherent defeatism in the wake of the disaster in 
Vietnam.859 
Although Mitterrand was fairly progressive when it came to colonial policy, there 
was another aspect to his 1950s mentality on Africa that deserves mention here.  In one 
sense, his views in Présence français et abandon also typified those of his counterpart 
colonial administrators, who were deeply suspicious of the United Nations and any other 
international interference with France’s empire in Africa.  Views espoused in both books 
serve as a preview of Mitterrand’s Africa policy during his presidency.  Referring to the 
United Nations, he emphasized that “the first concern of French policy must be to refuse 
interference in her own affairs by an organization as confusing as it is disturbing.”860  For 
Mitterrand, the aforementioned interference of the Trusteeship Council in the Ewé affair 
and France’s governance of Togo had been only the first step, as the situation in Togo 
had been used by the General Assembly to attempt further scrutiny of France’s territories 
in AOF and AEF.  He bitterly noted that “our opponents had a field day claiming that [the 
settlement of the Togo issue] was made possible only under pressure from the UN and 
that therefore the safest way to attain a liberalized political status was to violate the 
                                                 
857 Ibid., 221.  “En Afrique Noire, des lois heureuses et opportunes ont non seulement préservé 
cette présence, mais encore elles ont préparé la communauté fédérale qui, par l’association, 
vaincra le séparatisme.”   
858 Ibid., 228. 
859 Ibid. 
860 François Mitterrand, Aux frontières de l’union française, 157.  “Le premier soin d’une 
politique française doit être de refuser l’ingérence dans ses propres affaires d’une organisation 
aussi confuse et aussi inquiétante”   
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sovereignty of France and call for help and protection to the Trusteeship Council, always 
ready to intervene in the affairs of others.”861  Like his fellow colonial administrators, he 
viewed the UN General Assembly as incompetent to handle such matters. 
Mitterrand also evinced a suspicion of Britain and the United States in these early 
years.  Regarding the British, he emphasized that the time had come for them to abandon 
“vain rivalries” so as to achieve better cooperation on the continent.862  He was almost 
certainly referring to the aforementioned Ewé crisis in West Africa, which Mitterrand 
believed had been invented by the British in order to gain unification for Togo.863  By 
1957, he saw the ultimate resolution of the Ewé crisis as benefiting British interests.864  
And while he understood that the United States needed to act in its national interest, he 
firmly believed that American leaders did not understand the French colonial perspective 
or her long history of contribution to the civilization of the continent.  Indeed, Mitterrand 
saw the French position in Africa as threatened on all sides; he noted that “we have no 
friends overseas – only subtle competitors and stubborn enemies.  Both of them 
undermine our positions and strike at our prestige.”865  Tragically, this Manichean view 
of power in Africa would later inform Mitterrand’s fateful decisions on African policy 
almost 40 years later. 
 
                                                 
861 Ibid. 209. “Nos adversaires avaient beau jeu de prétendre qu’une telle évolution n’avait été 
possible que sous la pression de l’ONU et que dès lors le moyen le plus sûr d’accéder à un statut 
politique libéral était d’échapper à la souveraineté de la France en demandant aide et protection 
au Conseil de tutelle, toujours prêt à s’immiscer dans les affaires d’autrui.”   
862 Ibid. 
863 Ibid., 29. 
864 François Mitterrand, Présence française et abandon, 202-4. 
865 Ibid., 227.  “Nous n’avons pas d’ami outre-mer mais des concurrents subtils et des ennemis 
opiniâtres.  Les uns et les autres sapent nos positions, atteignent notre prestige.”   
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Pierre Mendès France 
 Mitterrand’s views on France’s future in Africa would have great impact on 
another crucial figure of France’s Fourth Republic, Pierre Mendès France.  Indeed, the 
two were such close compagnons de route when it came to colonial policy that Mendès 
France wrote a preface for Aux Frontières de l’Union Française, in which he 
congratulated Mitterrand for “the lucidity and the precision of your exposé of the great 
problems of the French Union...I admire the intellectual and political courage with which 
you have researched your solutions.”866  Later, Mendès France asked Mitterrand to serve 
in his cabinet as Interior Minister, which gave Mitterrand vast responsibilities in putting 
down the first stirrings of the Algerian revolt in 1954.867 
Despite their similarity in colonial mentalities, the difference between Mitterrand 
and Mendès France’s political origins could not have been starker.  Unlike Mitterrand, 
there could be no question about Mendès France’s loyalty to republicanism during the 
Vichy years.  After the invasion of France, along with several other politicians from the 
Third Republic, Mendès France, then a deputy in the National Assembly and member of 
the Parti Radical, had attempted to flee to North Africa to re-establish the government 
and continue the war against Nazi Germany.  However, he and his comrades were 
captured by the Vichy regime and condemned to imprisonment for treason.  Mendès 
France’s daring escape in June 1941, a month after his sentencing, enabled him to join up 
with Free French units in London.  By 1943, he had been placed in charge of financial 
policy for the CFLN by De Gaulle, and would remain in administration for the rest of the 
                                                 
866 Pierre Mendès France, “Préface à Aux Frontières de l’Union Française” in Pierre Mendès 
France, Ouevres Complètes, Vol II: Une Politique de l’économie 1943-1954 (Paris: Gallimard, 
1985), 461. 
867 The Mitterrand-Mendès France collaboration has been explored in Raymond Krakovitch, Le 
pouvoir et la rigueur: Pierre Mendès France – François Mitterrand (Paris: Publisud, 1994). 
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war.  Therefore, he emerged from the war with an impeccable public image, as well as a 
reputation as a model for technocratic efficiency.  His participation in the Bretton Woods 
conference, as well as his seat in the National Assembly for the Fourth Republic, only 
heightened his standing as an informed, pragmatic voice capable of solving problems on 
a variety of levels.868 
 Before his investiture as President du Conseil in June 1954, there is little evidence 
that Mendès France gave significant thought to sub-Saharan Africa.  Like many Fourth 
Republic politicians, he concerned himself with France’s economic struggles and the 
stagnation of her political institutions. But there was some indication that he viewed 
France’s presence in Africa as central to her future.  On May 29, 1953, Vincent Auriol, 
then president, asked Mendès France to form a government.  This attempt would fail after 
the National Assembly refused to invest him with the powers of the President du Conseil.  
His speech asking for investiture, which outlined his program for France, focused little on 
Africa.  But Mendès France did note that France “does not stop at the shores of the 
Mediterranean.”869  France was also responsible for the populations of its overseas 
territories, who depended on France for their evolution.  Conversely, France needed to 
foster progress in its overseas territories in order to remain a strong presence in the world.  
As he argued, “their hopes, as well as their interests, are ours.  If we want to maintain our 
                                                 
868 Among the available biographies of Mendès France, of particular value are Eric Roussel, 
Pierre Mendès France (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2007); and Jean Lacouture, Pierre Mendès 
France (Paris: Seuil, 1981). 
869 Pierre Mendès-France, Discours d’investiture, in Pierre Mendès-France, Ouevres Complètes, 
Vol II, 440.  “...la France ne s’arrête pas aux rivages de la Méditerranée.”   
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standard of living, our independence, our own form of civilization, then the métropole 
alone no longer constitutes a sufficient base.”870 
 Although Mendès France’s first attempt to secure the Président du Conseil failed, 
events in Vietnam would rapidly change minds as to the need for his talents at the head of 
the government.  As he had done in the year since the denial of the office to him, Mendès 
France continued to publish his views as to France’s future in the midst of the political 
crisis following the disaster at Dien Bien Phu.  Just a few weeks after the fall of Vietnam, 
Mendès France turned his attention to the situation in the French Union.  Like Mitterrand, 
Mendès France had been an avid critic of the hardline colonial lobby and the inflexibility 
of French colonial policy, both in Vietnam and throughout the French Union.  That June, 
he published an article in the Revue Politique et Parlementaire about the future of the 
French Union.  For Mendès France, France’s downfall in Vietnam had helped crystallized 
the larger crisis France faced, as well as the looming threat to her overseas colonies: 
The events in Indochine teach us, through a very hard lesson, the inevitable 
consequences of the failure of insight or courage. The decisions that have been 
unduly delayed do not become easier, but rather more cruel. The refusal of limited 
concessions when they were more timely has now led to an amputation that we 
must submit to at considerable disadvantage.  The illusions that were formerly 
maintained only permitted us a moment to escape the reality that now resurfaces, 
but in an even worse form.871 
 
Given the failure of French policy in Vietnam, it was now time to take the lessons learned 
there and apply them throughout the remainder of the French Union – especially Africa.  
                                                 
870 Ibid.  “Leurs espoirs, comme leurs intérêts, sont les nôtres; si nous voulons maintenir notre 
niveau de vie, notre indépendance, nos formes propres de civilisation, la métropole seule ne 
constitue plus une base suffisante.”   
871 Ibid., 525.  “Les événements d’Indochine instruisent, pare une dure leçon, des conséquences 
qu’entraîne inévitablement le défaut de lucidité ou de courage.  Les décisions que l’on a indûment 
différées ne deviennent pas plus faciles mais plus cruelles.  La concession limitée qui a été 
refusée en temps utile entraîne l’amputation qu’il faut ensuite subir sans aucune contrepartie 
avantageuse.  Les illusions qui ont été entretenues ne permettent que de fuir un moment la réalité 
qui resurgit aggravée.”  Pierre Mendès-France, “Esquisse d’une politique de l’Union Française.”   
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As Mendès France noted, “it is time for France to regroup in order not to lose now in 
Africa, through new yet similar mistakes, her interests, friendships, and influence.”872  
What was at stake was nothing less than a “magnificent adventure” in which France had 
brought immense political, social and economic progress to millions of France’s African 
subjects.  Essentially, Mendès France framed the justification for France’s continued 
presence on the continent in terms of the civilizing mission.  France, he believed, “is 
strong insofar as it embodies the ideal that, for the rest of the world, remains attached to 
its name...”873  These ideals had no connection to military power, and were contrary to 
the defense of unjust political systems, as had been seen in Vietnam.  Rather, France’s 
ideals were what provided the foundation for its “moral grandeur.”874 
 While the remainder of Mendès France’s article focused mostly on events in 
Morocco and Tunisia, he closed with a brief discussion of sub-Saharan Africa.  In 
referring to the region, which was significantly calmer than Vietnam or North Africa, he 
emphasized that “we would be wrong to pay no attention to the transformations that are 
occurring and the impatience that is beginning to manifest itself.”875  Although the Fourth 
Republic constitution had assimilated France’s African subjects into the French Union, 
Mendès France noted that this project had its limits.  Therefore, France had to “take the 
initiative of reforms, and take advantage, for once, of being ahead of events.”876  This 
would involve reforms within the existing constitutional structure to devolve power back 
                                                 
872 Ibid., 526.  “Il est temps pour la France de se ressaisir afin de ne pas perdre maintenant en 
Afrique, par des fautes nouvelles mais semblables, ses intérêts, ses amitiés, son influence.”   
873 Ibid., 526.  “...France est forte dans la mesure où elle incarne l’idéal qui, pour le monde entier, 
reste attaché à son nom...”   
874 Ibid. 
875 Ibid., 528.  “...nous aurions tort de ne prêter aucune attention aux transformations qui s’opèrent 
et aux impatiences qui commencent à se manifester.”   
876 Ibid.  “...il faut prendre l’initiative des réformes en profitant pour une fois d’une légère avance 
sur les événements.”   
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to the territorial assemblies, thus further federalizing the French Union and providing 
more representative government.  For Mendès France, the stakes were too high to ignore 
the inevitable; he closed by emphasizing that “the fate of the French Union includes 
enough perils and difficulties, but also enough duties and hopes to prevent France from 
neglecting it any longer.”877   
 With events in Vietnam now threatening to destabilize the government in Paris, 
the National Assembly could no longer deny Mendès France the office of the President 
du Conseil, as they had done over a year earlier.  Indeed, Mendès France’s technocratic 
reputation now seemed best-suited to clean up the mess in which France now found itself.  
On June 19, 1954, after being asked to form a government by now-President René Coty, 
Mendès France was invested with the office by the National Assembly.  At his investiture 
declaration two days earlier, he presented a comprehensive plan to get France out of the 
crisis it found itself in, including forging a permanent peace in Vietnam, addressing the 
growing economic troubles, and clarifying France’s foreign policy vis-à-vis other 
European nations.878  After his initial speech, Mendès France allowed for a number of 
questions and statements, including one from Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, then a 
deputy in the National Assembly, who asked him to clarify his position on French sub-
Saharan Africa.  Noting that “I fully appreciate the importance of Africa to the French 
community,” Mendès France emphasized that “France will become tomorrow whatever 
French Africa will become.”879  When pressed by Senghor to give assurances about 
                                                 
877 Ibid.  “Le destin de l’Union Française comporte assez de périls et de difficultés, mais aussi de 
devoirs et d’espoirs, pour interdire à la France de s’abandonner plus longtemps.”   
878 Pierre Mendès-France, “La déclaration d’investiture” in Pierre Mendès-France, Oeuvres 
Complètes Vol. III: Gouverner c’est choisir 1954-1955 (Paris: Gallimard, 1956), 55. 
879 Ibid., 58.  “...je mesure pleinement l’importance de l’Afrique au sein de la communauté 
française... la France sera demain ce que sera l’Afrique française.”  
329 
 
further material aid from France so as to enable prosperity and “African grandeur”, 
Mendès France responded with a heartfelt statement regarding his commitment to the 
continent: 
Mr. Senghor has said that Africa is the continent of tomorrow. I agree with him. I 
also think that if we want to preserve with it in the future the relationships that we 
desire, it must also be the continent of today. That is why the government that I 
will assemble believes that France in Africa must address the great adventure of 
the twentieth century, to make it possible to assure full employment and 
prosperity in these territories that are customarily said to be underdeveloped. The 
realization of this immense task, linking the overseas countries and the métropole, 
within an ultimately organic French Union, will alone ensure, as part of a 
community based on mutual interests, the necessary decentralizations. The end of 
the colonial pact ... will not be to abandon the overseas countries to their own 
resources – that is to say to their own misery – or to grant them freedom to 
become subject to another guardianship, but rather to provide them, through the 
resources of the métropole, the means for personal and complementary 
development.880 
 
Mendès France’s remarks on Africa were met with overwhelming applause from most of 
the assembled deputies.881 
The Geneva Conference, which had already begun in April and eventually settled 
the war between North Vietnam and France, would occupy most of Mendès France’s 
early months as Président du Conseil.  With the official division of Vietnam in two, and 
the establishment of western-backed Bao Dai’s government in the South, Mendès France 
could now turn his attention to other matters, including strengthening the foundations of 
                                                 
880 Ibid., 58-9.  “M. Senghor a dit que l’Afrique est le continent de demain.  Je suis d’accord avec 
lui.  Je pense même que, si nous voulons conserver avec elle, demain, les liens que nous 
souhaitons, elle doit être le continent d’aujourd’hui.  C’est pourquoi le gouvernement qui je 
constituerai a conscience que la France doit aborder en Afrique la grande aventure du XXe siècle, 
assurer le plein emploi et la prospérité dans ces territoires que l’on a coutume de dire sous-
développés.  La réalisation de cette immense tâche associant les pays d’outre-mer et la métropole 
au sein d’une Union française enfin organique, permettra, seule, d’assurer, dans le cadre d’une 
communauté fondée sur l’intérêt réciproque, les décentralisations nécessaires.  La fin du pacte 
colonial, puisqu’on en a parlé, ce ne serait pas d’abandonner les pays d’outre-mer à leurs 
ressources propres, c’est-à-dire à leur misère propre, ni de leur consentir la liberté de se livrer à 
une autre tutelle, mais de leur donner, sur les ressources de la métropole, les moyens d’un 
développement personnel et complémentaire.”   
881 Ibid., 59. 
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the French Union.  On October 30, 1954, he gave a radio address to all the overseas 
territories, in which he established France’s future direction.  He first emphasized the 
importance of the French Union to France, noting that “with its overseas territories, 
France is indeed a great State, by its size, its population, the extent of its resources, its 
variety of climates and lands, and the colossal opportunities for development.”882  What 
made France great, Mendès France emphasized, were the political rights granted to all 
subjects of the French Union; he noted that during the vote for his investiture, “the voice 
of a deputy from Guinea counted just as much as that of a deputy from Paris.”883 
 But Mendès France also expressed his concern that the French Union not 
stagnate.  For this reason, he announced a significant new financial initiative to improve 
the economic status of France’s overseas territories.  Alluding to investments made by the 
Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social (FIDES) project, 
he emphasized the significant gains that had already been made over the past five years, 
which enabled the construction of roads, seaports, and airports, and had provided 
industrial infrastructure for urban areas.884  To add to this, Mendès France announced a 
second plan, which would “ameliorate the material condition of the African peasants, 
who constitute more than 90 percent of the population.”885 This would be accompanied 
by a further reinvestment in industry, as well as a renewed focus on education of Africans 
so that they could eventually play a role in the administration of their territories.  France 
                                                 
882 Ibid., 419.  “Avec les territoires d’outre-mer, la France est, en vérité, un très grand État, par sa 
superficie, sa population, l’étendue de ses ressources, la variété de ses climats et de ses terres, et 
des colossales possibilités de développement.”   
883 Ibid. 
884 Ibid., 420. 
885 Ibid.  “Le second plan aura pour l’objectif d’améliorer la condition matérielle de la 
paysannerie d’Afrique qui représente plus de 90% de la population.”   
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and her overseas territories, Mendès France noted, had to work together, as this common 
destiny “is the future of France and of liberty.”886 
 Unfortunately for Mendès France, his government was not immune to the 
instabilities and political fickleness inherent to the Fourth Republic.  On November 1, 
1954, members of Algeria’s Front de Liberation National launched a series of guerilla 
attacks throughout Algeria, thus beginning the eight year war for independence.  For his 
part, Mendès France strongly condemned the attacks in a rousing speech before the 
National Assembly on November 12.  Taking a decidedly different approach from his 
previous advocacy for more conciliation in the colonies, Mendès France now affirmed 
that “we do not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, 
or the unity and integrity of the Republic... Between [Algeria] and the métropole, there 
can be no conceivable secession.  This must be clear once and for all, and forever – in 
Algeria, the métropole, and abroad.”887    Mendès France’s words were overwhelmingly 
applauded by all parties in the National Assembly, but it would not be long before his 
enemies on the right would take advantage of the crisis to bring down his government.  
Despite Mendès France’s initially tough stance, he had taken the opportunity to propose a 
series of reforms in Algeria, similar to reforms that were already underway in Tunisia.  
The unpopularity of both of these enabled his political enemies, most notably former 
Président du Conseil René Mayer, who accused Mendès France of sponsoring policies 
that enabled terrorism.  By February, the situation in the National Assembly had 
deteriorated beyond Mendès France’s control, and his government succumbed to a no-
confidence vote on February 5, 1955.   
                                                 
886 Ibid., 421.  “...il est le destin de la France et de la Liberté.”   
887 Ibid., 455. 
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 Mendès France’s popularity and expertise were too valuable to go wasted in the 
new government.  The new Président du Conseil, the socialist Guy Mollet, immediately 
appointed him as the Ministre d’état – essentially a ministry without portfolio – to enable 
Mendès France to participate in the deliberations of Mollet’s government.  His fall from 
the lead post would further liberate his thinking on Algeria. By June of that year he was 
making clear the connection between the events in Algeria and the previous tragedy in 
Vietnam.  In a speech before the executive committee of the Parti Radical on June 8, 
Mendès France emphasized that like the situation in Vietnam, France needed to be more 
progressive in its policies.  Half-measures that might have placated the rebels several 
months before would no longer suffice.  What was at stake was not just the future of 
Algeria, but also that of France as well: 
I still think, at this moment, of French grandeur, of the grandeur of this 
magnificent Empire, united and lasting, which has made us proud.  We will have 
guarded it poorly on the day when we disappoint the very people who had faith in 
us.  But this time... we can restore, reclaim, and thus recreate a new French 
community in Africa, a community that will be based on common interests, but 
also on restored confidence.  This is our duty; it is our historic responsibility.888   
 
Mendès France also emphasized that, like Vietnam, the crisis in Algeria had implications 
for the rest of the French empire as well.  Unless France treated its sub-Saharan African 
territories with a progressive mentality that had escaped it in the years preceding the 
struggle in Algeria, it would suffer violent turmoil similar to that taking place in North 
Africa.  However, he believed that hope remained for French sub-Saharan Africa, “which 
                                                 
888 Pierre Mendès France, “Sauver l’Afrique tout entière” in Pierre Mendès France, Oeuvres 
Complètes, Vol. IV: Pour une république moderne, 1955-1962 (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), 199.  “Je 
pense encore, dans cet instant, à la grandeur française, à la grandeur de ce magnifique Empire 
solidaire et durable qui faisait notre fierté.  Nous l’avons mal gardé le jour où nous avons déçu les 
peuples qui avaient eu foi en nous.  Mais cette fois que nous avions su leur inculquer, nous 
pourrons la restaurer, la reconquérir, et ainsi recréer une nouvelle communauté française en 
Afrique, une communauté qui sera fondée sur les intérêts communs mais aussi sur la confiance 
rétablie.  Cela, c’est notre devoir, c’est notre responsabilité historique.”   
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will benefit from the reforms contained in the loi cadre adopted by the National 
Assembly... which will give to the people of black Africa the proof of our voluntary 
commitment to promotion and progress.”889  What was at stake, quite literally, was 
France’s entire historical project in Africa: 
We are at the crucial hour when we must renew and save the whole of Africa – 
black Africa as well as North Africa. The great interests which are invested there, 
the general interests of France - political influence, strategic positions, our role in 
the world, cultural influence, an essential complement to our European economy 
– and also the interests of French settlers there, some of whom have been there for 
a very long time, interests acquired through generations of ardent workers who 
have made the prosperity of these countries, who have contributed to the 
advancement of their peoples, and who must continue to render the same services 
tomorrow for the common good – this is precisely what me must save!890 
 
Therefore, what was needed in Mendès France’s view was a rejection of traditional 
colonial mentalities – just as Mitterrand had argued in his writings on the French Union.  
What threatened the future of the French Union, Mendès France argued, was not a 
mentality of reform and compromise.  Rather, it was “the eternal blindness, the eternal 
conservative and colonial egoism, it is the misunderstanding of the aspirations of our 
subjects, it is the recourse to police repression disguised as a political solution.”891  These 
                                                 
889 Ibid.  “Il se pose dans cette Afrique noire qui va bénéficier des réformes contenues dans la loi-
cadre, adoptée par l’Assemblée nationale, qui a subi depuis quelques marchandages et des retards 
fâcheux, que je regrette, mais qui donnera aux populations de l’Afrique noire la preuve de notre 
volonté de promotion et de progrès.”   
890 Ibid.  “Nous sommes à l’heure crucial où nous devons rénover et sauver l’Afrique tout entière, 
l’Afrique noire comme l’Afrique du Nord.  Les grands intérêts qui y sont investis, intérêts 
généraux de la France – influence politique, positions stratégiques, rôle dans le monde, 
rayonnement culturel, compléments indispensables à notre économie européenne – mais aussi 
intérêts des Français installés là-bas, parfois depuis longtemps, intérêts acquis par des générations 
de travailleurs ardents qui ont fait la prospérité de ces pays, qui ont contribué à l’avancement des 
populations, et qui doivent continuer à rendre les mêmes services demain pour le bien commun – 
voilà ce que nous avons à sauver!”   
891 Ibid., 201.  “Or, ce qui a compromis le destin de l’Union française, l’éternel aveuglement, 
c’est l’éternel égoïsme conservateur et colonialiste, c’est l’incompréhension des aspirations des 
autochtones, c’est le recours à la répression policière en guise de la solution politique.”  
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hardline solutions, he emphasized, had to be rejected, as they led only to revolt and 
disorder. 
 It must be emphasized that while Mendès France’s conception of Africa, like that 
of Mitterrand, represented a break from traditional attitudes toward the colonies, he was 
nevertheless unable to imagine a future in which the colonies would be outside of the 
French orbit.  Like many other figures in the Fourth Republic, he might have been able to 
envision a day of independence for many of France’s colonies, but he strongly believed 
that France would continue to play a fundamental and positive role after decolonization.  
This is precisely why he viewed traditional colonial sensibilities as so dangerous – they 
threatened to undermine France’s ongoing civilizing mission, and consequently its 
influence, both now and in the future.  As he noted in June 1958, as the Fourth Republic 
began to crumble, “if we consider now, not only in terms of countries suddenly promoted 
to independence, but also the notion of universal progress, the breaking of relations 
between a European country and a former colony too often implies the abandonment of 
large, undeveloped areas to a cruel and disturbing fate.”892  What was implicitly 
understood was that without providing continuing economic and cultural benefits, France 
would be unable to justify its continued involvement on the continent. 
 
The Loi Cadre and Eurafrique 
Mitterrand and Mendès France’s ideas would have great influence on France’s 
Africa policy in the late Fourth Republic.  Throughout the latter half of the 1950s, a 
                                                 
892 Pierre Mendès France, “Postface à La Politique de Carthage de Simone Gros.” Ibid., 433-4.  
“Si nous nous plaçons maintenant, non plus seulement au point de vue de pays brusquement 
promu à l’indépendance, mais à celui du progrès universel, la rupture des relations entre un pays 
européen et une ancienne colonie implique trop souvent l’abandon de vastes régions sous-
développées à un sort cruel et inquiétant.”   
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variety of proposals were put forth in an attempt to restructure and better preserve 
France’s relationship with sub-Saharan Africa.  In the midst of the ongoing military 
disaster at Dien Bien Phu, French colonial administrators revealed an ambitious project to 
increase autonomy at the local level.  This new policy was announced by Louis 
Jacquinot, Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer, in a speech before the National Assembly 
in April 1954.  In the speech, Jacquinot revealed the intention of the colonial office to 
broaden the powers of the territorial assemblies, set up councils to assist the métropole-
appointed governors, and enable more input on economic policy from France’s subjects 
within the French Union.893  Later that year, Jacquinot made a trip to AOF to unveil this 
strategy to the Grand Council there.894 
However, it would take an additional two years for these reforms in sub-Saharan 
Africa to be realized.  As discussed in chapter three, the constitution of the Fourth 
Republic had enumerated which powers would reside with the French Union, and had 
assigned very little real power to the local assemblies in the overseas territories.  
Therefore, the intended reforms announced by Jacquinot would require a significant 
restructuring of the French Union itself.  At the urging of socialist Ministre de la France 
d’Outre-Mer Gaston Deffere, the National Assembly passed the loi cadre in June 1956.   
As Tony Chafer explains, the law essentially split governmental functions into two 
categories – state services and territorial services.895  The former would remain with the 
government in Paris, while the latter would be assigned to the territorial assemblies.  A 
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series of later decrees determined that “state services” encompassed military defense of 
the French Union, foreign affairs, national police, customs, the monetary system, and 
higher education, among others.896  The remainder of government functions were defined 
as “territorial services” and left to the responsibility of local governments in the overseas 
territories.  As Chafer notes, the proponents of the reform “sought to maintain French 
dominance by keeping control of certain strategic areas of ‘high’ policy deemed central 
to ‘sovereignty’...”897  At the same time, they also “sought to take the French colonial 
administration out of the political front line by transferring responsibility for unpopular 
decisions to Africans.”898 
 While the loi cadre had clear benefits for the métropole, many of France’s 
colonial officials nevertheless viewed it as bringing radical change to colonial 
government, and were vehemently opposed to it.  In January 1955, Paul Chauvet, then 
governor-general for AEF, wrote a lengthy letter to Robert Buron, Ministre de la France 
d’Outre-Mer, about the brewing reforms.  Noting that the law would “radically transform 
the character of the territorial assemblies,” Chauvet argued that it would unnecessarily 
accelerate the political evolution of AEF, at a time when there were not enough African 
leaders ready to assume further responsibilities.899  Further, the reforms would undermine 
the powers of the governor general and cause confusion about the distribution of power in 
France’s African territories.  Most importantly, reform would lead to a loss of French 
control over the continent, with Chauvet warning of “disorders that will result for the 
                                                 
896 Ibid. 
897 Ibid. 
898 Ibid., 167. 
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overseas territories by the institution of uncoordinated reforms, and for which they are 
completely unprepared.”900 
 But such sentiments were futile in light of the unfolding anticolonial trend in 
North Africa.  By mid-1955, consensus was already developing as to the need for 
political reforms in sub-Saharan Africa.  An internal memo from July 1955 is instructive 
of the mentalities of French colonial officials during this period.  The memo opened by 
stating that “the reform of [government] structures in AOF has been forced by events.”901  
As the memo noted, a significant justification for territorial political reforms was that 
they would enable France to maintain its relationship with Africa going forward.  Most 
importantly, France needed to restructure its relations with the overseas territories so that 
they “will no longer assume the aspect of one being subjected to another, but rather of 
assistance and aid freely given.”902  Once accomplished, the reforms would help insure 
that French relations with Africa would be preserved through formation of African cadres 
friendly to France, technical assistance, and other advances in areas spanning transport, 
justice, and production.903  Essentially, the loi cadre reforms would provide a preemptive 
strike against the sort of unrest already seen in Vietnam and Algeria – exactly what 
Mitterrand and Mendès France had been arguing for. 
At the same time that the French colonial ministry and the National Assembly 
were debating whether to extend power to the territorial assemblies, the thinking of many 
politicians and colonial administrators was being influenced by the concept of 
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Eurafrique.  The concept embodied the notion that Europe and Africa had both historical 
and practical ties that necessitated a closer and more vital relationship in the future.  As 
Louisa Rice has recently demonstrated, the concept can be traced to the 1930s, but began 
receiving more serious consideration by the early 1950s.904  By this time, its main ideas 
had been clarified – namely, “that the two continents were complementary, inextricably 
linked primarily through socio-economic interdependency, and that the conjoined land 
mass was of great strategic importance on the ‘chessboard of the world.’”905  As Rice 
notes, this had clear implications in the international arena during the 1950s, when many 
modern-day European institutions were constructed, including the European Defense 
Community and European Economic Community.906 
Of course, for French leaders, the concept of Eurafrique was less concerned with 
the European relationship with Africa than it was with France’s future on the continent.  
As explained by French Ambassador Alphand in a note to Christian Pineau in May of 
that year, “the creation of Eurafrique involves a tightening of relations between Europe 
and a large part of the African continent.  It has as its object to fortify this ensemble and 
to maintain it within the camp of the free world by making it less vulnerable to the 
temptations of communism or totalitarianism.”907  As understood by American officials, 
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it represented a means to continue France’s influence on the continent.  A memo from 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to President Eisenhower noted that the concept of 
Eurafrique “is an ambitious but meritorious idea, which may be a device for transferring 
the present colonial relationship into a partnership on more equal terms.”908 
These efforts to link the future of Africa to developing European institutions 
achieved results in February 1957, when diplomatic representatives from the six 
European Common Market countries met in Paris and agreed to a loose association 
between the common market and overseas territories, committing $581 million over five 
years to France’s overseas territories - $270 million of which came from France.909  But 
there could be no question that the initiative would further French interests both on the 
continent and within the international arena.  British officials immediately became 
suspicious, complaining in November 1957 that “this so-called free trade zone 
corresponds only to an extension of a preferential regime, and principally the one that 
exists between France and its territories in Africa.”910  British officials also felt that 
associating African territories with European countries could serve as a drag for western 
economies participating in the free exchange zone.911  It could also hurt the market for 
European-made goods, given the more cheaply produced goods presumably coming from 
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the continent.  For their part, French officials attempted to justify the project by noting 
that it would help develop solidarity between Europe and the continent, and would lead 
them to better economic, social, and cultural development.912 
 Ironically, the French also found that the concept of Eurafrique could also be used 
against them to great effect in their ongoing colonial struggles.  What the new concept 
offered was the possibility of a significantly more decentralized relationship based on 
trade and economic ties, and not on direct political rule.  This was used to great effect by 
other nations attempting to restrain France’s ongoing influence on the continent, as the 
concept suggested that traditional forms of colonialism were obsolete.  One example of 
this could be seen in the midst of debates at the United Nations concerning the future of 
Algeria in 1957, when Tunisian and Moroccan officials approached U.S. representatives.  
They discussed the potential of Eurafrique, and the possibility of its realization being 
threatened by continued French military action in North Africa.913  From the United 
States’ perspective, the notion of Eurafrique offered another defense against the 
encroachment of communism on the continent, as it would link Africa more closely with 
the western democracies of Europe.  Therefore, the Tunisian and Moroccan officials 
implied, the United States needed to pressure France to back down in Algeria, so that the 
new arrangement of power on the continent – specifically one more favorable to 
American interests – could be realized. 
 Of course, the concept of using the supposedly liberal ideology of the colonial 
powers against them was not a novel one.  But what both the loi cadre and the notion of 
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Eurafrique accomplished was to provide a vision of the future in Africa whereby a 
colonial system that had existed for decades would have to endure in some alternate 
form.  As this chapter and the previous one have shown, France had its share of foes in 
the international arena who wished to end the French presence in sub-Saharan Africa 
completely.  But there remained eloquent voices in favor of France’s continued role on 
the continent.  The most compelling arguments came from those who were the supposed 
beneficiaries of the French colonial project. 
 
Voices from Africa: Léopold Sédar Senghor and Félix Houphouët-Boigny 
To this point, this dissertation has largely focused on the views of politicians and 
colonial officials from the métropole.  But the notion of sub-Saharan Africa as 
existentially important to France’s future was not merely European-driven.  Throughout 
the Fourth Republic – and before it was clear that independence could be realized in the 
near future – sub-Saharan African leaders played an important role in justifying both the 
beneficial nature of the French Union, and France’s continuing presence on the continent.  
These leaders freely adopted the language of the civilizing mission, spoke of the 
importance of France to Africa’s future, and framed their discussion of political and 
economic advancement within the larger structure of the French Union.  While a variety 
of African leaders were strong advocates of France’s influence, two were particularly 
important during the Fourth Republic in justifying the French presence, both to Africans 
and within the international community.  They were Senegal’s Léopold Sédar Senghor 
and Ivory Coast’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny. 
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The two men initially had divergent mentalities concerning the value of French 
presence in Africa.  After decolonization, they would diverge once more, as they became 
rivals in a series of regional power struggles in West Africa.  But for most of the Fourth 
Republic, Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny could find common ground on the importance 
of maintaining France’s relationship with Africa.  Born in Senegal, Senghor came from a 
part of the French empire in which Africans could be educated within the French system 
and attain French citizenship.914  He therefore embodied the success of the mission 
civilisatrice’s attempt to assimilate Africans into the body politic through French culture 
and education.  This enabled him to travel to France before World War II and graduate 
from the University of Paris.  During this prewar period, Senghor taught in France, 
published several poems, and began collaborations with other African intellectuals to 
launch the movement eventually known as négritude, which strongly rejected traditional 
French colonial mentalities about Africans and attempted to reinvent literature from a 
distinctly African perspective.915  But his criticisms of these colonial mentalities did not 
represent a wholesale rejection of the French republic.  During the prewar era, Senghor 
maintained that French culture could have a positive effect on Africa’s development.  His 
belief in this notion of France would be reflected in his service in the French military 
during World War II prior to the Nazi invasion of Paris. 
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With the end of the war and the establishment of the new government, Senghor 
became a deputy in the National Assembly in Paris, and eventually a national symbol for 
Senegal.  In Senghor, the Fourth Republic had from its inception a relatively strong ally 
who firmly believed in the French colonial project and was eager to mount a spirited 
defense of the values of French civilization to Africa’s future.  In 1945, as the war came 
to an end, and amidst debates about the extent of reform in France’s colonies, Senghor 
contributed an essay to a collaborative work, La communauté imperiale française, in 
which he discussed the challenges posed by the encounter between French colonizers and 
Africans.  For Senghor, while the war had undermined the legitimacy of France’s 
presence on the continent, the value of France to Africa’s future was beyond question.  
“France does not have to justify its colonial conquests, any more than it does the 
annexation of Bretagne or the Basque countries,” he noted.  “She must only reconcile her 
interests and those of her subjects.”916  For Senghor, reconciling interests involved a 
combination of the traditional colonial policies of association and assimilation.  France 
had to assimilate Africans into its empire, while at the same time finding a way to respect 
those traditions and social structures that had value to the continent.  In other words, 
rather than pursue a radical assimilation that made Africans into Frenchmen, Africans 
had to become part of France’s empire “in the spirit of the French civilization.”917  There 
could be no question about the mutual relationship the two would have in the future, as 
Senghor spoke of a “common ideal” that could unite the two continents in a shared 
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purpose.  “This common ideal,” he noted, “can be found within [the métropole’s] 
traditions, and it will be this tradition that will construct the unity of the French 
Empire.”918 
To be sure, Senghor was no dupe for the policies of French colonial hardliners.  
Throughout the Fourth Republic, he worked to ensure that French Union policies would 
be planned and carried out in the spirit of a cooperative endeavor, and not informed by 
traditional colonial notions of European domination of Africa.  This latter mentality could 
be clearly seen in 1950 during the London Conference, which as discussed in the 
previous chapter, had been instrumental in formulating the Combined Commission for 
Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) and establishing plans for 
the economic integration of Europe and Africa.  When word of the London proceedings 
became public, Senghor and his followers were quite concerned that the future of the 
continent was being determined without proper input from African representatives.  On 
May 17, 1950, Senghor and 67 representatives from the National Assembly and the 
Assembly of the French Union, labeling themselves the “Groupe Interparlementaire des 
Indépendants d’Outre-Mer”, drafted a resolution stating their concerns about the 
proceedings in London.  The resolution emphasized that “it is not possible, after having 
solemnly proclaimed that the colonial regime is abolished overseas, to make French 
overseas territories in Africa an international colony.”919  The resolution further argued 
that a Eurafrican collaboration could only take the form of “an association of economic 
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character, freely concluded on equal terms, in which the present and future interests of 
Africa will be safeguarded in the same manner as those of Europe.”920  Africa, the 
resolution emphasized, would no longer accept being an “appendage” of Europe, 
relegated to a position of providing raw materials and labor for the continent.  For his 
part, Ministre de France d’Outre-Mer Jean Letorneau made sure to promptly write 
Senghor to reassure him that this was not the case, and that the discussions in London 
were not paving the way for the domination of Africa by Europe.921 
While initially skeptical about the application of the concept of Eurafrique to the 
future of the continent, Senghor would eventually become one of its greatest proponents.  
Throughout his political career, Senghor could not divorce himself from his French 
cultural heritage; he remained a man strongly rooted in two worlds, affirming the 
fundamental importance of his African background, but nevertheless embracing the 
contribution that his French education had on his literary and political careers.  By the 
mid-1950s, he had accepted the practical application of the Eurafrique concept; as Rice 
notes, he recognized it “as a way of furthering African participation in decision making 
that affected Frenchmen beyond the hexagon.”922  The crises of 1954 would have little 
effect on this fundamental tenet of his ideology; while external events made the 
possibility of independence more real, they could not dissolve the existential ties that 
existed between France and her colonies in Africa. 
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Even in the face of possible decolonization, Senghor remained faithful to his 
vision of France’s continued importance for the development of Africa.  In his 1959 
report on the principles of the African Federation Party, he reaffirmed the French 
relationship with Africa, noting that “[w]hat unites us is our common determination to 
construct, in stages, a Federal State, or better still, a Negro-African Nation freely 
associated with France in a Confederation.”923  While this certainly involved the embrace 
of African tradition, it also meant continuing to learn from French influence.  For 
Senghor, independence did not represent a radical break; he remained suspicious of 
militant anticolonial movements, as had been seen at the Bandung Conference.  Such 
desires for immediate independence could only lead to “balkanization” and the 
weakening of individual territories in Africa.924  Instead, he emphasized, “[w]e should be 
impoverishing ourselves and very probably renouncing the hope of catching up our 
thousand year lag if, on the pretext of the anti-colonial struggle, we rejected the 
contributions of Europe.”925  His goal was “a dynamic symbiosis on a scale befitting 
Africa and the twentieth century, but above all, befitting man.”926   
While Senghor advocated for continued association with France because of its 
contributions to the continent, he also understand that Africa was vitally important to 
France’s future.  This went beyond mere economic exploitation; instead, France’s 
connection to Africa was deeply rooted in its sense of national identity: 
The evolution of the Community in the sense of History and of its own internal 
dynamism is in our interests.  It is also in the interests of France.  France has 
nothing to gain from following a policy of desperation, a policy of all or nothing.  
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Naturally, on the economic plane, France can do without Negro Africa.  She 
cannot do without her on the political plane or on the cultural plane.  France is not 
Holland.  She is a great lady who needs the luster of a large family.  Reduced to a 
small compass, she would fail in her mission in the world, which is to defend 
Man; she would lose her soul and her reasons for living.927   
 
As the next chapter will discuss, events would quickly overtake Senghor’s hope for West 
Africa’s participation in a federation with France.  But he would do his best to maintain a 
strong relationship with France after decolonization in 1960. 
Unlike Senghor, Ivory Coast’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny did not receive his 
education in France, instead taking his medical degree from the French colonial school in 
Senegal.928  He became a farmer and successful landowner, and later entered local 
politics.  After the war, he was elected to the French National Assembly as the 
representative from Ivory Coast.  But his status as an outsider to the métropole had 
already shaped his political ideology.  In Houphouët-Boigny, the young Fourth Republic 
found a formidable adversary, eager to point out the evils of colonialism and the 
hypocrisy of the French project in Africa.  This was made clear on March 30, 1946, when 
Houphouët-Boigny, then a delegate to the Constituent Assembly, gave a rousing and 
combative speech against the evils of forced labor in the overseas territories and the need 
to abolish it once and for all.929  Despite French efforts to end the practice, Houphouët-
Boigny asserted that it persisted throughout France’s African territories, and especially 
his home of Ivory Coast; its continued presence on French territory was “not only 
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destructive, inhumane, and anti-democratic, but also anti-economical.”930  Throughout 
the speech, he referred bitterly to the French colons who had imposed the policy on the 
continent; quite simply, these practices had put the lie to the notion of the French 
civilizing mission.  In urging the Constituent Assembly to take further measures to 
abolish forced labor, Houphouët-Boigny emphasized that “a unique occasion is offered to 
us today to prove to the world that the France of the rights of man and the citizen, the 
France of the abolition of slavery, always remains equal to itself and will not challenge or 
limit the freedom of peoples living under its own flag.”931  
As discussed in chapter three, while France had already made efforts to attempt to 
abolish forced labor, Houphouët-Boigny became rapidly disenchanted with the new 
republic.  Starting with the Bamako Conference of October 1946, which consolidated 
many of Africa’s pro-autonomy political movements into the cross-territorial 
Rassamblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), Houphouët-Boigny assumed a decidedly 
more militant stance, criticizing French hypocrisy at every turn and questioning the 
wisdom and necessity of a continued French presence in Africa.  In December 1947 in 
Dakar, he emphasized that Africa was “on the move” – largely because of the growing 
realization by Africans that they had to seize their political rights from a French 
government that was hesitant to grant them.  Houphouët-Boigny indicated that with the 
war over, it was now time to organize politically in sub-Saharan Africa.  In the process, 
he urged Africans to take note of several French “contradictions” – including the 
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contradiction between the abolition of slavery and the persistence of forced labor; the 
supposed French dedication to educating their subjects, juxtaposed with the reality of a 
broken education system; the futility of sponsoring development programs at the same 
time that Africa’s resources were being pillaged; and many others.932  The following 
year, after the communists had been expelled from the Fourth Republic’s ministries by 
Paul Ramadier, Houphouët-Boigny condemned the hypocrisy of the French political 
system, noting the contradiction between France’s alleged support for political rights and 
“the present policy of repression against our populations, which coincides with its anti-
labor policy and measures taken against the most democratic of the French, our friends 
the communists...”933 
Strikingly, in these early years when the RDA was collaborating with the PCF, 
Houphouët-Boigny spoke in very combative terms when it came to the French colonizers.  
In the same address in December 1947, he attacked the “colonialists” who, “with the 
millions earned from the labor of the African masses, have come to Paris to distribute 
monstrous propaganda against the maintenance of democratic liberties... liberties that risk 
limiting their scandalous profits.”934  In the long run, he strongly implied, Africa could 
not expect the French colonizers to uphold political rights for Africans, as these 
“colonialistes” could not be trusted.  Consequently, Africa’s future lay on its own 
continent, and not in association with France.  He emphasized that “the unity of action by 
                                                 
932 Félix Houphouët-Boigny, “Le continent Africain en marche”, December 1947.  Ibid., 49-50. 
933 Félix Houphouët-Boigny, “Rapport sur les conditions historiques du Rassemblement 
Démocratique Africain” Oct. 21, 1948.  Ibid., 75.  “...la politique actuelle de répression contre nos 
populations qui coïncide avec la politique anti-ouvrière et exclusive lancée contre les meilleurs 
démocrates français, nos amis communistes...”   
934 “Les colonialistes, avec les millions gagnés aux dépens de la masse laborieuse africaine, sont 
venus à Paris faire une propagande monstre contre le maintien des libertés démocratiques... 
libertés qui risquent de limiter leur scandaleux profits.”  Ibid., 56. 
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Africans is the primordial condition of success in their battle for the emancipation of 
Africa.”935  Closing with a flourish, he urged Africans to seize their future, noting that the 
continent “is going – painfully, but confidently, toward its future, a luminous future.  The 
sun is shining over Africa.”936    
The rhetoric of Houphouët-Boigny and other RDA leaders, along with the 
escalating political unrest in Ivory Coast and the RDA’s affiliation with the communists, 
partially explain the Fourth Republic’s policy of repression against the party.  From 1947 
to 1950, the more the RDA found increasing popularity throughout West Africa, the 
greater the threat that French leaders believed that it posed to stability in the republic.  
But as already discussed, the appointment of François Mitterrand to the post of Ministre 
de la France d’Outre-Mer presented a watershed moment for the RDA’s future.  With the 
RDA’s abandonment of the PCF in October 1950  – some called it a betrayal – it became 
a generally accepted political party within the framework of the French Union.  Now, 
instead of being known as a recalcitrant party opposed to the basic mission of the French 
Union and republican democracy, the RDA entered the mainstream, eager to exercise its 
newfound political relevance both in the métropole and in Africa.  Not surprisingly, its 
leaders, and most prominently Houphouët-Boigny, reoriented their approach to 
accommodate the notions of Africa’s future under French guidance, and the mutual 
importance of the two continents to one another.   
Essentially, with the RDA out of political exile, Houphouët-Boigny became one 
of the most effective and outspoken advocates for France’s project in Africa.  Like 
                                                 
935 Ibid.  “L’unité d’action des Africains est la condition primordiale du succès dans leur lutte 
pour l’émancipation de l’Afrique.”   
936 Ibid., 59.  “Elle va, douloureuse, mais confiante, vers son destin, un destin lumineux: le soleil 
est de l’Afrique.”   
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Senghor and Félix Éboué before him, Houphouët-Boigny represented both the success of 
French education in Africa, and the embodiment of why France was necessary for 
Africa’s future.  The message was even more powerful given Houphouët-Boigny’s 
former status as a political exile.  Once vehemently opposed to the French mission, he 
now stood as one of its greatest champions.  What is important to note is that, even in the 
face of France’s military setbacks in Vietnam and Algeria, unlike political leaders in 
Algeria, the RDA did not adopt a more militaristic or aggressive approach in the face of 
French weakness.  Instead, it framed the cause of African progress within the larger 
narrative of mutual ties between France and Africa.   
This dramatic volte-face was made clear in Houphouët-Boigny’s address in 
Abidjan on October 6, 1951, when he called for calm in the midst of civil and political 
unrest rampant throughout the country.  He also attempted to justify the recent break of 
the RDA from the PCF, claiming that the RDA had never “shared the communist 
ideology.”937  Noting that circumstances were now different from the ones that existed in 
1946, he emphasized that it was now time to cooperate with the institutions of the Fourth 
Republic: 
What matters most to us is the union of all men of good will, above our political 
parties and in the best interests of Côte d'Ivoire, the Republic and the French 
Union.  To our brothers in the métropole, I give assurances that the union of 
Africans will not provide any cause for concern.  The Republic is made of the 
union of all regions within it. The French Union is the harmonious synthesis of all 
local unions, drawing its strength from the common interests to develop, defend, 
and safeguard.  In our obligatory coexistence on this territory of the Republic, we 
need one other.938 
                                                 
937 Félix Houphouët-Boigny, “Solennelle déclaration publique au Stade Géo André à Abidjan”, 
Oct. 6, 1951.  Ibid., 85. 
938 Ibid., 88-9.  “Mais ce qui compte le plus à nos yeux, c’est l’union de tous les hommes de 
bonne volonté, par-dessus nos partis politiques et dans l’intérêt supérieur de la Côte d’Ivoire, de 
la République et de l’Union Française.  A nos frères métropolitains, je donne l’assurance que 
l’union des Africains ne peut à aucun titre les inquiéter.  La République est faite de l’union de 
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In closing, Houphouët-Boigny emphasized the shared destiny of the two continents, 
noting “our unwavering faith in the magnificent future of our beloved territory within the 
French Union.” 939 
 Throughout the 1950s, Houphouët-Boigny’s rhetoric against the métropole would 
continue to thaw, as it became increasingly apparent that the French presence on the 
continent was well-entrenched, and that Africans were gradually attaining political 
freedoms.  The RDA made certain to discourage political unrest by emphasizing the 
importance of peaceful cooperation with the French authorities.  From June 8-11, 1955, 
the RDA met in Conakry, and afterwards, Houphouët-Boigny issued a statement about 
further cooperation with France, affirming the party’s belief that “it is possible to make a 
better life for all, if we know how to coordinate our efforts for a peaceful and prosperous 
coexistence.”940  In order to achieve this, he argued, Africans had to relinquish any petty 
resentments they held about France’s past role on the continent.  He noted that “no 
profound antagonism separates the colonizers from the métropole from Africans, with the 
exception of vain prejudices and irrational fears, which the concern for our common 
future gives us a duty to combat together.” 941  Therefore, Houphouët-Boigny noted that 
the RDA encouraged cooperation between African leaders and the colonial 
                                                                                                                                                 
toutes les régions qui la composent.  L’Union française sera la synthèse harmonieuse de toutes les 
unions locales, puisant ses forces dans la communauté des intérêts à développer, à défendre, à 
sauvegarder.  Dans notre coexistence obligatoire sur ce territoire de la République, nous avons 
besoin les uns des autres.”   
939 Ibid., 90.  “Notre foi inébranlable en l’avenir magnifique de notre cher territoire au sein de 
l’Union française...”   
940 Félix Houphouët-Boigny, July 11, 1955, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 2246, Dossier 5.  “...il est 
possible de préparer à tous une vie meilleure, si nous savons concerter nos efforts en vue d’une 
cohabitation, paisible et prospère.”   
941 Ibid.  “Aucun antagonisme profond ne sépare les colons d’origine métropolitaine des 
Africains, sinon la barrière de vains préjugés et de peur irraisonnées que le souci de notre avenir 
commun nous font un devoir de combattre.”  
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administration; to do otherwise was contrary both to the interests of Africa’s future, as 
well as those of France.  “The fate of Africa within the French Union,” he emphasized, 
“depends on good relations as much as the mutual comprehension of our interests, and 
the reciprocal respect of our originalities that will be established among the diverse 
groups that populate our countries.”942   
 Houphouët-Boigny even began to appropriate the language of French colonial 
leaders in justifying Africa’s presence within the French Union.  While the Houphouët-
Boigny of the 1940s had been significantly more concerned with the future of Africa than 
with the future of France, the Houphouët-Boigny of the 1950s now increasingly 
portrayed himself – and by extension his countrymen – as having a full stake in the future 
of the métropole.  Essentially, Houphouët-Boigny saw himself as part of France’s larger 
mission in the world.  Therefore, political evolution was no longer accomplished solely 
for the benefit of Africans, but also for the greater advancement of France.  On May 1, 
1956, in a speech in Abidjan, he spoke about France’s special vocation in the world, and 
emphasized that Africa would be served better by remaining in the French orbit.  “A 
mystique of independence runs throughout and shakes our modern world,” he warned.  
“We prefer the mystique of fraternité to this mystique of independence, which is not 
always constructive.”943  In a speech in his birth village of Yamoussoukro on May 3, he 
discussed the advances being made in Africa in light of the new loi cadre.  These new 
reforms, he argued, “will serve no purpose if in our respective territories, metropolitans 
                                                 
942 Ibid.  “Le destin de l’Afrique au sein de l’Union Française dépend des bons rapports que la 
compréhension mutuelle de nos intérêts et le respect réciproque de nos originalités auront su 
établir entre les divers groupements qui peuplent nos pays.”   
943 Ibid., 118.  “Une mystique d’indépendance parcourt et secoue notre monde contemporain... A 
cette mystique d’indépendance qui n’est pas toujours constructive, nous préférons la mystique de 
la fraternité.”  Félix Houphouët-Boigny, “Réponse aux paroles de bienvenue au Président du 
cercle sportif Abidjan, May 1, 1956.”   
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and Africans do not unite fraternally to work together, with the same spirit, for the 
grandeur of the French Union.”944  Two days later, in a speech in Dalao, he addressed the 
governor of Ivory Coast, a number of assembled dignitaries, and his fellow countrymen, 
claiming to speak “in the name of France.”945  Houphouët-Boigny referred to a shared 
challenge for both Frenchmen and Africans, through which “France will help us 
accomplish the great mission which has also become theirs – the emancipation of Africa 
within a genuine French Union, humane, egalitarian, and fraternal.”946    Strikingly, in 
contrast to his rhetoric from a decade earlier, Houphouët-Boigny no longer saw the 
emancipation of the continent as an exclusively African endeavor.   
 On the contrary, Houphouët-Boigny would continue to support the French 
presence on the continent throughout the Fourth Republic – a presence that became all 
the more important to Houphouët-Boigny even in the face of the deteriorating situation in 
Algeria.  Referring to these events in May 1956, he noted that: 
At a time when France is going through difficult times that we are well aware of, I 
cannot emphasize enough to our brothers from the métropole and Africa that they 
must put a definite end to the sad past of errors (to err is human) and delays so 
that together in this troubled world, we can affirm that France is the great destiny 
of Africa, and that our Africa – black Africa above all – will always remain the 
great destiny of France.947 
                                                 
944 Félix Houphouët-Boigny, “Monsieur Houphouët-Boigny rend hommage à son village natal, 
May 3, 1956.”  Ibid., 125.  “Les réformes... ne servirait de rien si dans nos territoires respectifs, 
Métropolitains et Africains ne s’unissaient fraternellement pour œuvrer ensemble, et d’un même 
cœur, pour la grandeur de l’Union française.”   
945 Félix Houphouët-Boigny, “Discours prononcé à Dalao, May 5, 1956.”  Ibid., 133. 
946 Ibid., 136.  “...la France les aidera à accomplir la grande mission qui est devenue la leur, 
l’émancipation de l’Afrique au sein d’un véritable Union française humaine, égalitaire et 
fraternelle.”   
947 Félix Houphouët-Boigny, “Discours prononcé à l’occasion du ministre Houphouët-Boigny à 
l’assemblée territoriale, May 8, 1956.”  Ibid., 140.  “Au moment où la France traverse les heures 
difficiles qui nous connaissons, je ne saurais trop répéter à nos frères Métropolitains et Africains 
de tourner un page définitive sur le triste passé des erreurs (l’erreur est humaine) et sur les 
lenteurs du passé,  pour que, ensemble, dans ce monde inquiet, nous puissions affirmer que la 
France est la grande chance de l’Afrique, et que notre Afrique, l’Afrique noire surtout, demeurera 




Houphouët-Boigny’s political transformation was highly valued by the French 
authorities; in October of 1956, they actively sought his and the RDA’s support for the 
newly passed loi cadre.948  By the following year, his statements in favor of the French 
presence in Africa could not have been any more zealous; on April 11, 1957, Houphouët-
Boigny asserted that “we have agreed to link the future of Africa to French culture, as 
well as to France itself.”949  On May 15, he wrote personally to President René Coty, 
thanking him on behalf of Ivory Coast for the loi cadre reforms.950 
Given the turn in his rhetoric and level of support for France, Houphouët-Boigny 
also became an excellent example to the international community of the success of the 
French Union.  On January 9-10, 1957, he visited Washington and met with several 
officials from the State Department, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.  
During his meetings, Houphouët-Boigny extensively discussed the successes and future 
projects of the French Union, including general principles of French policy, the recent loi 
cadre, the future of Africa, and the importance of the concept of Eurafrique, both to the 
continent and the interests of the free world.951  Houphouët-Boigny’s visit had quite an 
effect on his hosts; Ministre des Affaires Étrangères Christian Pineau noted that the 
Americans were “very impressed by the manner in which Mr. Houphouët-Boigny 
expressed himself on the evils and the benefits of colonialism, to which he acknowledged 
the merit... of having launched Africa out of the state of savagery, in which it would still 
                                                 
948 Note pour Monsieur le Ministre, Oct. 4, 1956, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 491. 
949 “Allocution prononcée à la chambre de commerce de Côte d’Ivoire, April 11, 1957” in Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny, Anthologie des Discours, Tome I (Abidjan: Editions Ceda, 1978), 170.  
“Nous avons accepté de lier le destin de l’Afrique Noire de culture française à celui de la France.”   
950 Telegram from Félix Houphouet-Boigny to René Coty, May 15, 1957, ANP, 4 AG 47. 
951 Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à Monsieur le Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer, Jan. 
1957, ANOM, 1 AFFPOL 2183, Dossier 6. 
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find itself if the European colonizers had never intervened.”952  For their part, French 
officials felt that Houphouët-Boigny’s visit had made a great contribution to the State 
Department’s understanding of France’s overseas problems.953  Given his earlier rhetoric, 
such a development would have been unimaginable a decade previously. 
  
De Gaulle and Africa during the Fourth Republic 
 In assessing the evolution of mentalities about Africa during the Fourth Republic, 
a final word must be said regarding Charles de Gaulle.  After his resignation as head of 
the Provisional Government in 1946, he went into political exile for the next 12 years, 
occasionally making speeches but never getting directly involved with the functions of 
government.  De Gaulle continued his political exile until 1958, when he would be called 
back to form a government by President René Coty at the height of the Algerian crisis.  
But by this point, like his counterparts in the government, his thinking had already been 
affected by the explosive events of the mid-1950s.  As discussed in chapter two, de 
Gaulle’s appreciation of Africa’s importance to the empire developed during World War 
II, given the role that AEF played in rallying to Free France.  But this appreciation for 
Africa’s contributions was only part of the larger importance of the empire as a whole in 
restoring French grandeur after the war.  Essentially, although De Gaulle had a 
heightened sense of sub-Saharan Africa’s standing in the empire, AOF and AEF were 
mere complimentary parts, and not necessarily the central pieces of the empire – these 
                                                 
952 “Les fonctionnaires américains ont été également très impressionnés par la manière dont M. 
Houphouët-Boigny s’est exprimé sur les méfaits comme les bienfaits du colonialisme auquel il a 
reconnu la mérite... d’avoir tiré l’Afrique de l’état de sauvageries dans lequel elle se trouverait 




remained Algeria, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, France’s possessions in the Middle 
East. 
Although de Gaulle had been in political exile since 1946, he continued to follow 
events in the hopes of returning to power.  His initial mentality about Africa and the 
French Union was evident in a speech in Bordeaux in May 1947, in remarks given at the 
dedication of a plaque in memory of Félix Éboué, who had rallied AEF to Free France in 
August 1940.  De Gaulle used his speech not only to reflect on Éboué’s life, but also to 
assess the state of the French Union and its importance to the future.  As he noted, “the 
fate of our country, as well as the territories over which our flag flies, and even the 
destiny of the entire world, depend on what happens to the magnificent work of France 
overseas.”954  De Gaulle made clear that this ongoing project relied on progress being 
made in all of the colonies, including Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Vietnam, Madagascar, 
and “black Africa.”  Not coincidentally, “black Africa” was last on his list of France’s 
overseas territories.955  It also went unmentioned when de Gaulle described the extensive 
political reforms that had taken place throughout the empire since the war, most notably 
in Algeria, Vietnam, and Morocco.956  Instead, the main focus of the speech seemed to be 
the French Union as an aggregate, rather than the particular importance of any one of its 
parts.  To lose the French Union, de Gaulle argued, “would be a wound that could cost us 
dearly, up to and including our independence.”957 
                                                 
954 Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages: dans l’attente, 1946-1958 (Paris: Plon, 1970), 74.  
“...le destin de notre pays, celui des territoires où flotte notre drapeau, et même dans une large 
mesure celui du monde tout entier, dépendent de ce qu’il adviendra de l’œuvre magnifique de la 
France au-delà de mers.”   
955 Ibid., 75-6. 
956 Ibid., 78. 
957 Ibid., 81.  “...ce serait un abaissement qui pourrait nous coûter jusqu’à notre indépendance.”   
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In addition to its lack of emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa, de Gaulle’s speech 
diminished the importance of Éboué as a distinctly African figure, and instead portrayed 
him in the light of a larger historical narrative about France’s empire.  In praising Éboué, 
de Gaulle placed him in the lineage of famous colonial administrators who had advanced 
France’s standing in the world, including Louis Faidherbe, largely responsible for 
pacifying much of AOF; Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, who led the initial expeditionary 
mission in AEF; and Hubert Lyautey, the colonial administrator par excellence of 
Morocco in the early twentieth century.958  In addition, he firmly placed Éboué’s 
sacrifices during the war in the larger context of France’s international struggle to regain 
legitimacy, both at home and in the empire.  And Éboué’s greatest postwar contribution – 
namely, his emphasis on the need for distinctions in policy vis-à-vis specific African 
tribes – was blurred by De Gaulle, who focused instead on the Brazzaville Conference’s 
general importance to the empire.959  In commemorating Éboué as a product of the larger 
French empire, rather than a figure crucial to the development of sub-Saharan Africa, De 
Gaulle revealed the low priority he placed on sub-Saharan Africa in relation to the rest of 
the French Union. 
Only a few years later, his views seemed to have had already shifted regarding the 
distinct importance of sub-Saharan Africa to France’s future.  In March 1953, he 
travelled to both AEF and AOF to observe the reforms that had taken place since the 
Brazzaville Conference.  In a parallel to his speech in Bordeaux six years earlier, he was 
asked to participate in another commemoration of Éboué, for a dedication of a monument 
                                                 
958 Ibid., 76.  For a recent biographical look at all of these men, see Edward Berenson, Heroes of 
Empire: Five Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Africa (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2010). 
959 Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages: dans l’attente, 1946-1958, 77 
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in Bamako, Mali.  This time, De Gaulle emphasized Éboué’s sub-Saharan African 
heritage, noting that Éboué was a “black Frenchman” who had helped rally all of Africa 
to Free France.960  In addition to this revised view of Éboué’s identity, De Gaulle also 
placed an emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa in a way that he had not done in his speech in 
Bordeaux six years earlier.  Now, he discussed the “transformations in Africa” in a wide 
variety of areas, through which “the spirit of solidarity replaces bit by bit that of the 
former colonialism.”961  Interaction between the French and autochthonous populations in 
Africa had also reduced prejudices and had led to more cooperation since the war.  As De 
Gaulle noted, these developments could be attributed in large part to the Brazzaville 
Conference.  But now, instead of framing the Conference within the larger sense of the 
French Union, De Gaulle emphasized its particular importance to the evolution of French 
Africa.  This evolution had increased the importance of Africans within the French 
Union.  As he noted, “what marks the evolution we see here, is very much the part played 
by Africans, and the role played here by France.”962 
While the shift between De Gaulle’s remarks in 1947 and 1953 may seem subtle, 
he gave indications elsewhere about his views on the increasing importance of Africa to 
France’s future.  As the head of the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF), and 
hoping to return to a prominent role in French politics, De Gaulle maintained numerous 
back-channel relationships with foreign leaders.  In April 1952, he met in Paris with 
General Dwight Eisenhower, soon to be a candidate for president in the United States.  
During their conversation, De Gaulle, who in 1940 had shown little interest in Africa, 
                                                 
960 Ibid., 576. 
961 Ibid., 578.  “Dans le domaine moral et politique, l’esprit de solidarité remplaça peu à peu celui 
de l’ancien colonialisme.”   
962 Ibid.  “...ce qui marque ici l’évolution, c’est bien la part qu’y prennent les Africains et le rôle 
qu’y joue la France.”     
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revealed that he now placed great emphasis on the continent.  According to the American 
memorandum of conversation: 
[De Gaulle] said that in Africa the French had sometimes been wrong and 
sometimes been right, but nevertheless France needed that portion of Africa 
which was associated with her.  There were reforms which would have to be 
carried out, but in the framework of these reforms the French hoped that this 
portion of Africa would remain with them, as it was a prerequisite of their own 
greatness, and because they felt so strongly about this that anything which they 
interpreted as being interference or trespassing on their rights made them “leap 
into the air, and particularly myself,” added General de Gaulle.963 
  
Essentially, for De Gaulle, Africa was now an important aspect of France’s empire, 
which had to be protected and preserved at virtually all costs.  As the next chapter will 




 The events of May 1958 would bring an ill-fated end to the Fourth Republic.  No 
longer able to maintain control in Algeria – either over the war or the increasingly 
hardline European settler community – the Fourth Republic lost all legitimacy, leading to 
both President Coty’s request for De Gaulle to form a government, and the subsequent 
drafting of a new constitution.  As this chapter has demonstrated, there was an inverse 
relationship between political stability in the métropole and France’s relationship with 
sub-Saharan Africa during the late Fourth Republic.  Even as the situation in Algeria 
spun increasingly out of control and undermined confidence in one French cabinet after 
another, France consolidated its control in sub-Saharan Africa through new institutions 
and reforms.  By 1958, there had been a dramatic transformation of both mentalities and 
                                                 
963 Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant Colonel Vernon A. Walters, April 30, 1952.  
Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, Vol. VI: Western Europe and Canada 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 1201. 
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government policy.  The links between France and Africa were now based in abstract 
notions of cultural heritage, contributions to material progress, and a shared future.  
Given this shift, it was significantly less dangerous to devolve governmental functions 
back to AOF and AEF – a process that was well underway in 1958 as the European 
settlers in Algeria began their attempted coup against the French government. 
 From France’s perspective, the shift in Africa policy was fortuitous – its necessity 
having already been predicted by François Mitterrand and Pierre Mendès France a few 
years earlier.  The nature of France’s colonial wars in Vietnam and Algeria would 
preclude the formation of familial ties with those countries after independence.  But the 
relationship between Fifth Republic France and sub-Saharan Africa would flourish, both 
in the initial months of De Gaulle’s presidency, and after decolonization in 1960.  Of 
course, independence for France’s former colonies in Africa brought new challenges to 
France’s Africa project.  By relinquishing political control, France’s power vis-à-vis its 
former colonies, as well as its standing in the international community, were arguably 
diminished.  It would be up to De Gaulle and his followers to preserve France’s influence 







From Colonies to Client States: The De Gaulle Regime, 1958-1969 
 
The character of Francophone countries does not permit the former métropole to 
have economic interests in Africa equal to those of Great Britain.  But the 
political interest that France preserves in African countries and Madagascar is on 
a different level from its strategic and economic interests.  It maintains close 
relations with [African leaders] and will maintain a presence in Francophone 
capitals, regardless of the type of regime in power.964   
 
     -Internal Quai d’Orsay memo, Nov. 18, 1967 
 
Introduction 
By early 1958, the Fourth Republic was rapidly losing control over events in 
Algeria.  In February, seeking to achieve a strategic breakthrough against the Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN), French planes bombed Sakhiet, a suspected FLN stronghold 
in Tunisia.  The operation was a disaster; dozens of civilians were killed, instigating a 
public relations nightmare and leading to the resignation of Président du Conseil Félix 
Gaillard.  On May 13, what little legitimacy remaining with the Fourth Republic 
crumbled with the seizing of power in Algeria by hardline Generals Jacques Massu and 
Raoul Salan.  Fed up with what they perceived as the Fourth Republic’s constant 
weakness in the face of the FLN, they soon demanded that Charles de Gaulle be invested 
with the office of Président du Conseil in order to clean up the mess in Algeria.  De 
Gaulle’s announcement days later that he was ready to assume power, and President René 
Coty’s subsequent request for him to form a government, would sound the death knell for 
                                                 
964 Note: Vues françaises et britanniques sur la situation de l’Afrique à la fin de 1967, Nov. 18, 
1967.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1967 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2008), 
640-1.  “Le caractère des pays francophones ne permet pas à l’ancienne métropole d’avoir des 
intérêts économiques en Afrique égalant ceux de la Grande-Bretagne... Mais l’intérêt politique 
que la France conserve dans les pays africains et malgache est sans commune mesure avec ses 
intérêts stratégiques et économiques.  Il tient aux liens étroits les hommes et subsistera 
vraisemblablement dans les capitales francophones, quel que soit leur régime.”   
363 
 
the Fourth Republic.  By September, the French public had voted to abolish the 
constitution in favor of a new one that would grant broader powers to the executive 
branch.  Three months later, de Gaulle was elected as the Fifth Republic’s first president.  
In exile for twelve years, the general now returned to power triumphantly, hoping to 
succeed in the same mission he had pursued in the wake of World War II – to restore 
French grandeur.  As he noted to U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that July, “if 
France ceases to be a world power, she ceases to be France.”965 
In this chapter, I examine the rapid and startling transformation of the French 
relationship with Africa during the de Gaulle regime.  To be sure, de Gaulle’s African 
policy has been the subject of considerable scholarship in recent years.  As previously 
discussed, Tony Chafer’s work has been particularly helpful in deconstructing the myth 
of African independence as a “gift” willingly and magnanimously given by the new de 
Gaulle regime.966  Because of this misconception, Chafer argues, “complicity between 
France’s governing elites and African leaders has been one of the most enduring political 
aspects of the French colonial legacy in Black Africa.”967    Contra this myth, Chafer has 
provided insight on the role of West African political movements in winning 
independence for their countries.  Other historians, notably Guia Migani and Frédéric 
Turpin, have examined de Gaulle’s Africa policy as a distinct phenomenon, thus largely 
confining their analysis to the de Gaulle presidency and afterward.  However, Migani’s 
                                                 
965 Comptes rendus des entretiens franco-américains du 5 juillet 1958.  Documents Diplomatiques 
Français 1958 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1993), 26.  “Mais comment la France peut-
elle avoir sa place dans la situation mondiale?  Car si la France cesse d’être mondiale, elle cesse 
d’être la France.  C’est vrai du point de vue territorial comme point de vue politique.”     
966 For two examples of this line of thought, see Dorothy Shipley White, Black Africa and De 
Gaulle: From the French Empire to Independence (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1979); John Chipman, French Power in Africa (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
967 Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization? 
(Oxford: Berg, 2002), 235. 
364 
 
work stops at 1963, around the time when the transition to client-state relationships was 
becoming more apparent.968  In contrast, Turpin’s research extends well into the 
formation of client-state relationships by demonstrating the continuity in policy between 
the de Gaulle and Pompidou regimes, but focuses less on the connections between this 
period and the years following World War II.969     
As valuable as the aforementioned work has been, more insight can be provided 
about how the development of Africa’s political institutions remained reliant on 
assistance from the métropole, and how these affiliations with African leaders were 
influenced a great deal by the exigencies of France’s international situation.  Like his 
predecessor regimes, de Gaulle’s faced challenges on a number of foreign policy fronts.  
In his view, what was needed was strong leadership to restore France’s stature and 
“national independence.”  Consequently, one fundamental aspect of de Gaulle foreign 
policy was carving out a “special role” for France in Africa.  After the end of the 
Algerian War in 1962, French interests in North Africa would no longer predominate on 
the continent.  Although de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from Algeria was dictated by a 
variety of factors – most notably France’s continued defeats at the hands of the Algerian 
independence movement – the growing instability in North Africa also threatened 
France’s continued presence further south.  As the French ambassador in Gabon warned 
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères Maurice Couve de Murville in July 1961, Francophone 
                                                 
968 Guia Migani, La France et l’Afrique sub-saharienne, 1957-1963: Histoire d’une 
décolonisation entre idéaux eurafricains et politique de puissance (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008).  
Migani has also produced an English language article summarizing his research.  See Guia 
Migani, “De Gaulle and Sub-Saharan Africa: From Decolonization to French Development 
Policy, 1958-1963” in Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign 
Policies, 1958-1969, eds. Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2010), 251-70. 
969 Frédéric Turpin, De Gaulle, Pompidou, et l’Afrique (1958-1974): décoloniser et coopérer 
(Paris: Indes Savantes, 2010). 
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African leaders tended to identify with the Algerian independence movement, and any 
action reflecting poorly on France would have the tendency to undermine the ties it had 
so carefully forged on the continent.970 
With French withdrawal from North Africa on the horizon, sub-Saharan Africa 
became the last significant remnant of France’s former colonial power.  To be sure, 
France had specific strategic interests in the region, most notably the presence of oil in 
the Sahara, as well as the desert’s usefulness for the testing of atomic weapons.  But sub-
Saharan Africa represented more than these base interests.  French influence in Africa 
served as both a reminder of the métropole’s former colonial power, as well as a promise 
of its continued relevance in world affairs.  In short, it was the one area France could not 
afford to lose.  Therefore, de Gaulle’s initial challenge was managing the transition of the 
former colonies’ status under the French Union toward a significantly looser French 
“Community” which devolved most of the remainder of state functions back to local 
governments.  Just two years later, all of France’s former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa 
would declare their independence with little protest from the métropole – a clear sign that 
the legal form of France’s relationships with African countries mattered less than 
France’s actual influence on the continent.  
Of course, by 1958, the trend was clearly against continued European presence in 
former colonial areas.  Fortunately for de Gaulle, he could draw on one particularly 
valuable asset – the stature and respect accorded to him by African leaders.  As Tony 
Chafer notes, “[t]o many Africans, de Gaulle was ‘the man of Brazzaville’ and, as the 
                                                 
970 M. Risterucci, Haut-Représentant de France à Libreville, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre 
des Affaires Étrangères, July 17, 1961.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1961 Tome II (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1998), 101-3. 
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leader of Free France, was seen as the liberator of Africa.”971 While Chafer has shown 
that de Gaulle’s motives in 1944 were far from altruistic, there is little doubt that they 
were at least perceived that way in many circles at the time.  Simply put, there was no 
man better placed to reorient the relationship between France and Africa, especially given 
the troubles that France and its overseas territories faced as de Gaulle came to power.  By 
all accounts, he took full advantage of his standing in order to fully establish a French 
presence on the continent in the postcolonial era.  Throughout his regime, he was 
arguably the most significant political figure in Africa; there was a reason that so many 
African leaders referred to him affectionately as “papa”.972 
However, the extension of French influence in Africa did not go unchallenged.  
As discussed in the previous chapters, a vibrant anticolonial movement in Africa had 
already developed well before the inception of the Fifth Republic.  Led by Ghana’s 
Kwame Nkrumah, the new “pan-African” movement sought to develop the continent 
without continued European interference.  Not surprisingly, de Gaulle and his followers 
saw such notions of pan-African identity as a direct threat to the continuing French 
presence.  To this end, France encouraged its former colonies to oppose efforts by the 
pan-African bloc, both at the United Nations and in other international circles.  French 
leaders also fostered the development of a Francophone bloc, which could more 
effectively preserve the former colonial power’s interests in Africa.  With the 
independence of Belgian’s colonies, French influence could also extend into Congo, 
Burundi, and Rwanda. 
                                                 
971 Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 173. 
972 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair – A 
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The de Gaulle regime also faced perceived challenges from its western allies.  As 
chapters four and five illustrated, there was certainly a measure of skepticism among 
Fourth Republic leaders about the intentions of the United States and Britain.  But with 
de Gaulle’s rise to power, suspicions of the “Anglo-Saxons” reached a level unseen since 
the war era.  This sentiment manifested most prominently during debates about France’s 
role in NATO and Britain’s potential entry into the European Economic Community.  But 
it could also be seen in dealings with the “Anglo-Saxon” powers in Africa.  A variety of 
policies followed by the United States and Britain – including involvement in the Congo 
Crisis and support of certain African regimes – were often seen as attempts to undermine 
French influence on the continent.  After independence, Britain’s former colonies would 
also become a source of suspicion, as they were considered capable of furthering 
“Anglophone” interests in Africa. 
Through all of these efforts, the main focus was to preserve French influence in 
Africa at all costs.  Immediately after independence, it was fairly easy to reconcile this 
with the goal of encouraging democratic governments in African states.  But as the 
development of de Gaulle’s African policy illustrates, the realization quickly set in that a 
more flexible approach might be necessary in order to protect French interests.  In recent 
years, France has been the target of significant criticism for its client-state relationships 
with African dictators.  I will discuss this further in the conclusion, but it should be noted 
here that the seeds for this policy were sown during the early Fifth Republic.  What 
started as an effort to cultivate direct relationships between de Gaulle and African leaders 
eventually descended into active collaboration with despotic regimes.  By the mid-1960s, 
de Gaulle’s regime was actively supporting dictators with both military and financial aid, 
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and intervening with force when it became necessary to defend French interests.  As the 
previous chapters have demonstrated, these efforts were the culmination of two decades 
of insecurity stemming from World War II.  The resulting legacy was four decades of 
French collaboration with dictators in Africa.   
 
The Vote on the Community and the Secession of Guinea 
 In 1958, de Gaulle’s main objective for France’s new constitution was to expand 
the power of the executive branch of the French government.  But he also recognized, 
given the ongoing war in Algeria and other troubles faced by the French Union, that a 
new relationship between the métropole and its overseas territories would have to be 
forged.  On July 13, 1958, he emphasized that “we must build new institutions, establish 
the bonds of our union in a federal arrangement, and organize a great political, economic, 
and cultural ensemble that meets the conditions of modern life and progress.”973  This 
would entail modifying the arrangement with the overseas territories from a “Union” to a 
“Community”, whereby all governing powers would be returned to the overseas 
territories, with the exception of defense, foreign relations, economic policy, justice, and 
education.  Naturally, with the executive strengthened, the new President of the Fifth 
Republic would oversee the new Community.  As de Gaulle noted in a speech in Paris 
that September, this reorganization was vital to maintaining France’s standing in the 
world: 
                                                 
973 Allocution radiodiffusée prononcée à l’Hôtel Matignon, July 13, 1958.  Charles de Gaulle, 
Discours et messages: avec le renouveau, Mai 1958 – Juillet 1962 (Paris: Plon, 1970), 25.  
“...nous devons bâtir de nouvelles institutions, établir sur le mode fédéral les liens de notre union, 
organiser un grand ensemble politique, économique et culturel qui réponde aux conditions 
modernes de la vie et du progrès.” 
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The relationships between the métropole and the overseas territories require 
intense adaptation.  The world is crossed by currents that challenge the future of 
mankind and that are leading France to be cautious, all while fulfilling the role of  
restraint, peace, and fraternity, which is dictated by her vocation.  In short, the 
French nation will blossom or perish depending on whether the state has sufficient 
strength, perseverance, and prestige to take it where it needs to go.974   
 
In order to promote the proposed reorganization, de Gaulle embarked upon a tour 
of Africa in late August 1958, visiting Chad, Madagascar, Congo-Brazzaville, Ivory 
Coast, Haute-Volta, Guinea, and Senegal.975  De Gaulle’s message to his audiences was 
clear: if any of France’s African territories wished to become independent, they could 
simply vote “no” in a coming referendum, and France would not interfere with their 
decision.  But he emphasized that his strong preference, and that of France, was for 
Francophone Africa to remain affiliated with the métropole.  In a speech delivered in 
Abidjan, Ivory Coast on August 25, he explained the importance of the continued 
relationship between France and Africa, especially in light of the growing Cold War and 
threats to the continent: 
I am convinced of the magnificent and universal solidarity of all men and women 
of our African territories and our Métropole which is offered to them by this 
Community.  I am convinced that, a vote of “yes” having been pronounced 
everywhere, we will embark on the right path together.  We will enter together on 
the great way of free men... 
We will also provide an example to a world in peril, because who can doubt that 
this ensemble that we want to form together, is indispensable to us in the very 
grave circumstances that are encompassing our lands and the human race... With 
this terrible danger hanging over our heads, should we not stand together, 
shoulder to shoulder, over the largest possible space?  In as great a number as 
                                                 
974 Discours prononcé Place de la République à Paris, Sept. 4, 1958.  Ibid., 43.  “Les rapports 
entre la métropole et les territoires d’outre-mer exigent une profonde adaptation.  L’univers est 
traversé de courants qui mettent en cause l’avenir d’espèce humaine et portent la France à se 
garder, tout en jouant le rôle de mesure, de paix, de fraternité, que lui dicte sa vocation.  Bref, la 
nation française refleurira ou périra suivant que l’État aura ou n’aura pas assez de force, de 
constance, de prestige, pour la conduire là où elle doit aller.” 
975 Voyage du Général de Gaulle en Afrique Occidental Française, Archives Nationales de Paris 
(hereinafter ANP), 4 AG 299. 
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possible?  As fraternally united as possible, to face this threat, and by all means, 
to turn it away?976    
 
In general, de Gaulle received an overwhelmingly positive reception on his trip, thanks in 
large part by the efforts of African leaders wishing to stay affiliated with Paris.  For 
example, Houphouët-Boigny, who also served as the Minister of State in de Gaulle’s first 
cabinet, noted his concerns with the new constitutional arrangement.  He nevertheless 
stated that “we cannot remain indifferent to anything that affects the renewal of France, 
the grandeur of France, the unity of France...”977  However, elsewhere on the continent, 
there were signs that France’s former subjects might not accept the Community.  In 
Dakar and Conakry, de Gaulle was met by demonstrators calling for independence.978 
De Gaulle’s political gamble paid off.  The referendum, which took place on 
September 28, provided two choices for the overseas territories: continued association 
with France as part of the new Community, or complete independence.  As Tony Chafer 
                                                 
976 Discours prononcé par le Général de Gaulle à Abidjan, Aug. 25, 1958, p. 3-4,  ANP, 4 AG 
299.  “Je suis convaincu de l’adhésion universelle et magnifique de tous les hommes, de toutes les 
femmes de nos Territoires d’Afrique et de notre Métropole à cette Communauté qui leur est 
offerte.  Je suis convaincu que cela étant dit, c’est-à-dire le « oui » étant partout prononcé, tous 
feront ensemble le bon chemin.  Nous entrerons ensemble dans la grande voie des hommes 
libres... 
Pour l’exemple aussi à donner à un monde menacé, car, qui peut douter, que cet ensemble que 
nous voulons former en commun nous soit indispensable dans les circonstances si graves que 
traversent notre terre et l’espèce humaine... Dans cet immense danger qui pèse sur nos têtes, ne 
faut-il pas que nous nous tenions ensemble, coude à coude, sur le plus grand espace possible?  en 
aussi grand nombre que possible?  aussi fraternellement unis que possible, pour faire face à cette 
menace et, en tout cas, tenter de la détourner?”   
977 Houphouët-Boigny then proceeded to discuss his concerns whether France understood Ivory 
Coast’s eventual desire for independence.  Discours prononcé au stade Géo-André, Sept. 7, 1958.  
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Anthologie des discours, 1946-1978, Tome I (Abidjan: Editions Ceda, 
1978), 194.  “Bien que nous ne puissions demeurer indifférents à tout ce qui touche le renouveau 
de la France, la grandeur française, l’unité française, bien que j’appuie pour ma part avec joie et 
fierté, les textes qui consacrent désormais l’autorité, l’efficacité du Gouvernement français dont 
dépend en grande partie notre évolution commune...”   
978 Geoffrey Myers, “Shouts of ‘No, No,’ as De Gaulle Enters Dakar,”  Daily Telegraph and 




notes, de Gaulle had also implicitly offered a third option in a speech in Brazzaville that 
August, when he alluded to the possibility of independence for African states in the 
community at some later time.979  The effect that this may have had on the eventual vote 
is unclear, but there was no question that the result of the referendum was an 
overwhelming victory for de Gaulle.  All of France’s African territories, save one, voted 
for continued association with France through the new Community arrangement.  In West 
Africa, the official numbers were particularly staggering.  Of the seven states voting in 
favor of the Community, six had “yes” totals of over 94 percent, with Niger weighing in 
at 78 percent in favor.980 
 But Ahmed Sékou Touré’s Guinea had other ideas.  A member of the cross-
territorial Rassemblement Démocratique Africaine (RDA) and a vigorous trade union 
advocate, Sékou Touré had already earned a reputation as a populist and unpredictable 
political figure intent on winning independence for his country at all costs.  Leading up to 
the referendum, he appealed to Guineans to reject continued dependence on France so 
that Guinea could set its own path, noting that the proposal for the new Community 
“follows the logic of colonialism.”981 In a speech calling for independence, given in front 
of de Gaulle during his visit to Guinea, Sékou Touré called for a new basis for French-
Guinean relations, noting that “the quality, or rather the new nature of relations between 
                                                 
979 Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 174.  See also Jacques Foccart’s discussion 
in Jacques Foccart, Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, Vol. I (Paris: Fayard/Jeune 
Afrique, 1995), 161. 
980 Chafer’s work contains a chart of the relevant vote totals.  Chafer, The End of Empire in 
French West Africa, 179. 
981 “Interview Exclusive: Sékou Toure,”  L’Humanité, Aug. 25, 1958. 
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France and its former colonies will be determined without paternalism or deception.”982  
During the visit, he famously told de Gaulle that “we want independence... we prefer 
liberty in poverty over riches without dignity.”983  On September 28, Guinea responded to 
Sékou Touré’s appeals and rejected the French Community by an overwhelming vote – 
the only former African colony to do so.984  Four days later, its newly-constituted national 
assembly declared independence.985   
The de Gaulle regime’s swift and draconian reaction to the vote in Guinea 
illustrated how severe a loss the decision was to the métropole.  Although he had 
indicated that France would not present any obstacles to Guinea’s independence, de 
Gaulle also made clear that there were consequences for not cooperating in the way 
France had envisioned.  The day after the vote on the community, Jean Risterucci, the 
chief of the French mission to Guinea, wrote to Sékou Touré, indicating that France 
would be pulling out all assistance from the newly independent country: 
Due to this act, Guinea has no representation within the Community either from 
African or métropole agencies.  Due to this, Guinea can no longer normally 
receive either the support of the administration or the French state nor any loans 
for equipment.  Due to this, the responsibilities formerly assumed by the French 
state in Guinea must be profoundly revised... Similarly, the suspension of 
equipment operations will not allow for any new initiatives [in the country].986   
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The communiqué indicated that there would be a two month transition period in order not 
to disturb the functions of government.987  But as Martin Meredith indicates, the exodus 
of French officials was highly vindictive – “[t]hey took with them any French 
government property they could carry and destroyed what had to be left behind.  
Government files and records were burned; offices were stripped of furniture and 
telephones, even of their electric light bulbs.”988  The same day as Risterrucci’s 
communiqué to Sékou Touré, French representatives wrote to the Secretary General of 
the United Nations, opposing Guinea’s admission as an independent state to the 
organization.  They justified this position by arguing that Guinea was not ready to 
competently assume a variety of government functions including defense and foreign 
affairs, and could not protect the rights of minorities.989 
 For its part, Guinea attempted to maintain some level of cooperation with France, 
requesting that it remain within the franc monetary zone and that the two countries 
continue to trade.  In a series of letters to de Gaulle in early October, Sékou Touré 
reaffirmed these requests and further asked that France recognize Guinea as an 
independent nation.990  But matters were complicated by Soviet recognition of Guinea on 
                                                                                                                                                 
“De ce fait, la Guinée ne dispose d’aucune représentation valable à l’intérieur de la communauté, 
qu’il s’agisse des organismes métropolitains ou africains.  De ce fait, la Guinée ne peut plus 
recevoir normalement le concours ni de l’Administration de l’État français, ni des crédits 
d’équipement.  De ce fait, les responsabilités assumées par l’État français en Guinée doivent être 
profondément révisées...  De même, la suspension des opérations d’équipement ne permettra 
aucune initiative nouvelle.”   
987 Ibid., 498. 
988 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 21. 




October 4, which suggested the possibility of communist aid to Sékou Touré.991  As 
discussed in previous chapters, France had already been very concerned about possible 
communist penetration of the continent, from both the Soviet Union and Mao’s China.  
These concerns were particularly heightened after Khrushchev’s speech before the 20th 
Congress of the communist party in February 1956, in which Khrushchev noted that the 
elimination of colonial regimes was an official goal of the USSR’s foreign policy.992  
Partially because of this communist threat, de Gaulle was naturally skeptical of Sékou 
Touré, writing to him on Oct. 14: 
In order for the [French government] to be able to follow the path that you would 
like it to, you must understand that certain conditions must be fulfilled as 
preliminary matters.  It is a matter of, firsthand, that the government knows your 
intentions, notably concerning the requests you may think proper as to what 
would constitute an agreement of association.  On the other hand, we must receive 
evidence from the present government of Guinea regarding its ability to insure the 
effective charges and obligations of independence and sovereignty.993 
 
The mercurial Sékou Touré did not take kindly to de Gaulle’s suspicions about Guinea.  
He replied to de Gaulle the following day, accusing France of “an undeniable willingness 
                                                 
991 M. Dejean, Ambassadeur de France à Moscou, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères, Oct. 5, 1958.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1958 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie 
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992 Note du Département, pénétration Soviétique en Afrique, Jan. 26, 1959.  Documents 
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993 Charles De Gaulle to Ahmed Sékou Touré, Oct. 14, 1958, ANP, 5 AG I 214.  “Pour que le 
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l’indépendance et de la souveraineté.”   
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to stifle our young republic.”994  Nevertheless, he pressed his requests that Guinea remain 
in the franc zone – a request that was denied on October 28.995   
Having failed in this attempt, Sékou Touré appealed directly to de Gaulle, at the 
very least, to recognize Guinea as an independent and sovereign nation.996  But this was 
completely out of the question within French diplomatic circles.  As already noted, 
France already publicly opposed any recognition of independence or entry into the United 
Nations on the part of Guinea.  And, as an internal memo from later that month reveals, 
French officials made it a priority to pressure its western allies – notably Great Britain, 
Canada, and the United States – not to recognize Guinea in any way.997  By this point, 
Guinea had allies elsewhere on the continent, with Sékou Touré turning to Ghana’s 
Kwame Nkrumah for a loan of 10 million francs to help establish the new administration.  
The two leaders also declared a loose union between the two countries.  This latter 
declaration infuriated French leaders, as it was seen as Guinea’s betrayal of the 
Francophone bloc in Africa in favor of better relations with an Anglophone power.  
Nevertheless, Guinea continued to press its case with France, with Sékou Touré 
petitioning de Gaulle to sponsor Guinea’s application for admission to the UN.  De 
Gaulle’s curt response reveals his continued fury at Guinea’s rejection of entry into the 
French Community.  “Without completely rejecting [the possibility of eventually 
favoring Guinea’s admission],” de Gaulle indicated, “it appears to me that the situation 
created by your recent statement regarding a union with Ghana, a member of the British 
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Commonwealth, is weighing heavily on any future relations between us.  Consequently, 
it does not seem opportune to me to satisfy your request at the present time.”998  
 It must be emphasized that, despite these tensions, the French government 
attempted to maintain some semblance of a relationship with Guinea.  In the long run, it 
made no sense to cut off Guinea completely.  Such an action only risked the permanent 
defection of Sékou Touré to the Anglophone bloc, and/or to the growing number of 
anticolonial powers on the continent. Perhaps having understood this problem, on 
January 16, 1959, de Gaulle officially recognized Guinea.999  This did not necessarily 
settle the tensions between the two sides, as illustrated by Sékou Touré’s diatribe against 
France at the pan-African Conakry conference of April 1959, as well as a constant 
propaganda campaign within his own country blaming France for all of Guinea’s 
economic problems.1000  But France was willing to overlook some of these transgressions 
in order to keep Guinea reasonably within the French orbit.  An internal memo from May 
1959 warned that the deteriorating diplomatic situation was enabling the communist bloc 
to substitute its influence for that of France and the western world.1001  Cognizant of this 
threat, French officials met with Sékou Touré and members of his administration that 
May to discuss ways the two nations could cooperate with one another.  While 
acknowledging that Sékou Touré was not a friend of France in the region, French 
                                                 
998 Charles de Gaulle to Ahmed Sékou Touré, Nov. 29, 1958, ANP, 5 AG I 214.  “Sans rejeter 
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1001 Note de la direction d’Afrique-Levant, May 16, 1959.  Ibid., 636. 
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diplomat Roger Seydoux nevertheless warned the de Gaulle regime that a policy seeking 
to punish and exclude Guinea only harmed French interests in the long run: 
If France is less and less present in Guinea, its place will be quickly taken by 
candidates from the free world or behind the iron curtain who, lacking an 
ideological entente, will in any case find agreement on a common theme – 
anticolonialism.  They will threaten the flank of the [French] Community with a 
constant source of intrigue and subversion... If we allow the ties between us and 
Guinea to be loosened, we will contribute to providing more vigor to attempts at 
seduction now acting on Guinea.  If instead we continue to support them and help 
them adapt to independence, we will prepare an association in which the young 
state will be integrated more easily...1002   
 
These sentiments would persist throughout the de Gaulle regime; despite 
whatever level of intransigence posed by Sékou Touré, France was willing to make 
accommodations for its continuing existence within the French orbit.  Just two years 
later, after a particularly troublesome period of relations between the two countries, 
Guinea once again asked for a rapprochement between the two sides.  Despite signs of 
Sékou Touré’s increasingly repressive behavior, an internal French memo noted that “our 
interest is to encourage and favor with discretion this rapprochement.”1003  But by then, 
Guinea was just one of several African countries in which France was zealously 
attempting to maintain its postcolonial influence. 
 
                                                 
1002 Note de M. Roger Seydoux sur les entretiens franco-guinéens, June 24, 1959.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1959 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1994), 872-3.  “Si la France 
est de moins en moins présente en Guinée, la place sera vite prise par des candidats venus de 
monde libre ou de rideau de fer qui, à défaut d’entente idéologique, se mettront en toute cas 
facilement d’accord sur un thème commun: l’anticolonialisme, et maintiendront au flanc de la 
Communauté un foyer permanent d’intrigues et de subversion... 
Si nous laissons se desserrer les liens de toute nature qui nous unissent toujours à la Guinée, nous 
contribuerons à donner plus de vigueur aux tentatives de séduction qui, dès à présent, s’exercent 
sur elle.  Si, au contraire, nous les maintenons et les étendons en les adaptant à l’indépendance, 
nous préparerons une association de fait dans laquelle le jeune état devrait s’insérer d’autant plus 
facilement que les courants historiques, économiques et culturels vont dans ce sens.”   
1003 Note de l’Ambassade de France à Conakry, June 30, 1961.  Documents Diplomatiques 
Français 1961 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1997), 990. 
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Jacques Foccart and the Development of Francophone Africa  
Although Guinea had refused admission into the new French Community, the 
remainder of France’s overseas territories in sub-Saharan Africa all quickly acquiesced to 
the new administrative structure.  From October to December 1958, twelve African states 
joined the new Community.1004  The new arrangement would not last long; within two 
years, all twelve would be independent, this time without the rancor that had marked 
Guinea’s split two years previously. What mattered now was that France would be able to 
continue to exert its influence over the developing “états d’expression française” on the 
continent; the legal nature of that relationship was of little concern.  As de Gaulle noted 
in a speech in Senegal in December 1959: 
It is vital that the French, Africans, and Malagasy remain close together.  It is vital 
because of this continent of great men, who want and deserve progress.  It is vital 
because of France, whose assistance implicates reciprocal ties between us.  It is 
vital so that we can represent and advocate the ideals that we share throughout the 
world. It is vital so that we are able, if necessary, to defend our lands against all 
those who wish to take them, and our souls against those who would enslave 
them. And it is vital so that the fraternal ensemble that we are – which is a 
balancing element and an example for the world – succeeds.1005  
 
                                                 
1004 The twelve states were Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Mauritania, 
Chad, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Cote d’Ivoire, Haute Volta, and Niger. 
1005 Allocution prononcé à Saint-Louis du Sénégal, Dec. 12, 1959.  Charles de Gaulle, Discours et 
messages: avec le renouveau, Mai 1958 – Juillet 1962, 150.  “Il faut que les Français, les 
Africains et les Malgaches restent étroitement ensemble.  Il le faut à cause des hommes de ce 
grand continent qui veulent et qui méritent le progrès.  Il le faut à cause de la France, dont le 
concours implique des liens qui soient réciproques.  Il le faut pour que nous puissions représenter 
et faire valoir, dans le monde, l’idéal qui nous est commun.  Il le faut pour que nous soyons en 
mesure, s’il le fallait, de défendre ensemble nos terres contre ceux qui voudraient les prendre et 
nos âmes contre ceux qui voudraient les asservir.  Et il le faut pour que l’ensemble fraternel que 
nous sommes, et qui est un élément d’équilibre et un exemple pour le monde, réussisse.”   
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De Gaulle also made clear to other world leaders that France had a long-term interest in 
the continent.  As he noted to President Eisenhower in December 1959, “the countries of 
Africa must evolve with France, and not in opposition to it.”1006   
 Of course, it was vital that the new Francophone Community in Africa remain 
united as a bloc, especially given the increased focus on the continent by foreign powers.  
One immediate problem arose with the rapidly developing rivalry between the two most 
prominent leaders in France’s former African colonies, Félix Houphouët-Boigny and 
Léopold Sédar Senghor.  Each had different ideas about how African states should 
evolve; Houphouët-Boigny believed that each state should individually pursue its own 
path to development, while Senghor openly worried about the “balkanization” of West 
Africa resulting from these various paths.1007  After the 1958 vote on the Community, 
both leaders sought to enhance their power in West Africa by forming alliances in the 
region.  In Senghor’s case, this led to an initial agreement in January 1959 by four West 
African states – Senegal, Soudan, Dahomey, and Haute-Volta – to association within the 
Community.  After independence in 1960, Senghor led Senegal to join Soudan in a short-
lived union known as the Mali federation.  Houphouët-Boigny’s efforts focused on 
linking Côte d’Ivoire in a federation with Dahomey, Haute Volta, and Niger, known as 
the Conseil d’Entente, which was aimed at more technical and economic cooperation 
among the four states.1008  Another union, which included Central African Republic, 
                                                 
1006 Réunion des trois à Rambouillet, Dec. 20, 1959.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1959 
Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1995), 765.  “Il faut que les pays d’Afrique évoluent avec 
la France et pas contre elle.” 
1007 Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 180. 
1008 Note du Secrétariat d’État aux relations avec les États de la Communauté, April 1, 1960.  
Documents Diplomatiques Français 1960 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1995), 351-4. 
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Congo-Brazzaville, and Chad, was formed at a conference at Fort Lamy in May 1960.1009  
These various groupings had proven Senghor’s fears, with French leaders growing 
concerned about a “balkanization” of the continent, whereby the Francophone bloc would 
be split up and weakened in the face of Anglophone interests in Africa.1010 
 Fortunately for France, all of these new African blocs quickly professed their 
intention to remain closely affiliated with the métropole.  When the Conseil d’Entente 
countries requested independence, they made certain to clearly indicate that they wished 
for a continued strong association with France.1011  For its part, France quickly and 
positively responded to these desires for continued association, signing a series of 
cooperative accords spanning economic, technical, and educational aid with several 
Francophone states within a year of independence.  Most importantly, the de Gaulle 
regime agreed to provide military aid to new African states.  France also encouraged the 
former Community states to cooperate on a variety of issues.  Shortly after independence, 
twelve states took part in a series of meetings meant to search for a common ground on 
developments in Congo, the war in Algeria, and the threat of the pan-African 
movement.1012  By April 1961, when the twelve nations met in Yaounde, an internal 
                                                 
1009 Note de la sous-direction des affaires de la Communauté: Naissance de l’Union des 
Républiques d’Afrique centrale, June 7, 1960.  Ibid., 782-8. 
1010 See Jacques Foccart’s brief discussion of the dangers of “balkanization” with regard to 
Nigeria’s power in West Africa, in Jacques Foccart, Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philippe 
Gaillard, Vol. I (Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995), 342. 
1011 Note: Évolution politique des États du Conseil de l’Entente, Aug. 19, 1960.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1960 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1996), 230. 
1012 These meetings took place in Abidjan in October 1960, Brazzaville in December 1960, and 
Yaounde in April 1961.  The twelve states were Senegal, Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, 
Dahomey, Mauritania, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Central African Republic, Chad, Cameroon, 
and Madagascar.  Note du Secrétariat d’État aux Relations avec les États de la Communauté, 




French memo approvingly noted a growing solidarity among these Francophone states 
and a shared purpose on a variety of issues.1013   
 In addition to these early efforts to transform the former colonial arrangement in 
sub-Saharan Africa into a new French community, the de Gaulle administration mounted 
a vigorous diplomatic effort designed to strengthen direct ties between Paris and 
individual African leaders.  The man charged with leading this effort was Jacques 
Foccart, the Secrétaire Général aux Affaires Africaines et Malgaches, serving under de 
Gaulle’s direct supervision.  Foccart’s tenure in the office, which lasted from 1960-1974, 
would lead to his being given the nickname Monsieur Afrique.1014  Within the 
administration, he had virtually unchecked power on African matters, needing to consult 
de Gaulle only on serious decisions, and often having final say over the Quai d’Orsay.1015  
By the end of the de Gaulle regime, Foccart’s influence on the continent had grown to the 
extent that he took frequent telephone calls from African leaders, including Togo’s 
Gnassingbé Eyadema, Congo’s Mobutu Sese Seko, and Gabon’s Omar Bongo, during 
which he gave them advice on ruling their respective countries.1016  When Foccart was 
                                                 
1013 Ibid., 454. 
1014 Foccart, who died in 1997, has left behind several valuable sources on his time as head of the 
Africa cell.  In 1995, he did a series of interviews with journalist Philippe Gaillard.  See Foccart 
parle: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard (2 vols.) (Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995).  His 
journals, written while he was in office, have also been published.  See Journal d’Elysée (5 vols.) 
(Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1997).  Of the latter set, the first two volumes address his service 
under the De Gaulle regime.  In the coming years, more insight into his work will be possible due 
to the recent opening of the long-awaited Archives du Secrétariat Général pour les Affaires 
Africaines et Malgaches, in the Archives Nationales de Paris.  As of this writing, an inventory of 
documents was close to completion.  For a discussion of the collection, which contains over 5,000 
dossiers, see Pascal Geneste, “Les papiers Foccart aux Archives Nationale,” Vingtième Siècle 78 
(2003): 157-162.  I would like to thank Pascal Geneste, who works at the Archives Nationales, 
for his helpful responses to my queries about the collection. 
1015 Foccart somewhat modestly describes his authority over the various French bureaucracies on 
African matters in Jacques Foccart, Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, Vol. I 
(Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995), 233-4. 
1016 Ibid., 236. 
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temporarily relieved of his duties following de Gaulle’s resignation in April 1969, 
Houphouët-Boigny personally wrote to Foccart to express his gratitude for his 
contributions, noting that he had become “the living symbol of the privileged relationship 
that we had with [de Gaulle].”1017   
 Foccart, one of de Gaulle’s closest advisors throughout his political life, gained 
the general’s confidence during his time in the Resistance, which he joined in 1942.  His 
clandestine service during the war made him well-suited to reorganize the provisional 
government’s security forces after liberation.  After de Gaulle’s self-imposed exile from 
power, Foccart turned his attention to politics, where he helped de Gaulle build the 
structure for the new Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF).  In 1949, he became the 
president of the RPF’s Overseas Commission.1018  From 1947 to 1952, de Gaulle sent 
Foccart on a series of missions to Guadeloupé, Martinique, Guyane, and Réunion to make 
contact with local representatives of the RPF and help build the party.1019  After de Gaulle 
disbanded the RPF, Foccart accompanied the general on trips to Africa in March 1953 
and March 1957, as well as during de Gaulle’s 1958 tour in advance of the vote on the 
Community.  It was during all of these trips that Foccart developed his network, making 
acquaintances with the men who would eventually rise to power in Africa.1020  When de 
Gaulle returned to politics in 1958, the choice of Foccart to head the Fifth Republic’s 
“Africa cell” was an obvious one.  As Foccart would later note, de Gaulle trusted his 
counsel on African affairs, and the general took a great interest throughout his presidency 
in events transpiring on the continent: 
                                                 
1017 Félix Houphouët-Boigny to Jacques Foccart, May 3, 1969.  Ibid., 483.  “...le symbole vivant 
des relations privilégiées que nous entretenions avec lui.”   
1018 Ibid., 91. 
1019 Ibid., 476. 
1020 Ibid., 100-1. 
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African affairs interested the General in all their details.  He paid close attention 
to me every day, regardless of the importance of the events I spoke with him 
about, often minor in international news or in relation to national concerns.  One 
cannot say anything similar about any other region.  He wanted to follow the 
evolution [of the continent] bit by bit, and country by country.  He knew the men 
who mattered, and not just the heads of state; he was fully aware of the strengths 
and weaknesses of their character, their supporters, their adversaries, and their 
problems.1021 
 
Although Foccart had great influence in all of France’s dealings with her former 
African colonies, the centerpiece of his early efforts was a series of high-level visits by 
African heads of state, aimed at reinforcing common interests, as well as shared cultural 
and historical ties.  Starting in 1961, de Gaulle personally welcomed to Paris those 
leaders vital to French interests on the continent.  In the first year of the initiative, 
Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny, Leon M’Ba of Gabon, Hubert Maga of Dahomey, Fulbert 
Youlou of Congo-Brazzaville, and Diori Hamani of Niger were all treated to lavish 
multiday visits to the métropole.  These visits typically involved a welcome at Orly 
Airport by de Gaulle or Foccart with an accompanying full military honor guard, a 
ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe’s Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, presentation before 
the French diplomatic corps, and a state dinner at the Elysée Palace.  In the following 
days, their tours involved a visit to the UNESCO headquarters in Paris, additional 
meetings with French officials, a joint press conference with de Gaulle, and entertainment 
                                                 
1021 Ibid., 241-2.  “Les affaires africaines intéressaient le Général dans tous leurs détails.  Il s’en 
entretenait quotidiennement avec moi quelle que fût l’importance des événements dont je lui 
parlais, souvent mineure dans l’actualité internationale ou par rapport à ses préoccupations 
d’ordre national.  On ne peut rien dire de semblable à propos d’aucune autre région du monde.  Il 
tenait à suivre le fil d’évolution qu’il avait amorcée et à la comprendre, pays par pays.  Il 
connaissait les hommes qui comptaient, et pas seulement les chefs d’État ; il n’ignorait rien de 
leurs forces et de leurs faiblesses de caractère, de leur assise, de leurs soutiens, de leurs 
adversaires ni de leurs problèmes.”   
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involving some aspect of French culture, such as an outing to the Comedie Française or a 
presentation at the Bibliotheque Nationale about France and Africa’s shared heritage.1022 
But the centerpiece of these visits was undoubtedly the state dinner given by de 
Gaulle, during which the President commemorated the special relationship that existed 
between France and each leader’s respective country.  Exemplary of this were his 
comments during Senghor’s visit in April 1961, when de Gaulle spoke of the long history 
between France and Senegal: 
For three centuries, our two countries have had close contact and yet they have 
never opposed each other, have never ignored each other, and have never fought 
with each other.   For three centuries, they established strong and numerous links 
between them.  For three centuries, there is not one great human cause - and it 
goes without saying that great human causes are also those of France - there is not 
one great human cause that has not been supported at the same time by the men of 
Senegal: the advent of democracy, the abolition of slavery, the opening of Africa 
to civilization, the defense of freedom in two world wars, and the liberation of 
Europe in World War II. Of course, it is mostly the blood of soldiers and ideas of 
thinkers that sealed this fraternity. For France, a black soldier, in common 
parlance, is a Senegalese soldier.  For France, President Senghor is a Senegalese 
poet and also a French writer, as well as a Head of State.1023 
 
De Gaulle was also effusive in his praise for other African leaders.  Two months later, in 
a state dinner for Houphouët-Boigny, de Gaulle emphasized both “the eminent role you 
                                                 
1022 The details of these meetings can be found in the following records: Leon M’Ba of Gabon, 
ANP, 5 AG I 576; Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, ANP, 5 AG I 577; Felix Houphouët-
Boigny of Ivory Coast, ANP, 5 AG I 580; Hubert Maga of Dahomey, ANP, 5 AG I 583; Fulbert 
Youlou of Congo-Brazzaville, ANP, 5 AG I 584; and Diori Hamani of Niger, ANP, 5 AG I 582. 
1023 Toast adressé à S.E. M. Léopold Senghor, Président de la République du Sénégal, April 19, 
1961.  Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, avec le renouveau: Mai 1958 – Juillet 1962, 
304-5.  “Depuis trois siècles, nos deux pays sont en contact étroit et ils ne se sont jamais opposés, 
jamais méconnus, jamais combattus.  Depuis trois siècles, ils nouent entre eux des liens forts et 
nombreux.  Depuis trois siècles, il n’y a pas une seule grande cause humaine – et il va de soi que 
les grandes causes humaines sont celles de la France – il n’y a pas une seule grande cause 
humaine qui n’ait été soutenue en même temps par les hommes du Sénégal : l’avènement de la 
démocratie, l’abolition de l’esclavage, l’ouverture de l’Afrique à la civilisation, la défense de la 
liberté dans les deux guerres mondiales, la libération de l’Europe au terme de la deuxième.  Bien 
entendu, ce sont surtout le sang des soldats et les idées des penseurs qui ont scellé cette fraternité.  
Pour la France, un soldat noir, dans le langage courant, c’est un soldat sénégalais.  Pour la France, 
le Président Senghor, c’est un poète sénégalaise et un écrivain français, en même temps qu’un 
Chef d’État.”   
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play at the essential action you have taken” as well as the “profound esteem and 
attachment” felt by France for the Ivoirian leader.1024  When Congo-Brazzaville’s 
President Abbé Fulbert Youlou visited that November, de Gaulle took note of Congo-
Brazzaville’s vital role in the early stages of the resistance.1025  The following year, de 
Gaulle welcomed the Central African Republic’s David Dacko, and praised him for being 
“the guide and main craftsman of the profound transformation which is in the process of 
being realized in the Central African Republic.”1026 
For their part, many African leaders remained loyal to France throughout de 
Gaulle’s tenure as president.  In particular, Houphouët-Boigny would become the 
linchpin of French policy in Africa, and he frequently expressed his deep gratitude for the 
continuing relationship with France, as he did in a 1966 speech marking the anniversary 
of Ivory Coast’s independence.1027  In turn, de Gaulle cited Houphouët-Boigny and 
Senghor as positive examples during conversations with other African leaders.1028  For 
example, both Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor were often instrumental in keeping the 
recalcitrant Guinea within the French orbit.1029  In 1965, de Gaulle credited Houphouët-
Boigny for having played an important role in the rapprochement between France and 
                                                 
1024 Toast adressé à S.E. M. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Président de la République de Côte 
d’Ivoire, June 7, 1961.  Ibid., 323. 
1025 Toast adressé à S.E. M. l’Abbé F. Youlou, Président de la République du Congo, Nov. 20, 
1961. Ibid., 365-7. 
1026 Toast adressé à S.E. M. D. Dacko, Président de la République Centrafricaine, June 20, 1962.  
Ibid., 425. 
1027 Discours prononcé à l’occasion du sixième anniversaire de l’indépendance, Aug. 5, 1966.  
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Anthologie des discours 1946-1978,  Tome II (Abidjan: Editions Ceda, 
1978), 741. 
1028 Meeting between Charles de Gaulle and Foreign Minister of Kenya Joseph Murumbi, March 
29, 1965,  ANP, 5 AG I 214. 
1029 Note de la direction d’Afrique-Levant: relations franco-guinéennes, June 4, 1963.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1963 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1999), 590. 
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Nigeria.1030  They were also not afraid to go on the attack when necessary.  This could be 
seen after Guinea’s declaration of independence, when Senghor criticized Sékou Toure’s 
ambitions and his growing relationship with the Soviet Union in a press conference in 
Paris on May 22, 1959.1031  Houphouët-Boigny and his followers in the Conseil d’Entente 
took a more hardline approach, insisting that no state that wanted immediate 
independence should be allowed to join the French Community.1032  In November 1965, 
Sékou Touré, during another period of disenchantment with France, accused French 
officials, along with Houphouët-Boigny and the presidents of Dahomey, Upper Volta, 
and Congo of participating in a plot to assassinate him.1033  In a press conference on 
November 17, Houphouët-Boigny attacked Sékou Touré’s regime, accusing him of 
despotism and manufacturing the accusations to deflect attention from problems with his 
own regime.  Most notably, he mounted an impassioned defense of France, complaining 
that Sékou Touré should not have made accusations against the French authorities who 
had tried to work with him in good faith.1034  This latter defense demonstrated a well-
entrenched pro-French bloc in Africa, which French officials had exerted a great deal of 
effort coordinating.   
 
                                                 
1030 M. le Général de Gaulle, Président de la République Française, à Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa, Premier Ministre de la République du Nigeria, Sept. 28, 1965.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1965 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2004), 377. 
1031 M. de Guiringaud, Ambassadeur de France à Accra, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, May 25, 1959.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1959 Tome I (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1994), 701 note 1. 
1032 Note: Evolution politique des États du Conseil de l’Entente, Aug. 19, 1960.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1960 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1996), 228. 
1033 M. Koenig, Ambassadeur de France à Conakry, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, Nov. 16, 1965.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1965 Tome II (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 2004), 594. 
1034 M. Raguenet, Chargé d’affaires de France A.I., près l’ambassade de France à Abidjan, à M. 
Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Nov. 22, 1965.  Ibid., 629. 
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The Francophone Bloc and African Politics 
The coalescing of a Francophone bloc was especially important given the 
continued collaboration of the anticolonial states in Africa.  As noted in the previous 
chapter, the work of the 1955 Bandung Conference had served as an inspiration for the 
movement.  Its leader in West Africa was Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, whose country had 
won its independence from Britain in 1957.  His “pan-African” movement aimed to form 
a common African consciousness and expel western interests from the continent.  For 
French leaders, Nkrumah’s movement threatened to bolster a “myth of African unity” 
that could potentially undermine the unique bond among Francophone African 
nations.1035  Not coincidentally, the pan-African movement began to gain momentum just 
as the controversy between France and Guinea broke out.  In December 1958, Nkrumah 
held a pan-African conference in Accra, and attacked colonialism, imperialism, and 
racism in all its forms. France’s recent draconian measures in Guinea were heavily 
criticized, as was France’s attempt to maintain a continuing presence on the continent.  
As the French representative to the conference later noted, Nkrumah declared that 
“Africa is not the extension of Europe or any other continent, and he opposed the 
contention of some non-African elements entrenched on the continent that they could 
refuse to allow the application of the law of the majority, despite the fact that this is the 
basis of the West’s political doctrine.”1036    
                                                 
1035 Note de la direction d’Afrique-Levant, Sept. 16, 1960.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 
1960 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1996), 354. 
1036 M. de Guringaud, Ambassadeur de France à Accra, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, Jan. 1, 1959.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1959 Tome I (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1994), 5.  “L’Afrique n’était le prolongement ni de l’Europe ni d’aucun 
autre continent, et s’éleva contra la prétention de certains éléments d’origine non africaine établis 
en Afrique qui se refusent à laisser appliquer la loi de la majorité, laquelle constitue pourtant... la 
base de la doctrine politique de l’Occident.”   
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Although representatives from most of the French territories in Africa were 
invited, very few attended, having been discouraged from doing so by the French 
authorities.  But despite this failure in outreach, Nkrumah’s conference posed a challenge 
to French interests, especially in West Africa.   He announced the eventual formation of a 
“United States of Africa” with the union between Ghana and Guinea serving as a 
fundamental first step.1037  The two countries also immediately began supporting Algeria 
in UN debates concerning French actions in North Africa.  That April, the Accra coalition 
reunited in Conakry, Guinea, where Sékou Touré attacked France and promised “the final 
liquidation of colonialism by peaceful means of non-cooperation, that is to say, by 
economic boycott wherever necessary and possible.”1038  The following August, nine 
independent states met in Monrovia, Liberia, to discuss, among other things, French 
actions in Algeria and the testing of nuclear weapons in the Sahara.1039  This latter issue 
would continue to be a source of discontent with France in Africa and a powerful 
counterpoint against continuing French influence in the region. 
 Nkrumah reasserted the position of the newly-independent African countries in a 
meeting with the French ambassador to Ghana, Louis de Guiringaud, in May 1959.  After 
Guiringaud explained the structure of the new French community, Nkrumah noted that 
                                                 
1037 M. de Guiringaud, Ambassadeur de France à Accra, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, Dec. 9, 1958.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1958 Tome II (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1993), 826-7.  M. de Guiringaud, Ambassadeur de France à Accra, à M. 
Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Jan. 1, 1959.  Documents Diplomatiques 
Français 1959 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1994), 2-12. 
1038 M. Francis Huré, chargé d’affaires de France à Conakry, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre 
des Affaires Étrangères, April 22, 1959.  Ibid., 545.  “la liquidation finale du colonialisme et du 
racisme par le moyen pacifique de la non-coopération, c’est-à-dire, le boycottage économique 
partout où cela sera nécessaire et possible.”   
1039 Note de la direction d’Afrique-Levant, au sujet de la conférence de Monrovia, Aug. 10, 1959.  
Documents Diplomatiques Français 1959 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1995), 162-3.  




this made Francophone African territories beholden to France, which was in 
contravention to their natural wishes to be more integrated within Africa.1040  “Africa 
must belong to Africans,” Nkrumah emphasized.  “No part of Africa can be considered as 
an extension of Europe or any other continent.”1041  For his part, Guiringaud responded 
that in the age of atomic weapons, “it is not nominal independence that matters, but the 
way to earn respect and the possibility of cooperation between peoples.”1042  He noted 
that Houphouët-Boigny and other African leaders had already decided that their best 
interests lay with France.  Upon leaving the meeting, it was clear to Guiringaud that 
Ghana considered France “adversary number one”.  He concluded that France might be 
the only power “which places a check on [Nkrumah’s] expansionist and pan-African 
dreams.”1043   
 Fortunately for France, it could count on its friends in Africa to defend its 
interests on the continent.  The new Francophone bloc was particularly useful at the 
United Nations.  A November 1960 internal memo from the French delegation to the UN 
approvingly noted the debut of this concerted lobby by Francophone African countries at 
the General Assembly.  “Our black friends,” the memo noted, “have asserted their 
presence and their faith in a new Africa – certainly liberated [from colonial rule], but 
hostile to all forms of violent upheaval.”1044  More importantly, the new Francophone 
                                                 
1040 M. de Guiringaud, Ambassadeur de France à Accra, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, May 26, 1959.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1959 Tome I (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1994), 706. 
1041 “L’Afrique doit appartenir aux Africains.  Aucune fraction de l’Afrique ne peut être 
considérée comme le prolongement de l’Europe ou d’un autre continent.”  Ibid., 706. 
1042 Ibid., 706-7. 
1043 Ibid., 708.  “Nous sommes bien ceux, et peut-être les seuls, qui font échec à ses rêves 
expansionnistes et panafricains.”   
1044 Note de la Délégation française auprès du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, Nov. 24, 
1960.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1960 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1996), 
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African bloc was only “moderately anticolonial” and did not seem inherently disposed to 
opposing French ideas for the development of Africa.1045  As the head of the French 
delegation at the UN noted, this showing at the General Assembly was illustrative of an 
“amicable collaboration” between France and Francophone nations, which was superior 
to the relationship being developed between Britain and Anglophone countries on the 
continent.1046 
 The growing rivalry between the pan-African and Francophone blocs led to a 
further hardening of alliances.  On the pan-African side, the Casablanca Conference, held 
from January 3-7, 1961, demonstrated the developing cooperation among the anticolonial 
powers.  Chaired by Morocco’s Mohammed V, it brought together the main players in the 
anticolonial movement, including Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, Mali’s Modibo Keita, Egypt’s 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Algeria’s Ferhat Abbas.1047  In the years that followed, French 
diplomats would refer to these countries as “the Casablanca powers”. The conference 
addressed a number of matters, including the unfolding crisis in Congo (discussed 
below), the continued war in Algeria, and France’s testing of atomic weapons in the 
Sahara.1048  As in the past, such discussions posed a serious threat to France’s interests on 
the continent.  An internal Quai d’Orsay memo on the conference, while acknowledging 
that rivalries existed among the aforementioned anticolonial leaders, nevertheless warned 
that the Casablanca powers were capable of presenting a “common front” against African 
                                                                                                                                                 
632.  “Nos amis noirs... ont donc tenu à affirmer leur présence et leur foi dans une Afrique 
nouvelle, émancipée certes mais hostile à tout bouleversement violent.”  
1045 Ibid. 
1046 M. Bérard, Chef de la Mission permanente de la France auprès de l’Organisation des Nations 
Unies, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Dec. 21, 1960.  Ibid., 773. 
1047 Note de la direction d’Afrique-Levant, Conférence de Casablanca, Jan. 10, 1961.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1961 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1997), 14. 
1048 Ibid. 16-7. 
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nations loyal to France.  This threat was even more dangerous given the potential of the 
deteriorating situation in Congo to undermine western authority there.  “This summit of 
African extremists will probably be quite disappointing for the participants,” the memo 
noted.  “But the evolution of events in Congo could once again tip the scales in their 
favor.”1049   
 Partially in response to the Casablanca Conference, the Francophone bloc 
continued its efforts to form a loose union around shared goals and principles.  To this 
end, twelve states that had previously met at Abidjan, Brazzaville, and Yaounde 
convened in September 1961 in Tannarive, Madagascar to form the Union Africaine et 
Malgache (UAM).1050  The organization had as its goal “to organize, in all areas of 
foreign policy, cooperation among its members in order to strengthen their solidarity, to 
assure their collective security, to aid their development, and to maintain the peace in 
Africa, Madagascar, and the world.”1051  To this end, the Tannarive powers agreed on a 
mutual defense pact to supplement their existing arrangements with France, established 
an organization for economic cooperation, and concluded pacts to coordinate policy in 
the areas of diplomacy, justice, and communications.1052  Most important for France, the 
UAM, while ideologically sympathetic to general pan-African notions and the larger 
                                                 
1049 Ibid., 17.  “Ce sommet des extrémistes africains aura sans doute finalement été assez décevant 
pour tous les participants.  Mais l’évolution des événements au Congo risque de faire à nouveau 
pencher la balance en leur faveur.”   
1050 See M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, aux Représentants 
diplomatiques de la France à l’étranger, Sept. 21, 1961.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 
1961 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1998), 446-9.  The UAM would later become the 
Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache at the Nouakchott Conference of February 1965.  
See Note de la Direction des Affaires Africaines et Malgaches: Participation du groupement 
francophone aux conférences d’Alger et d’Accra, Aug. 12, 1965.  Documents Diplomatiques 
Français 1965 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2004), 226 note 2. 
1051 Ibid. 447.  “...d’organiser, dans tous les domaines de la politique extérieure, la coopération 
entre ses membres afin de renforcer leur solidarité, d’assurer leur sécurité collective, d’aider à 
leur développement et de maintenir la paix en Afrique, à Madagascar et dans le monde.”   
1052 Ibid. 448. 
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nonaligned movement, was not rabidly anticolonial.1053  As Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères Maurice Couve de Murville noted in his report on the conference to French 
diplomatic representatives around the world, “both by its style and its conclusions, the 
Tannarive Conference has attested to the existence among its participants of a maturity 
and a cohesion, which have to this point not been seen among the rival Casablanca 
states.”1054  The following February, Couve followed up with his diplomatic corps, 
approvingly noting that “this beginning of consolidation in moderate Africa is in itself 
encouraging, as it was important to undermine the extremists’ monopoly on exploiting 
the myth of the unification of Africa.”1055   
 For his part, de Gaulle was strongly supportive of these efforts.  Any 
developments on the continent that hindered the formation of a strong Francophone bloc 
also threatened to undermine French influence in Africa in general.  In January 1962, he 
wrote to Houphouët-Boigny, congratulating him on his efforts to construct a Francophone 
African union, and emphasizing its importance to France’s future: 
... Europe, which also intends to unite its free nations, has a great interest in 
dealing with as coherent a group as possible in the middle of your continent.  
France, in particular, strongly wishes that the assets of moral, cultural, and 
material values, which it has in common with many African countries and 
Madagascar, are represented and developed by them in a common African 
community and not divided into multiple and feeble elements.  Finally, the world 
would have nothing to gain from the pulverization of these peaceful regions.1056   
                                                 
1053 Ibid. 446. 
1054 Ibid. 449.  “Tant par son style que par ses conclusions, la conférence de Tannarive a attesté 
l’existence, chez ses participants, d’une maturité et d’une cohésion qui ont jusqu’ici totalement 
fait défaut au groupe rival des États de Casablanca.”   
1055 M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, aux Représentants diplomatiques de 
la France à l’étranger, Feb. 3, 1962.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1962 Tome I (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1998), 94.  “Ce début de consolidation de l’Afrique modérée est en soi 
encourageant et il importait certainement d’enlever aux extrémistes le monopole de l’exploitation 
du mythe de l’unification de l’Afrique.”   
1056 Le Général de Gaulle, Président de la République Française, à M. Houphouët-Boigny, 




 French officials were greatly heartened by the role played by the UAM at the 
United Nations.  As noted in chapters three and four, France had been subjected to a 
series of attacks in the General Assembly throughout the 1950s.  With the transition to 
independence of France’s former colonies, they could take a more prominent and 
eloquent stand in the General Assembly in defense of their former colonizer.  As noted by 
French UN representative Roger Seydoux, several UAM members spoke in favor of 
France in proceedings of the Fourth Committee; each time they were given the 
opportunity to discuss France, “they praised the benefits of our actions in their countries, 
manifested their pride in taking part in our culture, and exemplified the success of the 
decolonization policy of General de Gaulle.”1057  This was in stark opposition to attacks 
by some of the UAM countries on Great Britain and Anglophone countries in Africa, and 
embodied a loyalty not seen among the African countries in the British 
Commonwealth.1058  As Seydoux proudly noted two months later, the most striking 
aspect of the relationship between France and the UAM nations was “solidarity and unity 
based primarily on our shared language and culture.”1059   
                                                                                                                                                 
elle aussi, tend à d’unir dans sa partie libre, a grand intérêt à avoir affaire, au milieu de votre 
continent, à un groupement aussi cohérent que possible.  La France, en particulier, souhaite fort 
que le capital de valeurs morales, culturelles, et matérielles, qui lui est commun avec nombre de 
pays africains et avec Madagascar soit représenté et développé par eux en Afrique comme un 
tout, et non pas fractionné en multiples et faibles éléments.  Enfin, le monde, lui non plus, n’aurait 
rien à gagner à la pulvérisation de ses régions pacifiques.”   
1057 M. Seydoux, Représentant permanent de la France auprès de l’Organisation des Nations 
Unies, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Jan. 3, 1963.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1963 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1999), 13.  “...ils ont loué les 
bienfaits de notre action dans leur pays, manifesté leur fierté de participer à notre culture et cité 
en exemple le succès de la politique de décolonisation du général de Gaulle.”   
1058 Ibid. 
1059 M. Seydoux, Représentant permanent de la France auprès de l’Organisation des Nations 
Unies, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, March 15, 1963.  Ibid.,  283.  




 In 1965, the UAM would transform into a larger organization, the Organisation 
Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM).  This organization, which focused on 
educational, technical and economic cooperation, was comprised of all Francophone 
countries with the exception of Mauritania, and unlike the UAM, expanded to include 
Rwanda and Congo.  Like the creation of the UAM, the founding of the OCAM 
heartened French leaders, as it helped present a more unified Francophone bloc to counter 
other interests on the continent.  That July, de Gaulle welcomed the heads of state of 
eight OCAM members to the Elysée Palace, and reaffirmed the essential ties that existed 
between France and Francophone African nations: 
All of you here... united in the desire to ensure that your states, their elites and 
their people, are profoundly linked among themselves by a decidedly common 
language and culture.  Because this language and culture are that of we other 
Frenchmen, we can only rejoice at the decision taken by yourselves and which, 
for the foreseeable future, will bring even more each day through its spirit, soul, 
and radiance.1060   
 
It should be noted that de Gaulle only encouraged Francophone African 
collaboration.  Indeed, French leaders were highly suspicious of any cooperative 
agreements in Africa that were not purely Francophone.  As one example, the 
Organization for African Unity, founded in 1963 by 32 African nations in an attempt to 
reconcile the divide between the Casablanca and Francophone blocs, was seen by the de 
Gaulle regime as a potential proxy for the dangerous pan-Africanist philosophy.  
Similarly, the pursuit of an Anglophone-inclusive West African regional economic 
                                                 
1060 Toast adressé à L.L.E.E. Mm. Les chefs d’état de l’OCAM, July 9, 1966.  Charles de Gaulle, 
Discours et messages: vers le terme, Janvier 1966 – Avril 1969 (Paris: Plon, 1970), 59.  “Vous 
voici... réunis dans la volonté de faire en sorte que vos États, leurs élites et leurs peuples, soient 
liés entre eux en profondeur par une langue et une culture décidément communes.  Comme cette 
langue et une culture sont celles de nous autres Français, nous ne pouvons que nous réjouir d’une 
décision prise par vous-mêmes et qui, au long des temps, nous rapprochera chaque jour davantage 
par l’esprit, l’âme et le rayonnement.”   
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arrangement (the organization that would eventually become ECOWAS) by Senegal, 
Mali, and other Francophone states was heavily frowned upon.  As an internal Quai 
d’Orsay memo from March 1968 noted: 
If this project were completed, it would involve serious danger both for the 
Francophone African states and us.  It would end the West African monetary 
union as well as the franc zone; undermine the foundations of the Yaounde 
Convention [a financial aid agreement between Europe and Africa]; probably 
mark the end of Francophone African organizations; disrupt our policy of 
cooperation, and because of economic disparities among the Anglophone 
countries, render uncertain the latter’s economic takeoff.1061   
 
The idea of shared ties in Africa based on French language and culture would 
later inspire Senghor’s concept of Francophonie, which he began discussing in 
connection with the UAM’s successor organization, the Organization Commune 
Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), by the mid-1960s.  As discussed in chapter five, for 
Senghor, there was something inherent about French culture and education that made 
Francophone countries particularly situated to bring progress to Africa.  In a conversation 
with the French ambassador to Senegal in 1966, Senghor noted that “it is obvious that 
only Francophonie... can provide a solution for African problems, among them the 
relationship between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa.”1062  Eventually, the concept 
of Francophonie would expand beyond the métropole and Africa; Senghor also 
                                                 
1061 Note de la direction des affaires Africaines et Malgaches, March 28, 1968.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1968 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2009), 580.  “Ce projet, s’il 
était même à son terme, comporterait de sérieux danger tant pour les États africains francophones 
que nous-mêmes.  Il mettrait un terme à l’union monétaire Ouest-africaine et de ce fait à la zone 
franc, saperait les fondements de la Convention de Yaoundé, marquerait probablement la fin des 
organisations francophones africaines, perturberait notre politique de coopération et, en raison des 
disparités économiques entre pays anglophones, rendrait aléatoire le décollage économique de ces 
derniers.”   
1062 M. Vyau de Lagarde, Ambassadeur de France à Dakar, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, April 18, 1966.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1966 Tome I (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 2006), 650.  “Mais il bien est évident que seule la francophonie... peut 
apporter une solution aux problèmes africains, entre autres celui des relations entre le Maghreb et 
pays au sud du Sahara.”   
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envisioned it encompassing Belgium, Switzerland, and Canada.1063  That year, at the 
OCAM conference in Tannarive, Madagascar, the organization agreed to form an 
exploratory committee chaired by Senghor and Niger’s Hamani Diori to further discuss 
the issue.1064  The foundations for the formal organization would later be established at 
the 1969 Niamey Conference in Niger, which brought together the ministers of education 
from Francophone countries to discuss efforts to preserve and spread French culture 
throughout the world.  It persists to this day and includes over 50 members from four 
continents.1065 
 
De Gaulle’s Relationship with the United States and Great Britain 
 The increased collaboration of the anticolonial powers in Africa was not the only 
compelling reason to encourage development of a strong Francophone bloc.  With the 
return of de Gaulle to power, French foreign policy would be underscored by a strain of 
Anglophobia not seen since the end of World War II.  To be sure, as chapters four and 
five discussed, suspicions of the “Anglo-Saxons” had not disappeared completely, as 
Fourth Republic leaders remained concerned about American and British intentions on 
the continent.  But there had also been increased collaboration with the western alliance 
in Africa, especially in the face of potential communist penetration.  Of course, de Gaulle 
had similar concerns about Soviet, and later Chinese designs.  But while he remained a 
believer in the American alliance in many respects, he also worried that the United States 
                                                 
1063 Ibid. 
1064 Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, aux Représentants diplomatiques de la France (in 
Africa), Jan. 12, 1968.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1968 Tome I (Paris : Imprimerie 
Nationale, 2009), 69. 
1065 For more on Francophonie’s history, see Christian Valantin, Une histoire de la francophonie 
(Paris: Belin Littérature et revues, 2010).  See also Christophe Traisnel, Francophonie, 
francophonisme : groupe d’aspiration et formes d’engagement (Paris: L.G.D.J, 1998). 
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had too much power – a sentiment he conveyed to UN Secretary-General U Thant in July 
1964, when he noted that “although she is an ally of the United States, France does not 
believe that American hegemony is good for the world.”1066  He was also quick to view 
U.S. and British interests as intertwined; for de Gaulle, France, while remaining close to 
the western alliance, also had to assert its autonomy between the twin poles of “Anglo-
Saxon” and Soviet domination.  To this end, de Gaulle pursued a policy of “national 
independence” for France that could give it more latitude vis-à-vis the Cold War powers.  
In his own words, this independence would “allow France to become – despite the 
ideologies and hegemony of [the United States and the Soviet Union], in spite of the 
passions and prejudices of race, above the rivalries and ambitions of nations – a 
champion of cooperation, whose absence would lead to the troubles, the interventions, 
and the conflicts, which lead to world war.”1067  
 De Gaulle’s policy of “national independence” was made clear during 
controversies concerning France’s development of atomic weapons and its involvement 
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  During the Eisenhower 
administration, the preference of the U.S. government was to have its nuclear umbrella 
protecting Western Europe, instead of having individual nations develop their own 
atomic weapons.  To this end, the United States generally refused to share nuclear secrets 
                                                 
1066 Compte rendu: entretien du général De Gaulle et de M. Thant, secrétaire général de l’ONU, 
July 21, 1964.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1964 Vol. II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 
2002), 81.  “Bien qu’elle soit l’amie des États-Unis, la France n’estime pas qu’une hégémonie 
américaine soit bonne pour le monde.” 
1067 Conférence de presse tenue au Palais de l’Élysée, Sept. 9, 1965.  Charles de Gaulle, Discours 
et Messages, pour l’effort: Août 1962 – Décembre 1965 (Paris: Plon, 1970), 384.  “En 
effet, l’indépendance ainsi recouvrée permet à la France de devenir, en dépit des idéologies et des 
hégémonies des colosses, malgré les passions et les préventions des races, par-dessus les rivalités 
et les ambitions des nations, un champion de la coopération, faute de laquelle iraient s’étendant 
les troubles, les interventions, les conflits, qui mènent à la guerre mondiale.”   
398 
 
with its allies in mainland Europe – with the exception of Britain, which had tested its 
first nuclear weapon in 1952 and began cooperating with the United States on nuclear 
technology later in the decade.1068   However, France, which had already been pursuing 
its own nuclear program during the Fourth Republic, was excluded from these 
cooperative efforts – a decision which enraged de Gaulle.  From the outset of his return to 
power, de Gaulle made no secret about his intentions for France to achieve an atomic 
arsenal.  As he noted to U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in July 1958: 
We do not have the atomic bomb.  We are far behind you; we are not as rich as 
you are.  But we are on track to make ourselves an atomic power, which, of 
course, will not rival your arsenal or that of the Soviet Union.  It is now only a 
matter of months.  But one thing is certain: we will have atomic weapons.1069 
 
That October, in a press conference, de Gaulle justified France’s pursuit of atomic 
weapons by indicating that France had favored complete disarmament.  But this having 
failed, it made no sense for France not to develop a nuclear arsenal – especially when 
both the “Anglo-Saxons” and the Soviets already had them.1070  In 1960, de Gaulle’s 
vision was realized when France completed its first successful nuclear test in the Sahara – 
a decision that caused great consternation among the western alliance, as well as anger 
throughout African capitals.1071 
                                                 
1068 For an overview of the early British atomic weapons program, see John Baylis, Ambiguity 
and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
1069 Comptes rendus des entretiens franco-américains du 5 juillet 1958.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1958 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1993), 26.  “Nous, nous 
n’avons pas cette force atomique.  Nous sommes très en retard sur vous; nous sommes beaucoup 
moins riches que vous.  Mais nous sommes sur la voie de nous faire une puissance atomique qui, 
bien évidemment, sera sans rapport avec la vôtre ou avec celle de l’URSS.  C’est maintenant une 
affaire de mois.  Une chose est certaine: nous aurons l’arme atomique.”   
1070 Conférence de presse tenue à l’Hotel Matignon, Oct. 23, 1958.  Charles de Gaulle, Discours 
et messages: avec le renouveau, Mai 1958 – Juillet 1962 (Paris: Plon, 1970), 57.   
1071 For more on the history of the French nuclear program, see Bruno Tertrais, La France et la 
dissuasion nucléaire: concept, moyens, avenir (Paris: Documentation française, 2007); Wilfrid L. 
Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).  See also Philip 
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In addition to these tensions with the western alliance about nuclear weapons, de 
Gaulle’s regime also initiated efforts to change the terms of the NATO alliance in a 
manner more favorable to France.  The primary concerns regarding NATO were twofold.  
First, de Gaulle and his followers were upset that the collective security pact did not 
encompass the French community in Africa.  This meant giving France privileged control 
over the Mediterranean and Africa, where it could defend its particular sphere of interest.  
Second, de Gaulle wished to undermine, and perhaps abolish, the practice of integrating 
NATO forces.  He viewed the defense of national territory as the primary responsibility 
of that nation’s citizens, and did not want French troops taking orders from foreign 
officers on matters of national security.1072  Based on these two areas of discontent, along 
with the aforementioned resentment about American nuclear policy, the de Gaulle regime 
would make a series of decisions significantly diminishing French participation in NATO 
command, including the withdrawal of all of France’s fleets, the expulsion of NATO 
troops from the métropole, and the removal of all non-French nuclear weapons from 
French soil.1073 
 In addition to its growing rivalry with the United States, the French relationship 
with Britain also worsened during the de Gaulle years, mostly because of debates about 
                                                                                                                                                 
G. Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of De Gaulle’s Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).  
1072 These views were made clear in De Gaulle’s press conference in Paris on Sept. 5, 1960.  
Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages: avec le renouveau, Mai 1958 – Juillet 1962, 248-9. 
1073 Several excellent sources on the troubled relationship between France and the western 
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Relations and the French Problem, 1960-1963: a Troubled Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 
2000); Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns 
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Britain’s entry into the European Common Market, and to a lesser extent, British support 
for Anglophone African countries.  De Gaulle also remained highly suspicious of 
Britain’s special relationship with the United States, as well as the possibility that joint 
“Anglo-Saxon” action could hinder French designs in a variety of areas.  From his 
perspective, Britain could not focus its attention across the Atlantic and maintain a 
special relationship with the United States, while at the same time attempting to receive 
favorable treatment on the European mainland.  This led to French attempts to prevent 
Britain from joining the Treaty of Rome, which had established the European Economic 
Community in 1956.  When Gladwyn Jebb, the British ambassador to France, indicated 
to de Gaulle in December 1958 that Britain felt it was being subjected to “hostile 
maneuvers” by France, de Gaulle responded that “it was the United States and England 
that have pushed France toward the track of European community.”1074  This issue would 
persist throughout the de Gaulle regime; when negotiations broke down in May 1963 
between the six European members and Britain, the French ambassador to London 
attacked the British unwillingness to understand how the U.S.-U.K. special relationship 
interfered with eventual integration with the mainland.1075  Maurice Couve de Murville 
confirmed these sentiments in conversations with President Kennedy later that month.  
After Kennedy confronted him about French efforts to exclude Britain from the EEC and 
suggested that French sentiments bordered on anti-Americanism, Couve noted that the 
special relationship with United States prevented Britain from establishing similar 
                                                 
1074 Note de la Présidence du Conseil, Dec. 12, 1968.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1958 
Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1993), 855. 
1075 M. de Courcel, Ambassadeur de France à Londres, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, May 22, 1963.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1963 Tome I (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1999), 521-2. 
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relations with Europe.1076  De Gaulle’s policy was so vindictive that even after Britain’s 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson made several overtures to de Gaulle promising to make his 
country more independent of the United States, de Gaulle still vetoed Britain’s entry in 
November 1967.1077 
 More importantly, the return of de Gaulle to power marked a significant shift in 
the level of suspicion of British intentions in Africa.  While these suspicions had certainly 
existed during the Fourth Republic, the level of paranoia about Anglophone intrigues on 
the continent reached a high point during the de Gaulle regime.  To be sure, there 
remained a level of cooperation between the respective French and British diplomatic 
corps, especially regarding planning for the future of Africa.  But the level of trust 
between the two nations had changed permanently.  This could be immediately seen 
during the crisis in relations with Guinea, when Sékou Touré announced the formation of 
a loose union with former British colony Ghana.  Sufficient hostility was evident from 
both the French government and the French press about potential British plots that it 
prompted a meeting on November 25, 1958 with British ambassador to France Gladwyn 
Jebb, who attempted to reassure French officials.  His aide-memoire of the conversation 
detailed the sentiments he expressed to the French delegation: 
The French government have already been given categorical assurances that 
HMG were in no way a party to the agreement reached between Dr. Nkrumah and 
M. Sékou Touré.  It would indeed be ridiculous to conclude from this agreement 
that the United Kingdom, which has been gradually relinquishing its colonial 
responsibilities throughout the world, has any desire to supplant or weaken the 
French position in Africa.  On the contrary, HMG fully realise the value of the 
French Community as a defence against Communist or Nasserist expansion.  Both 
                                                 
1076 Entretien entre le Président des États-Unis et le Ministre des Affaires étrangères à 
Washington, May 25, 1963.  Ibid., 539. 
1077 For Wilson’s talks with De Gaulle, see M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères, à divers représentants diplomatiques de la France à l’étranger, Jan. 30, 1967.  
Documents Diplomatiques Français 1967 Tome I (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 2008), 174. 
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France and the United Kingdom are basically in the same position in Africa.  The 
essential problem for both countries, as the French government will agree, is to 
ensure that their former colonies, whatever degree of independence that they have 
obtained, remain in close and friendly relations with them and with the West as a 
whole.1078  
 
 Despite such frequent assurances, de Gaulle’s mentality about British and 
American actions in Africa was unwavering, as illustrated by a note to Foccart, written by 
the General on July 5, 1962.  De Gaulle had received word that the Quai d’Orsay was in 
discussions with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Mennen Williams 
regarding further cooperation on the continent.  De Gaulle, highly suspicious of any such 
talks, made clear that he had no tolerance for Anglophone interference in what he 
considered was France’s exclusive domain: 
Why even have these negotiations?  All we will accomplish is to allow the 
Americans, and especially this American, who is hostile to us, to interfere in our 
African affairs....  We must not engage with the Americans on any subject or on 
any point.  This unfortunate meeting that will take place is to be limited to a 
simple summary and exchange of views.1079     
 
Of course, de Gaulle’s mentality was not lost on Francophone African leaders eager to 
cooperate with France in the postcolonial era.  Houphouët-Boigny in particular remained 
a staunch critic of Anglophone Africa; in January 1961, he met with French Prime 
Minister Michel Debré and assailed British policy in Africa, which he considered 
“egotistical and hostile to French policy, and without any real effort at cooperation with 
                                                 
1078 Aide-memoire from British ambassador Gladwyn Jebb, Dec. 5, 1958, ANP, 5 AG I 214.  
1079 Charles de Gaulle to Jacques Foccart, July 5, 1962.  Jacques Foccart, Foccart parle: 
entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, Tome I (Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995), 479.  “Pourquoi 
faire ces négociations?  Tout se passe comme si nous mettions nous-mêmes les Américains (et 
spécialement cet Américain-là, qui nous est hostile) dans nos affaires africaines.  D’ailleurs, les 
Anglais, eux, se sont défilés ! 
Sur aucun sujet, sur aucun point, nous ne devons nous engager en rien vis-à-vis des Américains.  
La fâcheuse réunion qui va avoir lieu est à limiter à un simple et sommaire échange de vues.”   
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the West.”1080  He also criticized the “mediocrity” of Anglophone African leaders and the 
growing influence of Nigeria in West Africa.1081 
To be sure, as was the case for the Anglophobic strain in the Free French 
movement, the level of enmity between de Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxon powers should 
not be overstated.  Later in the de Gaulle regime, France began to move away from a 
policy of direct rivalry with Britain in Africa.  Foccart would later claim that with the 
exception of the conflict in Biafra, Nigeria (discussed below), there was very little direct 
confrontation with Britain on the continent.1082  But there still remained an Anglophone 
threat – the problem was no longer active British threats to the French presence in Africa, 
but rather the rivalry between Francophone and Anglophone territories.  As an internal 
memo from June 1959 noted: 
There no longer exists in 1959 what could properly be called a franco-British 
rivalry in Africa.  There exists an antagonism between the British Commonwealth 
and the French Community.  Our adversary is no longer the colonial office, but 
rather the office that has relations with the commonwealth, the Foreign Office, 
those sectors with a large majority in favor of British opinion, and of course the 
dominions of black Africa – the countries descended from British language and 
civilization (with the exception of South Africa).1083   
                                                 
1080 Note du Premier Ministre, M. Michel Debré, entretien avec M. Houphouët-Boigny, Jan. 16, 
1961.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1961 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1997), 50.  
“... une politique égoïste, hostile à la politique française et sans véritable effort de coopération 
occidentale.” 
1081 Ibid. 
1082 Jacques Foccart, Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, Tome I, 253. 
1083 M. Debré, Première Ministre, à M/ Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Aug. 
26, 1959.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1959 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1995), 
237.  “Il n’existe plus à proprement parler en 1959 de rivalité franco-britannique en Afrique.  Il 
existe un antagonisme entre le Commonwealth (britannique) et la Communauté (française).  
Notre adversaire n’est plus le Colonial Office, mais l’Office des relations avec le Commonwealth, 
le Foreign Office, des secteurs très largement majoritaires de l’opinion britannique, et bien 
entendu avec les Dominions du continent noir, les pays africains de langue et de civilisation 
britannique (Afrique du Sud exceptée).”   France was a frequent supporter of the apartheid regime 
in South Africa, partially due to the Pretoria government’s independence from Anglo-American 
policy on the continent.  An internal Quai d’Orsay memo from April 1966 noted that despite the 
apartheid policy, French-South African relations were “satisfactory”, in part because South Africa 




The rivalry with Anglophone Africa posed an even greater threat given French 
efforts to support the development of the UAM, which could help further Francophone 
interests on the continent.  As the organization took shape, officials at the Quai d’Orsay 
made certain to emphasize the importance of being wary about the intentions of the 
former British colonies, and particularly Nigeria.  In the wake of a conference in Lagos in 
January 1962 during which the UAM met with Nigeria and other African states to discuss 
regional cooperation, Couve wrote to the diplomatic corps the following March 1962, and 
warned them that at some point, it would be important “it would be important “to 
highlight the dangers to the UAM that can be presented by regional consolidations with 
neighboring Anglophone states, which will use to maximum advantage their geographical 
position and superiority of resources.”1084 Given this, Couve noted it might be a good 
                                                                                                                                                 
relations économiques entre la France et l’Afrique du Sud, April 28, 1966.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1966 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2006), 705.  This economic 
cooperation included the sale of uranium by South Africa to France for use in its atomic weapons 
program, and the shipment of significant amounts of weapons from France to South Africa.  Ibid., 
706.  In the UN, while France did not outwardly support South Africa’s apartheid policy, it also 
opposed efforts to sanction the Pretoria regime and refused to participate in committees 
addressing apartheid.  Ibid., 707.  When African countries began to more publicly criticize 
France’s arms sale, the Quai d’Orsay, rather than re-evaluating its policy, simply blamed Britain 
and Anglophone African countries.  Note de la sous-direction sur les réactions africaines à la 
campagne contre nos ventes d’armes à l’Afrique du Sud, Jan. 30, 1968.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1968 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2009), 179.  Only after 
understanding that continued arms sales would have serious consequences for “our economic 
presence and our political influence on the African continent” did French officials decide to cut 
back the arms sales.  Note de la sous-direction d’Afrique: les livraisons d’armes à l’Afrique du 
Sud, June 5, 1968.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1968 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 2009), 879. 
1084 M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, aux Représentants diplomatiques de 
la France à l’étranger, March 14, 1962.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1962 Tome I (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1998), 252.  “Il y aurait lieu, à cette occasion, de souligner les dangers que 
peuvent présenter pour l’UAM les regroupements régionaux avec les États voisins de l’Afrique 
anglaise, qui utiliseront au maximum les avantages découlant de leur position géographique et de 
la supériorité de leurs ressources.”   
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idea to enlarge the UAM to include Francophone states Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo, in 
light of “the latent competition between French Africa and Anglophone Africa.”1085 
Although they were not French colonies, Rwanda and Burundi nevertheless held 
significant importance, given their proximity to former British colony Uganda, which the 
de Gaulle regime saw as a natural rival to French interests in east Africa.  The 
independence of both nations in July 1962 presented an opportunity for France.  A Quai 
d’Orsay memo from March 1962 emphasized the importance of Rwanda and Burundi to 
France’s future: 
These two countries are of particular importance to us because they are 
Francophone, and because of the more or less avowed greed they are subjected to 
by neighboring English language countries, Uganda and especially Tanzania.  The 
leaders of Dar-es-Salaam [the capital of Tanzania] dream of effectively 
reconstituting the former German East Africa.  Our interest is obviously that 
Rwanda and Burundi remain in the realm of Francophone Africa.1086   
 
To this end, the memo concluded that any aid provided to Rwanda and Burundi should be 
commensurate to significant aid already being given to the former Belgian Congo.1087  A 
memo from that May concluded that the need for military, economic, technical, and 
educational aid was significant, given the coming departure of Belgian forces and the 
possibility of ethnic violence and general disorder.1088 
                                                 
1085 Ibid. 
1086 Note de la direction d’Afrique-Levant: Ruanda-Urundi, March 13, 1962.  Ibid., 248.  “Ces 
deux pays revêtent pour nous une importance particulière du fait qu’ils sont francophones, et en 
raison des convoitises plus ou moins avouées dont ils sont l’objet de la part des pays voisins de 
langue anglaise, l’Ouganda et surtout le Tanganyika.  Les dirigeants de Dar-es-Salaam rêvent en 
effet de reconstituer l’ancien Est-Africain allemand.  Notre intérêt est évidemment que le Ruanda 
et le Burundi demeurent dans le monde africain de langue française.”   
1087 Ibid., 249. 
1088 Note de la direction d’Afrique-Levant, May 5, 1962.  Ibid., 461-464; M. Massé, Consul de 




 For his part, Rwandan president Grégoire Kayibanda made significant efforts to 
cultivate this relationship, meeting with French officials in August 1962 and telling them 
that he and his collaborators “had for many years kept an eye on France.”1089  With 
Rwanda’s independence and the opening of the French embassy in Kigali, Kayibanda 
looked forward working with France to obtain technical assistance, and also to working 
with the larger Francophone community in Africa.1090  The following month, Kayibanda 
and his counterpart from Burundi attended a UAM conference in Bangui in order to 
develop these relationships.1091  In line with Foccart’s outreach to African leaders, 
Kayibanda was rewarded with a state visit to Paris that October, including a personal 
meeting with de Gaulle.1092  This led to a series of accords between the two countries for 
aid in several areas.  By May of 1965, Kayibanda began petitioning France for even more 
aid.1093  Mwambutsa IV Bangiricenge, the king of Burundi, was given a similar audience 
in December 1962, eventually leading to French-Burundi accords on technical and 
education cooperation in February of 1963.1094  By early 1966, the French ambassador in 
Burundi had noted that French assistance to the country was preventing it from forging a 
closer relationship with the Soviet Union.1095  In addition to this, the French government 
                                                 
1089 M. Barbey, Ambassadeur de France à Usumbura et à Kigali, à. Couve de Murville, Ministre 
des Affaires Étrangères, Aug. 21, 1962.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1962 Tome II 
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1090 Ibid. 
1091 M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à M. Roger Seydoux, Chef de la 
Mission permanente de la France auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Oct. 2, 1962.  Ibid., 
265-6. 
1092 Ibid. note 3. 
1093 M. Fines, Ambassadeur de France à Kigali, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères, May 21, 1965.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1965 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 2003), 618. 
1094 Note: Situation au Burundi, April 8, 1965.  Ibid., 425-7. 
1095 M. Barbey, Ambassadeur de France à Bujumbura, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, Jan. 22, 1966.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1966, Tome I (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 2006), 120-2. 
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was already taking steps to strengthen its relationship with another Francophone nation – 
the largest on the continent. 
 
“Nonintervention” in Africa: The French Position during the Congo Crisis 
 Like Rwanda and Burundi, the former Belgian Congo provided a valuable 
opportunity for French interests in Africa.  Congo had been a source of both great wealth 
and prestige for King Leopold II, who secured Belgium’s interest in the vast territory in 
the heart of Africa in the late 19th century.1096  For over twenty years, Leopold and his 
followers exploited Belgium’s prize colony, extracting tens of millions of dollars worth 
of rubber and ivory through the use of slave labor, and massacring untold numbers of 
Congolese in the process.1097  By the early twentieth century, reports of the atrocities in 
the Congo had been made public, forcing Leopold to divest himself and his heirs of their 
interests in the Congo, and leading to the turnover of the colony to the Belgian state.  It 
would remain in Belgian hands until June 30, 1960, when, following the prevailing winds 
sweeping across the continent, Congo gained its independence. 
 But the decolonization of Congo quickly led to disaster.  Power was initially split 
between Joseph Kasavubu, the country’s new president, and Patrice Lumumba, its prime 
minister.  The latter was a charismatic firebrand with sympathies for both the Soviet 
Union and the pan-African movement.  His speech on Congo’s day of independence, 
which attacked Belgian rule and continued European involvement in Africa, quickly gave 
                                                 
1096 In 1971, Mobutu Sese Seko would rename the former Congo as Zaire.  For purpose of 
consistency, I simply refer to it as Congo in this dissertation.  France’s former colony in Afrique 
Équatoriale Française, now known as Republic of the Congo is referred to as Congo-Brazzaville 
after its capital city. 
1097 See Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in 
Colonial Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998); Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa: 
White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876-1912 (New York: Avon Books, 1992). 
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him a reputation among the European community as a man who could not be dealt 
with.1098  Part of the transition agreement between Congo and Belgium included the 
maintaining of Belgian officers in command positions in the Congolese army to train new 
military leaders.  But, partially inspired by Lumumba’s words, Congolese troops 
mutinied against the Belgian officers still holding command positions in the national 
army.  From the standpoint of internal control, this could not have come at a worse time, 
as President Kasavubu immediately had problems consolidating power in the vast new 
nation.  Angered by Lumumba’s intransigence and concerned about Belgian commercial 
interests in the Congo, Belgium encouraged and supported the independence of the 
province of Katanga only 11 days after Congo’s independence.  The secession of 
Katanga, rich in minerals, posed an immediate challenge to Kasavubu and Lumumba’s 
legitimacy in Congo.  They immediately set about subduing Katanga by force, and 
requested UN military aid in order to do so.  For its part, the UN was willing to sponsor a 
peacekeeping force, but was largely unwilling to intervene in the growing civil war.  The 
fallout from this stalemate, now known as the Congo Crisis, would last until 1966. 
From the beginning, France pursued a complex policy for the settlement of the 
conflict in Congo.  Overall, the Quai d’Orsay strongly supported the Kasavubu 
government in Leopoldville, while remaining strongly skeptical of Lumumba, who was 
seen as a proxy for both Soviet and pan-African interests in Congo.  However, French 
officials also generally opposed any efforts by the UN and its Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjold to mediate the conflict.  Part of this could certainly be ascribed to general 
French suspicion of UN actions in the developing world, as already demonstrated by 
                                                 
1098 See Ludo de Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, Renee Fenby and Ann Wright, trans. 
(New York: Verso, 2003). 
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French perception of UN interference in French matters in Africa during the 1950s.  
Fittingly, Maurice Couve de Murville noted in a letter to the French ambassadors to 
Britain, the United States, and Congo in January 1961 that “the policy of the UN in 
Congo appears to have as its objective the extension of chaos and anarchy and is leading 
to the disintegration of the country.”1099  French officials worried that outside interference 
would undermine internal acceptance of the Leopoldville regime’s legitimacy, thus 
preventing long-term stability in the region.1100   
Nevertheless, while the de Gaulle regime professed a policy of noninterference in 
the conflict, it did all it could to insure that France would establish a presence in the 
Francophone nation once things eventually settled.  In late 1960, the situation 
deteriorated even further after a split between Kasavubu and Lumumba, leading to 
divisions within those parts of Congo not yet subject to the war with Katanga.  Lumumba 
was removed from power later that year in a coup by U.S.-backed strongman Joseph 
Mobutu.  The latter surrendered him to Katangese forces, who killed Lumumba with 
Belgian help on January 17, 1961.   While controversial to this day, the murder of 
Lumumba, and the subsequent election of a new prime minister, Cyrille Adoula, brought 
a temporary respite of stability to Congo. By August 1961, the French ambassador 
Fulgence Charpentier urged the Quai d’Orsay to take an active more role in the country, 
noting that recent developments “should lead us to reconsider our policy in Congo where, 
in light of the competition for power, our task is to maintain the primacy of the French 
                                                 
1099 Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, aux représentants diplomatiques de France à Londres, 
Washington, Léopoldville, Jan. 11, 1961.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1961 Tome I 
(Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1997), 22.  “La politique de l’ONU au Congo paraissait avoir pour 
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1100 M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à M. Bérard, Chef de la Mission 
permanente de la France auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Sept. 17, 1960.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1960 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1996), 361. 
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language and to avoid an evolution toward anarchy, which would be catastrophic for 
those neighboring countries friendly to France.”1101  In this vein, he also recommended 
that Francophone African countries be persuaded to open embassies in Leopoldville.1102  
“Since independence,” Charpentier noted, “we have exercised a certain reserve and 
discretion.  But the times have changed... the evolution can be rapid.  We must be 
prepared to adapt to new circumstances.”1103   
France received assistance in its Congo policy from the developing Francophone 
bloc, which supported French initiatives in the UN and provided continuing aid to the 
Kasavubu regime.  In the UN, supporters of Lumumba tended to favor robust UN 
military involvement in the Katanga conflict – an initiative opposed by all of the 
Francophone African states except Mali and Guinea.1104  Further, in December 1960, 
twelve sub-Saharan Francophone nations met in Brazzaville, in part to discuss the Congo 
conflict.  In accord with already-established French policy, they agreed not to send any 
military aid to either side of the conflict, and insisted that the UN not involve itself any 
further.1105  Instead, they favored a policy whereby political and economic support would 
                                                 
1101 M. Charpentier, Ambassadeur de France à Léopoldville, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre 
des Affaires Étrangères, Aug. 7, 1961.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1961 Tome II (Paris: 
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1102 Ibid., 231. 
1103 Ibid., 233.  “Depuis indépendance, il y un an, nous avons tiré parti de notre réserve et de notre 
discrétion.  Mais les temps ont changé... L’évolution peut être rapide.  Nous devons être prêts à 
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1104 M. Bérard, Chef de la Mission permanente de la France auprès de l’Organisation des Nations 
Unies, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Nov. 22, 1960.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1960 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1996), 614. 
1105 M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à M. de Juniac, Ambassadeur de 
France à Addis-Abeba, Dec. 27, 1960.  Ibid., 810 note 4. 
411 
 
be provided to the Kasavubu regime, while allowing Congolese forces to police the 
country exclusively.1106 
For their part, Congolese officials encouraged France’s new interest in their 
country.  Prime Minister Adoula frequently met with French officials to emphasize 
shared ties between the two nations and the need for France to become more involved in 
Congo’s future.  In March 1962, he met with Fulgence Charpentier and noted that given 
its culture and its language, France should play an “eminent role” in the Congo.1107  
Charpentier assured him that France was devoted to Congo’s unity and that France 
accorded the highest importance to Congo, as it was the premier Francophone country in 
Africa.1108  Adoula continued to play this card in a meeting with the new French 
ambassador Clauzel that June, noting that with the end of Belgian presence in the 
country, “it was normal for Congo to hope that France will provide indispensable 
technical aid, because [France] is the home of cultural treasure and is the only nation in 
the world toward which it is natural for the Congolese to turn.”1109  In a March 1964 
meeting with Ministre des Affaires Étrangères Couve de Murville, Adoula emphasized 
that “France must not ignore Congo, a great African country of French culture.”1110  In 
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meetings the following month, Adoula repeated his request for additional aid to Prime 
Minister Georges Pompidou and Couve de Murville.1111 
 By 1962, French officials agreed that the time had come to provide further aid to 
Congo.  But French motivations were not simply relegated to maintaining the unity of the 
country.  There was an implicit recognition that France had only a short period of time to 
build relationships with the new government and maximize its influence in Congo – 
especially given heightened interest in the region by the United States.  As noted by the 
chief of France’s mission to the UN: 
The time seems ripe to define our Congo policy for the months to come in light of 
recent developments.  The issue is obviously important.  In the rivalry between 
Anglophone Africa and Francophone Africa, the Congo, through its economic and 
human resources, is likely to play a determinative role.  Our adversaries could use 
our absence or maintenance of complete detachment to try to undermine our long-
term position in Black Africa.1112    
 
France wasted little time aiding Kasavubu.  The centerpiece of French cooperation 
consisted of a series of accords signed in December 1963 whereby France provided 
professors, experts, scholarships for study in France, and over 12 million francs in 
financial aid.1113  This cooperation would continue with the rise of Moise Tshombe, the 
former leader of the Katanga province, to Prime Minister in 1964.  Just a year and a half 
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later, even greater flexibility would be required when Tshombe, closely allied to France, 
fell from power in a military coup.  His successor would test the limits of France’s 
willingness to maintain influence in Francophone Africa. 
 
The French Relationship with Mobutu 
 By 1965, the crisis in Congo had dragged on for nearly five years.  With Congo’s 
political institutions no longer able to maintain any semblance of control, Joseph Mobutu 
and his officers took control of the country on November 24, 1965.  Citing the “complete 
failure of the political system”, Mobutu essentially banned all political activity and 
instituted military control over government functions.  These changes were made 
retroactively legal by the now-impotent Congo parliament on November 26.1114  On 
December 13, Mobutu further claimed that internal corruption and stagnation, along with 
the sacrifice of Congo’s independence vis-à-vis foreign powers, had made the change in 
government unavoidable.1115  But as his repressive regime in Congo would eventually 
illustrate, Mobutu’s reasons for taking power were far from altruistic.1116  He proclaimed 
a dictatorship for the next five years, and announced that political activity would be 
strictly regulated, with government run by fiat and purges of ministries to control 
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corruption.1117  These initial steps to consolidate power were only the beginning; as 
Martin Meredith notes, over the next few years Mobutu’s regime gradually escalated a 
brutal campaign of political repression throughout the country, which included show 
trials of members of the former government and public torture of political enemies.1118 
 In its immediate aftermath, Mobutu’s coup over French-backed Moise Tshombe 
was seen by Foccart and de Gaulle as a victory for American and Belgian interests in the 
region.1119  Nevertheless, French officials moved quickly to ingratiate themselves with 
the new regime.  French officials had already established a relationship with Mobutu 
during the Congo Crisis, when he was a general in the national army.1120  This may 
explain why, despite Mobutu’s suspension of democratic institutions, French ambassador 
to Congo Jacques Koscziusko-Morizet immediately wrote to Couve after Mobutu’s coup, 
emphasizing that “because several states will not fail, upon approval of their parliaments, 
to announce their official recognition of the new regime, it would be advisable, by any 
means, that we not be the last to clearly define our position and to signal to General 
Mobutu our desire for cooperation.”1121  While this would not immediately include 
official recognition of Mobutu’s government, it did include clear statements of French 
willingness to work with the new regime. Koscziusko-Morizet was given the opportunity 
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to do so during a lavish reception given by Mobutu for the foreign diplomatic corps the 
following day.  Upon being prompted for France’s position regarding the new 
government, the ambassador assured Mobutu that “our attitude was unchanged, and that 
insofar as the Congolese government wished, it retained the cooperation of France.”1122  
For his part, Mobutu was sure to reciprocate France’s goodwill in the early years of his 
regime.  On May 4, he met with Koscziusko-Morizet and, like many African leaders 
before him, emphasized his great esteem for de Gaulle, noting that he was the head of 
state that he most admired, and that he hoped that France would join in the effort to bring 
Congo out of its state of isolation.1123   
Koscziusko was nevertheless circumspect about the extent of French support for 
Mobutu, emphasizing that it must be considered in light of Mobutu’s notoriously 
mercurial temperament, and that France’s relationship with Congo itself should take 
precedent over support for any particular government.1124  By the following July, there 
were already clear signs of Mobutu’s despotism.  An internal Quai d’Orsay memo noted 
significant political repression by the regime, including the elimination of all potentially 
dangerous opposition, the stripping of power from both parliamentary assemblies, the 
suspension of political parties and the right to strike, the seclusion of prominent political 
                                                 
1122 M. Koscziusko-Morizet, Ambassadeur de France à Léopoldville, à M. Couve de Murville, 
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Nov. 26, 1965.  Ibid., 651.  “...notre attitude était inchangée, et 
que dans la mesure où le gouvernement congolais le désirait, la coopération de la France 
demeurait acquise au Congo.”   
1123 M. Koscziusko-Morizet, Ambassadeur de France à Léopoldville, à M. Couve de Murville, 
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, May 6, 1966.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1966 Vol. I 
(Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2006), 772. 
1124 Ibid., 774. 
416 
 
figures, including former president Kasavubu, and the execution of four prominent 
leaders accused of attempting a coup against Mobutu.1125 
 Despite this, France continued to provide aid to the Mobutu regime, including 
financial assistance, the training of experts, and radio and television technology.1126  Of 
course, this was in line with a longer policy of cooperation with Mobutu’s predecessor 
Kasavubu.1127  But this was not enough for Mobutu, who conveyed to Koscisuko-Morizet 
on October 7, 1966 his clear desire for further assistance and a stronger relationship 
between the two countries.  Playing upon France’s wishes to bolster regimes in 
Francophone African countries, Mobutu told the ambassador that “France is present here, 
and we have welcomed her, because she has respected our dignity.  But her action is not 
of the dimension of relationship that must exist between her and the largest Francophone 
country in Africa.  I would prefer to move beyond the current useful, but limited 
arrangement, and promote a broader and direct plan of cooperation.”1128  To this end, he 
proposed a loan from France to Congo of 100 million francs, to be made available by 
November 24 of that year.  What was important, Mobutu emphasized, was that France 
“was actually on our side in our struggle for recovery and national independence.”1129  
Despite his earlier reservations, Kosciusko-Morizet now backed Mobutu’s appeal for aid, 
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writing to Maurice Couve de Murville that same day and indicating that “we have arrived 
at an important time in Franco-Congolese relations, and I hope therefore that all 
possibilities of a partially or totally favorable response can be explored.”1130   
 Mobutu clearly knew that he was pushing at an open door.  In February 1967, his 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Justin Marie Bomboko, visited France for a series of 
meetings with officials in the de Gaulle government.  Throughout Bomboko’s visit, he 
strongly suggested Congo’s intention to replace Belgium’s influence in the country with 
that of France.  As noted by an internal Quai d’Orsay memo, Bomboko indicated that 
Congo wished to “look to us for more assistance in order to liberate itself from the 
monopoly of its former colonizer [Belgium] and thereby achieve a genuine 
independence.”1131  This involved significant requests for aid, including the training of 
mining experts, the recruitment of French capital for Congolese mines, financial aid 
separate from the mining sector, and supplementary credit for the government secured by 
France’s extensive profits from its own gold mining efforts in Kivu province.1132   
Perhaps most importantly, Bomboko conveyed Mobutu’s personal wish to be 
officially received in Paris by de Gaulle himself, and benefit from the prestige that had 
already been bestowed upon so many other African leaders during the Fifth Republic.1133  
Although French officials in the Quai d’Orsay were initially noncommittal about such a 
visit, they nevertheless saw advantages in aligning themselves more closely with Mobutu.  
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On March 3, 1967, Kosciusko-Morizet wrote to Couve to provide his insights into 
Mobutu in light of a recent meeting with the Congolese leader.  Kosciusko-Morizet 
delivered an overwhelmingly positive report, noting that Mobutu “has no doubts about 
the reality of France’s financial assistance and welcomes openly, even more so for 
political and moral strategy than the material gains, this rapprochement which he has 
desired for a long time with our country.”1134  To the ambassador, Mobutu seemed 
genuinely enthusiastic about collaboration with France, and he emphasized the 
importance of pursuing a deeper relationship, noting that after the Congo crisis, the 
country “believes it can count on its friends, and most of all on France.”1135  An internal 
Quai d’Orsay memo was somewhat more pragmatic, noting that the granting of an 
official visit to Mobutu “will allow for the reinforcement of our influence in the vastest 
Francophone African country, filled with potential riches and situated at the heart of the 
continent.  It will consecrate, in the eyes of the Congolese, the beginning of cooperation 
between the two countries.”1136 
By 1968, the French government had an extremely positive view of Mobutu’s 
rule, noting economic and political progress which could be credited to “the clever, 
insightful and tenacious actions of General Mobutu.”1137  Mobutu’s visit eventually took 
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place in March 1969, the last by an African leader during de Gaulle’s presidency.  De 
Gaulle offered very high praise during Mobutu’s visit to the Elysée Palace on March 27, 
noting that France had taken great interest in the African leader.  During a state dinner in 
Mobutu’s honor, de Gaulle emphasized the importance of Congo both to France and 
Africa.1138  Unsurprisingly, he also noted the shared ties in language between the two 
leaders and offered further cooperation.1139  These shared ties would later be the focus of 
efforts by the French, Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Central African Republic government to 
persuade Mobutu to join the new Francophonie organization.1140  To be fair, at this point 
Mobutu’s Congo had not yet become what Michela Wrong describes as “the paradigm of 
all that was wrong with post-colonial Africa.”1141  But as already noted, the signs of 
Mobutu’s despotism and corruption were quickly becoming apparent. 
 
French Involvement in the Civil War in Nigeria 
 Given the original French position of nonintervention in the Congo Crisis, its 
involvement in the Nigerian civil war would seem fundamentally inconsistent with 
Gaullist policy in Africa.  But in both situations, French decisions were driven by the best 
means to secure French influence on the continent.  The 1967 secession of Biafra from 
Nigeria was comparable to Congo’s Katanga in one fundamental aspect – it stemmed 
from the attempt of an ethnic majority in a resource-rich province to assert its autonomy 
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vis-à-vis a central government desperately trying to consolidate its control over a young 
nation.  While the conflict had its roots in long-simmering ethnic tensions among the 
three main groups in Nigeria (Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo), the immediate cause was a spate 
of political and ethnic violence in 1966 that led to the rise to power of Colonel Yakubu 
Gowon, assisted by elements from Nigeria’s Hausa north in order to reassert firm federal 
control over the entire country.1142  In May 1967, much of the Igbo-dominated 
southeastern Nigeria, rich in oil and mineral resources, declared its independence from 
the federal government in Lagos.  Calling itself Biafra, the breakaway province 
immediately solicited support from the international community, and especially from 
France.   
 French relations with Nigeria had already endured a long period of tension when 
the conflict in Biafra exploded.  As a former British colony and one of the largest and 
most influential nations on the continent, Nigeria posed severe concerns to France’s 
attempts to maintain a presence in West Africa after decolonization.  As an internal Quai 
d’Orsay memo from September 1962 warned, Nigeria was increasingly turning its focus 
toward Francophone nations in Africa.1143  To make matters worse, throughout much of 
the 1960s, relations between the two countries had been nonexistent after French nuclear 
testing in the Sahara.  A test on December 27, 1960 led to Nigeria breaking off 
diplomatic relations with France the following January, punctuated by the expulsion of 
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the French ambassador from Lagos.1144  Matters had begun to thaw by the mid-1960s, but 
unrest within Nigeria, along with de Gaulle and Foccart’s increasing paranoia about 
Britain’s wishes to undermine French power on the continent, were ultimately too much 
for any sort of reasonable settlement between the two countries.  While French authorities 
were careful not to directly upset their allies across the Channel regarding Biafran policy, 
the struggle would play out as a proxy war between Francophone and Anglophone 
interests.  From a very early point in Gowon’s regime, French authorities viewed 
Nigeria’s new strongman as a puppet of the Anglo-Saxon powers; an August 1966 Quai 
d’Orsay memo noted that Gowon was “probably acting under the pressure of the British 
and the Americans” in his campaign to enforce Nigeria’s federal structure.1145 
 Perhaps cognizant of French wishes to undermine British-supported Nigerian 
interests in West Africa, Nigerian officials made a concerted effort to ensure that France 
remained on the sidelines of the conflict.  This was done primarily through a series of 
letters sent by Colonel Gowon to de Gaulle himself.  On May 30, 1967, Gowon 
petitioned de Gaulle to “refrain from doing anything that will impair the... sovereignty 
and integrity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”  He added that any action to recognize 
Biafra would be considered an unfriendly act by the government in Lagos.1146  On June 
12, Gowon once again wrote to de Gaulle, blaming the breakdown of recent peace talks 
in Kampala on the intransigence of the Biafran delegation, and attacking Biafran claims 
that of acts of genocide were being committed during the offensive by the Lagos 
government.  “The basic aim of the war as far as my Government is concerned,” noted 
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Gowon, “is to preserve the territorial integrity of Nigeria and to guarantee to the different 
tribes equal status and the basis for living together peacefully.”1147  On June 14, Gowon 
wrote to de Gaulle again, imploring him to take no action to recognize Biafra’s 
independence.1148 
 Initially, the official stance of the French government was consistent with its 
staunch policy of neutrality during the Congo Crisis.  French officials noted their support 
for quasi-federal arrangements like that of Nigeria, emphasizing the importance of the 
central government’s ability to exercise control over disparate territories.  In March of 
1967, an internal memo from the Quai d’Orsay prepared for Foccart indicated France’s 
desire not to get involved with the internal affairs of other states, and to support the 
territorial integrity of Nigeria.  It also supported whatever measures Gowon deemed 
necessary to protect foreign nationals, and especially French citizens.1149  Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères Maurice Couve de Murville ordered the French ambassador to 
Nigeria to reaffirm this policy to Gowon later that month.1150  On June 13, de Gaulle 
replied to Gowon, assuring him that “true to its traditional line of conduct, the French 
government does not wish to intervene in the internal affairs of your country, nor 
compromise in any way the chances of resolving the current difficulties.”1151  He also 
noted that France’s only interests in the conflict were to preserve peace and prosperity in 
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Nigeria and the surrounding region.  As late as April 1968, the official French policy was 
to accord recognition only to the government in Lagos, help maintain peace and 
prosperity in the region, and refrain from any act that could prolong the suffering of the 
respective civilian populations.1152 
 In reality, de Gaulle and his followers had already changed their minds about the 
need for more direct French involvement in the crisis.  This was due in no small part to 
direct entreaties from Biafran authorities, who recognized that France might have 
interests in the region beyond the conflict itself.  Foccart would admit as much years 
later, when he noted that “for France, Nigeria was a country disproportionate to those we 
knew well [i.e., Francophone African nations in West Africa], and which cast over them a 
disturbing shadow.”1153  De Gaulle, while noting that France should try not to intervene 
or give the appearance of having done so, nevertheless admitted to Foccart that “the 
fragmentation of Nigeria is desirable, and if Biafra succeeds, it would not be a bad 
thing.”1154    
Biafra’s courting of France began immediately after the declaration of 
independence in May 1967, when its leader Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu wrote to 
de Gaulle, imploring him to recognize Biafra’s diplomatic representative to France, and 
emphasizing the significant natural resources contained in the breakaway province.1155  
Initially, de Gaulle’s advisors counseled reticence in the face of Biafran attempts to get 
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French aid.  But Biafra gave indications that it wanted France to replace British influence 
in the region.1156  By December of that year, de Gaulle reversed course, instructing the 
relevant departments to provide aid to Biafra without providing actual diplomatic 
recognition.1157  On December 14, he wrote to Foccart, noting that “without actually 
recognizing Biafra, or furnishing direct aid, we must prepare for the issue in the 
future.”1158  This included sending an official representative to Biafra, preparing a plan 
for cultural exchange with Biafran students, and encouraging SAFRAP (the precursor to 
French state-owned oil company Elf Aquitaine), to provide a loan of 500,000 pounds 
sterling to the Biafran government.  Most importantly, the French government was 
willing to “close its eyes” to the Biafran acquisition in France of two B-26 bombers, an 
Air France Super Constellation aircraft, and several T-6 fighter aircraft.1159 
 For his part, Ojukwu continued his efforts with France, and began to play 
diplomatic cards that he knew might resonate with the French sense of the balance of 
power in West Africa.  On May 1, 1968, he wrote to de Gaulle, lamenting the “the war of 
aggression launched against my people by the Nigerian Federal Government, supported 
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and encouraged in their action by the British government.”1160  He first asked de Gaulle 
to intervene with SAFRAP on behalf of Biafra to ensure that the oil company provided 
the payment to Biafra that had previously been promised for continued access to the 
province’s oil.  More importantly, Ojukwu made a direct appeal to de Gaulle’s suspicions 
of the Anglo-Saxons to convince him to officially recognize the Biafran government: 
My dear President, I need hardly add, therefore, that my country, beset by Anglo-
Saxon intrigue, now looks up to France, under you, as the only country capable of 
restoring to us our rights and dignity.  The British, having failed with their 
Nigerian friends to obtain a military conquest of Biafra, are now hypocritically 
trying to promote a peace conference in order to re-establish their domination of 
our country…  Your Excellency, I can assure you that any assistance your 
Government will give to us at this difficult time will be most amply rewarded in 
the future.  I nourish the hope that, under your great leadership, the Government 
of France will not disappoint us but will in fact rank amongst the first European 
states to accord official recognition to Biafra…Nothing will please us more also 
than the establishment of the closest co-operation with our neighbouring Franco-
phone African States, the necessity for which has been so clearly demonstrated in 
this war.1161   
 
This direct appeal would be followed up two months later, when Biafra’s representative 
Pius Okigbo met in Brussels with the French ambassador to Belgium, indicating that the 
time had come for France to recognize Biafra’s independence.  Okigbo emphasized that 
France and other Francophone African states could play an important role in the 
mediation of the ongoing conflict, and that only France understood that “Great Britain, in 
blindly supporting the [Nigerian] federal government, has lost all consideration for 
Biafrans.”1162 
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 Of course, these sentiments played directly to de Gaulle and his followers’ 
distinct sense that the “Anglo-Saxon” powers did not have France’s best interests at heart.  
But Ojukwu and the Biafrans also received support for their cause from other African 
leaders, who were suspicious of Anglo-American malfeasance in Africa.  Houphouët-
Boigny had already intervened on Biafra’s behalf by asking de Gaulle in September 1967 
to put pressure on oil companies to make overdue payments to the Biafran government so 
that it would have money to buy weapons from Portugal.1163  By May of 1968, Ivory 
Coast was one of four African nations, including Gabon, Zambia, and Tanzania, to 
officially recognize Biafra, although they would remain isolated in this policy for the 
remainder of the conflict.1164  With this accomplished, Houphouët-Boigny mounted an 
aggressive campaign starting in mid-1968 to convince French officials to do more 
regarding the situation in Biafra.  According to Jacques Raphael-Leygues, the French 
ambassador to Ivory Coast, Houphouet Boigny indicated to him in a meeting on July 2 
that there were two distinct threats to stability in Africa – the spread of Islam and the 
penetration of the continent by communist Chinese interests.  According to Houphouët-
Boigny, the subjugation of Biafra implicated the former, as the Lagos government was 
run by the western-unfriendly, Muslim-dominated North.  Therefore, he concluded that, 
in supporting Lagos, the Anglo-Saxons were “digging their own grave.”1165  Later that 
month, Houphouët-Boigny personally vouched for Ojukwu in another conversation with 
Raphael-Leygues, noting how impressed he was with the Biafran leader in meetings on 
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1165 M. Raphael-Leygues, Ambassadeur de France à Abidjan, à M. Debré, Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères, July 3, 1968.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1968 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie 
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July 19-20.1166  On July 24, Houphouët-Boigny wrote to de Gaulle personally, asking him 
to intercede in the conflict in Nigeria, and “the quicker the better, because there is not a 
moment to lose.”1167 
 These efforts would finally pay off with the French decision to increase its aid to 
Biafra and call for an international solution to enable the Biafrans to attain more 
autonomy vis-à-vis the government in Lagos.  On July 31, the Conseil des Ministres of 
the Fifth Republic, composed of de Gaulle, then-Prime Minister Maurice Couve de 
Murville, and the ministers in de Gaulle’s cabinet, issued a statement regarding the 
ongoing conflict.  Noting the overwhelming loss of life and the growing humanitarian 
crisis, they indicated that “the French government considers that, as a result, the current 
conflict must be resolved on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination and 
include the implementation of appropriate international procedures.”1168  While he 
initially remained silent, de Gaulle reaffirmed this policy in a press conference in Paris on 
September 9, noting that while France had not yet officially recognized Biafra, he would 
not rule out doing so in the future, especially given the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe.  
He added that he could foresee the possibility of Nigeria becoming a loose federation 
under which Biafrans would be given greater self-autonomy vis-à-vis the government in 
Lagos.1169   
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 With the French government’s tacit recognition of Biafra, Ojukwu wrote to de 
Gaulle on August 2.  He began by praising de Gaulle, noting his “eternal gratitude for this 
noble act of humanity, statesmanship, and vision.”1170  Ojukwu also continued to tie 
Biafra’s ongoing struggle to the broader Anglo-French rivalry in Africa.  He emphasized 
that “[w]e Biafrans, in our just struggle against Anglo-Nigerian conspiracy, have been 
sustained by the heroic examples of French history and the great men who made 
them.”1171  Most striking for Ojukwu was de Gaulle’s “steadfast dedication to the high 
principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity.”1172  Later that month, he would praise de 
Gaulle even more obsequiously, sending a letter on de Gaulle’s birthday, noting that the 
day marked “the birth of an illustrious and patriotic leader who, in defiance of 
circumstances sufficient to defeat ordinary mortals, succeeded in restoring his country to 
dignity and freedom.”1173  For Ojukwu, de Gaulle’s stature enabled him to serve as an 
inspiration to both his country and those fighting for freedom around the world, including 
Africa.  Because of de Gaulle’s leadership, Ojukwu noted, “France has once again, 
therefore, become a symbol of hope for all those fighting for freedom, as well as for those 
who crave for a world order based on the secure principles of respect for human 
values.”1174 
 After the government declarations of late summer 1968, France immediately 
provided more extensive aid to the Biafran side.  By September 3, this already 
encompassed a grant of 125,000 francs by the French government, the mobilization of 
private donations of over 12 million francs through the French Red Cross, and 150 tons 
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of provisions and medical supplies.  There were also plans to send French technical 
experts to help distribute aid, along with additional medical personnel and airplanes.1175  
While details remain uncertain to this day, France also facilitated significant military aid 
to the breakaway province.  Reports by the British press about this aid and France’s 
violation of an international arms embargo were initially denied by French officials.1176  
But decades later, Foccart would admit to France’s role in the furnishing of arms to 
Biafra, initially through a scheme which “consisted of allowing the movement to Ivory 
Coast of arms recovered during World War II, after having effaced their serial 
numbers.”1177  Foccart also admitted that this operation, at least in the short term, 
remained a secret.1178  After de Gaulle’s pronouncements in 1968 about Biafran 
autonomy, even more military aid in the form of weapons, planes, pilots, and mercenaries 
were furnished.  When asked about this, Foccart would later admit that “it is certain that 
we provided aid there.”1179   
 Ultimately, the Biafran conflict outlasted de Gaulle’s tenure as President.  In 
December 1969, Gowon ordered a final, overwhelming offensive into the breakaway 
province, routing Ojukwu’s forces and causing the Biafran leader to flee the country.  By 
January 1970, the conflict was over, with Biafra eventually re-absorbed back into 
Nigeria.  But France’s failed adventure in West Africa had not deterred it from further 
interference in African politics.  In the final years of de Gaulle’s regime, the government 
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had already begun laying the groundwork for its fateful relationships with African 
dictators for the next three decades. 
 
French Support for African Dictators during the de Gaulle Regime 
 The tumultuous political history of Africa in the past half-century has been well-
documented, a trend from which France’s former colonies have not been immune.1180  
After the transition to independence, several Francophone African states underwent 
political struggles during the 1960s that led to some of the most brutal dictatorships of the 
twentieth century.  In the early years of the de Gaulle regime, France maintained its 
commitment to the spread of democracy in Africa and support for legitimately elected 
regimes.  But by the mid-1960s, French policy began to shift toward pragmatism, with a 
tacit recognition that continued African support for the special relationship with France 
was more important that more idealistic goals of overseeing successful political 
development.  Essentially, France maintained loyalty to the political existence of states in 
Africa, but not always to the governments that controlled them.  In the end, an African 
ruler’s hold on his country was often determined by French confidence in his ability to 
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maintain control and therefore preserve French influence in the respective state.  Three 
examples of this chameleon-like policy in Africa during the 1960s are particularly 
illustrative – France’s relationship with the regimes of Congo-Brazzaville’s Alphonse 
Massemba-Débat, Gabon’s Léon M’Ba, and the Central African Republic’s Jean Bédel-
Bokassa. 
 A crisis in Congo-Brazzaville in August 1963 demonstrated both France’s 
willingness to intervene in internal conflict when it suited its interests, as well as its 
ability to quickly adapt to a new regime.  Abbé Fulbert Youlou, who had been president 
of the country since independence in 1960, faced a series of protests against his 
increasingly authoritarian government.  On August 13, the second day of protests, he 
requested military aid from de Gaulle through Congo-Brazzaville’s defensive treaty with 
France.  Seeking to preserve French influence in the country, de Gaulle immediately sent 
paratroopers to help Youlou restore order.1181  While this action was initially successful, a 
series of more intense riots on August 15 led to Youlou’s resignation.  But despite 
France’s attempt to prop up the Youlou regime, his successor Alphonse Massemba-Débat 
made sure to placate the French government upon taking power.  He assured France that 
Congo-Brazzaville would continue to maintain its friendship with France and participate 
in the UAM.  More importantly, Massemba-Débat made a public statement that the 
intervention of French paratroopers “did not constitute an interference into Congo’s 
internal affairs.”1182 
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 Tellingly, the French government adapted quickly, backing the Massemba-Débat 
regime once it had consolidated power in Congo-Brazzaville.  Of course, France was 
willing to tolerate the new regime only to the extent that it truly remained friendly to 
French interests.  By the following year, there were already indications that Massemba-
Débat was becoming increasingly authoritarian and was turning to China for help.  
Although this had not led Massemba-Débat to take any explicitly anti-French positions, 
an internal memo recommended that French diplomats clarify the situation for him.  
Should the regime maintain power, it noted, “we will probably still have a few 
possibilities to preserve our most important interests, to exercise a certain influence and 
to curb radical changes.  But we must make clear to the Brazzaville leaders, at a 
sufficiently high level, an explanation which fixes the terms of our support and defines 
the interests that we seek to preserve.”1183  After a series of continuing brutal crackdowns 
in Brazzaville in December 1964, Maurice Couve de Murville ordered the French 
ambassador to Congo-Brazzaville to threaten the removal of all French aid from the 
country.1184  But Massemba-Débat’s continued professions of loyalty to de Gaulle and 
France seemed to placate the French authorities, despite his reception of significant aid 
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from the Soviet Union and his courting of other socialist governments in Africa.1185  He 
reaffirmed these views in a meeting with de Gaulle in October 1965.  After de Gaulle 
indicated that it was important that Massemba-Débat was able to maintain internal order 
in the country, and that France remained Brazzaville’s main source of support, 
Massemba-Débat sufficiently reassured French representatives that “France must occupy 
the first place in the Congo.”1186   
By January 1966, the official French policy had been further clarified: as long as 
Massemba-Débat was willing to cooperate with the French government, France was 
willing to take actions to prop us up his authoritarian regime.  As noted in an internal 
memo: 
Our policy has in effect consisted of reminding the authorities in Brazzaville that 
we do not intend to interfere in [Congo-Brazzaville’s] internal affairs, and that we 
will not support any subversive movements, whether or not they are associated 
with Abbé Youlou.  But, for its part, the Brazzaville government should abandon 
its attitude of suspicion towards us if it would like to continue an efficacious 
collaboration between the two countries.1187 
 
This support was threatened later that year after Congo-Brazzaville’s state media 
organized a campaign of intimidation against French personnel in the country, including 
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French ambassador Louis Dauge.1188  The source of the campaign seems to have been 
increasing paranoia from the Brazzaville government about France’s lack of support for 
the Massemba-Débat regime.1189  In response, de Gaulle ordered Dauge’s return to Paris, 
a breakoff of diplomatic relations that would last until May of 1967.  Yet even after the 
government-organized campaign of intimidation, France was willing to re-establish 
relations with Massemba-Débat, sending Dauge back to Brazzaville to reaffirm the 
relationship in May 1967.1190  This signaled no particular loyalty for Massemba-Débat 
himself; when he was overthrown in a military coup the following year, French 
authorities quickly recognized the new government in Brazzaville once it showed it could 
maintain order in the country. 
The situation in Congo-Brazzaville illustrated France’s willingness to maintain a 
certain flexibility in order to preserve its influence on the continent.  However, at times, 
the de Gaulle regime decided that a more hardline approach was necessary to preserve 
French interests.  One example of this was French restoration of the autocrat Léon M’Ba 
to power in Gabon after his ouster in a coup in February 1964.  M’Ba had served as 
Prime Minister of Gabon before its transition to independence, and after independence, as 
its first president.  But he quickly cultivated a reputation as a ruler who tolerated no 
political dissent within his country.  A new constitution in 1961 gave him virtually 
unchecked power.  By 1964, the situation had spun totally out of control, with significant 
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discontent throughout army ranks concerning M’Ba’s grip on the country.  On February 
18, the army revolted against M’Ba, occupying the presidential palace and placing him 
under military arrest.1191  Later that day, he was forced to sign a letter of resignation, thus 
giving a modicum of legitimacy to the army’s action.   
 Despite M’Ba’s troubled past, French action to support him was swift and 
overwhelming.  Just hours after the coup, French forces were ordered to Gabon from 
positions in Congo-Brazzaville, Central African Republic, and Senegal.1192  Although 
M’Ba had ruled with little consideration for Gabon’s laws during his previous three years 
as president, the French ambassador to Gabon nevertheless indicated that “Gabon’s 
interest is not to allow the mutineers to violate the laws of the country and decide its 
fate.”1193   By the following morning, French forces had already taken control of Gabon’s 
state radio station, the main post office and the presidential palace.  After this show of 
force, the coup against M’Ba quickly collapsed.1194  By the end of the day, he was once 
again well-entrenched – now with French military backing – as the autocratic leader of 
Gabon.  Later that month, a memo from the French ambassador to Gabon would 
acknowledge that M’Ba only continued to hold power because of the French military 
intervention and the threat of further action by France.1195  Years later, when asked who 
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had been the de facto leader of Gabon – Foccart or M’Ba – the former admitted that he 
was frequently available to M’Ba, who consulted him often.1196   
Until his death in 1967, M’Ba remained close to de Gaulle’s regime.  The quick 
action by the French army in February 1964 resulted in his deep gratitude, as illustrated 
by a personal letter thanking de Gaulle ten days after the coup attempt.1197  That 
November, he asked for and received French assurances that it would defend his regime 
from future external threats.1198  But the Quai d’Orsay remained skeptical about M’Ba’s 
utility to France.  Noting that his authority had severely deteriorated, the report 
emphasized that M’Ba’s government had “an allure of brutality and arbitrariness, which 
has ultimately alienated the entire Gabonese elite and has begun to worry the masses, 
who are generally passive when it comes to political matters.”1199  Despite this, the memo 
noted that a failure to support M’Ba’s political power was not an option, as his removal 
from power “would certainly compromise our interests.”1200  Therefore, it advised a two-
step process whereby France would continue to give M’Ba its support while also urging 
him to prepare for the future by enabling young leadership that could eventually take 
power.1201  When he died in 1967, his French-approved successor, Omar Bongo, was 
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already in a position to take power.  He would remain one of France’s closest allies in 
Africa until his death in 2009. 
 The relationship with M’Ba illustrates that the de Gaulle regime was willing to 
tolerate autocratic leaders if they remained at least marginally loyal to France.  Nowhere 
was this principle more clear than in France’s relationship with the Central African 
Republic’s Jean Bédel Bokassa.  The country, formerly Oubangui-Shari, had become 
independent from France in 1960 and was ruled after independence by David Dacko, who 
established one-party rule in the country and reinforced his political standing with a sham 
election in 1964.  But by late 1965, both the army and the bureaucracy had turned against 
him, paving the way for a coup d’état on New Year’s Eve by Bokassa, who forced Dacko 
to resign, installed himself as leader, and dissolved the country’s parliament.1202  Despite 
France’s existing defense agreement with Dacko and the Central African Republic, 
Jacques Foccart pragmatically viewed the coup as a fait accompli, and refused to send 
French troops to back Dacko.1203  From France’s perspective, in many ways, Bokassa was 
an ideal candidate to rule the Francophone country.  Born in 1921, he joined the French 
army in 1939 and fought for Free France.  He would remain in the army until the Central 
African Republic achieved its independence, when he transferred his commission to its 
new army.1204  Shortly after taking power, he made certain to emphasize the importance 
of France to his regime, noting the “profound and brotherly attachment between France 
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and the Central African Republic” in a speech that May.1205  For its part, France quickly 
recognized the new regime and furnished Bokassa with a private plane, a Douglas DC-
3.1206 
 But like the Mobutu regime in Congo, from a very early stage, there were clear 
signs that Bokassa did not intend to rule his country based on democratic principles.  As 
recently detailed by Martin Meredith, his early years were “not especially brutal” given 
the excesses of the 1970s.1207  Nevertheless, there were several disturbing atrocities in the 
early Bokassa regime, including the murder of a former minister, the execution of a 
former head of internal security, and the imprisonment of Dacko.  Perhaps most 
disturbing, Meredith notes, “[p]olitical prisoners and inmates in Ngaraba prison in 
Bangui were routinely tortured or beaten on Bokassa’s orders, their cries clearly audible 
to nearby residents.”1208  For their part, French officials found themselves frustrated with 
Bokassa’s temperament, professing loyalty to France one moment and attacking it 
vehemently the next.1209  An April 1968 memo noted that the relationship between the 
two countries had been subjected to “serious fluctuations” since Bokassa’s assumption of 
power in 1966, attributable mainly to Bokassa’s “psychology”.1210  In one incident, 
Bokassa became extremely enraged because of suggestions in the magazine Paris-Match 
that he had bought his military medals instead of earning them.1211  Bokassa’s indignation 
that the French government was unable to silence the reports served as a warning sign 
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that he did not fully comprehend western-style democracy.  Overall, the French 
ambassador to Bangui found him “impulsive, impatient, a bit incoherent, stimulated by 
his apprehensions, and naturally open to excess.”1212 
 Despite these incidents, France did everything in its power to maintain its 
influence with the Bokassa regime.  Foccart quickly made it a priority to extend him the 
same courtesy as he had to other African leaders.  In July 1966, Bokassa was invited to 
Paris and given a full state visit by de Gaulle, who met with him on July 7.  During his 
stay in France, Bokassa made clear that he needed substantial financial assistance from 
France.  For show purposes, he also requested that France provide military uniforms to 
former soldiers of his country, so that they could march in a parade celebrating the 
country’s day of independence later that year.1213  He would be extended another visit in 
February 1969, just weeks before de Gaulle’s resignation from the presidency.1214 
Bokassa was able to extract significant aid from France practically by blackmail; 
he made clear to French authorities in October 1966 that his country needed foreign aid, 
and that he had no scruples as to whom he accepted it from – the strong implication being 
that he could turn to other French rivals on the continent.  As the French ambassador to 
Central African Republic noted to Couve, Bokassa’s game was clear: “we are seized by 
exorbitant demands, and if we refuse them, or only fulfill them in part, he will take refuge 
behind our refusal and make appeals to other powers.”1215  This could mean the 
                                                 
1212 M. Français, Ambassadeur de France à Bangui, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, Oct. 28, 1966.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1966 Vol. II (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 2006), 805. 
1213 M. Français, Ambassadeur de France à Bangui, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, Oct. 28, 1966.  Ibid., 804 note 2. 
1214 The details of Bokassa’s 1969 visit can be found in ANP, 5 AG I 650. 
1215 M. Français, Ambassadeur de France à Bangui, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, Oct. 13, 1966.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1966 Vol. II (Paris: 
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acceptance of aid, and the consequent strengthening of its relationship with the United 
States.  The Quai d’Orsay was already significantly concerned about increased 
communist aid to Africa in general, and the Soviet Union in particular had provided 
medical aid to the Bokassa regime.1216  According to the ambassador, in this situation, the 
increasing financial difficulties of the regime, as well as Bokassa’s disenchantment, could 
represent a “pitfall” for France.1217  When France was slow to respond to his requests, 
Bokassa dressed down its diplomatic delegation with sharp words, accusing them of 
trying to pressure him into liberating his predecessor David Dacko from prison.1218 
Nevertheless, Bokassa remained generally loyal to France, a quality that endeared 
him to both de Gaulle and his successors.  In May 1968, a series of student 
demonstrations and strikes broke out throughout Paris in response to conditions in 
universities and workplaces.  At the height of the crisis, de Gaulle left the country to meet 
with French General Jacques Massu in Germany, thus raising questions about a possible 
abdication of power.1219  On May 30, a day after de Gaulle’s departure, Bokassa wrote 
directly to him, noting that 
All the people of Central Africa under my senior direction implore Your 
Excellency to retain power until the end of your term... It was a unique solution 
on your part to restore peace in France and the world, as you did in 1958 when 
France and the French community, as well as the Central African Republic, were 
                                                                                                                                                 
Imprimerie Nationale, 2006), 739-40.  “...nous saisir de demandes exorbitantes et, si nous les 
refusons, ou ne les exauçons qu’en partie, se retrancher derrière notre carence pour en appeler à 
d’autres puissances.”   
1216 Note de la direction des Affaires Africaines et Malgaches: L’action des pays communistes au 
sein des États francophones d’Afrique noire (mars-octobre 1966), Oct. 21, 1966.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1966 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2006), 772-8. 
1217 M. Français, Ambassadeur de France à Bangui, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, Oct. 13, 1966.  Ibid., 740. 
1218 M. Français, Ambassadeur de France à Bangui, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre des 
Affaires Étrangères, Oct. 28, 1966.  Ibid., 804. 
1219 For more on the 1968 student crisis, see Kristin Ross, May ’68 and Its Afterlives (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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on the edge of chaos.  The six thousand Frenchmen of the Central African 
Republic and their Central African brothers assure you of their support.1220   
 
It is unclear what sort of support Bokassa was implying in his letter to de Gaulle.  For 
their part, French officials were impressed with the leader’s show of solidarity, noting 
that Bokassa’s profession of support “constitutes an undeniable gesture of attachment.  It 
has also permitted him – and perhaps he realized this – to escape from a [diplomatic] 
situation that might have become hopeless.”1221  The following February, he received 
another invitation to a state visit with de Gaulle in Paris, where the latter praised Bokassa 
as “a craftsman and an example” of the positive relationship between France and the 
Central African Republic.1222 
 Bokassa and Mobutu can be counted among the worst examples of French policy 
in Africa.  But as all of these aforementioned cases have illustrated, there was nothing 
particularly extraordinary about France’s decisions to support dictators on the continent 
during the de Gaulle regime.  In the final years of de Gaulle’s tenure, France would also 
support Gnassingbé Eyadema after a military coup in Togo,1223 Chad’s dictator François 
                                                 
1220 Reproduced in M. Herly, Ambassadeur de France à Bangui, à M. Couve de Murville, Ministre 
des Affaires Étrangères, May 30, 1968.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1968 Tome I (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 2009), 851.  “Le peuple centrafricain tout entier, sous ma haute direction, 
supplie Votre Excellence de garder le pouvoir jusqu’à la fin de son mandat stop.  Solution unique 
pour restaurer la paix en France et dans le monde ainsi que vous l’avez fait en mil neuf cent 
cinquante-huit lorsque la France et la Communauté française, dont la République centrafricaine, 
se trouvaient au bord du chaos stop.  Les six mille Français de la République centrafricaine, avec 
leurs frères centrafricains, vous assurent de leur appui stop.”   
1221 Note de la direction des affaires Africaines et Malgaches, June 6, 1968.  Ibid., 888.  
“L’initiative du général Bokassa constitue un geste indéniable d’attachement.  Elle lui a permis 
également – et peut-être en avait-il conscience – de sortir d’une situation qui risquait de devenir 
pour lui sans issue.”   
1222 Toast adressé à S.E. le Général J.B. Bokassa, Président de la République Centrafricaine, Feb. 
11, 1969.  Charles de Gaulle, Discours et message, vers le terme: Janvier 1966 – Avril 1969 
(Paris: Plon, 1970), 382. 
1223 Eyadéma, a veteran of the French army, took power with the help of the army in January 1967 
after ousting Nicolas Grunitzky, who had himself taken power in a coup.  Despite this, French 
ambassador Rostain indicated after meeting Eyadéma for the first time that the dictator had “a 
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Tombalbye after civil unrest there in the late 1960s,1224 and a coup d’état in Dahomey by 
Alphonse Alley in December 1967 to replace the military dictatorship of Christophe 
Soglo.1225 French officials also made no serious protest concerning the overthrow of 
Mali’s Modibo Keita by military officer, and eventual autocrat, Moussa Traore.1226  As 
already noted, much of this stemmed from France’s need to be flexible on the continent.  
The direction of France’s Africa policy going forward was best explained by an internal 
memo from 1967: 
The character of Francophone countries does not permit the former métropole to 
have economic interests in Africa equal to those of Great Britain.  But the 
political interest that France preserves in African countries and Madagascar is on 
                                                                                                                                                 
good conscience” and “good will.”  M. Rostain, Ambassadeur de France à Lomé, à M. Couve de 
Murville, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Jan. 20, 1967.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 
1967 Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2008), 117.  Less than three years earlier, De Gaulle 
had received Grunitzky in Paris and toasted him at a state dinner, praising his leadership in Togo.  
Toast adressé à S.E.M.N. Grunitzky, Président de la République Togolaise, March 4, 1964.  
Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, pour l’effort : Août 1962 – Décembre 1965 (Paris : 
Plon, 1970), 186-8. 
1224 Note de la direction des affaires Africaine et Malgaches, July 26, 1967.  Documents 
Diplomatiques Français 1967 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2008), 115-9.  In 1968, 
France agreed to send troops to support the Tombalbye government should the need arise.  Note 
de la direction des Affaires Africaines et Malgaches: Intervention au Tchad, Sept. 2, 1968.  
Documents Diplomatiques Français 1968 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2010), 345.  
French forces intervened to help combat a rebellion against Tombalbye’s regime in Northern 
Chad in September 1968.  Note de la direction des affaires Africaines et Malgaches: Intervention 
française au Tibesti, Sept. 10, 1968.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1968 Tome II (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 2010), 400-1.  This was despite Tombalbye’s “attitude hostile” towards 
France, according to Jacques Foccart.  Jacques Foccart, Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philippe 
Gaillard, 292-3. 
1225 Le Général de Gaulle, Président de la République française au Lieutenant-Colonel Alley, 
Président de la République du Dahomey, Feb. 2, 1968.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1968 
Tome I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2009), 218.  De Gaulle’s recognition of Alley came just 
months after France had reaffirmed its support for Soglo.  Note de la direction des affaires 
Africaines et Malgaches : Voyage officiel du général Soglo en France, Nov. 15, 1967.  
Documents Diplomatiques Français 1967 Tome II (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 2008), 617-25.  
This included a heartfelt toast by De Gaulle on November 21 at a state dinner in honor of Soglo.  
Toast adressé à S.E.M. C.H. Soglo, Président de la République du Dahomey, Nov. 21, 1967.  
Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vers le terme : Janvier 1966 – Avril 1969 (Paris : 
Plon, 1970), 224-6. 
1226 M. Schaffhauser, Chargé d’Affaires de France A.I. à Dakar, à M. Debré, Ministre des Affaires 
Étrangères, Nov. 20, 1968.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1968 Tome II (Paris : Imprimerie 
Nationale, 2010), 858-9. 
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a different level from its strategic and economic interests.  It maintains close 
relations with [African leaders] and will maintain a presence in Francophone 




 Unlike his predecessor regime in the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle’s eventual fall 
from power had little to do with events beyond the métropole.  Initially, it seemed that he 
would survive the immediate aftermath of the student riots and his disastrous retreat to 
Germany to meet with General Massu.  His dissolution of the National Assembly in 
1968, followed by an election that June, led to overwhelming gains for his party.  But the 
events of May 1968 had nevertheless delivered a mortal wound from which de Gaulle 
would never fully recover.  The following year, he announced plans for a referendum to 
significantly restructure how the government operated, including an overhaul of the 
Senate.  Staking his political power on the outcome, de Gaulle promised to resign if the 
referendum failed.  Despite victory for his party a year earlier, the referendum was 
narrowly defeated, losing by a margin of five percentage points.  On April 28, 1969, de 
Gaulle kept his promise, resigning the presidency and retiring to his estate in the small 
village of Colombey Deux-Eglises.  He would be dead by the following year. 
 But de Gaulle’s legacy in Africa would endure long after his death.  With the 
election of de Gaulle’s Prime Minister Georges Pompidou to the presidency, continuity in 
Africa policy was ensured.  Pompidou made certain to keep de Gaulle’s greatest asset in 
                                                 
1227 Note : Vues françaises et britanniques sur la situation de l’Afrique à la fin de 1967, Nov. 18, 
1967.  Documents Diplomatiques Français 1967 Tome II (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 2008), 
640-1.  “Le caractère des pays francophones ne permet pas à l’ancienne métropole d’avoir des 
intérêts économiques en Afrique égalant ceux de la Grande-Bretagne... Mais l’intérêt politique 
que la France conserve dans les pays africains et malgache est sans commune mesure avec ses 
intérêts stratégiques et économiques.  Il tient aux liens étroits les hommes et subsistera 
vraisemblablement dans les capitales francophones, quel que soit leur régime.”   
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Africa policy, Jacques Foccart, at the head of the Africa cell in the Elysée Palace.   
Pompidou and all of his successor executives in the Fifth Republic would continue to 
cultivate and nourish relationships with Francophone African leaders, just as the de 
Gaulle administration had done.  This policy would continue for the next twenty five 
years, with little introspection in French government circles concerning its impact on 
African political development.  But when France provided support to a genocidal regime 
in east Africa that murdered almost a million people, the depths of French African policy 




Conclusion – The French Colonial Illusion and the Road to Rwanda 
... we have saved tens of thousands of people, poor people, who have already 
endured much suffering. 
 
-Address to the French nation by President François Mitterrand, July 14,  
1994, after the killing of at least 800,000 people by the previously French- 
backed Hutu regime in Rwanda.1228 
 
For more than six decades after the invasion of France by the Nazis, French 
leaders conveniently avoided a fundamental reality.  World War II permanently ended 
France’s status as a first-rate world power, despite heroic efforts by Charles de Gaulle 
and the Resistance to overthrow Vichy and rally France to the Allied cause.  She would 
no longer be treated as such within the international community, given the spread of 
American and Soviet hegemony.  Yet French politicians and colonial administrators 
continued to act as if France still had a preeminent role to play in the postwar era.  As this 
dissertation has argued, what enabled their naïveté was the preservation of a vast empire, 
spanning one-third of Africa and significant parts of Southeast Asia.  For de Gaulle and 
other leaders from the postwar Provisional Government and Fourth Republic, the empire 
was the object of considerable French pride.  It was both a link to France’s past and a 
promise of France’s return to its former position of power and influence. Consequently, 
the empire soon became the linchpin of French foreign policy.   
In 1940, sub-Saharan Africa had been just one part of that empire – and was 
arguably the least important.  But the events of the war, and the rapidly changing postwar 
atmosphere, would eventually elevate sub-Saharan Africa to a principal role in French 
foreign affairs.  In recent years, historians have increasingly focused on how Africans 
                                                 
1228 “Génocide rwandais: ce que savait l'Elysée,” Le Monde, July 2, 2007.   “Nous avons sauvé 




asserted themselves into this dynamic, and forced French leaders to recognize their 
political rights and human dignity.  This contribution remains important, but as I have 
argued in this dissertation, international events, largely beyond France’s control, also 
greatly influenced this process whereby French and African paths became more closely 
intertwined.  From 1940 to 1962, French leaders faced an international situation that was 
increasingly hostile to France’s preservation of its traditional empire.  This hostility 
manifested in a number of ways, including the spread of American idealism, the 
interference of the United Nations in France’s territories, the rise of third world 
anticolonial movements, and eventually, the outbreak of revolution in French colonies.  
As demonstrated by numerous public statements and confidential government 
memoranda, presented with these challenges, French leaders searched for new ways to 
consolidate French standing in the world and uphold the notion of an “eternal France” 
capable of maintaining its independence in the face of a growing Cold War.   
This notion would prove to be stubbornly resilient, as evidenced by the tragic 
decision to fight colonial wars in Algeria and Vietnam.  The case of postwar Britain 
serves as a useful comparison.  In June 1947, exhausted by the war and increasingly 
focused on the domestic front, Britain agreed to the Indian Independence Act, essentially 
relinquishing one cornerstone of British foreign power.  To be sure, this was not done 
magnanimously; the political strength and moral appeal of the Indian independence 
movements had gradually forced Britain to realize the folly of trying to preserve its 
empire on the subcontinent.  But it is important to note that, faced with reality, Britain did 
eventually leave.  In contrast, French leaders spent more than a decade attempting to hold 
on to the empire at all costs.  Not even the loss of the empire’s most vital territories – 
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Vietnam in 1954 and Algeria in 1962 – could undercut the core belief that a fundamental 
part of France’s future would be determined overseas.  To the contrary, the loss of these 
two territories mandated an even closer relationship with Francophone Africa.  By 1962, 
that region was indispensable.  After the fall of Algeria, French leaders vowed to draw 
the line at sub-Saharan Africa.  No foreign power – not the Soviet Union, not Britain, not 
the United States – could be allowed to interfere with France’s exclusive role on the 
continent.  Consequently, all remaining vestiges of the civilizing mission were gradually 
abandoned, in favor of a policy of power politics determined to preserve French influence 
in Africa at any cost.   
What is striking about French leaders examined in this dissertation is the relative 
congruence between their public statements about Africa, and their private reflections, 
apparent in government memos and correspondence.  From Vichy to the Free French, 
from postwar Gaullists to French Socialists, from France under occupation to the 
governments of the Fourth and Fifth Republics, a consensus persisted in the French 
foreign policy establishment that France was entitled to determine Africa’s future, and 
that its role had to be defended on all fronts – especially from Anglo-Saxon intrigues.1229  
To be sure, a certain level of cynicism crept into this belief system; by the 1960s, the de 
Gaulle regime had privately abandoned the ideals of the civilizing mission in favor of a 
simple conservation of French power.  But a core idea persevered – namely, that a French 
future without Africa was unimaginable.  Before World War II, the continued French 
presence in Africa was often justified through France’s importance to the continent’s 
                                                 
1229 Of course, this dissertation has largely focused on those holding political power within the 
colonial and foreign policy establishments.  The Parti Communiste Française, which had little 
influence over the relevant ministries, is exempt from this analysis.  With some exceptions, it 
took a generally anticolonial stance during this period. 
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political and economic development.  Gradually, as the postwar era unfolded, the 
situation was reversed – it was now sub-Saharan Africa that held the key to the 
preservation of French power and influence.  As I have argued in this dissertation, this 
mentality began to develop from the insecurity borne out of the tragedy of 1940, and can 
be readily identified in the colonial ideology of numerous postwar French leaders, 
including de Gaulle, René Pleven, Pierre Mendès France, and François Mitterrand. 
In his seminal work, François Furet famously referred to the end of support for 
communism in Europe as “the passing of an illusion.”1230  The intellectual strength of 
communism, he argued, was derived from the ideal of egalitarianism inherent in its 
founding, as well as the contributions of the Soviet Union in defeating Nazi Germany.  In 
this sense, communism was a backward-looking idea, which could only last so long as its 
realities lagged behind the powerful memories of its followers.  This illusion was 
shattered in 1989, when virtually all of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe fell.  
Yet France’s own inflated illusions of international power and entitlement in Africa 
strangely endured long after the fall of communism.  Further, unlike communism, the 
French colonial illusion lacked an idealized history to draw from.  By the 1950s, 
colonialism had already been discredited throughout the international community.  And 
despite Africa’s contributions to rallying the empire to the Resistance, postwar France 
could not claim the prestige of war victory, as Stalin and his followers did. 
Nevertheless, the French colonial project in Africa persisted long after 
decolonization, outliving many of the regimes that had attempted to curb France’s 
interference with the continent’s development.  An authoritative treatment of French 
                                                 
1230 François Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, 
trans. Deborah Furet (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
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involvement in Africa after de Gaulle’s presidency, using state archives, is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation and has yet to be written.  But two examples are illustrative of 
France’s relationships with African leaders during the 1970s and 1980s – President 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s dealings with Jean Bédel Bokassa of the Central African 
Republic, and Mitterrand’s continued support for the repressive rule of Mobutu Sese 
Seko in Zaire.1231  After de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969, Bokassa continued to rule the 
Central African Republic with an iron fist, murdering ministers who disagreed with his 
policies and using the army to massacre civilians who protested his regime.  Yet despite 
clear indications of the Bokassa regime’s brutality, the Giscard regime supported him.  
Most scandalous was Giscard’s agreement to pay for Bokassa’s lavish coronation 
ceremony in 1977 as “emperor” of the Central African Republic, which according to 
Martin Meredith, cost $22 million and involved a close reproduction of the coronation of 
Napoleon almost two hundred years earlier.1232  France’s support for the ceremony was 
most likely due to Bokassa’s continued loyalty to his country’s former colonial master, 
but there were also whispers about Bokassa’s gift of diamonds to Giscard.1233  While the 
French helped overthrow him in 1979, they did so only after a highly publicized massacre 
of children in Bangui, at a point when they were “no longer able to stand the 
embarrassment” of Bokassa’s violence and corruption.1234  Essentially, until Bokassa 
became uncontrollable, the French government was perfectly willing to support him. 
                                                 
1231 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2006), 224-30 and 524-5. 
1232 Ibid., 228. 
1233 Sandra Burton, “A Campaign Catches Fire,” TIME Magazine, March 30, 1981, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,922507-2,00.html. 
1234 Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 230. 
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This same approach marked France’s relationship with Zaire’s Mobutu Sese 
Seko, who, as already noted, had been supported by de Gaulle despite continued violence 
and corruption.  By the Mitterrand years, the full depravity of French policy in then-Zaire 
was fully apparent.  As detailed by Michela Wrong, Mobutu engaged in a series of 
crackdowns that had virtually eliminated all political opposition in his country, 
constructed a cult of personality through the Zairian state, and robbed the government’s 
treasury dry through lavish shopping sprees and payoffs to his political supporters.1235  To 
be fair, France was not the only western country that supported Mobutu during this 
period; the United States and Belgium also saw him as a key ally in the region.1236  But 
France’s support was of particular importance.  Mobutu was given a Concorde jet which 
he used to make numerous diplomatic and pleasure trips to Paris,1237 and Mitterrand did 
not hesitate to send French paratroopers to Zaire to help Mobutu quell civil protest in the 
early 1990s.1238  In exchange for France’s support, Mobutu provided his personal loyalty 
and continued access for French businesses in Zaire.1239  As Martin Meredith notes, when 
Mobutu’s regime began to fall in 1997 during the First Congo War, France went so far as 
to recruit and send hundreds of Serbian paramilitaries, many of whom had committed war 
crimes during the Balkan wars, to protect Mobutu.1240  Like other postcolonial African 
heads of state, Mobutu was a valuable ally so long as he maintained power and facilitated 
French political and economic influence in his country. 
                                                 
1235 See Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in 
Mobutu’s Congo (New York: Perennial, 2002). 
1236 Ibid., 202-4. 
1237 Howard W. French, “Mobutu Sese-Seko, 66, Longtime Dictator of Zaire,” New York Times, 
Sept. 8, 1997, http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/090897obit-mobutu.html. 
1238 Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz, 203. 
1239 Ibid.  
1240 Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 535. 
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The cases of Bokassa and Mobutu are just two examples of how the illusion of 
French entitlement and power subverted African political and economic development.  It 
would take a genocide to undermine these illusions and finally raise questions about the 
propriety of France’s African adventures.  On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan 
President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot 
down over Kigali, the capital of Rwanda.  Habyarimana, a Hutu, had brokered a cease-
fire with minority Tutsi leader Paul Kagame the previous year, purportedly bringing an 
end to ethnic conflict that had lasted since Rwanda’s independence from Belgium.1241  
But with the death of Habyarimana, the cease-fire crumbled, and radical Hutu elements 
quickly took control of the country.  Just hours after the assassination, Hutu militias 
began rounding up and massacring ethnic Tutsis, first in Kigali, and then throughout 
Rwanda’s countryside.  They also murdered Belgian peacekeepers assigned to monitor 
the cease-fire in the capital, eventually leading to the pullout of the vast majority of UN 
forces.  Within a week, virtually all foreign diplomatic personnel had been evacuated 
from the country – thus enabling the Hutu regime to continue the grisly killings at an 
alarming rate.  By the end of the month, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
estimated that 300,000 people had been massacred, often by their own friends and 
neighbors wielding machetes.  The killing continued for a hundred days, ending only 
when Kagame’s forces, previously exiled in neighboring Uganda, invaded the country 
and deposed the regime.  The final toll was devastating – between 800,000 and a million 
                                                 
1241 The United Nations-backed Arusha Accords, signed in 1993, were intended to reduce the 
tensions between the Hutu government and the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front and eventually 
result in a power-sharing arrangement between the two sides.  For an account of the UN mission 
in Rwanda, see Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in 
Rwanda (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004), 53-5. 
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Rwandans died during the genocide, with hundreds of thousands more surviving terrible 
injuries at the hands of Hutu militias.   
In the past 17 years, France’s involvement in the Rwandan genocide has been 
well-documented.  As these studies have shown, France provided vital military and 
political support to the Hutu regime during the 1990s, helped train some of the 
interahamwe militias that carried out massacres throughout Rwanda in 1994, and 
shielded high-level Hutu figures from prosecution, most notably radical Hutu Madame 
Agathe Habyarimana, the widow of the assassinated President Habyarimana.1242  For its 
part, the present Rwandan government has leveled numerous accusations against France 
for its involvement.  On August 5, 2008 it released a report that included allegations 
about French participation in political assassinations, rapes of Tutsi women, and active 
assistance to Hutu genocidaires as they escaped the advancing Tutsi armies in the final 
days of the genocide.1243  In addition, the report named several former high-ranking 
French officials as bearing responsibility for these actions, including former Prime 
                                                 
1242 See Daniela Kroslak, The French Betrayal of Rwanda (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2008); Oliver Wallis, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the 
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Rwanda under international law, see Paul Schmitt, “The Future of Genocide Suits at the 
International Court of Justice: France’s Role in Rwanda and Implications of the Bosnia v. Serbia 
Decision”, Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 (Winter 2009): 585-623. 
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Minister Alain Juppé, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin, and 
most notably, former President François Mitterrand. 
 Mitterrand, who had reinvented himself yet again as a socialist, was elected to the 
presidency in 1981 after promising to break from some of the policies of the center-right 
Gaullists, who had held the post for 23 years.  In terms of domestic policy, Mitterrand 
generally kept his word, starting with the nationalization of several industries shortly 
after he assumed the presidency, and the passage of expansive social legislation.  
However, this shift from the Gaullist past did not include a change in France’s policies in 
Africa.  Like de Gaulle before him, Mitterrand viewed French influence in Africa as a 
means to counterbalance the gravitation of nations toward American or Soviet influence.  
When the Cold War ended, he worried that the United States and Britain would be less 
willing to respect France’s sphere of influence on the continent.  Therefore, in his second 
presidential term, Mitterrand initiated a renewed focus on the continent, with Rwanda as 
a crucial component of this policy.  His point man in the country was his son, Jean-
Christophe, who was vital in arranging arms deals and providing vital military advice and 
assistance to president Habyarimana.1244    Four years prior to the genocide, France 
supported the Hutu regime through a military intervention (Operation Noirot), during 
which Mitterrand sent 600 paratroopers to Rwanda.  The mission was ostensibly to 
protect French citizens during the civil war between Hutu forces and the Tutsi Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF), which was led by Paul Kagame and backed by Ugandan leader 
Yoweri Museveni.  In reality, the French operation developed into a closely linked 
                                                 
1244 Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families, 
104.  In 2009, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand was sentenced to two years in prison for his role in the 
“Angola-gate” affair, which involved the illegal sale of arms to Angola during a civil war in the 
1990s.   
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relationship between French and Rwanda military units, with French troops helping the 
Hutus put down the rebellion.1245 
When the genocide began in April 1994, elites in both the French executive 
branch and the military had little desire to see their clients lose power in post-conflict 
Rwanda.  As the Hutus were carrying out a relentless slaughter against the Tutsis, leaders 
in Paris attempted to confuse the issue, with Francois Mitterrand and others implying that 
both sides were carrying out significant acts of genocide.1246  This pattern of obfuscating 
the events of the genocide continued after the Hutu regime was defeated.  French officials 
soon propagated what Oliver Wallis refers to as a “double genocide myth” which stated 
that large groups of Hutus and Tutsis were both guilty of large scale acts of genocide 
against each other.1247   
Even when the full implications of the genocide began to dawn on him, 
Mitterrand refused to reverse course.  By mid-June 1994, he had concluded that the 
radical Hutu regime was led by a “bunch of killers” who he could no longer support 
                                                 
1245 Wallis, Silent Accomplice, 38-9. 
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Wallis, Silent Accomplice. 
1247 Wallis, Silent Accomplice, 186-7.  Former Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin 
propagated this line as recently as 2003, when he referred to the events in 1994 as the “Rwandan 
genocides.”  Ibid.  Oliver Lanotte has detailed the double game that France played in Rwanda in 
the early weeks of the genocide: 
Tout en se disant “consterné par l’ampleur de la violence”, le gouvernement 
français estime que « le rôle de la France n’est pas de rétablir l’ordre par ses 
soldats sur l’ensemble du continent africain ».  Malgré les demandes répètes des 
pays du « pré carré » qui redoutent les effets contagieux d’une déstabilisation 
venue de l’extérieur, la France refuse d’intervenir…Parallèlement à cette 
politique d’abandon, il apparait que l’Elysée et certain réseaux ont favorisé une 
« politique des mains sales » ayant consisté à maintenir discrètement une 
coopération militaire aves les FAR [the Rwandan government forces]. 
Olivier Lanotte, La France au Rwanda: entre abstention impossible et engagement ambivalent 
(Brussels: Peter Lang, 2007), 343-4. 
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because “there had been a genocide.”1248  Nevertheless, he preferred to keep the Hutus in 
power because it “was the democratic thing to do.”1249  Later in the summer, as the 
international community urged the UN Security Council to take action, France launched 
Operation Turquoise, whose mission was allegedly to stop the killing in Rwanda by 
establishing safe zones for Tutsis.  In reality, the mission enabled many of the 
perpetrators to escape into present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo.  Unwilling to 
face up to France’s responsibility, Mitterrand went on French television on the evening of 
July 14, ludicrously proclaiming that, through Operation Turquoise, “we have saved tens 
of thousands of people, poor people, who have already endured much suffering.”1250 
As with so many African dictatorships supported by the de Gaulle regime, 
France’s motive in Rwanda seems to have been to maintain its political influence in the 
region by upholding the existing regime as long as possible.  But until 1994, the 
ramifications of this policy had never been so cruel or murderous.  How did it come to 
this?  Fifty years earlier at Brazzaville, French colonial administrators had promised a 
renewed relationship with Africa based on a greater respect for the wishes of France’s 
subjects on the continent.  To be sure, as this dissertation has argued, many of these 
promises were more rhetoric than reality.  But no justification for the involvement in the 
Rwandan genocide could, on its surface, have anything in common with avowed French 
colonial ideology during the Third and Fourth Republics.  As Alice Conklin has noted, 
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Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 
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the French presence in Africa had originally been infused with the notion of the civilizing 
mission, which encompassed 
 ...an emancipatory and universalistic impulse that resisted tyranny; an ideal of 
self-help and mutualism that included a sanctioning of state assistance to the 
indigent when necessary; anticlericalism, and its attendant faith in reason, science, 
and progress; an ardent patriotism founded on the creation of a loyal, disciplined 
and enlightened citizenry; and a strong respect for the individual, private property, 
and morality.1251 
 
Of course, as has already been discussed, these ideals often did not correspond to actual 
policies followed by the French administration in Africa during the colonial era.  Yet this 
was still a far cry from complicity in a genocide that killed hundreds of thousands of 
people.   
The origins of French support for the Hutu regime can be traced to a few key 
themes addressed in this dissertation, all of which are vital in understanding France’s 
need to maintain its influence in Africa after decolonization.  First, as a Francophone 
nation, Rwanda was seen as part of France’s zone of influence on the continent.  
Although it had not been a French colony, Rwanda was considered part of the larger 
community of Francophonie, which linked French-speaking nations together through a 
common history and culture.  Consequently, along with former French colonies in sub-
Saharan Africa, Rwanda was viewed by French leaders as under France’s exclusive 
purview.  This notion was the outgrowth of previous conceptions of French territorial 
integrity and sovereignty in Africa during the colonial age.  During World War II, both 
the Vichy and Free French administrations zealously guarded against all foreign 
encroachment in their African territories.  Fear of such encroachment also marked the 
ministries of the Fourth Republic, which struggled to maintain control over French Africa 
                                                 
1251 Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West 
Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 7-8. 
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in the face of anticolonial sentiment emanating from the United States and the United 
Nations.   
Second, the French involvement with the Hutu regime was a vital part of 
maintaining French standing throughout the world.  In the postcolonial era, France’s 
close relationships with African leaders were a testament to its continued relevancy 
within the international community. Although various French administrations from 1940 
to 1969 acted under different international constraints, they all recognized that a special 
relationship with Africa was necessary to sustain French power.  The importance of 
Africa to France’s future developed largely from France’s postwar international situation.  
When France lost its colonies in Vietnam and Algeria, the role of sub-Saharan Africa in 
France’s future grew exponentially.  As the cases of Rwanda and so many other 
postcolonial African nations demonstrate, French leaders were willing to do virtually 
anything to maintain Francophone sub-Saharan Africa within the French orbit, including 
supporting dictators, ignoring traditional French values, and in Rwanda, providing 
support to a genocidal regime.  Only through such cynical policies could France preserve 
one of its most valuable bargaining chips in the game of international power, and 
demonstrate its continued relevance in the face of the United States and the Soviet Union.  
 Finally, the French involvement in Rwanda demonstrates the deep-rooted fear that 
“Anglo-Saxon” interests were conspiring to undermine, and possibly terminate, the 
French presence in Africa.  To this end, excerpts from the French presidential archives, 
published by Le Monde in 2007, provide some insight into the Mitterrand regime’s 
mentality during the fateful spring and summer of 1994.  French leaders viewed Paul 
Kagame – who had been trained by the American military at Fort Leavenworth and was 
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supported by American and British ally Yoweri Museveni of Uganda – as an Anglo-
Saxon stooge capable of undermining French power in east and central Africa.1252  As I 
have demonstrated, suspicions of the Anglo-Saxon powers – first Britain, and eventually 
the United States – were shared by French regimes from across the political spectrum, 
ranging from Vichy to the de Gaulle presidency.  While France maintained an alliance 
with Britain and the U.S. during the Cold War, for French officials, the threat of Anglo-
Saxon interference loomed constantly over all of its dealings in Africa. 
This fear of Anglo-Saxon encroachment overrode all other imperatives in 
Rwanda.  In January 1993, based on information he had received from informants, the 
French ambassador to Rwanda warned that the Hutus were already planning to commit 
genocide, with Habyarimana himself telling his subordinates “to carry out a systematic 
genocide using, if necessary, the assistance of the army and the involvement of local 
people in the killing.”1253  Nevertheless, French leaders continued to focus on the threat 
of Kagame’s troops to French influence in the region.  That February, French diplomat 
Bruno Delaye warned in an internal memo that Kagame’s RPF forces were “capable of 
taking Kigali” thanks in part to the “complicity of the Anglo-Saxon world.”1254  The 
                                                 
1252 Wallis, Silent Accomplice, 108-9.  To be certain, there has been significant debate in recent 
years about the merits of the Kagame regime, both regarding the nature of its governance of 
Rwanda, and Kagame’s role in the Congo Wars of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries.  An evaluation of the Kagame regime is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but great 
insight has been provided by Jason Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of 
the Congo and the Great War of Africa (New York: Public Affairs, 2011); Gerard Prunier, 
Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
1253 “Génocide rwandais: ce que savait l'Elysée,” Le Monde, July 2, 2007.   “Le président 
rwandais aurait lui-même donné le signal de départ de massacres après une réunion avec ses 
collaborateurs. Il aurait intimé "l'ordre de procéder à un génocide systématique en utilisant, si 
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1254 Ibid.  “Dans une note du 15 février 1993, le conseiller Afrique de l'Elysée s'alarme du fait que 
le FPR est "en mesure de prendre Kigali", bénéficiant entre autres de la "complicité bienveillante 
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following year, a full month into the genocide, General Christian Quesnot, serving as 
Mitterrand’s chief of military staff, continued to warn the president of the implications of 
a victory by Kagame’s forces in the civil war.  “President Museveni and his allies have 
established a Tutsiland with the Anglo-Saxon aid and the complicity of our false 
intellectuals,” Quesnot warned.1255  In order to emphasize the danger posed by Kagame, 
Quesnot began referring to the RPF as “Khmers Noirs” (Black Khmers) – an allusion to 
the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.1256 
Of course, this fear of Anglo-Saxon encroachment was a manifestation of the 
aforementioned imperative to preserve French influence in Africa at all costs.  In this 
sense, the Mitterrand regime’s involvement in Rwanda was a predictable continuation of 
policies followed by France after decolonization, whereby the maintenance of French 
power took precedent over enabling economic and political development in France’s 
colonies.  In chapter six, I argued that France’s support of African dictators began during 
the de Gaulle regime.  These policies continued with his successors Georges Pompidou, 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterrand, and Jacques Chirac.  Indeed, until very recently, 
France continued to intervene in African conflicts, including Côte d’Ivoire in 2004, Chad 
in 2006, and the Central African Republic in 2007.   
 All of the aforementioned examples demonstrate the underlying problem that 
French leaders had during the latter half of the twentieth century in managing the decline 
of French power within the international community.  At the mercy of events largely 
                                                                                                                                                 
du monde anglo-saxon" et d'un "excellent système de propagande qui s'appuie sur les exactions 
malheureuses commises par les extrémistes hutus" 
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beyond their control French leaders struggled to preserve a vision of the French nation 
state which stood in stark contrast to the reality faced by postwar France.  In recent years, 
much has been written about how postwar societies have been affected by the difficult 
process of integrating painful memories into contemporary notions of national 
identity.1257  As Henry Rousso has argued, postwar France dealt with the trauma of the 
Vichy past largely by relegating the guilt of collaboration to a few select actors.1258  But 
collaboration with the Nazis and participation in the Holocaust were not the only 
inconvenient truths from the war era.  The loss of French influence and prestige – de 
Gaulle’s notion of grandeur – was an almost unavoidable reality, given the invasion by 
the Nazis, the shameful actions of the Vichy regime, and the exclusion of Free French 
leaders from most of Allied conferences addressing postwar issues.  Yet insecurity and 
sense of loss had the opposite effect.  French leaders believed that embracing this reality 
would be disastrous; instead, preserving the remnants of the French empire was the 
foremost concern.  By 1969, the idea of French influence in Africa had become so 
imperative as to supersede any previous notions of progress and development.   
The road from the 1944 Brazzaville Conference, which raised hopes about 
France’s devotion to a new era in Africa, to France’s refusal to intervene and stop 
genocide in Rwanda fifty years later, was a long and winding one, full of contingencies 
and alternative outcomes.  France’s involvement in Rwanda was certainly not the 
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political culture of postwar West and East Germany, see Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi 
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fractured memory of the Hirohito regime’s crimes has been addressed by John Dower, Embracing 
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inevitable outcome of France’s colonial illusion of the postwar era.  Yet, as the arguments 
and evidence in this dissertation have indicated, it was one of the possible outcomes of a 
French policy that confidently asserted itself in Africa throughout the postwar and 
postcolonial periods.  Although reflection on this period of French history has already 
begun in France, perhaps this dissertation can contribute to that ongoing conversation, 
and shed light on how well-meaning ideals are easily subverted by states’ fundamental 
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